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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Philip II, the man who conquered the Greek world and initiated a new age in the 
history of the Mediterranean, remains something of a mystery despite the breadth and 
variety of source material concerning his life.   Indeed, in some ways the plethora of 
sources has complicated rather than clarified assessments of Philip.  The ancients 
themselves came to widely differing conclusions in attempting to understand what kind 
of a man could take Macedonia from a backwater kingdom to the verge of being the most 
powerful nation in the known world.  Modern scholarship has largely followed suit.  
Assessments of Philip’s character and abilities have ranged from claims that he was the 
greatest king of Europe to comparisons with Hitler.1  Evaluations of his historical 
importance in relation to his more famous – but perhaps no more singular or brilliant – 
son Alexander have only exacerbated the problem.2   
                                                        
1 The former was the assessment of Diodorus Siculus; Diod. 16.95.1; a more measured but in principle 
similar conclusion was recently reached by Worthington: see Ian Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008): 187-203 and Nicholas G. L. Hammond, Philip of Macedon 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994): 188-91.  On Philip as Hilter (or perhaps more properly 
on Hilter as Philip) see A. M. Adam, “Philip alias Hitler,” Greece & Rome 10 (1941).  That paper was only 
written in 1941; it is by no means, however, alone in seeing parallels between the two: see John Buckler 
and Hans Beck, Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century B.C. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008): 253.  The question of Philip’s motives in his dealings with Greece 
have largely centered around his sincerity in negotiating peace with Athens in 346 BCE, which has been 
portrayed as either a sincere attempt to establish peace or a backhanded way of assuring Athens’ 
unreadiness for Philip’s incursion into central Greece.  See for example T. T. B. Ryder, “The Diplomatic 
Skills of Philipp II,” in Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honour of N. G. L. Hammond, ed. Ian 
Worthington (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) and M. M. Markle, “The Strategy of Philip in 346 B.C.,” 
Classical Quarterly 24 (1974).     
2 So for example Worthington, Philip II, 203: “Philip was a charismatic leader whose merits far outweighed 
his faults, though the latter were plentiful… he deserves to live beyond the shadow of his more famous 
son.”   
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This study turns away from the traditional questions posed by biographers of 
Philip and historians of late 4th century Macedonia.3 I focus instead to the responses 
elicited by Philip’s unprecedented career in the Athenian world, the same impressions 
from which our own interpretations of Philip are largely derived.  I examine these 
responses as the product of a complex interaction between culturally-loaded symbolic 
categories and historical reality.  For Philip -  Macedonian but also Hellenic; king but 
also member of the Amphictyony;  political outsider but also conqueror of Greece – was, 
above all, an individual who broke culturally-assigned identity categories.4  How then did 
Philip fit – or not - into the Greek, and specifically Athenian, cognitive framework?  
How, in short, did Athenians understand Philip’s rise to power?   
The study of the political response to Philip’s rise is made possible, but also 
inevitably delimited by, the source material available.  The late 4th century is rich with 
evidence for the Athenian political discourse concerning Philip’s Macedonia.  It includes 
speeches delivered by Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Hyperides as well as Isocrates’ and 
Speusippus’ pamphlets and letters.  The variety of approaches the orators employed in 
discussing Macedonian policy allows us to develop a coherent picture of the political and 
                                                        
3 For biographies of Philip see most recently Worthington, Philip II; also Hammond, Philip of Macedon; 
Gerhard Wirth, Philipp II (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1985); G. Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon (London: Faber 
& Faber, 1978); J. R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London: Thames & Hudson, 1976); 
Paul Cloché, Un Fondateur d’empire: Philippe II, roi de Macédoine (Saint Étienne: Éditions Dumas, 
1955); A. Momigliano, Filippo il Macedone (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1934). 
4 On the construction of Greek identity against the image of a barbarian “Other” see especially Lynette 
Mitchell, Panhellenism and the Barbarian in Archaic and Classical Greece (Swansea: Classical Press of 
Wales, 2007); Thomas Harrison, ed., Greeks and Barbarians (New York: Routledge, 2002); Jonathan Hall, 
Hellenicity. Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Irad Malkin, ed., 
Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Jonathan Hall, 
Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Pericles Georges, 
Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience. From the Archaic Age to the Age of Xenophon (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press: 1994); Jacqueline de Romilly, “Les Barbares dans la Pensée de la Grèce 
Classique,” Phoenix 47 (1993): 283-292; Edith Hall, Inventing the Barbarian. Greek Self-Definition 
through Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); François Hartog, The Mirror of Herodotus. The 
Representation of the Other in the Writing of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).  
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sociological framework within which the ‘problem’ of Philip was addressed.  Notably, 
both a popular view – as articulated in the speeches of Demosthenes, Aeschines, and 
Hyperides, all delivered before a popular audience – and an elite view - as articulated by 
Isocrates and Speusippus – are represented.  I will show that the popular and the elite 
views of Philip had much in common in terms of the rhetorical resources upon which 
they drew; what primarily separated their views of Philip’s rise was their approach to 
national versus panhellenic ideals.  The public orators spoke to a body of Athenians, and 
thus their rhetorical framework was Athenian; the philosophers, on the other hand, 
addressed themselves to a panhellenic audience and therefore preferred to emphasize the 
shared elite values of the Hellenic aristocracy, whose close personal ties had never quite 
been subsumed by local political loyalties.5  At the same time, all these individuals are 
Athenians (and, of course, they are all necessarily male Athenians of citizen age) and thus 
reflect an Athenian viewpoint even when articulating a larger, panhellenic agenda.   
This study focuses on the Athenian perspective on Philip.  Because of this 
admittedly self-imposed limitation, I have not dealt in depth with Theopompus’ 
Philippica, even though his account is central to Philippic studies in general.6  As a Chian 
who seems to have had no love lost for Athens, Theopompus’ impressions stand quite 
apart from Athenian discourse.  I have, however, noted Theopompus’ scathing 
eyewitness report of Philip’s character and habits in some instances where it dovetails 
with the portrait of Philip presented by Demosthenes.  Such parallels hint that some 
Athenian responses to Philip would have found agreement among other, non-Athenian                                                         
5 See especially Hall, Hellenicity, ch. 6 on the interplay between Hellenic and national identities and elite 
international relations; notably, Hall argues that suspisions of Medizing were aimed at the Greek elite 
rather than the Persian Other.  
6 On Theopompus see Michael Flower, Theopompus of Chios: History and Rhetoric in the Fourth Century 
BC (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
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voices of the Hellenic world; indeed, I will also argue that Isocrates’ portrayal of Philip 
was meant to appeal to a wider Hellenic audience.  Considering such parallels would 
form a natural continuation of my project, though it is unfortunately outside of its current 
scope. Inasmuch as one of my main goals here is to look at the nature of Athenian 
political discourse via interpretations of Philip’s character, Theopompus will play only a 
minor role in the following discussion.             
A central premise of my argument is that explanations of Philip’s rise to power 
are to be sought in articulations of his ἦθος.  That is, interpretations of an individual’s 
political action - in this case Philip’s - were founded on interpretations of his ‘character’, 
loosely defined as his social and cultural identity melded with his unique individuality.7  
Ethopoieia was a key component of Greek rhetoric that served not only to affect the 
emotions of the audience but also to provide a key ‘proof’ of the plot as narrated by a 
litigant.  So, for example, the gravity of Meidias’ punch – and therefore of Demosthenes’ 
suit - hinged on Meidias’ elite socio-economic standing, an identity that was associated 
with hubristic tendencies.8  Demosthenes’ reinterpretation of Meidias’ action allowed 
him to tap into widely-held Athenian fears over aristocratic behavior.  In much the same 
                                                        
7 For a history of ἦθος through Aristotle see Frédérique Woerther, “Aux Origines de la Notion Rhétorique 
d’èthos,” Revue des études grecques 118 (2005) and Eckart Schüetrumpf, “The Model for the Concept of 
Ethos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” Philologus 137 (1993).  Aristotle’s discussion of ἦθος is too limiting to be 
truly useful in this case, however, as he only deals with character as it applies to the speaker himself in an 
effort to persuade the audience: see William Fortenbaugh, “Aristotle on Persuasion through Character,” 
Rhetorica 10 (1992).  Jeremy Trevett, “Aristotle’s Knowledge of Athenian Oratory,” Classical Quarterly 
46 (1996), discusses the philosopher’s general lack of engagement with the “practical” (i.e., forensic and 
deliberative) branches of oratory. 
8 See Donald Russell, “Ethos in Oratory and Rhetoric,” in Characterization and Individuality in Greek 
Literature ed. Christopher Pelling (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990): 197-212 and A. R. Dyck, “ The 
Function and Persuasive Power of Demosthenes’ Portrait of Aeschines in the Speech On the Crown,” 
Greece and Rome 32 (1985).  On Demosthenes’ Against Meidias see Douglas McDowell, ed. And trans., 
Demosthenes: Against Meidias (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).  See also Jon Hesk, “The Rhetoric of 
Anti-rhetoric in Athenian Oratory,” in Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne, eds., Performance Culture and 
Athenian Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), concerning the susceptibility of 
professional orators to being characterized by their peers as greedy logographers or manipulative sophists. 
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way, Philip’s success and ultimate power over the Greek world demanded ethopoieic 
explanations.  By rearticulating Philip’s character through shared culturally-assigned 
categories, orators attempted to impose a particular narrative on the historical situation 
and thereby impel the Athenians to adopt a course of action fitted to that narrative.  As I 
will show, these narratives could be quite different: while Demosthenes, for example, 
presented Philip as a barbarian diametrically opposed to everything the city of Athens 
stood for, Aeschines could laud the king as a philhellene quite at home with Athenian 
social mores.   Nevertheless, each characterization of Philip, directed at Athens’ citizen 
body and articulated by statesmen competing against one another for prominence and 
prestige, should be analyzed as a (re)articulation of Athenian values.9                   
At the same time, each political speech was part of a larger, ongoing discussion 
within the Athenian political realm.  Modern political theorists have shown that once an 
issue is framed in reference to a certain value, continued deliberation tends to employ the 
same frame – and that this is true for both proponents and opponents of the issue.10  
                                                        
9 I am in fundamental agreeement with Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, 
Ideology, and the Power of the People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), that the mostly elite 
professional statesmen addressing the demos were constrained by the norms of popular rhetoric and 
ideology and with his further argument in Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of 
Popular Rule (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) that elite criticism of democracy took place for 
the most part from within an Athenian discourse and without impinging upon their basic loyalty to the city.  
On elite conformity to popular norms see also Mogens H. Hansen, The Athenian Assembly in the Age of 
Demosthenes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 85-86.  At the same time, the parallels between intellectuals 
typically characterized as elites, such as Thucydides and Isocrates, and public speakers such as 
Demosthenes, make it clear that ideas percolated between popular and elite rather than flowing either from 
the bottom up or from the top down.     
10 Framing and framing effects has been widely studied by political scientics in recent years.  See especially 
Dennis Chong and Paul Druckman, “Framing Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007); Paul 
R. Brewer and Kimberly Gross, “Framing and Citizens’ Thoughts about Policy Issues: Effects on Content 
and Quality,” Political Psychology 26 (2005); James N. Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson, “Framing and 
Deliberation: How Citizens’ Conversations Limit Elite Influence,” American Journal of Political Science 
47 (2003); James N. Druckman, “On the Limits of Framing Effects,” Journal of Politics 63 (2001); 
William A. Gamson, Talking Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  Interest in 
comparing modern and ancient discurcive norms is prominent in the work of Josiah Ober, especially 
Democracy and Knowledge. Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008).  See also Hesk, The Rhetoric of Anti-rhetoric, 201-208; Josiah Ober and Charles Hendrick, 
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Testing this hypothesis for Athenian politics is, it is true, difficult because of our lack of 
source material: even for most of the extant court cases, where we would most expect a 
directly confrontational rhetoric to emerge, we have only one side of the story; and for 
debates in the ekklesia, where presumably more than just two opinions would have been 
voiced on any given topic, we are never privy to more than a single point of view in any 
given debate.  Unfortunate as well is the fact that in the two court cases where we do 
have both sides (that concerning the embassy to Philip and that concerning Demosthenes’ 
crowning in the theater), there are discrepancies between what each side says his 
opponent is going to say - or even what each side says his opponent has said - and the 
actual content of the opposing speech.  The existence of such obvious untruths in the 
representation of others’ forensic speeches – where an orator would have the greatest 
likelihood of being caught in such a lie - have led some scholars to the conclusion that the 
speeches are entirely unreliable in their accounts of the historical and political 
atmosphere in which they were ostensibly delivered.11   
I do not believe, however, that the picture need be quite so bleak.  In the rest of 
the introduction I would like to focus on two instances where we are given some inkling 
of the orators’ method of persuasion.  The first is the newly discovered Hyperides’ 
Against Diondas, which features several startling parallels to Demosthenes’ On the 
Crown; the second is contained in Aeschines’ On the Embassy and concerns 
                                                                                                                                                                     
eds., Demokratia. A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996) and the essays in J. Peter Euben et al., eds., Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction 
of American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).       
11 See Ian Worthington, “Greek Oratory, Revision of Speeches, and the Problem of Historical Reliability,” 
Classica et Mediaevalia 42 (1991); P. Harding, “Rhetoric and Politics in fourth-century Athens,” Phoenix 
41 (1987), also argues for heavy revision of the speeches prior to their publication.  The length of some 
speeches – particularly of Demosthenes’ On the Crown, which is 324 sections long – is another argument 
used in favor of extensive revision.  See also K. J. Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1968) 167-170.  
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Demosthenes’ manipulation of the claims made by his rival Ctesiphon.  I hope to show 
that from such instances as these we can get an inkling of how the give and take of 
Athenian political debate might have actually sounded like.  While the orality of 
ekklesiastic debate has recently become a matter of increased interest, and work on the 
fora for Athenian political discussion have also increased our knowledge of the physical 
setting in which policy decisions were made, narratives within the speeches themselves 
which detail such debates have, on the whole, been underutilized.12  Such narratives, 
though they need not be taken literally, nevertheless disclose the rich texture of Athenian 
political life, in which each speech, shaped by ideology as much as by historical and 
political exigencies, became a layer in the ever-growing and ever-changing discourse at 
the heart of Athens’ democracy.13               But while consistency and accuracy were certainly not in and of themselves 
priorities for Athenian politicians, the discovery of Hyperides’ Against Diondas, which 
contains startling parallels to Demosthenes’ On the Crown, prompts a reanalysis of such 
evidence as we do have.14   Instances where the orators reflect on a prior argument and 
others in which they describe their opponents’ arguments should be studied for the                                                         
12 For discussions of the spoken nature of Athenian politics see especially Judith Tacon, “Ecclesiastic 
‘Thorubos’: Interventions, Interruptions, and Popular Involvement in the Athenian assembly,” Greece & 
Rome 48 (2001); Adriaan Lanni, “Spectator Sport or Serious Justice? οἱ περιεστηκότες and the Athenian 
Lawcourts,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 117 (1997); Edith Hall, “Lawcourt Dramas: the Power of 
Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory,” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of 
London 40 (1995); and C. Joachim Classen, “The Speeches in the Courts of Law: A Three-cornered 
Dialogue,” Rhetorica 9 (1991). On the physical settings in which orators spoke see especially Mogens 
Herman Hansen, The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) and Alan L. 
Boegehold, The Athenian Agora. Results of Excavations conducted by the American School of Classical 
Studies at Athens (Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1995). 
13 On the way orators manipulated even seemingly straightforward narratives see especially E. Badian and 
Julia Heskel, “Aeschines 2.12-18: A Study in Rhetoric and Chronology,” Phoenix 41 (1987). 
14 See for example Judson Herrman, “Hyperides’ Against Diondas and the rhetoric of revolt,” Bulletin of 
the Institute of Classical Studies 52 (2009) and S. C. Todd, “Hypereides’ Against Diondas, Demosthenes’ 
On the Crown, and the Rhetoric of Political Failure,” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 52 
(2009).  The text is available in Chris Carey et al., “Fragments of Hyperides’ Against Diondas from the 
Archimedes Palimpsest,” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 165 (2008).   
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methods by which the orators attempted to persuade, deride, confuse, and otherwise do 
what they did best: turn facts, as well as the fictions created by their peers, into useful 
weapons for themselves.  Knowledge of the rhetor’s method can also lead to an 
understanding of the kinds of arguments to which they were responding.  In the final 
analysis, orators were much more prone to using material obtained from the arguments of 
their fellows, which they could turn to their own ends, in the course of debate than in 
crafting speeches “from scratch”.  While factual accuracy was not a priority, interaction 
with the themes, arguments, and even turns of phrase employed by political allies and 
enemies was critical.  Having once arrived at this conclusion, it will become possible to 
situate descriptions of Philip in the orators within their appropriate political context.     
The case for which Hyperides composed the Against Diondas was known even 
before the discovery of the text.15  The situation bears many similarities to Aeschines’ 
prosecution of Ctesiphon.  In 338, before the battle of Chaeronea, Hyperides and 
Demomeles, Demosthenes’ cousin, jointly moved a proposal to crown Demosthenes for 
his services to the state.  Their proposal was challenged in a graphe paranomon by 
Diondas, just as later Ctesiphon’s proposal in 336 to crown Demosthenes would be 
challenged by Aeschines.  Both cases would also have years to wait before finally 
coming to trial: Diondas’ suit was probably tried in 334/3, while Aeschines’ languished 
for six years, until 330/29.16   
The Archimedes Palimpsest contains a portion of the speech Hyperides gave in 
defense of his and Demomeles’ motion to crown Demosthenes.  The extent to which the 
                                                        
15 Before the discovery of the papyrus, rather garbled evidence for the existence of the case was known 
from Dem. 18.222, [Plutarch] X Or. 848F and 846A, Eusebius Praep. Evang. 10.3.14-15 (i.564 Mras), and 
the scholia to Demosthenes 20.52. 
16 Carey et al., “Fragments of Hyperides’ Against Diondas,” 3. 
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Against Diondas prefigures arguments used by Demosthenes four years later in the 
Crown speech is remarkable.17  Following up on a suggestion of Peter Rhodes, Stephen 
Todd posits (pp. 165-166) that On the Crown was not vastly innovative in its rhetorical 
strategy, as it had been previously thought, but was rather symptomatic of a particular 
strain in Athenian political discourse – of which both Hyperides’ Against Diondas and 
Demosthenes’ On the Crown are exponents - that attempted to come to terms with the 
overwhelming defeat at Chaeronia.   
To take but a single example, one of the most well known arguments in 
Demosthenes’ crown speech claims that fortune (τύχη) was ultimately responsible for 
the failure at Chaeronea: leading, for example, to Demosthenes’ famous comparison of 
himself to a ship owner whose shipwreck was caused not by poor preparation on his part 
but by τύχη (Dem. 18.194); again, Demosthenes argues that he should not be blamed for 
the strength of a god or of τύχη, if the generals failed, or if the city was betrayed (Dem. 
18.303).   This argument from τύχη was previously seen as an innovation developed by 
Demosthenes; indeed, it has been acclaimed as part of the oratorical mastery of the 
Crown speech.18  In light of Hyperides’ Against Diondas, however, the argument from 
τύχη turns out not to be quite as innovative as had previously been supposed.19  For 
Hyperides, too, argues that Demosthenes deserves to be honored because τύχη, not bad 
policy on the part of Demosthenes, was the real reason for Athens’ defeat:                                                         
17 Todd, “Hypereides Against Diondas,” 165, comments on the frequency with which the decypherers of 
the text brought up parallels with On the Crown. 
18 For this view of Demosthenes’ On the Crown, see for example Harvey Yunis, “Politics as Literature: 
Demosthenes and the Burden of the Past,” Arion 8 (2000-2001) 104.   
19 Nevertheless, even if we now know that Demosthenes’ On the Crown was not wholy innovative in this 
respect, it certainly greatly expanded on this theme: τύχη occurs 29 times in the On the Crown, by far the 
most instances of any other known speech.  Moreover, Demosthenes - as oppose to Hyperides - also uses 
τύχη to refer to his own personal (mis)fortune: see H. Wankel, Demosthenes. Rede für Ktesiphon uber den 
Kranz (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1976) 1106 and 1174; this was evidently Demosthenes’ new twist on the 
theme. 
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δεῖ δὲ τῶν κινδύνων πάντων τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἰς 
τοὺς πράττοντας ἀναφέρειν, τὰ δ᾿ ἐκ τούτων ἀποβαίνον(τα) εἰ(ς) 
τὴν τύχην.  Διώνδας δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀξιοῖ γενέσθαι· μὴ Δημοσθένην 
τῆς προαιρέσεως ἕνεκα ἐπαινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ ἐμὲ τῆς τύχης ἕνεκα 
εὐθύν(ας) δοῦναι. 
 
Initiatives and plans ought to be credited to those who propose them, but 
their outcomes credited to fortune.  But Diondas thinks the opposite 
should happen – that Demosthenes shouldn’t be praised for his policy, but 
that I should be held to account because of the workings of fortune. (Ag. 
Dion. p. 2, 2-9)   
Other parallels in wording between Hyperides’ and Demosthenes’ speeches are equally 
striking, including the description of the Thebans welcoming the Athenians (Hyp. Ag. 
Dion. pp.1,1-6; Dem. 18.215) and the list of Greek traitors (Hyp. Ag. Dion. pp. 6,32 – 7,2 
and Dem. 18.294-296).  In sum, comparing the speeches inevitably leads to the 
conclusion that either Hyperides and Demosthenes were working closely together, or that 
the body of rhetorical topoi within which they were operating was stylized to such a high 
degree that even certain phraseology was part of its common stock – stylized enough, in 
any event, to leave them open to accusations of plagiarism by Porphyry (frag. 408 lines 
73-85).     
The argument for stylization rather than plagiarism or intensive collaboration is 
supported by the appearance of arguments from τύχη elsewhere.  So, looking further 
back, τύχη is also present in Aeschines’ defense of himself in the speech On the 
Embassy, long before the Against Diondas or the Crown speeches.  Here too Aeschines 
uses the topos to play down the orator’s influence over the outcome of a given political 
policy.  He argues that he didn’t have the power to avert the destruction of Phocis and 
Cersebleptes: rather, he states, τύχη and Philip are responsible for this, while he was 
merely responsible for his loyalty and his speech as an ambassador (Aeschin. 2.118).  The 
presence of this topos in Aeschines’ speech should alert us to the fact that the argument 
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from τύχη was a known part of a rhetor’s arsenal long before Chaeronea.20   The tension 
between originality and the use of familiar material apparent in the political speeches is, 
rather, the same as that outlined for the funeral oration by Nicole Loraux: “insofar as the 
topoi are units – necessary, but interchangeable – of civic speech, originality… has no 
other means of expression than through them.”21    Yet for all that political communication was grounded in a body of shared topoi, it 
was also the product of a specific debate occurring in a particular historical context.  To 
acknowledge that the argument from τύχη is a topos not original to a post-Chaeronean or 
Demosthenic context does not negate the particular importance it gained in that particular 
period, and for Demosthenes in particular.  For although the argument from τύχη was 
employed by Aeschines, it was not at the forefront of his argument; Aeschin. 2.118 is, in 
fact, its only appearance in that speech.  By contrast, Demosthenes made fortune’s role a 
centerpiece of his defense.  We do not have enough of Hyperides’ Against Diondas, 
unfortunately, to say how critical τύχη was to his argument.  Yet there is reason to 
believe, given the parallelism throughout the two speeches, that their shared use of τύχη 
was also more particular than the fortuitous use of a broadly shared topos would 
explain.22  What this connection between the two speeches might be is more difficult to 
define; at the very least, it can be reasonably argued that τύχη took on added importance 
and a particular meaning in the aftermath of Chaeronea for those politicians who had                                                         
20 There are similar parallels in oratory that have not gone unnoticed: those between Demosthenes’ On the 
Crown and Demosthenes’ Funeral Oration, as well as the latter speech and the Funeral Oration of 
Hyperides, for example, have been remarked on by Nicole Loraux, The Invention of Athens. the Funeral 
Oration in the Classical City trans. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) 166.  Cecil 
Wooten, “The Ambassador’s Speech. A Particularly Hellenistic Genre of Oratory,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 59 (1973), presents the similarities in the speeches of ambassadors in 4th century through Hellenistic 
times and argues on that basis that the ambassador speech was a highly stylized medium.   
21 Loraux, Invention of Athens, 311. 
22 For further parallels see Carey et al., Fragments of Hyperides’ Against Diondas, 15-19 and Todd, 
Hyperides’ Against Diondas.  
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advocated war with Macedonia.  It would have made sense for Demosthenes and 
Hyperides, as long-time political allies, to work together in crafting the best speech 
possible in a situation such as Diondas’ indictment, where a loss would have reflected 
badly on them both.  It would also have been perfectly reasonable for Demosthenes in 
336, while crafting his defense for Ctesiphon, to employ arguments that had been 
successful for Hyperides a few years previously.23  All of these factors may have been at 
work here.  We should hardly expect less from any group of political allies, who would 
have benefited from presenting a united front before the public eye.  There were always 
precedents which an orator could call up to memory to either emulate or avoid, and 
always a larger framework within which the orator was operating.  Conformity, not 
innovation, gave the speaker the greatest probably of relating to his audience in ways 
which they could readily understand on the basis of past experiences in the ekklesia.  This 
is not to say that inventiveness was not a prized quality in speechmaking, but that 
originality was checked by the need to be clearly understood.24  Any given political 
speech was part of the broader discourse that engendered it and framed the major issues 
at hand.           
Such redeployment of arguments is apparent not only between political allies like 
Hyperides and Demosthenes.  Political enemies, too, refashioned the arguments of their 
opponents to suit their narrative of events: twisting an opponent’s words is arguably a                                                         
23 Could it even be that the argument from τύχη took on a new importance in explanations of Chaeronea 
more broadly, and that in localizing it to Demosthenes and Hyperides we are again giving too much weight 
to extant sources?   
24 See Stephen Usher, Greek Oratory. Tradition and Originality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
who particularly traces the orators’ usage and innovation of topoi.  The use of rhetorical topoi might have 
also made it easier to be heard by the whole assembly: their use meant that any given assemblyman need 
not actually hear every word the rhetor said in order to understand his meaning.  For the realities of debate 
in the ekklesia see Mogens H. Hansen, The Athenian Assemby in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1987): 69-72.   
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much more powerful tool than the invention of strawmen.25   A comparison of 
Demosthenes’ and Aeschines’ speeches on the embassy of 346 and on Demosthenes’ 
crowning have sometimes uncovered such rearticulations: so, for example, Aeschines’ 
analogy of politicians as ferrymen at the Salamis crossing (Aeschin. 2.158) has been seen 
as fodder for Demosthenes’ vivid portrayal of himself as the ship-owner whose ship is 
wrecked by a storm (Aeschin. 3.194).26   But, in this case, as elsewhere, it is difficult to 
tell whether Demosthenes is alluding directly to his opponent’s argument or not: both 
images may simply derive from the oft-used “ship of state” analogy, without any more 
specific implication. We gain firmer ground in the narrative passages of Aeschines’ On 
the Embassy.  Here Aeschines portrays Demosthenes employing fancy rhetorical 
footwork to satirize the other ambassadors.  These provide some of our best evidence for 
what Athenian political debate might have been like.   
After his account of the meeting between the ambassadors and Philip, Aeschines 
recounts the ambassadors’ opinions concerning the king.  He also narrates their report of 
the meeting and their impressions of Philip to the Athenian ekklesia.27  I will consider 
Aeschines’ full account of this episode later (pp. 136-161).  Right now, only the 
comments of one ambassador in particular, Ctesiphon, need concern us.   Over the course 
of On the Embassy Aeschines will show us how Demosthenes gradually reduced 
Ctesiphon’s remarks into utter nonsense in an effort to discredit the ambassadors.  Thus 
                                                        
25 See also Hesk, Rhetoric of Anti-rhetoric, on the orators’ uses of ‘spin’.  Hesk focuses on the orators’ 
characterization of their opponents as logographers and sophists and their defenses against such attacks.   
26 Stephen Usher, Demosthenes. On the Crown (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1993): 237; Harvey Yunis, 
Demosthenes. On the Crown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 216; Wankel, Rede für 
Ktesiphon, 915.   
27 This is the so-called first embassy of 346 BC, sent to Philip with the purpose of sounding out his 
sentiments on a peace treaty with Athens.  The opinions of the ambassadors are allegedly elicited by a trick 
played on them by Demosthenes.   
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Aeschines portrays one kind of rearticulation that orators could employ in denigrating 
their opponents.   
According to Aeschines, while the ambassadors were dinning at Larissa on their 
way back from Macedonia Ctesiphon called Philip pleasant (ἡδύς) and lovely (ἐπαφρόδιτος) (Aeschin. 2.42);  and during the ambassadors’ subsequent report, 
Ctesiphon openly voices his approval of Philip’s appearance (ἰδέα) (Aeschin. 2.47).  In 
essence, he seems to have been employing Philip’s appearance as a gauge for his 
character.  Ctesiphon’s vocabulary during the private dinner at Larissa makes this 
connection between appearance and morality clear: ἡδύς has a general meaning of being 
“sweet” or “pleasant”; ἐπαφρόδιτος, though connected with the favor of Aphrodite, 
more generally denotes loveliness or charm.28  Ctesiphon’s remarks thus quite clearly 
refer to Philip’s character in addition to his appearance.  Before the ekklesia, however, 
Ctesiphon speaks more broadly about Philip’s ἰδέα, a choice of vocabulary that would 
have indicated most immediately, though not exclusively, outward appearance rather than 
inner character or the mind.29  In the repetition of his initial comment to the demos, then, 
the object of Ctesiphon’s remark is more specifically oriented – at least in Aeschines’ 
version of events - to Philip’s outward appearance.  It is likely, however, that Ctesiphon 
                                                        
28 For example, ἐπαφρόδιτος would used as the Greek version of Sulla’s epithet Felix (Plut. 34.2). 
29 Interestingly enough ἰδέα is not a common word in the orators: a TLG word search brings up 22 
instances, 15 of them from Isocrates; but the other 7 instances all plainly indicate physicality: so Dem. 
19.233 complains that Aeschines prosecuted Timarchus because as a youth he was “better than average in 
appearance” [τις ὢν ἐφ᾿ ἡλικίας ἑτέρου βελτίων τὴν ἰδέαν]; and Aeschines in the Against Timarchus, 
in discussing  Athenian attitudes to physical beauty, claims that Demosthenes will say that it would be 
strange “if everyone about to have children prayed that their unborn sons would be noble in appearance and 
worthy of the city” [εἰ τοὺς μὲν υἱεῖς τοὺς μηδέπω γεγονότας ἅπαντες εὔχεσθε οἱ μέλλοντες 
παιδοποιεῖσθαι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς τὰς ἰδέας φῦναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίους] (Aeschin. 2.134), but that 
once they were born their beauty became a possible cause for disenfranchisement.      
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still meant to suggest some analogy between Philip’s pleasing exterior and his apparent 
moral worth.       
Ctesiphon’s comment was taken up and employed against him by Demosthenes.  
According to Aeschines, Demosthenes plotted against the other ambassadors to make 
them appear foolish before the demos: he waited until they had all said their fill 
concerning their favorable impressions of Philip and then accused them of wasting 
valuable time with “foreign gossip” [ὑπερόριος λαλιά] (Aeschin. 2.49).  Laughing at 
their remarks, Demosthenes argued the case that Philip was no better or worse than some 
notable Athenians.  Among the others, he also parodied Ctesiphon: ἐδόκει Κτησιφῶντι 
τὴν ὄψιν λαμπρὸς εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δ’ οὐ χείρων Ἀριστόδημος ὁ ὑποκριτής  [In 
appearance [ὄψις] he [Philip] seemed splendid [λαμπρὸς] to Ctesiphon, but to me no 
worse than Aristodemus the actor] (Aeschin. 2.51-52).  While describing Philip simply as 
λαμπρός could encompass more than just physical beauty, coupled with ὄψις 
Demosthenes’ word choice reinterprets Ctesiphon’s primary concern as being on Philip’s 
physical appearance.  With a subtle shift of vocabulary, Demosthenes has narrowed the 
focus of Ctesiphon’s commentary to pure visual perception.   This narrowing of focus 
makes sense in light of Demosthenes’ alleged purpose: his goal was to devalue the 
ambassadors’ report.  While assessing Philip’s character on the basis of his appearance 
could be an important component in judging his trustworthiness, a simple description of 
his looks would hold no such value and would indeed be ‘mere foreign gossip’. 
In its final appearance, Aeschines recounts how Demosthenes reduces 
Ctesiphon’s remark ad absurdum: during the second embassy to Philip, when each 
ambassador had the chance to speak, Demosthenes allegedly tried to appear better than 
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the others by once again distancing himself from their style of reportage.  With respect to 
Ctesiphon, he comments: οὐκ εἶπον, ὡς καλὸς εἶ· γυνὴ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ 
κάλλιστον [I did not say that you are beautiful [καλὸς]; for a woman is the most 
beautiful of beings] (Aeschin. 2.112).   Aeschines’ Demosthenes has thus denigrated a 
potentially important comment concerning Philip’s character into pure sexual innuendo.  
This process is one type of reinterpretation to which an orator’s statements could have 
been subjected by his opponents.  Moreover, Aeschines’ narrative shows that orators had 
a remarkable capacity to remember each other’s arguments and to refashion them at will.  
Indeed, even if we cannot trust the narrative itself, Aeschines’ own care in constructing 
this verbal repartee – I note, too, that the narrative of the second embassy is a good 50 
sections after the narrative of the first – is equally telling of the orators’ care in their craft.  
In sum, speakers employed and redeployed each others’ arguments – sometimes in 
similar and non-agonistic ways, after the fashion of Demosthenes and Hyperides, and 
sometimes in more sinister ways, as Demosthenes did to Ctesiphon’s remarks.  While the 
paucity of our sources has doubtless severely limited our ability to identify those places 
in which such revisions and reinterpretations have taken place, we should be wary of 
assuming that orators fabricated their opponents’ arguments wholesale or that originality 
was particularly prized in public speechmaking.   
Chapter 2 looks to Macedonia and Philip’s self-presentation before the Greek 
world.  I argue that Philip was not radically innovative in crafting his political identity. 
Rather, the developing nature of Macedonian kingship and Argead identity allowed 
Philip great leeway for interpreting his civic and social roles.  Macedonia had always 
been a locus for ideological exchange between Greek, Macedonian, and Near Eastern 
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ideas, and this is particularly clear in the institution of the βασιλεία and the civic 
structure of Macedonia.  The ease with which Macedonians traditionally adopted foreign 
ideologies gave Philip the freedom to embed himself within Greek systems of power 
without abrogating his traditional Macedonian roles.  Over the course of his reign Philip 
took on an amalgam of positions in the Greek world which were not in and of themselves 
new, though their consolidation in a single man was certainly unprecedented.  In crafting 
the League of Corinth, moreover, Philip followed in the footsteps of the Persian King, 
whose overwhelming influence on the Greek politics of the early 4th century BCE Philip 
had supplanted.   
The following two chapters form a closely-knit pair, as both deal with Athenian 
public discourse and the way that discourse evolved over the course of Philip’s reign.  
Chapter 3 turns to Athens and political speeches concerning Philip and Macedonia 
composed before the watershed Peace of Philocrates of 346 BCE, while Chapter 4 
examines the evidence we have for the political debate of the post-peace period.  The 
division of the speeches into those composed before the year 346 BCE and those 
composed afterward is not arbitrary.  There are both historical and source-based reasons 
for doing so. First, the year 346 BCE marks a watershed moment in Philip’s reign, as it 
was in that year that he put an end to the Third Sacred War and, in consequence, became 
definitively involved in the politics of southern Greece.30  Second, Philip and Athens 
concluded the fateful Peace of Philocrates during this year, the negotiations over which 
were crucial in forming the Athenians’ understanding of the Macedonian situation.  
Third, the vast majority of the pre-peace speeches dealing with Macedonia that have 
come down to us are Demosthenic and deliberative, while the later speeches dealing with                                                         
30 See below pp. 133-134, on the importance of 346 BCE for Philip’s relations with the Greek poleis. 
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Philip, by contrast, are for the most part forensic speeches drawn from the both 
Demosthenes and Aeschines.  Forensic debates were highly elaborated affairs where 
speakers had much more time to present their arguments and in which character-building 
was much more important than in deliberative oratory.  By contrast, deliberative speeches 
focused on the Athenian polis, the nature of its citizens, and the policy dictated by that 
nature.31  My own differences in focus between the two chapters thus naturally mirror the 
distinctions in the nature of the evidence.  There are thus real qualitative differences to 
the evidence of each chapter in addition to changes in the political reality of mainland 
Greece. 
In Chapter 3 I focus on the way Demosthenes used two culturally loaded 
typologies, that of the barbarian Other as a natural Athenian enemy and the structural 
antithesis between democracy and monarchy, to inform his discussion of Philip.  Both 
typologies draw on previous articulations of similar issues during the 5th century, and 
thus a particular goal of the chapter will be to position Demosthenes’ rhetoric in relation 
to these time-tested themes as we know them from Herodotus and Thucydides.  I also 
show the way Philip’s ἦθος in Demosthenes’ speeches complemented the importance 
Demosthenes placed on his own role as the wise advisor in democratic deliberation.  In 
Chapter 4 I expand upon the interconnection between the individual orator, the political 
setting in which the orator was operating, and the consequences for his view of Philip’s 
ἦθος.  In addition, where in Chapter 3 I concentrate on the older 5th and 4th century                                                         
31 These are broad generalizations, of course.  For an overview of the conventions governing forensic 
oratory see Michael de Brauw, “Forensic Oratory,” in A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, ed. Ian 
Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) and for deliberative oratory see Stephen Usher, 
“Symbouleutic Oratory,” in A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2008); on the conventions of Greek oratory more broadly see Stephen Usher, Greek Oratory: 
Tradition and Originality (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1999) and George Kennedy, The Art of 
Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1963).  
  19 
conceptions evident in Demosthenes’ rhetoric concerning the king, Chapter 4 is much 
more focused on the contemporary influences shaping the expression of Philip’s ἦθος.  I 
argue that Aeschines conceives of Philip as a kind of orator, a character type familiar to 
his audience, with whom they might have felt at ease; Demosthenes, on the other hand, 
distances Philip, rejecting his speaking ability and portraying him rather as the 
prototypical Other.   
The consequences of these constructions of Philip’s  ἦθος are far-reaching.  For 
Aeschines, portraying Philip as an orator bolsters his presentation of international debate 
of the sort conducted on the embassy as an extension of Athenian debate in the ekklesia, 
which, in turn, limits the ability of the politician to act contrary to the will of the people.  
Even outside the polis the politician is always under the watchful eye of the demos.  As a 
consequence, the demos is able to judge equally well about events that occur outside the 
polis as about matters inside the city.  For Demosthenes, the case is just the opposite.  In 
his view, the world outside of Athens is an essentially foreign space and the demos stands 
in need of the wise advisor to perceive international developments clearly and to make 
accurate judgments about them.  Because of his privileged role as mediator between the 
outside world and the polis, the advisor in Demosthenes’ discourse takes on a much more 
powerful role in public debate than Aeschines’ speaker.  In the end, Demosthenes even 
uses the threat posed by Philip’s monarchy to argue that the wise advisor should – at least 
in certain circumstances - be granted control over the political process itself.  Within 
these forensic debates, Philip’s ἦθος is a key element in the competing visions 
constructed by Aeschines and Demosthenes of the Athenian political process as a whole. 
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Chapter 5 turns to Isocrates, a political thinker who wrote advice to Philip on 
handling his affairs with respect to the Greek world, and, specifically, Athens.  Like 
Demosthenes and Aeschines, Isocrates constructs Philip’s ἦθος in a way that 
complements his own self-presentation as a political thinker.  In particular, I show that 
Isocrates presents Philip as a philosopher in training whose political ideas are naturally 
quite close to Isocrates’ own way of thinking.  Moreover, as a political outsider whose 
source of power lies beyond the traditional boundaries of the Greek world, Philip mirrors 
the position of the elite critic of the Athenian democracy, whose lack of participation in 
the messy politics of the ekklesia gives him a broader perspective on the state of Greece 
and sounder political sense.  Isocrates constructed a favorable presentation of Philip’s 
ἦθος from the perspective of an elite Athenian.  In doing so, he articulated a discursive 
framework which allowed elites to accept and even endorse Philip’s activity within 
Greece.   
With Isocrates, then, this study returns full circle back to the realities of Philip and 
his court.  In Macedonia as in Athens, presentations of Philip’s ἦθος were critical to 
policy-making and, more broadly speaking, to fostering relations – whether amicable or 
hostile - between Macedonia and Greece.  In pursuing the way Philip’s ἦθος was 
described by a range of Athenian voices, we gain insight into the ideological and political 
framework within which his rise to power to Greece could be viewed by his Greek 
contemporaries.  In short, focusing on Philip’s ἦθος in the orators discloses the inner 
workings of Athenian political discourse.  At the same time, disclosing the peculiarly 
Greek, specifically Athenian, and finally individual concerns which governed the way 
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each orator reconceptualized Philip, uncovers the distance between Philip and the sources 
which so critically bear on his life as we understand it.   
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Chapter 2: Models of Macedonian Monarchy 
Introduction 
While my project as a whole concerns the Greek confrontation with Philip as a 
Macedonian and as a king, in this chapter I examine the development of the Macedonian 
monarchy as a Macedonian phenomenon.  Because much of what we know about 
Macedonia comes from Greek sources, uncoupling the Macedonian from the Greek 
perspective is particularly difficult.  Yet the role of the monarch within Macedonian 
society is a vexed issue in its own right, quite apart from the orators’ impressions of 
Philip’s monarchy which I will be exploring in later chapters.  For Philip’s refashioning 
of Macedonian kingship and, later, his participation in Greek political organizations 
forms the backdrop against which the Athenian discussion concerning Philip took place.  
At the same time, discussing the orators’ assertions about Philip acquires new importance 
when seen against the continuous redefinition of the monarchy within Macedonia: in a 
sense, Philip and the orators both participated in a larger dialogue over the potential role 
of a Macedonian monarch in Greece.  The connection between Athenian ideology and 
Philip’s policy is perhaps clearest in the rhetoric of Isocrates, whose speech and letters, 
though composed for Philip’s benefit, are couched in unequivocally Athenian terms.  Yet 
inasmuch as the leading Athenian orators travelled in the same international political 
forum as Philip, their voices too had the potential to considerably impact the king’s 
image and, in consequence, his policy toward Greece. 
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The early goal of this chapter will be to show that Macedonian notions of 
monarchy were still in a developmental stage in the 4th century, formulated largely in 
response to Greek and Persian political ideologies.  I particularly highlight the role of the 
Argead ruling house in creating and disseminating the notion of a Macedonian state ruled 
by an Argead monarch. We should view Philip and his shaping of the monarchy not as a 
unique chapter in Macedonian history but as part of a tradition of ideological exchange 
between Macedonia, Greece, and the Near East.  In the latter sections I examine Philip’s 
reign more closely to illuminate how he crafted his role, first within Macedonia, and later 
within the larger Greek world.  Indeed, he never seems to have wanted to impose his rule 
over the poleis, though that is, in effect, what he would accomplish  by the end of his life.  
Even so, Philip never imposed monarchy on the Greeks; rather, he employed Greek 
traditions and systems of social organization to achieve his ends.    
The Macedonian ethnos and the Argeads  
Who were the Macedonians, and what made them uniquely Macedonian?  The 
question seems basic, and yet it cannot be answered clearly.32  Early Macedonian history 
is more myth than reality.  As best we can tell, the future Macedonian kingdom first 
gained importance at about the same time as the foundation of Greek colonies on the 
coast of the Chalcidicean peninsula, that is, during the mid to late 7th century BCE.33  
Strabo links the expansion of the Argeadae Macedones to a colonizing push by the                                                         
32 It has also been muddied by the interests of modern politics: for the latest developments see 
http://macedonia-evidence.org/ and Andreas Willi, “Whose is Macedonia, Whose is Alexander?,” Classical 
Journal 105 (2009). For an overview of the fraught history of modern Macedonia as it has influenced 
classical scholarship see Eugene Borza, In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), ch. 1.  For the way nationalism has pervaded recent Macedonian 
archaeology see Yannis Hamilakis, “La trahison des archéologues? Archaeological Practice as Intellectual 
Activity in Postmodernity.” Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology 12 (1999), on the work of Manolis 
Andronikos.  
33 The first colonies were probably Methone, Dicaea and Mende (Strabo 488).  
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Chalcidians, who apparently founded as many as thirty cities during this period, around 
650 BCE.34  The fact that the colonists appear to have been unconcerned by local threats 
of violence against them also seems indicative of amicable relations between the 
colonizing Greeks and the native populations.35   
The importance of the Argeadae Macedones as the nucleus of the future 
Macedonian state is confirmed by the family name of the future kings of Macedonia, who 
formed the so-called Argead dynasty.  The claims that the Argead name derives from the 
city of Argos and that the Argeads were descended from the Argive Temenids, should not 
be taken at face value.36  It is much more likely that the Argead kings were natives who 
rose to prominence along with the growing fortunes of their tribe and that their name 
came from a local source.37  The friendly relations between the Argeadae and the Greek 
colonists may indicate that the Argead claim to Temenid ancestry was of 6th century 
origin, though our earliest sources for it derive from the later half of the 5th century (see 
below, pp. 27-32).   
It may be the case that both the Argeadae and the colonists also found common 
purpose against the Illyrians, who had become dominant in the area c. 800 BCE but 
whose power, to judge by archaeological remains, decreased significantly around this 
                                                        
34 Strabo 7a.1.11.  Nicholas G. L. Hammond, A History of Macedonia, I: Historical Geography and 
Prehistory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 432, posits that Strabo’s source here was Hecataeus.   
35 See Miltiades Hatzopoulos, “Royaume de Macédoine et Colonies Grecques: Langues et Institutions,” 
Cahiers du Centre Gustave-Glotz 7 (1996): 16-7 and B. Isaac, The Greek Settlements in Thrace until the 
Macedonian Conquest (Leiden: Brill, 1986). 
36 In the earliest version of the myth, the Macedonian royal family was supposed to be descendants of 
Perdiccas, a Temenid from Argos; so the royal family could also referred to as the Temenidae (Hdt. 8.137; 
Thuc. 2.99).  Later versions introduced a founder by the name of Archelaos and one by the name of 
Caranos: see Nicholas G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, II: 550 – 336 B.C. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 3-14 (contra Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 80-4).   
37 It has been argued that the Argead name comes from an Orestian Argos, in Upper Macedonia: see 
Jonathan M. Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2002), 155-156. 
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time.38  Greek manpower may very well have been the key to the Illyrians’ diminishing 
influence and concomitant Argead expansion.  Indeed, in latter times we know that the 
Macedonians were not at all shy of taking advantage of Greek military force against their 
enemies; Amyntas I, for example, offered Hippias the Pisistratid a place to settle in 
Anthemous, an area the Macedonians had difficulty controlling at that time.39  Amyntas 
probably aimed to employ Hippias in helping subdue the area, given the strategic 
importance of the city.40  Though Hippias refused, the offer gives us an inkling as to what 
benefits the early Argeadae could have seen in the establishment of Greek colonies in 
their neighborhood.41  In any event, it appears likely that the rise of the Argeadae 
Macedones should be tied to the establishment of the Greek colonies in the area, and that 
the Argead rulers took advantage of Greek military power against their traditional local 
enemies.  
Greek colonization soon became helpful to the Macedonians not only militarily, 
but also economically.  While the earliest Greek settlements in the north were agricultural 
in nature, by the early 5th century their focus was increasingly shifting to the wealth of 
wood and precious metal with which their new environs abounded.  Wood from the area 
around the Strymon River and further south on the Pierian mountains seems to have been 
especially prized for its quality.42  The Athenians in particular looked to the northern 
Aegean as a source of wood; their interest in Macedonian timber may have begun as                                                         
38 Hammond, History of Macedonia, I, 423. 
39 This occurred after the Spartans’ unsuccessful bid to restore Hippias’ tyranny at Athens.  I note too the 
strategic alliances between Perdiccas and, alternately, Athens and Sparta mentioned at Thuc. 2.80.6; 4.79.2; 
4.83; 4.124.1; 7.9.1. 
40 Anthemous was a coastal city on the border between Chacidice and Mygdonia, an area that the 
Macedonians did not have full control over at this time.  See Hammond, History of Macedonia, I, 190-1.   
41 Hippias refused Amyntas’ offer, as well as a similar offer made him by the Thessalians.  Interestingly 
enough, Peisistratus is said to have gone to Rhaecalus in Macedonia during his second exile, though we do 
not know why (Arist. AP 15.2); see Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 116. 
42 Theoph. 1.9.2; 4.55; 5.2.1; 7.1-3. 
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early as Themistocles’ initial development of the Athenian navy.43  The Argeadae 
Macedones, settled at this period in the Haliacmon valley, were well positioned to take 
advantage of the trade opportunities with the south which were opened up by the 
colonists.  Themistocles was evidently on friendly terms with Alexander I, who ruled 
Macedonia during the Persian War era, since we know that he spent time in Macedonia 
during his exile.44  Interestingly enough, Herodotus’ Megabazus explicitly expresses the 
fear that if such a ready supply of wood as was in Macedonia should fall into Greek 
hands, it would be detrimental to the Persians.45  While the Persians’ fear may be more 
telling of Macedonian circumstances during Herodotus’ lifetime than during the actual 
Persian War period, Macedonian wood was certainly used for the Athenian navy 
relatively early.  By the late fifth century, Athenian interests in Macedonian timber were 
well developed: we know, for example, that Athens had an agreement with Perdiccas II 
for exclusive rights to Macedonian oars, and that she rewarded his heir, Amyntas III, with 
the status of πρόξενος and εὐεργήτες for special access to the timber supply.46  The 
timber trade increased the interdependence between Macedonia and her immediate Greek 
neighbors on the Chalcidice.  The Chalcidicean ports acted as convenient trade hubs 
between northern resources and southern Greeks, though the export of wood increasingly 
became a source of tension between the Macedonians and the colonists.47  In addition to 
                                                        
43 On the trade in timber between Macedonia and Athens see Eugene Borza, “Timber and Politics in the 
Ancient World: Macedon and the Greeks,”Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 131 (1987).   
44 Thuc. 1.137. 
45 Hdt. 5.23. 46 For the agreement between Athens and Perdiccas see IG I3 89; for the treaty between Athens and 
Amyntas see IG II2  102 = M. N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, II: from 403 to 323 B.C. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948): no. 129.  The importance of Amphipolis, founded by Athens in the 
northern Aegean in 437 BCE, was partially based on the foothold it gained for its mother-city in the timber 
trade (Thuc. 4.108).         
47 An inscription found at Torone, a Greek city on the Chalcidice, for example, records the purchase of 
seven talents of wood: see Cambitoglou, “Military, domestic and religious architecture at Torone in 
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wood, gold and silver deposits from the eastern part of Macedonia around the Strymon 
River were also mined from at least the 5th century.  These Macedonian mines would 
continue to be a source of vast wealth for the Antigonids and the Romans.48  Wood, gold, 
and silver fueled Greek interest in Macedonia and became a primary factor in the 
development of Argead power.  
It may have already become clear that in discussing the rise of “the Macedonians” 
what I really mean is the rise of the tribe of Argeadae Macedones and their royal family, 
the Argeads.  To speak of an expansion of Macedonians more generally is in some 
respects inaccurate, as this might seem to imply some prior notion of geographic or 
institutional unity among the Macedonian tribes.49  This was, however, not the case.  
Among the peoples of the area local designations seem to have had greater valence than 
any overarching ethnic identity.  It is not even clear whether many of the local ἔθνη who 
would later become identified as Macedonians considered themselves as such before their 
conquest by the Argeads.  This is most evident to us in the area of Upper Macedonia, 
where the rugged terrain made stable systems of communication difficult and whose 
tribes were therefore the last to come under Argead influence.  For the ἔθνη of Upper 
Macedonia would not be fully integrated into the Argead kingdom until Philip’s time; 
and even so, local affiliations retained their organizational force well into the Roman 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Chalkidike,” in Excavating Classical Culture. Recent Archaeological Discoveries in Greece, ed. Maria 
Stamatopoulou et al. (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2002), 26. 
48 See Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 53-4. 
49 Ibid., 28-9; contra Hammond, History of Macedonia I, who pointedly begins his exploration of 
Macedonia with a study of its geography.  See also Michael Zahrnt, “Makedonien als politischer Begriff in 
griechischer Zeit,” Thetis 11-12 (2005) who makes the distinction between Macedonia and Thrace: the 
former used by the Greeks to refer to a political entity and the latter used to refer to (an overarching) 
geographical entity.   
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period.50  Strabo, for example, could write in reference to three such northern tribes that 
“the Orestai, Pelagones, and Elimiotai [became] a part of the Macedonians, some 
willingly and some unwillingly” [οἱ μὲν ἑκόντες οἱ δ̓ ἄκοντες, μέρη καθέσταντο... 
Ορέσται δὲ καὶ Πελαγόνες καὶ  Ἐλιμιῶται Μακεδόνων] (9.5.11).  To complicate 
matters still further, Hecataeus (FGrH 1 F 107) called the Orestai a Molossian tribe, 
while Thucydides identifies the Elimiotai as simply Macedonian (2.99).  There appears, 
then, to have been no real consensus on the ethnic identity of individual tribes such as the 
Orestai or Elimiotai.  It is probable that the tribes of Lower Macedonia had similarly 
shifting notions of their identity, but at an earlier time period, before their sense of ethnic 
independence was lost under Argead rule.  As the power of the Argeadae Macedones 
grew, the identity of the tribes surrounding the ‘original’ Macedonian kingdom shifted.51  
It is thus best to define the entity “Macedonia” prior to Philip’s reign as that area under 
the control of the Argeads at any given time period rather than as a state with well 
defined geographic or ethnic borders.   
The foundation myth of the Argeads offers further insight into the development of 
the Macedonian state as a product of tribal warfare and external Greek power.  The 
earliest account of the Macedonian royal family’s descent from the Argive Temenids 
comes down to us in Herodotus.52  It’s appearance at a time when the Persian Empire was 
                                                        
50 On the organization of Upper Macedonia see Miltiades Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions under the 
Kings (Paris: de Boccard, 1996): 77-104.   
51 Unfortunately, archaeology is of little help in advancing our knowledge on this point: even in the historic 
period “Macedonians” are characterized by an eclectic culture which is not readily identifiable.  There are, 
on the other hand, reports of marriages between the kings of Macedonia and of Elimeia, for example, 
dating to this period: a scholiast reports that Derdas I, king of Elimeia, was the cousin of Perdiccas II 
(schol. Thuc. 1.57.3).  On Macedonia and Elimeia see Ellis, Philip II, 37-8.     
52 Ernst Badian, “Greeks and Macedonians,” in Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early 
Hellenistic Times, ed. B. Barr-Sharrar and Borza (Washington, DC: National Gallery of Art, 1982), 34 and 
Eugene Borza, “Athenians, Macedonians, and the Origins of the Macedonian Royal House,” in Studies in 
Attic Epigraphy, History, and Topography presented to Eugene Vanderpool by Members of the American 
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retreating from Europe is probably no accident.  During the early 5th century Macedonia 
had, at least nominally, accepted Persian rule.  Xerxes’ defeat and withdrawal from 
Greece impelled Alexander I to enact a policy of rapprochement with the Hellenic 
world.53  So, for example, Alexander participated at the Olympics and patronized Pindar 
in an attempt to present himself  as a Greek aristocrat.54  The story of Alexander’s Argive 
descent, which connected him to the Temenids and thus finally to Heracles, would have 
been yet another way for the king to foster amicable relations with Greece.  
Herodotus tells the tale in order to prove that Alexander is in fact a Greek because 
of his Argive descent.  In his narrative, a young Perdiccas and his two brothers, cast out 
of Argos and sent northward, entered the household of an (unnamed) Macedonian king at 
Libaea, a city in Upper Macedonia, as laborers.  Because portents predicted Perdiccas’ 
future kingship, the king decided to send him and his brothers away.  Instead of giving 
them their wages, the king pointed to a patch of sunlight coming through the smoke hole 
of his house and told the boys that that patch of light would be their wages.  While his 
                                                                                                                                                                     
School of Classical Studies (Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1982) doubt the 
historicity of the myth and argue that this story should be dated to Alexander I’s reign; contra Hammond 
and Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 3-7 and Hammond, “The Early History of Macedonia,” Ancient 
World 27 (1996): 69-70; for a more recent note to the same effect see Angeliki Kottaridi, “Discovering 
Aegae,” in Excavating Classical Culture. Recent Archaeological Discoveries in Greece, ed. M. 
Stamatopoulou and M. Yerolanou (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2002), 78.   
53 Alexander and his father, Amyntas, had both been nominal subjects of the Persian Empire since c. 510 
BCE (see Hdt. 5.17-21).  The connection was solidified by a marriage between Gygaea, Amyntas’ 
daughter, and Bubares, a high-ranking Persian.  I am unconvinced by Borza’s claim that this tie was one of 
alliance rather than outright subjection (Shadow of Olympus, 102-3) and that the Macedonians were not 
Persian subjects until Mardonius’ expedition (Hdt. 6.42-5).  Herodotus was clearly partial to Alexander’s 
line of propaganda, which sought to minimize or eliminate the extent to which Macedonia was connected to 
the Persian Empire, and this should make any evidence he brings against Macedonia’s willing subjection to 
Persia into question.  As a territory at the very edge of the Empire, it is only natural to expect that the 
Persian hand there would have been light or even nominal.  Yet the Persians evidently had enough clout, 
and interest, in the area to built a new city on the Strymon River (Hdt. 5.23-4).       
54 On the importance of the Olympics as a marker of hellenic identity see Hall, Hellenicity, 154-168.  
Alexander’s actual participation in the Olympics, at least as Herodotus describes it, is fraught with 
problems (Hdt. 5.22).  See Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 110-3; Badian, Greeks and Macedonians, 34-35; P. 
Roos, “Alexander I in Olympia,” Eranos 83 (1985): 162-168.  Pindar produced an encomium for 
Alexander, preserved as frags. 120-1. 
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brothers stood dumbstruck, Perdiccas accepted the king’s offer and drew a circle around 
the patch.  The boys left, foiling the king’s subsequent attempt to pursue and kill them.  
Perdiccas settled in another part of Macedonia and Herodotus states that he eventually 
conquered “the rest of Macedonia.” [τὴν ἄλλην Μακεδονίην] (Hdt. 8.138).  The abrupt 
ending to the story has surprised many commentators, who have assumed that it must 
have been condensed by Herodotus.55 Also surprising is the fact that Herodotus’ account 
has little actual bearing on the point the historian himself is attempting to prove – namely, 
that the Argead house was indeed Argive in origin.  Indeed, the narrative spends almost 
no time on Perdiccas’ provenance – we don’t even hear the reason why Perdiccas and his 
brothers were exiled from Argos, a point that would seem of critical interest to a Greek 
audience.  Instead of Perdiccas’ origins or his latter military conquests, the myth 
emphasizes his stay with the Macedonian king at Libaea.   
I suggest that the emphasis on Perdiccas’ adventures in Libaea points to another, 
Macedonian reading of the myth quite different from the Herodotean, hellenic reading.  
While the hellenic reading employed the myth as proof of the Argeads’ Argive ancestry, 
in its Macedonian context the story was aimed at establishing the Argead’s claim to rule a 
unified Macedonia.  The clue to this Macedonian reading lies in the geography of the 
story.  The Macedonian king whom Perdiccas met lived in Lebaea, a city located 
somewhere in Upper Macedonia;56 when Perdiccas first fled the king’s household, 
Herodotus relates that he went to the country round about ‘the Gardens of Midas’, which 
the historian also calls “another part of Macedonia” [ἄλλην γῆν τῆς Μακεδονίης] (Hdt. 
                                                        
55 See for example Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 7.  Also telling is the lack of resolution 
to the stories of Perdiccas’ brothers; it seems likely that they would have been the eponymous ancestors of 
other Macedonian tribes.   
56 The precise location of Lebaea is unknown. 
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8.138.2).  This area, Herodotus explains, lies near Mt. Vermion, a mountain directly 
northwest of the Haliacmon plain and Aegae: that is, the center of Argead Macedonia as 
Herodotus and his contemporaries would have known it.  Only after gaining control of 
this area does Perdiccas return to Upper Macedonia to ‘reclaim’ his kingdom from the 
aboriginal Macedonian king.  In short, the myth reveals the existence of two Macedonian 
lands – that controlled by the king at Lebaea, explicitly called “Upper Macedonia” [ἡ 
ἄνω Μακεδονίη] (Hdt. 8.137.1), and the ‘other’ Macedonian land, the plain below Mt. 
Vermion.  The latter area must be synonymous with Lower Macedonia, even if 
Herodotus does not explicitly call it so.  Thus the story sets up a distinction between 
Lower Macedonia and Upper Macedonia.  This geographic distinction only became 
critical during the latter 5th and 4th century history of the country, when the Argeads of 
Lower Macedonia were attempting to assert their claim to Upper Macedonia, and would 
certainly not have been current in the 6th century, when the mythic Perdiccas was 
supposed to have reigned; as I have already mentioned, even the identity of the Upper 
Macedonians as Macedonians was contested until the end of the 4th century.57 Here, then, 
the Macedonian implications of the story become clear, along with the confusion between 
the two Macedonian lands mentioned by Herodotus: the myth’s aim is to establish the 
claim of the Argeads of Lower Macedonia to Upper Macedonia, both explicitly through 
Perdiccas’ acquisition of the patch of sunlight and implicitly by identifying the 
inhabitants of Libaea as Macedonian.58  Again, it is only for Herodotus that the critical 
                                                        
57 So Thucydides says that in the time of Perdiccas, Alexander I’s son, the Lyngestai and Elimiotai, tribes 
of Upper Macedonia, were allies and subjects of the lowland Macedonians but had their own kings [Τῶν 
γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ   Ἐλιμιῶται καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἃ ξύμμαχα μέν ἐστι 
τούτοις καὶ ὑπήκοα, βασιλείας δ ̓ ἔχει καθ ̓ αὑτά] (2.99). 
58 This interpretation solves the geographic confusion which the Perdiccas story has sometimes caused.  
Hammond, partially on the basis of this myth, sees the lands of Herodotus’ native king as an ‘original’ 
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importance of the myth lies in Perdiccas’ Greek origins; the narrative itself has almost 
nothing to say on that score.  Divorced from its Herodotean context, the myth discloses 
another meaning that asserts Alexander’s ancestral rights to supremacy over the whole of 
Macedonia - as he understood it to be.59 
Of course, the Greek and Macedonian readings of the story are not mutually 
exclusive.  Alexander’s bid to assert his ancestral right to “the whole of Macedonia” 
(whatever he and his contemporaries understood that to be) would have been relevant to a 
Greek as well as a Macedonian audience.  By giving the Argeads Greek roots and by 
asserting their right to rule over the tribes of Upper Macedonia, the Perdiccas myth 
argued for favorable relations between the Argeads and the Greeks.  Unlike any 
neighboring tribes who might try to curry favor for themselves among the Hellenes, the 
Argeads could claim Greek sympathy for themselves based on their kinship.  The 
hellenically-oriented myth of Perdiccas was probably only one among any number of 
different interpretations of the past and present of Macedonia; even the Perdiccas myth, 
in mentioning the boys’ detour into Illyria before their arrival at Libaea, seems to indicate 
the at one point Perdiccas may have had an Illyrian rather than a Hellenic origin.60  At 
different times and in different circumstances, non-hellenic orientations would have 
served the Macedonians better.  One only has to glance at the sweep of Macedonian 
history to note the plethora of claimants to the Macedonian throne who were wont to                                                                                                                                                                      
Macedonia and conjectures that when Perdiccas flees he “[is] no longer in ἡ Μακεδονὶς γῆ; indeed it is the 
one place in which [he] must not be.  But Herodotus is in a hurry to end the digression” (History of 
Macedonia I, 434).  This plainly contradicts the text.  Borza, though he rejects that the myth is a literal 
account of Macedonian history, nevertheless interprets its geography as a memory of early Macedonian 
expansion (Shadow of Olympus, 81-2).   
59 The myth was also important as an aeteology for the sacrifices which, according to Herodotus, the 
Argeads offered the river which they crossed while being pursued by the native king’s horsemen.  
According to the myth, after the brothers had crossed, the river rose to such an extent that the horses were 
unable to cross it (Hdt. 8.138.1).   
60 As suggested by Hammond, History of Macedonia, I, 434, on the basis of Hdt. 8.137.  
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challenge the heir apparent with the support of some outside power – whether Greek, 
Thracian, or Illyrian.61  I have stressed, as well, the claims of some Upper Macedonian 
tribal kings to autonomy, and they too would have looked to their Thracian and Illyrian 
neighbors to support their independence.  In acknowledging the myth of Perdiccas as it is 
presented to us by Herodotus, one would be buying into a specifically Argead vision of 
the Macedonian kingdom.62   
The effectiveness of Argead propaganda in disseminating a politically-loaded 
geography of Macedonia is also evident in Thucydides’ account of Macedonia.   
Thucydides, who agrees with Herodotus’ on the Argeads’ Temenid ancestry, presents his 
interlude on Macedonia as a historical narrative of Argead expansion.  Each Argead 
conquest is followed by the expulsion of the indigenous population.  He employs 
geographic nomenclature as proof of the prior ownership of the land by original non-
Macedonian peoples.  The passage is particularly interesting in its evident confusion over 
Macedonian identity, which is alternately defined either geographically or ethnically.  I 
suggest that Thucydides’ apparent desire to conform the geographic with the ethnic basis 
of Macedonian identity stems from Argead sources, as comparison with another possible 
articulation of Macedonian expansion, which has come down to us in Strabo, will show.   
Thucydides’ excursus on Macedonia forms a digression from the story of 
Sitalces’ invasion of Macedonia during the reign of Perdiccas, Alexander I’s son, in 
429/8 BCE:                                                         
61 So, for example, the Thracians’ invasion in 429 BCE was nominally an effort to gain the throne for 
Amyntas, Perdiccas’ nephew (Thuc. 2.95, 2.100). 
62 This would be true whether or not the audience was Greek, and might explain the curious fact that 
Herodotus has Perdiccas travel first to Illyria before descending to Lebaea.  Could another, perhaps earlier, 
version of the myth have featured an Illyrian Perdiccas?  Given the former power of the Illyrians in the 
area, such a version, if it existed, would certainly have been useful to the Argeads.  Both Hammond, 
History of Macedonia I, 433 and Ellis, Philip II, 35 suggest as much, though both end by taking the myth as 
Herodotus’ recounts it more or less at face value.     
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Ξυνηθροίζοντο οὖν ἐν τ Δοβήρῳ καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο, ὅπως κατὰ 
κορυφὴν ἐσβαλοῦσιν ἐς τὴν κάτω Μακεδονίαν, ἧς ὁ Περδίκκας 
ἦρχεν.  Τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ   Ἐλιμιῶται 
καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἃ ξύμμαχα μέν ἐστι τούτοις καὶ ὑπήκοα, 
βασιλείας δ ̓ ἔχει καθ ̓ αὑτά.  Τὴν δὲ παρὰ θάλασσαν νῦν 
Μακεδονίαν   Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Περδίκκου πατὴρ καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι 
αὐτοῦ, Τημενίδαι τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄντες ἐξ  ̓Άργους, πρῶτοι ἐκτήσαντο 
καὶ ἐβασίλευσαν ἀναστήσαντες μάχῃ ἐκ μὲν Πιερίας Πίαρες, οἳ 
ὕτερον ὑπὸ τὸ Πάγγαιον πέραν Στρυμόνος ᾤκησαν Φάγρητα καὶ 
ἄλλα χωρία (καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πιερικὸς κόλπος καλεῖται ἡ ὑπὸ τῷ 
Παγγαίῳ πρὸς θάλασσαν γῆ), ἐκ δὲ τῆς Βοττίας καλουμένης 
Βοττιαίους, οἳ νῦν ὅμοροι Χαλκιδέων οἰκοῦσιν· τῆς δὲ Παιονίας 
παρὰ τὸν  Ἀξιοῦ μέχρι Στρυμόνος τὴν Μυγδονίαν καλουμένην  
̓Ηδῶνας ἐξελάσαντες νέμονται.  ἀνέστησαν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς νῦν  
̓Εορδίας καλουμένης  Ἐορδούς, ὧν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐφθάρησαν, 
βραχὺ δέ τι αὐτῶν περὶ Φύσκαν κατῴκηται, καὶ ἐξ  Ἀλμωπίας  
̓́Αλμωπας.  ἐκράτησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν οἱ Μακεδόνες 
οὗτοι, ἃ καὶ νῦν τι ἔχουσι, τόν τε  Ἀνθεμοῦντα καὶ Γρηστωνίαν καὶ 
Βισαλτίαν καὶ Μακεδόνων αὐτῶν πολλήν.   
So they [i.e., the Thracians] gathered and made their preparations in 
Doberus, so that from that height they could attack down into Lower 
Macedonia, which Perdiccas ruled.  The Lynkestai, Elimiotai, and other 
tribes of the Macedonians, who are allies and subjects of the lowland 
Macedonians but have their own kings, inhabit the highlands.  The current 
land of Macedonia by the sea was first conquered by Alexander, 
Perdiccas’ father, and his ancestors, who were Temenidae from Argos.  
They were the first to hold and rule this land after having uprooted the 
Pierians from Pieria, who later settled Phagres and other places by Mount 
Pangaeus beyond the Strymon River (and even now the land from Mount 
Pangaeus to the sea is called the Pieriean bay).  They also uprooted the 
Bottiaians, who are now the neighbors of the Chalkideans, from Bottiaia.  
They also conquered the strip of Paionian land near the Axios River that 
stretches to Pella and the sea, and the land called Mygdonia beyond the 
Axios that stretches to the Strymon, having expelled the Edonians.  They 
also uprooted the Eordians from what is now called Eordia - many of 
whom died, though a few of them settled near Physca - and the Almopians 
from Almopia.  These Macedonians also conquered other tribes, whom 
they rule even now: Anthemon and Grestonia and Bisaltia and a lot [of the 
land] of the Macedonians themselves.  (Thuc. 2.99) 
Thucydides attempts to link geographic areas with the people who had been originally 
settled in those areas; their expulsion, and the consequent expansion of the Macedonians 
themselves, results in a situation where all of the land under Argead rule is now settled by 
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ethnic Macedonians.63  These new settlers, however, are not natives, and the geography 
of the land reflects this non-Macedonian history.  Thucydides concludes the passage by 
stating that the Macedonians conquered ‘other’ tribes and ruled Anthemon, Grestonia, 
Bisaltia, and “much of Macedonia proper”.  I note first the oddity of Thucydides’ 
awkward transition between conquered peoples to territory controlled - ἐκράτησαν δὲ 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν οἱ Μακεδόνες οὗτοι, ἃ καὶ νῦν τι ἔχουσι, τόν τε  
̓Ανθεμοῦντα καὶ Γρηστωνίαν καὶ Βισαλτίαν καὶ Μακεδόνων αὐτῶν πολλήν 
(emphasis added).  The sentence structure is strange enough in itself to give pause, but its 
purport is equally unclear: what does it mean that the Argeads conquered these ‘other 
peoples’ and, in conclusion, ‘a lot [of the land] of Macedonia itself’?  What is 
Thucydides’ notional Macedonia based on – what makes this land properly Macedonian?  
For that last phrase – namely, that the Argeads had conquered “a lot [of the land] of the 
Macedonians themselves” – implies that there was still a portion of the Macedonian 
people not (yet?) under the domination of the Argeads even after all of the earlier 
conquests.64   Thus even as Thucydides tries to clarify the meaning of Macedonia by 
equating its current geographic and ethnic borders, the meaning of the term slips away.  
                                                        
63 On the accuracy of the passage see Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions, 169-71.  He concludes that 
Macedonian territory was divided into two categories, that settled by the conquering Macedonians 
themselves and the territories of subject non-Macedonians.  See also Ellis, Philip II, p. 41, who rightly 
throws water on the idea that the Macedonians conquered, expelled, and resettled the area that comprised 
the Macedonian state in the 5th century.  Rather, he sees the kingdom as “a conglomerate of tribal 
territories interspersed with small settlements acquired piecemeal over many generations.  There can have 
been little sense of cohesion.”  
64 Noted by Hammond, History of Macedonia I, 437, who explains the oddity thus: “who are these 
Macedones, of whose territories only a part had been acquired?  They can hardly be tribes of Macedones, 
other than the Argeadae Macedones, living in their homeland in northern Pieriea; for it is inconceivable that 
the homeland was not entirely under Temenid rule.  Accordingly they must be the Macedones of Upper 
Macedonia, that is the Macedones of 2.99.2.”  See Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 84-89.   
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Precisely what relation do the people have with the land, and what relation does either 
ethnic or geographic designation have with the Macedonian kingdom?65   
Thucydides’ stress on the Macedonian ethnicity of the people under Argead rule 
appears to be a rearticulation of Argead propaganda, and his confusion a result of that 
propaganda.66  As I have already shown in relation to Herodotus’ myth of Perdiccas, the 
Argeads were keen to define the borders of Macedonia to their own advantage as well as 
to legitimize Argead rule.  That we can clearly see the same Argead influence in 
Thucydides’ description of Macedonia is evident from his reference to the Upper 
Macedonian peoples as subordinates (ὑπήκοοι) of the Argeads.  For this was not really 
the case: in the same breath, in fact, Thucydides also calls them allies (ξύμμαχοι) of the 
Argeads and says that they had their own kings; this interpretation of the relations 
between the Upper Macedonians and the Argeads is closer to the truth.  Indeed, 
Thucydides elsewhere records that, when Perdiccas set out to subdue Arrhabaeus, the 
king of the Lyncestan Macedonians, he first had to buy the help of Brasidas and the 
Peloponnesians (4.83); clearly Arrhabaeus did not consider himself Perdiccas’ 
subordinate.  The status of the tribes of Upper Macedonia within a larger Macedonian 
                                                        
65 Both Hammond, History of Macedonia I, 435-40 and Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 84-9, attempt to see in 
Thucydides’ description a historic narrative of the Macedonian kingdom.  I note, too, that while 
Thucydides’ goal in the passage as a whole is geographical in nature – that is, he wishes to delineate the 
extent of Macedonian territory – it is an end that evidently could not be reached without ethnographic and 
historic components: hence we learn that Macedonia was acquired by Perdiccas’ ancestors only slowly, and 
that in the process they had conquered and expelled various indigenous tribes.  Evidently, neither a 
description of the area nor a list of subject tribes would do.  Such debates about geographic and 
ethnographic borders were a major concern for the historians of the fifth century: I note for example Hdt. 
2.15-17, where Herodotus engages in precisely the same kind of debate over the borders of Egypt; like 
Thucydides, Herodotus argues that Egypt ought to comprise that territory inhabited by Egyptians (2.17).    
66 Thucydides, of course, was not particularly interested in the details of Macedonian history and politics, 
as his agenda lay elsewhere.  But he may very well have been familiar with Argead claims: his family 
connections lay in the north, in Thrace, and he seems to have spend much of his exile there (Thuc. 1.1, 
4.105.1; Hdt. 6.39.1). 
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state thus seems to have been liminal at best.  Calling them subordinates of the Argeads 
and ethnically Macedonian was to buy into an Argead viewpoint.    
 The politically charged rhetoric implicit in Thucydides’ description is further 
illuminated by comparison to our other major source for the expansion of the 
Macedonian kingdom, namely Strabo.  In discussing the peoples inhabiting the area of 
the western Haliacmon valley, in Upper Macedonia, Strabo concludes: “the Orestai, 
Pelagones, and Elimiotai [became] a part of the Macedonians, some willingly and some 
unwillingly” [οἱ μὲν ἑκόντες οἱ δ̓ ἄκοντες, μέρη καθέσταντο... Ορέσται δὲ καὶ 
Πελαγόνες καὶ  Ἐλιμιῶται Μακεδόνων] (9.5.11).  Thucydides and Strabo’s accounts 
disagree on a fundamental level concerning the development of the Macedonian 
kingdom.  Whereas Thucydides explains the growth of Macedonia as an expansion from 
an original homeland into areas formerly occupied by other peoples, Strabo posits that, 
instead, Macedonian influence impelled neighboring peoples to adopt a Macedonian 
identity.   
It may be objected that Strabo focuses on tribes from Upper Macedonia, whereas 
Thucydides’ list concerns the conquest of Lower Macedonia and the coastal region; 
taking this line of reasoning, we might conclude that the Argeads simply went about their 
early conquests in a different way than they did their latter acquisitions.67  Yet while such 
an explanation as possible, it seems to me to be a too-neat resolution that explains away 
the fundamental ideological distinction between the accounts without giving either its 
due.  On the one hand, Thucydides’ explanation of Macedonian expansion posits that all 
peoples currently subject to the Argeads are part of the Macedonian ἔθνος; Strabo’s                                                         
67 As argued by Hammond, History of Macedonia I, 435-40.  Hammond argues that Strabo’s source here is 
Hecataeus and that we should interpret the differences between Strabo’s partition of Macedonia and 
Thucydides’ version as reflective of the state of affairs in c. 500 BCE and c. 450 BCE, respectively.   
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account, on the other hand, claims that the Macedonian kingdom was built by 
incorporating different ἔθνη into the singular political entity which had no driving force 
but the self-aggrandizement of the Argead rulers and their clan.  Once again, the identity 
of Macedonia is at issue, and the borders of Argead Macedonia are at stake.68  
Thucydides’ version of Macedonian expansion would have supported the Argead claim 
to a Macedonian state comprised of both Lower and Upper Macedonia, on the grounds 
that all the peoples living therein were ethnic Macedonians and thus subject to Argead 
rule, as per Perdiccas’ historical precedent; Strabo’s version would have no such 
politically charged implication.     
By positing a Macedonia that is ethnically cohesive, Thucydides’ narrative 
supports the Argead claim to a Macedonian kingdom with borders that extend from the 
coast to the tribes of Upper Macedonia.  In other words, Thucydides’ description aims to 
equate “Macedonia” with the “Macedonians” and bring both into at least nominal 
subjection under the ruling Argead king.  Like Herodotus, Thucydides’ geography of 
Macedonia shows the hand of Argead propaganda in its assumption that the Argead 
royals had a right to rule over the disparate ‘Macedonian’ tribes.  Thucydides’ narrative 
of ancient Macedonian conquest, like the myth of Perdiccas, is evidence for the subtle 
ways in which Argead discourse penetrated Hellenic ideas concerning Macedonia.  Both                                                         
68 The argument over the borders of the Macedonian state continues along much the same lines as the 
ancient debate to this day: consider the fact that Hammond opens his History of Macedonia with the 
statement “Our first need is to define Macedonia not as a political area but as a geographical entity… as a 
geographical entity Macedonia is best defined as the territory which is drained by the two great rivers, the 
Haliacmon and the Vardar, and their tributaries.”  On the other hand, Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 28, 
considers Hammond’s a “narrow definition, even geographically” and proposed instead to define 
Macedonia as “the territory so called both by the Macedonians themselves (insofar as we have any 
information about this) and by those who wrote about them in antiquity” – thus essentially throwing the 
question back to the ancients who themselves, as we see, could not agree on this point.  Zahrnt, 
Makedonien als politischer Begriff, has more recently pointed out that the term “Macedonia” always refers 
to the political entity, whereas geographically this area was included in what was called “Thrace”; contra 
Nicholas G. L. Hammond, “Connotations of ‘Macedonia’ and of ‘Macedones’ until 323 B.C.,” Classical 
Quarterly (1995): 120-22.   
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stories come from relatively late, Argead sources; moreover, both use a common mythic 
trope: on the one hand the exiled progenitor hero, and on the other expulsion of a native 
population whose earlier presence now acts as an aeteology for a particular place name or 
names.  In Thucydides’ and Herodotus’ accounts we see evidence of the Argeads 
claiming control over an ethnically cohesive Macedonian state.  Inasmuch as the 
acceptance by the international community of a notional Macedonian state encompassing 
both Lower and Upper Macedonia facilitated Argead power,  the spread of such claims 
throughout  the Hellenic world went far in making those claims a reality.    
Macedonian institutions and the early monarchy 
The previous section examined the growth of a specifically Argead notion of the 
Macedonian ἔθνος from the 6th through the 5th centuries.  Illuminating the political 
significance of a notional Macedonian ἔθνος for the Argeads has critical implications for 
assessing the institutions of early Macedonia.  Up through the mid- and even the late-
twentieth century, the question of the nature of Macedonian institutions has worked from 
within the supposition that the Macedonians were a well-defined ethnic category.69  The 
question of Macedonian institutions thus became one of locating power on a sliding scale 
between the monarch on the one hand and the Macedonian people on the other.  In this 
form it came to be known as the ‘constitutionalism question’.  Proponents of the 
constitutionalist position argued that Macedonian institutions were based on a traditional 
and fixed hierarchy of power; they also tended to claim a powerful role for the 
Macedonian people within the government, based on a set of well-defined, if unwritten,                                                         
69 Where ‘being Macedonian’ could mean either ethnic belonging or belonging by virtue of being a 
“citizen” of the Macedonian state.  For the latter view see Hammond, Connotations of ‘Macedonia’ and of 
‘Macedones’; rebutted by Edward Anson, “The Meaning of the Term Makedones,” Ancient World 10 
(1985): 67-8, who supports the former view.   
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rights.   The anti-constitutionalists, on the other hand, stressed the autocratic nature of the 
kingship and saw the power of the Macedonian people as circumstantially rather than 
legally defined.70  In presenting the problem in this way, however, both sides 
fundamentally missed the mark.  For, in taking for granted the existence of an ethnically 
defined Macedonian people, the ‘constitutionalist question’ located civic tension between 
a minority and a majority of ‘citizens’ or ‘would-be citizens’.71  Once the notion of a 
relatively simple definition of Macedonian peoplehood is dispelled, however, one side of 
that scale – that is, the Macedonian common citizenry– disappears from view.72  
                                                        
70 These early arguments over Macedonian constitutionalism have been well summarized by Borza, 
Shadow of Olympus, 231-236.  Hammond has argued the constitutionalist position quite recently: see 
Nicholas G. L. Hammond, “ The Continuity of Macedonian Institutions and the Macedonian Kingdoms of 
the Hellenistic Era,” Historia 49 (2000): 141-160, and Connotations of ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedones’.  For 
the anti-constitutionalist position see Edward Anson, “Macedonia’s Alleged Constitutionalism,” The 
Classical Journal 80 (1985): 303-316 and R. M. Errington, “The Nature of the Macedonian State under the 
Monarchy,” Chiron 8 (1978): 77-133.   
71 The notion that a state is composed of its citizens is itself intrinsically Greek.  Thus Aristotle begins his 
exploration of types of government by stating that a state is defined by the number of its citizens [ἡ γὰρ 
πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθός ἐστιν] (1274b l. 41).  He applies the same model to a monarchy: see for 
example 1313a l. 1-17, 1315a l. 31-40.  As applied to Macedonia by modern scholars, this model (perhaps 
unconsciously) also mirrors the Greek obsession with (barbaric) tyranny versus (enlightened) Greek 
democracy.  It seems to me that those arguing for ancient Macedonian constitutionalism also tended to 
assert the Macedonians’ “enlightened” status as almost-Greeks and thus, ultimately, attempted to justify the 
Macedonian conquest of the “free” Greek world.  This critique of the constitutionalist position is also made 
by Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 239, who writes that “clearly there is insufficient evidence to describe the 
relationships between the king and others in terms that derive from the analysis of… city-states… it will do 
neither to follow a “noble savage” model, nor to describe Macedon in terms of Greek… city-states, with 
which Macedon had little in common.”      
72 A dispassionate view of Macedonian history, keeping in mind that actual history is inevitably messier 
than the historian’s narrative of it, bears this out: the simple fact is that the strongest argument for a 
Macedonian citizenry – the apparent right of the army to elect or at least ratify its next king – is an illusion.  
For one thing, there is not a single smooth succession in the history of Macedonia that we have evidence 
for: if this is a system, it certainly wasn’t a functional one: see Elizabeth Carney, “Regicide in Macedonia,” 
La Parola del Passato 38 (1983): 261-272.  Second, the narratives of acclamation by the army make sense 
even without a constitutionalist reading: no claimant to the Macedonian throne had any chance of success 
without an army, whether it was one drawn from the populace of Macedonia or a foreign one.  The army 
thus had de facto power, and a claimant had to make sure that he had the support of an army – though 
almost any army would do; thus the army’s legitimacy in king-making stemmed from its ability to defeat 
the armies of rival claimants rather than from the notion that it represented the Macedonian people.  See 
also Alan Samuel, “Philip and Alexander as Kings: Macedonian Monarchy and Merovingian Parallels,” 
American Historical Review 93 (1988): 1270-1286, who compares the Argeads to the Merovingians and 
comes to much the same conclusion - namely that successful leadership was based on the personal 
effectiveness of the king, particularly in terms of his military accomplishments, and his influence on the 
aristocracy and the people.          
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Another model has recently been championed by Hatzopoulos.  Instead of 
focusing on the king’s relationship with the people, Hatzopoulos locates the political 
tension in Macedonia between national/monarchic and local forces.73  He also argues that 
local Macedonian civic institutions were modeled on Greek poleis, and were therefore 
democratic in nature.   While Hatzopoulos is right to emphasize the importance of local 
civic bodies within Macedonia, I will argue in this section that local forces need not, and 
indeed in the case of Macedonia should not, be equated with democratic forces.74  To 
argue as Hatzopoulos does is, again, to assume a Greek viewpoint – namely, that urban 
spaces foster democracy and that monarchies and democracies are inherently at odds with 
one another.  I suggest instead that we should look to Persian Ionia - where Greek poleis 
and Persian monarchy had coexisted, for the most part peaceably, for centuries - rather 
than mainland Greece as another potential model for Argead urbanization.  The source of 
tension within the Macedonian kingdom came from the opposition between the 
monarch’s desire for unification and the locals’ desire for greater autonomy.     
Hatzopoulos’ earliest sources for the tension between national and local forces 
come from the reign of Archelaos (c. 413-399 BCE) - as indeed they must, since the reign 
of Archelaos provides very nearly all of our evidence for Macedonia’s institutions prior 
to Philip’s ascension.  At the heart of the reforms instituted by Archelaos was an effort to 
                                                        
73 See Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions.  Hatzopoulos’ arguments were already prefigured in the 
1970s by Ellis, Philip II, 41, who rightly argued that Macedonia was “anything but homogeneous”. 
74 Hatzopoulos’ argument is based for the most part on his examination of Antigonid and Roman epigraphic 
material.  His use of such late sources to make assertions about the institutions of early Macedonia is the 
most distressing feature of Macedonian Institutions.  Indeed, he seems to see no break between Argead and 
Antigonid Macedonia at all.  This makes for rather confused reading and seriously undermines his 
conclusions.   Partly, of course, this is a problem of sources: we simply cannot know what Macedonia of 
the 6th and 5th centuries looked like on the level of local organization, though the growth of archaeological 
interest in Macedonia may eventually change that.   
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assuage regional tensions through an innovative building programme. Thucydides relates 
the following:   
Καὶ οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες οὗτοι ἐπιόντος πολλοῦ στρατοῦ ἀδύνατοι 
ὄντες ἀμύνεσθαι ἔς τε τὰ καρτερὰ καὶ τὰ τείχη, ὅσα ἦν τῇ χώρᾳ, 
ἐσεκομίσθησαν.  ἦν δὲ οὐ πολλά, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον  Ἀρχέλαος ὁ 
Περδίκκου υἱὸς βασιλεὺς γενόμενος τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ 
ᾠκοδόμησε καὶ ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε καὶ τἆλλα διεκόσμησε τά [τε] 
κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ 
κρείσσονι ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι βασιλῆς ὀκτὼ οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ 
γενόμενοι.   
With a large army marching against them, the Macedonians were unable 
to defend themselves and shut themselves up in such strong places and 
fortifications as there were in the country.  There were not many [of 
these], though later Archelaos the son of Perdiccas upon his ascension as 
king built those which are there now, cut straight roads, and provided for 
other matters in warfare –horses, hoplites, and other provisions –  to a 
larger degree than all the other eight kings who had come before him.  
(Thuc. 2.100.2) 
As a result of Archelaos’ reforms, then, he was able to muster a larger force of cavalry 
and heavy infantry than any previous Macedonian king.  This was no minor achievement, 
as prior Macedonian military might was not very great: the Argeads had certainly never 
been able to match a Greek hoplite force and could hardly subdue even their non-Greek 
neighbors when operating on their own.75  As I have argued above (pp. 10-11), early 
Macedonia depended heavily on engaging the help of its Greek neighbors in wartime.   
By reorganizing his kingdom, Archelaos was able to achieve military independence.   
Yet Archelaos’ reforms also effected non-military changes in the Macedonian 
state.  The creation of fortified places created civic centers for the rural population, while                                                         
75 The machinations of Perdiccas II, Archelaos’ father and predecessor, are revelatory in this respect.  He 
continuously switches alligences and induces his neighbors to come to his aid (Thucydides 1.57-8; 1.61; 
2.29; 2.80; 4.79; 4.132); most tellingly, he bribes Brasidas to help him subdue the neighboring Lyncestian 
Macedonians and when Brasidas decides to parlay with them, Perdiccas is unable to do anything about it 
(4.83).   Perdiccas’ army consisted mainly of horsemen and some hoplite forces enlisted from the Greek 
cities within his kingdom – though not very many of the latter (see 2.100.5) - along with a large force of 
light-armed men (2.80.7; 1.62-3; 4.124).   On the Macedonian army during this period see Hammond, 
History of Macedonia II, 141-148. 
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better roads eased communication between the king and the hinterland.  Both 
developments would have spurred economic growth within the kingdom.76  Moreover, by 
allowing for urbanization and better communication above the local level, Archelaos’ 
reforms opened up the way for greater cohesion in Macedonia as a whole.  Archelaos’ 
additional building projects in Pella, which would become the largest city in Macedonia 
during his reign (Hellenica 5.2.13), give further evidence of his desire to create a more 
cohesive Macedonian state.77  The site of Pella in the central plain between the 
Haliacmon and Axios rivers, close to the center of the kingdom as it would have been in 
the late 5th century and also well off the coastline, points to Archelaos’ concern for the 
inland, ‘backwards’ areas of his kingdom.78                                                           
76 On the connectedness of military reforms with economic and social reforms in Macedonia see J. R. Ellis, 
“The Dynamics of Fourth-Century Macedonian Imperialism,” Archaia Makedonia II (1973): 106-108.  
Archelaos’ reign saw enormous economic growth in Macedonia, as evidenced by his coinage: see William 
S. Greenwalt, “The Production of Coinage from Archelaos to Perdiccas III and the Evolution of Argead 
Macedonia,” in Ventures into Greek History edited by Ian Worthington (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 
105-134.  As argued by Hammond and Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 140, Thucydides’ language 
makes it clear that Archelaus did not merely repave older roads but actually cut new ones into the interior 
of the country.  I am not, however, convinced by Greenwalt’s suggestion that Archelaos’ reforms indicate a 
transition between transhumant pastoralism and agriculture (see William S. Greenwalt, “Archelaos the 
Philhellene,” Ancient World 34 (2003): 135-6).  There is no concrete evidence for such a shift, and to argue 
for its occurrence based on Hansen’s model of the development of the Greek citizen-hoplite, as Greenwalt 
tries to do, is both using a model that is not unassailable in its own right as well as translating a paradigm 
into a completely different context, where it simply doesn’t belong.  Whereas one might imagine that the 
Greek yeoman farmer had a stake in obtaining hoplite armor and defending his own polis, participation in 
the polis-like urban spaces of Macedonia does not necessarily imply a willingness to defend a distant 
Macedonian king.  The situation in Macedonia is simply too different for this analogy to work.  I wonder, 
too, whether instead of a growth of a ‘hoplite middle class’, as Greenwalt argues, we shouldn’t see 
Archelaos’ civic centers as innovations in efficiency, which were better able to organize individuals who 
were already there but who had not previously participated in civic/military functions.   In other words, I 
do not find it an obvious conclusion that just because Perdiccas II, Archelaos’ father, was unable to field a 
hoplite army, that means that “there were not enough yeomen farmers and “middle class” businessmen 
within his realm to man a hoplite army.” (135).  
77 Pella was, however, a significant city even before Archelaos’ ascension; both Thucydides (2.99.4; 
2.100.4) and Herodotus (7.123) mention it. 
78 On Pella’s continental orientation see Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 169-70 and Hammond and Griffith, 
History of Macedonia II, 150.  The geography of the central plain around the Haliacmon and Axios rivers 
are difficult to determine; silt carried from the rivers and drainage projects both combined to shift the 
landscape dramatically during the Greek and Roman periods.  In the fifth century Pella lay directly on the 
shore of the Thermaic Gulf (Hdt. 7.123), but probably by the time of Philip II this part of the gulf was silted 
over and one had to sail up the Ludias River, to the Lake of Ludias, in order to reach Pella’s port.  See 
Hammond, History of Macedonia I, 142-154 and Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 42-44.    
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While there is evidence for increasing urbanization and prosperity among the 
Macedonian population over the course of Archelaos’ reign, it is not at all certain that we 
should link this increasing prosperity with the spread of democratic ideology.79  The 
Greek paradigm of government was not the only one available to the Argeads.  The 
Thessalian and the Persian monarchs – and to some extent even the Thracian kings – 
were also dealing with just such issues of the role of the monarch in ruling an urban (or 
increasingly urbanized), and in some cases Greek, population; any of these monarchic or 
quasi-monarchic systems could have provided alternative solutions to marrying urban 
spaces with kingship.   Archelaos certainly developed ties with the Aleuadae of Thessaly, 
as we know from the fact that he would later intervene on their behalf in Thessalian 
affairs.80 Perhaps more important as a potential model, however, was Persia.  The 
Macedonians had had first-hand experience with Persian rule and with the Persian court 
during the Persian wars.  While direct Persian influence receded along with the Empire, it 
appears that cultural links continued, or were renewed, between the Macedonian nobility 
and Persia during the late fifth century.  So, for example, the Macedonian kings partook 
in lion hunts resembling those of the Persian monarchs; and again, the institution of the 
Royal Pages may indicate an Argead attempt to model the Macedonian court on that of 
the Persian kings.81  Moreover, Archelaus’ coinage, unlike that of his predecessors, was 
                                                        
79 As Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions, has done - he states, for example, that Macedonian 
modernization during this period “meant above all the mass introduction of methods, institutions and 
attitudes developed in the most advanced states of that time, the city-states of southern Greece, and which 
were indissolubly linked to the phenomenon of the polis in all its aspects: economic, social, political, 
military and cultural” (467).  Greenwalt, as I have already mentioned above, also equates Archelaos’ ‘civic 
centers’ with southern Greek poleis.  Fanoula Papazoglou, “Polis et Souveraineté,” Ziva Antika 50 
(2000):169-176 critiques Hatzopoulos’ interpretation of the Beroia gymnasiarch law – which in any case 
can prove nothing concerning our period - on these grounds.   
80 On Archelaos’ intervention in Thessaly see Borza, Shadow of Olympus,164-166. 
81 On lion hunting see Pierre Briant, “Chasses royales macédoniennes et chasses royales perses: le theme de 
la chasse au lion sur la chasse de Vergina,” Dialogues d’histoire ancienne 17 (1991): 211-255; his 
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made to conform to the Persian standard.82  None of this evidence, of course, can 
conclusively show Persian influence on the Macedonian institutions of this time period; it 
does, however, suggest that the Argeads could look elsewhere for models of successful 
government at the civic level besides southern Greece.  Persian rule over Ionia proved 
that Greek, and consequently Greek-like, poleis and Greek culture could live relatively 
peacefuly under the subjection of a monarchy.   
The case of Pydna is suggestive for the way Archelaos handled the problem of 
ruling over a Greek, formerly autonomous polis and for how he viewed his programme of 
urbanization as a whole.  Pydna was a Greek colony within Macedonian territory which 
rebelled against Argead rule during Archelaos’ reign.  Having subdued the revolt, 
Archelaos moved the whole city several miles inland.83  In doing so, he presumably 
meant to reduce the autonomy which came from Pydna’s easy access to the sea.  Pydna’s 
rebellion need not indicate that urban populations were in and of themselves incompatible 
with monarchy: as a large and powerful Greek colony, Pydna would have had other 
incentives toward autonomy besides a desire for democratic rule, incentives that would 
not have existed in the newly built civic centers of the Macedonian interior.  Native 
Macedonian communities, without the history and independent connections of a Pydna, 
would hardly have had the same relations with their Argead monarchs.  Indeed, the fact 
that Pydna’s revolt early in Archelaos’ reign did not dampen his  subsequent efforts at                                                                                                                                                                      
discussion of the lion-head coins seems particularly convincing (236-40).  On the royal pages see Nicholas 
G. L. Hammond, “Royal Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys trained in the Macedonian Manner during the 
Period of the Temenid Monarchy,” Historia 39 (1990): 261-290; however, Hammond’s finding is not 
ironclad – it depends on the veracity of much later sources.  For somewhat later (late 4th century-early 3rd 
century), but more secure, connections see Stavros A. Paspalas, “On Persian-Type Furniture in Macedonia: 
the Recognition and Transmission of Forms,” American Journal of Archaeology 104 (2000): 531-560 and, 
of course, Dietmar Kienast, Philipp II von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden (Munich: Fink, 
1973) on the influence of Persian monarchy on Philip’s Macedonia. 
82 Hammond, History of Macedonia II, 138.  However, cf. Greenwalt, “Production of Coinage,” 112-6.     
83 Diod. 13.49.1. 
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urbanization suggest that the king did not see a growth in anti-monarchic sentiment as the 
inevitable result of his policies.84  In sum, there is little reason to suppose that 
urbanization necessarily promoted democratic thinking among the Macedonian populace. 
In addition to his civic reforms, Archelaos also increased the efforts at 
hellenization that had characterized Argead rule at least since the time of Alexander I.  
The most concrete evidence of Archelaos’ hellenizing efforts was the construction of a 
new palace at Pella, painted by no less than Zeuxis.85  In addition to the famous artist, 
Archelaus gathered a veritable cohort of Greek cultural icons at his court.86  Like 
Alexander I, he revisited the myth of Argead origins, with an Archelaos now taking the 
place of Perdiccas as the founder of the dynasty.87  Moreover, he established an Olympic 
festival, complete with sporting and dramatic contests, at Dion, in Macedonia, in honor of 
Zeus and the Muses.88  As participation in games was a critical component of Hellenic 
identity, the establishment of this festival was an unmistakable statement of Macedonia’s 
equal participation within the Hellenic world.89  The games would also have served a 
                                                        
84 For all we know, the civic structure of a Greek colony under Macedonian rule may have been different 
than that of a native Macedonian city.  Again, the Persian Empire could provide a model for the rule of 
disparate peoples, with their own local civic structures, by an overarching Persian organization. 
85 Ael. Var. Hist. 14.17.  Pella has been extensively excavated; see especially Petsas, Photios M. Pella. 
Alexander the Great’s Capital (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978).     
86 Besides Zeuxis, we know of Choerilus of Samos, the epic poet, (Athen. 8.345d; Suid. Choerilus (X 595); 
Timotheus of Miletus, the musician (Plut. Mor. 177B); Agathon, the tragedian from Athens (Ael. Var. Hist. 
2.21, 13.4; Schol. Aris. Frogs 85; Plut. Mor. A/B; and Euripides (Ael. Var. Hist. 13.4; Aris. Pol. 1311b; 
Athen. 13.5998 d-e; Plut. Mor. 177 A; St. Byz. Bormiskos).  
87 So Euripides, Archelaos, which connects the original Archelaos with the foundation of Aegae.   
88 There is some confusion as to whether the Olympics were held at Aegae (as stated by Arr. 1.11.1) or at 
Dion (so Diod. 17.16.3-4).  Hammond, History of Macedonia II, 150, proposed that Archelaos merely 
moved the Olympic festival from Aegae to Dion.  We know, however, that there was a sanctuary to Zeus at 
Dion: for bibliography see Borza, Shadow of Olympus, 173-4.   
89 Badian, “Greeks and Macedonians,” 35, has seen a connection between these games and Greek 
antagonism to Archelaos’ hellenicity, concluding that these games were de facto a “counter-Olympics” 
probably set up after Archelaos had tried, and failed, to gain entry into the games at Olympia.  I think his 
conclusion makes too much of the fact that Thrasymachus called Archelaos a barbarian (frag. 2); the plain 
fact is that the Argeads could be either Greeks or barbarians depending on the given speaker and the given 
circumstances, and Thrasymachus’ comment need not be reflective of an (unkown) decision of the 
hellanodikai concerning Archelaos.  I agree here with Greenwalt, “Archelaus the philhellene,” 145-6, that 
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unitive function, as participants from all over Archelaos’ kingdom, both native and 
Greek, would have been encouraged to congregate at the games.90  It follows that we 
might also imagine the foundation of palaestrae and local systems of education on a new 
scale in Macedonia.91 Thus Archelaos’ games furthered the same basic agenda as his 
other reforms: namely, the unification and urbanization of his kingdom. 
There was, however, another possible motivation behind Archelaos’ 
establishment of games.  For while participation in the games was open to all, some 
pursuits, especially chariot racing, served rather to indicate those individuals of high 
social status who could afford to own and train horses for such pursuits.92  Victory in 
such high status competitions bolstered one’s social standing and could even serve as 
justification for autocratic rule.  Athenian history gives eloquent testimony to the 
connection between games and political standing, and the same was true for the rest of 
the Greek world.93  Seen in this light, the two Olympic victories of Alexander I, even if 
they were in the footrace and in the pentathlon, take on new meaning not only as proof of 
his Greek origins but also as indicators of his noble birth and his right to the throne.  It                                                                                                                                                                      
the point of the Olympics at Dion was to allow participation for non-Argead Macedonians alongside the 
Argead rulers. 
90 See Greenwalt, “Archelaus the philhellene,” 145-149.   
91 See ibid., 146-7 and David Pritchard, “Athletics, Education, and Participation in Classical Athens,” in 
Sport and Festival in the Ancient World, ed. David Phillips and David Pritchard (Swansea: Classical Press 
of Wales, 2003), 293-349, for an Athenian parallel. Certainly there was a well-developed system of sports 
and education at the local level in Macedonia by the mid-2nd century BCE, as the gymnasiarch law of 
Beroia shows.  Whether this can be used as evidence for the late 5th century, however, is another matter.  
On the gymnasiarch law see Philippe Gauthier and Miltiades Hatzopoulos, La Loi Gymnasiarchique de 
Béroia (Paris: de Boccard, 1993).  cf. also Papazoglou, “Polis et Souveraineté.” 
92 On the importance of games for Hellenic and aristocratic identity see Hall, History of the Archaic Greek 
World, 270-73 and Nigel James Nicholson, Aristocracy and Athletics in Archaic and Classical Greece 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
93 Cylon’s attempted coup came after his Olympic victory in the footrace (Thuc. 1.126.3-7); so too, 
Peisistratus allowed Cimon to return from exile in return for being declared the Olympic victor for a chariot 
race Cimon had won (Hdt. 6.103); Alcibiades begins his speech on behalf of the Sicilian expedition with an 
account of his Olympic victories (Thuc. 6.16.2): see Mark Golden, Sport and Society in Ancient Greece 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 5.  On shifting paradigms of aristocratic control of 
athletics and victory in the 5th and 4th centuries see Nicholson, Aristocracy and Athletics. 
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seems possible, too, that Archelaos’ establishment of a Macedonian Olympics could have 
added to the prestige of the Argead clan within the Macedonian aristocracy, whose 
members were becoming increasingly prosperous along with the country as a whole.  So 
too, we know from Arrian that the sacrifices to Zeus at Dion, which were held alongside 
the games, had special importance for the Argead clan (1.11); adding games would have 
augmented the prestige of the festival, and consequently of the Argeads themselves.94   
While such arguments must remain largely in the realm of speculation, it seems possible 
that the Olympics at Dion might have played a dual role in bringing together 
geographically diverse members of the Macedonian kingdom and, at the same time, 
reinforcing Argead preeminence in the social hierarchy.   
Some conclusions about the nature of the early Macedonian monarchy can now be 
drawn.  Most importantly, the idea of a pan-Macedonian kingship was an Argead 
ideology disseminated by the kings and had no a priori validity in the Macedonian 
context.  As the Argeads extended their influence over the course of the 5th century, they 
were confronted by tribal organizations on the one hand, and Greek colonies on the other 
hand, none of which had any prior commitment to a Macedonian state or an Argead king.  
It follows that the Argeads’ most pressing problem during this time of expansion and 
unification was the tension between national/monarchic forces and local concerns.  This 
disunity among the people subject to Macedonian rule was the fuel for Archelaos, who 
sought to strengthening the Macedonian military.  In the process, he also urbanized and 
Hellenized the kingdom he had inherited.  The Hellenic influence on Macedonia and the                                                         
94 I am reminded, for example, of the Peisistratids’ involvement in the Panathenaic games, which it is likely 
that they did in order to garner popular good will and foster Athenian civic identity.  See Donald Kyle, 
Athletics in Ancient Athens (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 28-31.  On the goodwill and popularity a tyrant could 
hope to garner from staging games, and for an interesting parallel between kingship and archonship at the 
games, see Xen. Hiero 9. 
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Argead court, however, should not blind us to the other monarchies, and particularly 
Persia, which served as models for the successful integration of Greek culture within a 
monarchic system of government.   
The Kingship of Philip II 
The previous examination of early Macedonian kingship has several important 
consequences for the reign of Philip II.  For one thing, Philip II, like his predecessor 
Archelaos – and indeed like most of the Macedonian kings – was faced with a disunited 
kingdom when he came to power.95  One of his primary concerns throughout his reign 
was to create unity out of an ethnically, socially, and economically disparate people.  
Paradoxically, however, this disunity created a certain freedom in redefining the king’s 
role: a king of Macedonia could have just as much institutional power as he could 
manage to take and, furthermore, could adopt non-Macedonian traditions.   Indeed, it is 
noteworthy that the kings of Macedonia – unlike neighboring kings – were not styled ὁ 
βασιλεύς, but rather were addressed by name.  The lack of a formal title supports the 
idea that the king’s power was individual rather than institutional.96  It follows that non-
Macedonian paradigms of Macedonian kingship had the potential to palpably affect 
Macedonian reality.  We have already seen this tendency in Alexander I’s claims to 
kingship over a greater Macedonia and in Archelaos’ reforms: both kings used Greek and 
                                                        
95 Archelaos’ success proved to be of short duration – he was assassinated in 399 BCE, and Macedonia 
sank back into dysfunctional turmoil for the next 40 years.  Disunity was thus once again the first and 
foremost problem which confronted Philip when he ascended to the throne in 360 BCE.  On the date of 
Philip’s ascension I follow Miltiades Hatzopoulos, “The Oleveni Inscription and the dates of Philip II’s 
reign,” in Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian Heritage, ed. W. L. Adams and Eugene 
Borza (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982),  and disregarding the fact that Philip in these 
first years may only have been acting regent for his nephew Amyntas rather than king in his own right; 
Amyntas’ youth means that Philip was de facto king, whatever his title.   
96 See Errington, Macedonian Royal Style and also Carney, Legitimacy and Female Political Action, 370. 
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Persian ideologies at their own convenience to bolster their own power.  In this respect, 
too, Philip followed in the footsteps of his predecessors.    
Like Archelaus, Philip was an innovator; at the same time, the reign of Philip has 
left us much more evidence from which to calculate the extent of these changes.  Like 
Archelaus, Philip’s primary aim was military – explicitly so in the reforms which he 
instituted in the very first years of his reign – though, again, they also brought about a 
range of social and economic changes.97 My focus here is primarily on the social changes 
that occurred during Philip’s reign, and their implications for the way Philip understood 
and recast his role as king of Macedonia; but it is important to note at the outset that the 
majority of these changes were probably made out of concern for, or are the results of, 
military reforms.98  Like Archelaos, Philip brought greater unity and organization to his 
kingdom through a multi-faceted approach that combined population movements with the 
creation of strong personal ties between Macedonians of various social levels and the 
king.    
 Philip’s reign saw a remarkable widening in the number of individuals actively 
participating in the civic institutions of Macedonia.  This widening is evident from the 
lowest to the highest ranks and appears to have begun in the first year of Philip’s reign, 
when he had the pressing task of filling the ranks of a Macedonian army decimated by the 
Illyrians in advance of another Illyrian incursion.99  While it is unclear how exactly he 
                                                        
97 See Griffith’s eloquent summation, History of Macedonia II, 405-408.  Ellis, “Dynamics of Fourth-
Century Macedonian Imperialism,” persuasively argues that the grown of the Macedonian army and its 
nearly constant activity proved a powerful unifier of peoples and tribes under Philip’s rule. 
98 Philip’s military reforms have come under close scrutiny.  See particularly Hammond, Philip of 
Macedon, ch. 3; Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 405-449.  
99 Diodorus 16.2.5 reports that more than 4,000 Macedonians had died in the battle.  Even if this number is 
exaggerated – and doubtless it is -  this was an incredible loss for Philip to make up for in just a year.  
Nevertheless, he had a force of 10,000 footsoldiers and 600 cavalry with him in his next encounter with the 
Illyrians (Diod. 16.4.3).   
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accomplished this feat, Philip’s actions following the victory against the Illyrians and his 
subsequent annexation of Upper Macedonia are indicative of his concern to access new 
sources of manpower.  Thus Philip founded the city of Heraclea Lyncestis in Upper 
Macedonia at this time, providing that rural territory a civic center which could make it 
easier to organize the local population and, consequently, draft men into the army.100  
While this is the only foundation we can be sure of, it seems likely that it was not Philip’s 
only initiative in city-building.  He also allowed Upper Macedonian nobility to gain 
positions of importance in his court, thus tapping into pre-existing sources of local 
power.101  Philip’s employment of Upper Macedonian hierarchies in his own service also 
points to the success of Argead propaganda, which had always sought to assert the 
Argeads’ right to rule over Upper as well as Lower Macedonia. 
 The foundation of Heraclea Lyncestis in Upper Macedonia is symptomatic of 
Philip’s continuation of the policies that had made Archelaus’ reign so successful.  
Located in a mountainous area, with a transhumant population and difficult systems of 
communication, the city linked the upper echelons of Macedonia’s centralized 
government (e.g., the king and his court) and the local civic administration of the 
Lyncestian populace.102  Local authorities would have been in charge of drafting men into 
the army, which was arranged according to regional groupings.103  By providing soldiers 
with weapons and armor rather than expecting them to carry their own, as was the                                                         
100 On Heraclea Lyncestis, see Hammond, Philip of Macedon, 27; R. Katičić, “Lynkos und die Lynkesten,” 
Beiträge zur Namenforschung 13 (1962): 126-143. 
101 See Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 396.  In this context, one might also take note of Alexander’s 
famous allegation that ‘Philip found the Macedonians as uncivilized pastoralists and created out of them a 
modern, civilized fighting force’ (Arr. 7.9.2).   
102 Indeed, Heracleia Lyncestis remained the only major center in Lyncestis through the Roman period.  See 
Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions, 88.  Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions, 96-104 argues that the 
local institutions of Upper Macedonia remained much the same from archaic to Roman times, being based 
throughout on federations of villages [κώμαι]. 
103 Arr. 3.16.11 and Diod. 17.57.2.  See Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 426. 
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practice of the Greek states and probably of his predecessors, Philip was able to co-opt 
the poorer classes into the army and thereby increase the levy.104   Like Archelaus, too, 
Philip followed the practice of population transplants.  Philip would settled Macedonians 
– in greater or smaller numbers – in the predominantly Greek cities which came under his 
control.105  Such a policy not only secured the loyalty of areas that would have chaffed 
under Macedonian rule, but also increased the number of loyal propertied Macedonians 
by redistributing land seized in war – men who could subsequently be expected to 
provide their own weapons and armor in the service of the king.106  The lower classes 
could expect to be rewarded for service with spoils of war along with pay, if not grants of 
newly-acquired land.107  The best soldiers might also serve among the king’s Foot 
Companions [πεζέταιροι], a professional force which was active year round, unlike the 
rest of the army.108  All these reforms show that Philip, like Archelaos, succeeded in 
drawing on a larger pool of landed men capable of serving in the army, and in doing so 
more efficiently, than had any of his predecessors.  As his conquests multiplied, Philip 
would have been able to offer his troops ever larger possibilities of material gain and 
advancement.    
 Philip’s reign also saw the opening of new opportunities for advancement among 
the aristocracy.  Philip’s court and the ranks of the king’s Companions, the ἑταῖροι, 
included men from Upper Macedonia and Greeks of various backgrounds in addition to                                                         
104 See Diod. 16.3.1.  It seems unlikely that Philip was able to do so early in his reign, however, because 
this would have required substantial funds which Macedonia simply didn’t have at the time of his 
ascension.   
105 Philip’s population transplants are described by Just. 8.5.7-6.2; see also Diod. 8.6 on Crenides (Philippi) 
and Steph. 666 on Philippi and Philippopolis.  On Philip’s policy toward Pydna and the cities of the 
Chalcidice see Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions, 179-199. 
106 See Hatzopoulos, Macedonian Institutions, 270. 
107 We know that Alexander’s army was paid, and paid according to their rank; it is justified to see this as a 
continuation of his father’s policy: see Ellis, Philip II, 54-55; Hammond, Philip of Macedon, 39.   
108 Theop. F 348; see Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 414-419 and Ellis, Philip II, 53.  
  53 
the traditional aristocrats of Lower Macedonia.109  Even Theopompus’ and Demosthenes’ 
excoriating accounts make clear that Philip prized skill in war and diplomacy above 
origin and ancestral rank.110  Because many of these individuals – such as many of the 
Upper Macedonians, for example - would not have been drawn to the courts of Philip’s 
predecessors, the sheer number of Companions at Philip’s court was probably greater 
than it had ever been before.111  No distinction, again, seems to have been made between 
Upper Macedonians and Lower Macedonians.112  The fact that the Argeads had claimed 
supremacy over these peoples for more than a century must have only further confirmed 
the equality of the disparate Macedonian tribes within Philip’s court.113  By expanding 
the ties of personal loyalty that had already been in existence between the aristocracy and 
the king before his ascension, Philip was able to unify the disparate elements of the 
Macedonian kingdom under his control. 
 Marriage was another key aspect of Philip’s policy of unification.  The practice of 
polygamy among Macedonian royalty allowed the monarch to use marriage as a 
guarantee of the loyalty of his subject peoples and his neighbors.114  Philip was, of 
                                                        
109 Though it is noteworthy that no Greeks appear in positions of military importance. 
110 Theop. F 224; Dem. 2.17-19; also Isoc. To Philip 18-19.   
111 See Theop. F 224-5, which estimates the number of Philip’s Companions at something under 800.  
Theopompus’ calculation was based on the latter part of Philip’s reign.  That Alexander further enlarged 
the ranks of the Companions by extending the title to much of his cavalry is also suggestive for his father’s 
policy: see Anaxim. F 4. 
112 Though it is interesting to note that under the surface regional tensions probably continued to simmer:  
see A. B. Bosworth, “Philip II and Upper Macedonia,”Classical Quarterly 21 (1971): 93-105, who suggests 
that Philip was murdered by an Upper Macedonian conspiracy precisely because his last marriage to a 
woman of Lower Macedonian ancestry, Cleopatra, raised old rivalries that had not been a factor earlier in 
Philip’s reign.    
113 The same can be said of the Royal Pages, for which see especially Nicholas G. L. Hammond, “Royal 
Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys Trained in the Macedonian Manner during the Period of the Temenid 
Monarchy,” Historia 39 (1990): 261-290. 
114 Probably all the Argead monarchs practiced polygamy, though we have virtually no information on any 
royal wives before Philip’s reign.  See especially Elizabeth Carney, Women and Monarchy in Macedonia 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000) and William Greenwalt, “Polygamy and Succession in 
Argead Macedonia,” Arethusa 22 (1989): 19-45.   
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course, not the first Macedonian king to use marriage as a way of assuring his political 
alliances.115  He does, however, seem to have employed this political tool on an 
unprecedented scale: by the end of his life he had married a total of seven wives.  Five of 
these marriages were contracted in the early years of his reign, when he most needed to 
establish himself and make friendly connections.116  While not all of Philip’s marriages 
were made on or after campaigns, all of them were to some degree politically 
motivated.117  Royal marriages were contracted as a matter of political expediency and 
created a personal relationship between the two families involved.  Thus Philip’s use of 
marriage bolsters the view that his kingship, as well as that of every Argead, was founded 
on personal loyalty and relationships contracted directly with the king.  
 Philip seems to have employed much the same policy of building strong 
individual connections in his dealings with the Greek world.  This is, indeed, the way 
Polybius interpreted the connections between Philip and many of the leading Greeks of 
his day.  Arguing against Demosthenes’ view that these individuals were traitors, 
Polybius affirms that such men were simply trying to benefit their own poleis in creating 
personal ties to Philip (18.14).  Again, Philip was not an innovator in this respect: we 
                                                        
115 So for example the sister of Alexander I married Bubares, a high-ranking Persian, during the period of 
Macedonian subjection to Persia before the Persian Wars: Hdt. 5.21.  The marriage of the Bacchiad 
Eurydice, Philip’s mother, to Amyntas similarly was an attempt to solidify the northern border of 
Macedonia: see William Greenwalt, “Amyntas III and the Political Stability of Argead Macedonia,” 
Ancient World 18 (1988): 35-44.  
116 On Philip’s marriages and their political nature see Carney, Women and Monarchy, 3. 
117 The notion that Philip married κατὰ πόλεμον is that of Athenaeus in his famous passage concerning 
Philip’s marriages (Deipnosophistai 13.557b-e), and it has been notoriously problematic: see Adrian 
Tronson, “Satyrus the Peripatetic and the Marriages of Philip II,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 104 (1984): 
116-126.  Also vexing is Satyrus’ notion that Philip’s last marriage, to a Macedonian named Cleopatra, was 
a love-affair; this interpretation has been, however, discredited; The marriage was probably contracted 
solidify Philip’s position among the Macedonian aristocracy while on the Persian campaign; see Carney, 
Women and Monarchy, 70-75 and Elizabeth Carney, “ The Politics of Polygamy: Olympias, Alexander and 
the Murder of Philip,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 41 (1992): 169-189.  See also Ernst Badian, 
“The Death of Philip II,” Phoenix 17 (1963): 244-250 on the politically charged implications of the 
marriage of Philip’s daughter Cleopatra shortly thereafter. 
  55 
know of a number of private contracts made between individuals and previous 
Macedonian kings.118  Argead patronage of the arts went hand in hand with the 
development of such personal friendships with members the Greek aristocracy.  I have 
already mentioned this policy in connection with Archelaus (see above, p. 45); Philip, 
too, was well known as a patron of artists – so much so, in fact,  that actors were 
specifically targeted as particularly efficacious envoys to Philip’s court.119  Yet both 
patronage of the arts and personal friendships with Greeks were informal connections and  
did not guarantee the king influence over southern Greek politics; indeed, in democratic 
states they might actually prove harmful, as Philip’s connections lay among the 
aristocracy.120   
In Macedonia, Philip solidified his rule and unified his holdings by fostering 
personal relationships with individual Macedonians of all social levels and regional 
affiliations.  He also built on the success of his predecessor Archelaos by establishing 
cities and organizing the population under his rule.  Yet such strategies by themselves 
were not enough to garner Philip influence over the Greeks; he would have to find new 
ways of building control over and accessing the resources of the south. In the next 
section, I turn to Philip’s bid for formal power within the Greek world, and in particular 
to his relations with the Thessalians and the establishment of the League of Corinth.  
While Philip’s engagement with the Greeks is a much more complex topic than I can 
fully address here, I take these two events - that is, Philip’s election as tagos of the                                                         
118  Thus Andocides attempted to use his relationship with Archelaus to secure a deal for oars for Athens 
and thereby gain return from exile (Andoc. 2.11).  Amyntas III gave a gift of timber to the general 
Timotheus for his services to Macedonia (Dem. 49.26-30).  As well, I mentioned above the close 
connections that existed between the Argeads and the Peisistratids (ff. 18).   
119 Se Aeschin. 2.15 concerning Aristodemus the actor; Aeschines, of course, was a former actor himself.  
See also Dem. 19.10 on Ischander and 19.192-195 on Satyrus.   
120 Perhaps most telling in this respect is Demosthenes’ allegation that Xenophron, son of one of the Thirty 
Tyrants, lived in Pella (19.196).  Aeschines, however, calls him a Macedonian (2.4, 2.153-8).   
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Thessalian League and his role in establishing the League of Corinth - as symptomatic of 
his negotiation of a new role for the Macedonian king within the Greek context.  I argue 
that the Argead ability to co-opt Hellenic and Persian paradigms set a precedent for 
Philip’s success in crafting his new relations with the poleis.   
Philip and Thessaly 
Arguably Philip’s most important step in gaining access to the Greek political 
world was his assumption of leadership in Thessaly.  It was in this guise that his serious 
involvement in the politics of central Greece began, thus setting off a chain of events that 
would lead him down the path to becoming the greatest power in mainland Greece.  
Although previous Macedonian kings had involved themselves in the confused politics of 
Thessaly, Philip’s assumption of leadership over the Thessalians was a unique event.121  
The details of Philip’s early engagement in Thessaly are difficult to piece together, but 
the end result is secure: Philip was elected to the position of tagos by the Thessalian 
League, probably in 352 BCE and certainly by 349/8 BCE.122  His new position gave him 
the use of the famous Thessalian cavalry, access to a large source of tax revenue as well 
as the strategic port of Pagasae, and some control over the Thessalians’ votes in the 
Amphictyonic League.                                                           
121 Alexander II, the son of Amyntas and Philip’s older brother, had attempted to impose his own rule on 
Thessaly in the early 360s after being invited in by the Aleuadae of Larissa (Diod. 16.14.1).  On the 
extraordinary nature of Philip’s election see also Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 285-95. 
122 Philip intervened on behalf of the League as early as 358, at which point he also married Philinna of 
Larissa.  In 353/2 he intervened decisively on the League’s behalf by defeating Onomarchus the Phocian, 
who had been called in to Thessaly by Pherae, and seizing Pherae itself.  He also married Nikesipolis of 
Pherae.  He was most likely elected tagos of the League at this point.  The tagos was the special title given 
to leaders of the Thessalian League, who were sometimes also called kings, archons, or tetrarchs: see 
Bruno Helly, L’État Thessalien, Aleuas le Roux, les théâtres et les “Tagoi” (Lyons: Orient Méditerranéen, 
1995), ch. 1 on the origin and use of the word tagos. On Philip’s early involvement in Thessaly see Thomas 
Martin, “A Phantom Fragment of Theopompus and Philip II’s Early Campaign in Thessaly,” Harvard 
Studies in Classical Philology (1982): 55-78, G. T. Griffith, “Philip of Macedon’s Early Interventions in 
Thessaly (358-353 B.C.),” Classical Quarterly 10 (1970): 67-80, and Thomas Martin, “Diodorus on Philip 
II and Thessaly in the 350’s B.C.,” Classical Philology 76 (1981): 188-201. 
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The growth of Philip’s power in Thessaly is a testament to his unique 
combination of military and political skill, a combination that he had already honed in his 
dealings with Macedonians.  As before, military victories played a vital role in endearing 
him to the Thessalians: Philip’s defeat of the Phocian Onomarchus in 352 BCE, after 
having suffered a spectacular set-back at the hands of that general just one year earlier, 
was particularly critical.  Yet various sources also testify to Philip’s political acumen in 
uniting and holding on a position of leadership in the Thessalian League.  By all 
accounts, the Thessalians were not easy to deal with.123  Philip’s approach to the 
seemingly intractable rivalries which regularly tore Thessaly apart is also similar to that 
he employed in winning over the disparate tribes of Macedonians.   
Philip’s success in Thessaly need not be ascribed solely to his own genius.  There 
are fundamental correspondences between Thessalian and Macedonian institutions which 
helped Philip move readily from the one to the other.  Thessaly’s evolution from a tribal 
to a polis-dominated culture was slower than that of the other Greeks to the south, and 
even in the 4th century traditional aristocratic families dominated a landscape of penestai, 
or serfs, a small contingent of poor but free Thessalians, and the perioikoi, weak Greek 
ἔθνη who lived around the borders of Thessaly proper.124  The Thessalian League, and 
with it the position of the tagos, was probably instituted in the late 6th century.  The tagos 
was elected to his office and in origin seems to have been a military leader responsible 
for a specific campaign.  The role of the tagos, however, quickly outstripped these 
                                                        
123 Isoc. Epistle II 20; Dem. 1.22. 
124 On the development of early Thessaly see Marta Sordi, La Lega Tessala Fino ad Alessandro Magno 
(Rome: Instituto Italiano per la Storia Antica: 1958); also Thomas Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in 
Classical Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), ch. 3 and H. D. Westlake, Thessaly in the 
Fourth Century B.C. (London: Methuen, 1935), chs. 1 and 2. 
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boundaries.125 For example, the tagos came to be a life-long position, and his power 
became such that Herodotus and Pindar called the leader of Thessaly a king.126  In 
addition, both Thessaly and Macedonia had been urbanized late, and even then never to 
the extent of the southern Greeks; both were created out of an amalgam of members from 
a single powerful ἔθνος surrounded by tribes or other ἔθνη who were at various times 
more or less dependent on the rulers of the central ἔθνος; both were dominated by an 
aristocratic class and both were led by an individual whose power could also vary 
depending on historical circumstance.127  Thus there was much similarity between the 
two regions socially, if not economically.  The institutional parallels between Thessalian 
and Macedonian society go far in explaining the ease with which Philip crossed the 
boundary between them, as the skills which Philip had honed in his early years at the 
Macedonian court were easily translatable into a Thessalian context.    
Philip employed a mixture of astute propaganda and force to consolidate his 
newfound power.128  The greatest problem confronting Thessaly at the time was an 
ongoing feud between the Aleuads of Larissa and the tyrants of Pherae; indeed, it was the 
Aleuads who had originally invited Philip in to help them defeat Pherae.  The cessation of 
civil strife was thus the most important concern of the new tagos - and strong leadership 
                                                        
125 On the Thessalian League and the tagos as a military institution see Helly, L’État Thessalien, passim; 
Marta Sordi, “I tagoi tessali come suprema magistratura militare del koinon tessalico,” Topoi 7 (1997): 
177-82; Fritz Gschnitzer, “Zum Tagos der Thessaler,” Anzeiger für die Altertumswissenschaft 
Humanistischen Gesselschaft 7 (1954): 191-2. 
126 Hdt. 5.63.3; 7.6.2; Pindar Pyth. 10 l. 3. 
127 Helly, L’État Thessalien pp.26-27, has also collected evidence for the appearance of tagoi as then 
nomenclature for local magistrates in Macedonia.  The evidence is Hellenistic, but gives further weight to 
the existence of a particularly strong connection between Thessalian and Macedonian social and political 
structures. 
128 Philip set up garrisons in some Thessalian cities (Dem. 1.21-2; 19.260; [Dem.] 7.32); particularly telling 
is the case of Gomphi, which changed its name to Philippopolis; he change of name suggests that the city 
rebelled and was later refounded by Philip (Steph. s.v. “Philippoi”).  On Philip’s military interventions in 
Thessaly see also Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 218-30.  
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and a knack for unification was precisely what Philip had to offer.  The close historical 
links between Macedonia and Thessaly would have made Philip less of a foreign 
presence here than he would be further to the south.  Philip’s personal demeanor, 
moreover, appealed to the Thessalians, who had the same aristocratic culture and heavy 
drinking practices as their northern neighbors.129  Philip could also leverage his Heraclid 
ancestry in his favor, as the Aleuads of Larissa also claimed descent from that hero.   
Finally, Philip contracted two strategic marriages, the first of which connected him to the 
Larissaeans and the later to the tyrants of Pherae.130  These two marriages would have 
indicated to the Thessalians, and particularly to the Pheraeans, that Philip meant to be 
evenhanded in his policy toward the rival factions.   
Philip also employed Thessalian religious sentiment to portray himself as a 
rightful leader.  His use of specifically Thessalian sacred precedent is evident in the 
famous story of the battle of the Crocus Field.131  According to Justin’s account, Philip 
ordered his men to crown themselves with laurel in honor of Apollo before their battle 
against Onomarchus and the Phocians, thus symbolizing Philip’s role as champion of 
                                                        
129 Theop. F 162.  On the distinctive nature of Macedonian symposia as oppose to Greek symposia see 
Elizabeth Carney, “Symposia and the Macedonian elite: the Unmixed Life,” Syllecta Classica 18 (2007): 
129-180. 
130 Philip married Philinna of Larissa probably in 358 or 357 BCE.  Whether she was a member of the 
Aleuad clan is in question, but equally unlikely are the claims that she was a whore (Plut. Alex. 77.5; Just. 
9.8.2, 13.2.11; Athen. 13.578a).  See Carney, Women and Monarchy, 61-2 and Griffith, Philip of 
Macedon’s Early Interventions in Thessaly, 69-72. 
131 This has been argued by Slavomir Sprawski, “All the King’s Men: Thessalians and Philip II’s designs 
on Greece,” in Society and Religions: Studies in Greek and Roman History, ed. Danuta Musial  (Torun: 
Nicolaus Copernicus University, 2005), 40-42.  That Philip’s use of religious precedent was suggested by 
his Thessalian friends seems reasonable, though it is obviously not a claim that can be proven.  It is also 
reasonable to suppose that Philip, with his love of games, would have found the tradition a particularly 
compelling one.  The Battle of the Crocus Field was one of the most important events in the Third Sacred 
War, which initially began as a dispute between the Phocians and the Thebans.  It pitted the Phocians, with 
the Athenians and Spartans as their major allies, against the Amphictyony as represented by the Thebans, 
with the Thessalians and later Philip on their side.  See John Buckler, Philip II and the Sacred War (Leiden: 
Brill, 1989); on the outbreak of the war see also Buckler and Beck, Central Greece and the Politics of 
Power, ch. 14.  
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Delphi.132  Onomarchus lost, and all survivors were thrown into the sea as punishment for 
their sacrilege.133  While Philip’s assumption of the role of Apollo’s champion has 
obvious significance within the larger Hellenic world, it also has particular Thessalian 
connotations.134  During the Pythian Games, it was a custom for a sacred procession to go 
from the Tempe Valley in Thessaly to Delphi carrying laurels for crowning the winners; 
the Pythian Games themselves were held in honor of an Amphictyonic victory over the 
sacrilegists of Krissa.  The crowning of Philip’s soldiers with laurel in order to avenge a 
sacrilege against Delphi, then, could be seen as a reenactment of this Thessalian tradition.  
We know, moreover, that Philip personally supervised the Pythian Games held in 346 
BCE, after the Phocians’ capitulation: this also would have had symbolic importance as a 
further reenactment of the Thessalian tradition.  It thus seems likely that Philip’s actions 
at the battle of the Crocus Field were meant to cast him in a specifically Thessalian role.  
In the story of the laurel wreaths we should see another of Philip’s efforts to identify 
himself as a legitimate tagos, one who defended the Thessalians’ reputation and interests 
abroad and who was conversant with Thessalian tradition.     
Philip’s reorganization of the Thessalian tetrarchies also points to the way he 
employed native Thessalian traditions to his own benefit without seeking to impose the  
monarchic control that he enjoyed over Macedonia over the Thessalians.  While early in 
the history of the League Thessaly had been divided into tetrarchies under the control of 
the tagos, in the 5th century each tetrarchy came under the jurisdiction of an annually 
                                                        
132 Just. 8.2.1-4. 
133 Diod. 16.35.6; 61.2. 
134 The role of Apollo’s champion was one that Philip himself had an affinity for, as the cult of Apollo in 
Macedonia was quite strong: see Ulla Westermark, “Apollo in Macedonia,” in Opus Mixtum: Essays in 
Ancient Art and Society, ed. E Rystedt et al. (Stockholm: Paul Aström, 1994), on the head of Apollo on 
Macedonian coins.  
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elected polemarch.135  Philip instituted tetradarchs, who were to be appointed by the 
tagos rather than elected by the League – as the original tetrarchs seem to have been.136 
While this shift was perceived by some, such as Demosthenes, as the stifling of 
Thessalian freedom, it could also have been favorably viewed as a return to a more 
traditional form of organization.137  Indeed, that Demosthenes’ horror stories of 
Thessalian slavery are wild exaggerations is further confirmed by the continuing 
production of individual city coinage within Thessaly.138  Philip’s appropriation of tax 
revenue from trade, another mark of outrage for the orator, was also a reasonable 
prerogative for a tagos who had to defray the costs of his campaigns, and was probably 
well within Philip’s rights.139  The Thessalian League itself retained some independency 
from the Macedonian tagos, as is particularly clear in its foreign policy decisions.  In 
sum, Philip worked within the traditional parameters of the tagos – modifying those 
parameters, it is true, when he felt it necessary, but doing so in accordance with 
Thessalian tradition rather than against it.   
The Amphictyony and the League of Corinth   Thus far I have shown that Philip’s use of Thessalian norms and customs speaks 
to his desire to integrate himself as seamlessly as possible into Thessalian society.  I have 
also argued that the similarities between Macedonia and Thessaly allowed Philip to 
employ political strategies that he and his Argead predecessors had successfully 
employed in Macedonia.  The problems which Philip faced in his dealings with the                                                         
135 See Fritz Gschnitzer, “Namen und Wesen der Thessalischen Tetraden,” Hermes 82 (1954):451-464 and 
Sordi, Lega Tessala, 313-320. 
136 See Helly, L’État Thessalien, 39-68. 
137 See Dem. 9.26.  Demosthenes’ argument (and his reference to a phantom Thessalian ‘dekadarchy’) are 
discussed by Helly, L’État Thessalien, 55-62 and Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 527-34.   
138 As argued by Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage. 
139 See Dem. 22. 
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southern Greeks, however, proved quite different.  Philip had no desire to establish a 
monarchy over the poleis; nor does he appear to have been particularly interested in 
expanding his direct power over these Greek poleis.  Philip’s policy was, above all, 
geared toward protecting Macedonian interests, and that included protecting Macedonia 
and the northern Aegean from southern Greek meddling.  In the hopes of establishing his 
right to these lands, Philip sought to create a panhellenic treaty which would force the 
Greeks, and particularly the Athenians, to acknowledge his claims to the Chalcidice.  Yet 
Philip had to find new structural solutions for enforcing his will over the fractious poleis: 
direct rule of the sort he exercised in Macedonia and Thessaly was simply not a viable 
option, even had he wanted it.  The establishment of the League of Corinth, which 
effectively solidified Philip’s claim to primacy among the Greeks, stands as a testament 
to the king’s ingenuity in integrating the Greek poleis into the Macedonian sphere of 
influence. 
Philip’s innovative approach in trying to expand his influence south of 
Thermopylae is apparent in his settlement of 346 BCE, the year he single-handedly put 
an end to the Third Sacred War by forcing the latest (and last) Phocian general to flee the 
country, thus leaving Phocis unprotected.  In gratitude for Philip’s help, the 
Amphictyonic council, led by Thebes and Thessaly, decided to give the Phocians’ two 
votes in the council to Philip and his descendants.  The king also received a host of other 
honors: a place among the naopoioi, who were responsible for the upkeep of the temple, 
the presidency of the Pythian Games, and the right of promanteia, which the Athenians 
had formerly enjoyed.140  Philip’s inclusion among the Amphictyonic members solidified 
his newly gained prestige within the panhellenic community and acknowledged the                                                         
140 Diod. 16.60.1-4 and Justin 8.5.4-6. 
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shifting balance of power in the Greek world.  At the same time, it gave Philip the ability 
to participate in Greek affairs in his own right rather than as the representative of the 
Thessalians.141   
It is unlikely that Philip saw his newfound position within the League as a 
springboard for further aggrandizement in Greece at this time.142   Instead, he seems to 
have desired a cessation of the constant conflicts that plagued the poleis and, in turn, the 
security of his own territory from Greek, and particularly Athenian, machinations.143  
After the defeat of the Phocians, Philip meant to turn his military aspirations elsewhere: 
notably, Diodorus links the end of the Sacred War with Philip’s plans to make an 
expedition against Persia.144  Indeed, after Philip had settled Greek affairs in 346 he 
turned his attention eastward, to Thrace and beyond.145  There is no reason to suppose 
that Philip thought he needed Greek military support, rather than simple assurance of 
                                                        
141 See Peter Londey, “Philip II and the Delphic Amphictyony,” Mediterranean Archaeology 7 (1994): 25-
34 on Philip’s possible motives for acquiring the votes.  While I think it plausible that Philip wanted to use 
the Amphictyony to impose peace on the Greeks, Londey’s emphasis on the inclusion Philip’s himself 
rather than the Macedonian state into the Amphictyony seems forced; agreements between ‘Macedonia’ 
and Greek poleis were always made in the king’s name, and while it is somewhat peculiar that Philip is 
placed among a list of ethnic designations, it is in keeping with the Greeks’ general practice with respect to 
the Macedonians – who were, moreover, not considered Greek, as oppose to Philip himself.  The argument 
made by Nicholas G. L. Hammond, “Were ‘Makedones’ enrolled in the Amphictyony in 346 BC?,” 
Electronic Antiquity 1 (1993), that the Macedonian state, and not Philip, was actually given the seats in the 
Amphictyonic council, is equally at odds with the evidence. The settlement of 346 BCE also saw a 
Macedonian military presence established in central Greece: see Bucker and Beck, Central Greece and the 
Politics of Power, 268. 
142 M. M. Markle, “The Strategy of Philip in 346 B.C.,” Classical Quarterly 24 (1974): 262, proposes a 
similar end goal for Philip’s policy at this time.  Contra Julia Heskel, “Macedonia and the North, 400-336,” 
in The Greek World in the Fourth Century: From the Fall of the Athenian Empire to the Successors of 
Alexander, ed. Lawrence A. Tritle, 167-188 (Oxford: Routledge, 1997), Hammond, Philip of Macedon, 95-
7, and Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 463-468.  
143 He had also just come to a peace agreement with Athens in the Peace of Philocrates, thus apparently 
ending the rivalry over the north Aegean. 
144 Diod. 16.60.5. 
145 Diodorus has him campaigning in Illyria in 344/3 BCE (16.69.7) and then in the Hellespont, where he 
attracts the Persians’ attention (16.74.2-77.3).    
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Greek non-intervention in his affairs, for an expedition against Persia.146  Philip did not 
actively seek the complete subjugation of Greece at this time, but rather wished to 
guarantee Macedonian autonomy and the cessation of Athenian machinations in the 
northern Aegean.147  Philip’s actions make clear that, at least in 346 BCE, the king had no 
desire to impose his rule over the Hellenic world.   
The settlement of 346 BCE, and particularly the concessions which Philip had 
forced upon the Athenians in the Peace of Philocrates, made, however, for a short-lived 
peace.  Yet even after its failure Philip appears to have had no real inclination to impose 
his will militarily on the Greeks.  It has sometimes been argued that Philip masterminded 
the 4th Sacred War in order to have an excuse to invade central Greece in 339/8 BCE.148 
The evidence, however, points even at this late date to Philip’s desire for a peaceful 
settlement with the poleis.  The 4th Sacred War began with a series of accusations of 
sacrilege leveled first at the Athenians and then at the Amphissans, who were a close ally 
of Thebes.149  The details are confusing; nevertheless, it is alleged that because the                                                         
146 This is true with the exception of the Thessalian cavalry, which both Philip and Alexander used 
extensively.  On Philip’s use of Greek forces see Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 431-8.    
147 In this analysis I follow Ellis, Philip II ch. 4 and “Dynamics of Fourth-Century Macedonian 
Imperialism,” and Griffith, History of Macedonia II, ch. 13; Markle, Strategy of Philip and Borza, Shadow 
of Olympus, 221-5, are also ultimately in agreement on this point as well, though I find each of them to be 
less than satisfactory: I am unpersuaded by Markle’s argument that Philip wished for Athens’ support 
rather than Thebes’, and I find no evidence, as Borza claims, that Philip meant the Peace of Philocrates to 
be a κοινὴ εἰρήνη (rather, this is closer to the suggestion made by the Athenian allies (Aeschin. 3.70), 
though even their proposal is less comprehensive, in terms of the city-states that would share in the peace, 
than a κοινὴ εἰρήνη agreement ought to be).  See however Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon chs. 8 and 9, who 
argues that in 344/3 Philip offered to make the Peace of Philocrates a common peace.  It has also been 
argued that Philip wished to establish a κοινὴ εἰρήνη in the Amphictyonic peace agreement concluded 
after the 3rd Sacred War, but this seems equally unlikely: see G. T. Griffith, “The So-Called Koine Eirene 
of 346 B.C.,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 59 (1939):71-79.  For the argument that Philip did desire the 
subjection of Greece as early as 346 see Buckler and Beck, Central Greece and the Politics of Power, 267-
268.   
148 Griffith, History of Macedonia II, ch. 18.  
149 Aeschin. 3.113-29 gives an account of the Amphictyonic meeting and its aftermath.  Allegedly, the 
Amphissans were going to accuse the Athenians of sacriledge but Aeschines prevented it and with a piece 
of brilliant rhetoric convinced the Amphictyons to vote rather that the Amphissans had been guilty of 
sacriledge for farming the plain of Cirra.  The next day, at the instigation of the Amphictyons, a group of 
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president of the council at this time was a Thessalian, and because Philip theoretically 
could control the majority of the votes in the council, we should see his hand at work 
behind these events.150  A number of points, however, make this scenario unlikely.151  For 
one thing, Philip was in Scythia at the time the conflict first broke out, and thus much too 
far away to have foreseen and provided against the many eventualities that could have 
arisen during the explosive meeting of the Amphictyony.  As well, Philip’s involvement 
in the conflict cannot have been a foregone conclusion, at least not at the early stages of 
the conflict: the Amphictyons, led by Thessaly, at first tried to gather an army and force 
Amphissa to pay the fine on their own (Aeschin. 3.128-9).   Only when this initial effort 
failed to produce results did the Thessalians ask for Philip’s help in the matter.  Thus it 
would be a mistake to see the Thessalians in the council acting as mere agents of Philip’s, 
rather than as first and foremost representatives of their own, local concerns.   
I suggest, furthermore, that even after Philip crossed Thermopylae, he did so with 
an eye to a peaceful settlement rather than to the drastic change in the status quo which 
the battle of Chaeronea and the League of Corinth came to represent.  First, Philip 
attempted to negotiate with Thebes, who had supported the Amphissans against the 
Thessalian-led Amphictyons.  The fact that Philip tried to negotiate with Thebes at all – 
when he had already crossed Thermopylae – points to his reluctance to impose a 
settlement through the direct use of military force.  In doing so he still looked to the                                                                                                                                                                      
Delphians ravaged Cirra and a skirmish broke out.  The Amphissans subsequently refused to pay a fine that 
had been levelled against them.  They were supported in this decision by Thebes, and also, peculiarly, by 
the Athenians, who were apparently convinced by Demosthenes that supporting Thebes rather than the 
Amphictyony was in their best interest.  There are obvious problems with this account, most prominently 
with the volte-face of the Amphictyons and, later, of the Athenians in response to the conflict; given our 
lack of other sources, however, thus far convincing solutions to these problems have not been found. 
150 A Thessalian, Cottyphus, was presiding over the council during these outbreak of war; he was also the 
man elected as general of the Amphictyonic forces against Amphissa the following year.   
151 As argued more fully by Peter Londey, “The Outbreak of the 4th Sacred War,” Chiron 20 (1990): 239-
260.   
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Amphictyony as a centralized body with the potential to exert authority over the 
panhellenic world, just as he had done in 346 BCE.  Philochorus provides proof of this 
view: he relates that Philip sent an embassy to Thebes, which asked that the fortress of 
Nicaea – a major bone of contention between Thebes and the Thessalians - be given to 
the Epikmenidian Locrians, a neutral party, in accordance with a decree of the 
Amphictyony.  In reply, the Thebans sent ambassadors to negotiate with Philip.152  Thus 
at this point in time Philip was still employing the Amphictyony and its decrees as the 
basis for a potential future settlement between Greek states.  Only with the Thebans’ 
alliance with Athens against Philip and the other Amphictyons did the inefficacy of the 
Amphictyony as a panhellenic adjudicating body became patent.   
The escalation of the 4th Sacred War from a petty dispute into a panhellenic war 
prompted Philip to establish a new panhellenic council - namely, the League of Corinth - 
which, with Macedonian backing, could enforce the panhellenic peace that Philip had 
been aiming to establish since 346 BCE.  The League of Corinth was created in two parts, 
first in a κοινὴ εἰρήνη agreement among the major powers of Greece and second in the 
establishment of a synedrion which was to oversee proper adherence to the peace 
agreement.  The end result was an innovative structure that drew on established Greek 
panhellenic systems while at the same time allowing for well-regulated oversight of 
individual poleis, something that had been significantly hampered the previous serious 
attempts at establishing a κοινὴ εἰρήνη. The κοινὴ εἰρήνη itself was a peculiar feature of                                                         
152 FGrH 328 F 56b.  Demosthenes corroborates the presence of a Macedonian embassy in Thebes (18.211-
16); notably, he states that the Macedonian ambassadors gave the Thebans the option of remaining neutral 
in the upcoming conflict between Philip and Athens, an option that is repeated in Hyperides’ account of the 
events of 338 in Against Diondas l. 13-5.  The Thebans were actually quite reluctant to ally with Athens 
against Macedonia at this time.  Philip was prepared to deal with the Amphissans as a local affair and 
overlook the recalcitrance of the Thebans, with whom he was still allied; the machinations of the 
Athenians, however, made this impossible.   
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the 4th century Greek political landscape which had, as its object, the creation of 
panhellenic peace.153  Such a peace agreement was first realized in 386 BCE under the 
influence of the Persian king, whose holdings in Asia Minor and the islands were 
protected under the arrangement and who, in fact, became the guarantor of the treaty.  
The King’s Peace, as it is also known, stipulated the autonomy of the participating states; 
thus in theory the agreement was meant to establish a balance of power in Greece.  In 
fact, however, it only perpetuated the Spartan hegemony, since the Spartans took it upon 
themselves to guarantee the “autonomy” of the Greeks on behalf of Persia.154  Despite 
this serious flaw, the principles on which the King’s Peace was established can be found 
in many later multi-state agreements, perhaps most notably in the Second Athenian 
League.155   
 The agreement between Philip and the rest of the Greek states participating in the 
peace – which included all major parties except for Sparta – is explicitly called a κοινὴ 
εἰρήνη.156  Philip knew the political value of crafting policy on the basis of tradition.  In 
                                                        
153 Isocrates particularly was a champion of the κοινὴ εἰρήνη, though such a panhellenic agreement was 
probably also a prevalent desire among the lesser Greek states, to whom it promised greater autonomy than 
they generally enjoyed.  See M. Jehne, Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und 
Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der greichischen Polisweltdes 4. Jahrhunderts v. Ch. (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 1994) and T. T. B. Ryder, Koine Eirene: General Peace and Local Indipendence in Ancient 
Greece (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965) on the idea and development of the κοινὴ εἰρήνη over the 
course of the century.  Buckler, “Philip II, the Greeks, and the King,” Illinois Classical Studies 19 (1994): 
119-22, examines the use of the term in the sources. 
154 On the King’s Peace (also known as the Peace of Antalcidas) and the idea of κοινὴ εἰρήνη see Katrin 
Schmidt, “The Peace of Antalcidas and the Idea of the Koine Eirene: A Panhellenic Peace Movement,” 
Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 46 (1999): 81-96.  On the circumstances of the peace more 
broadly see Ernst Badian, “The King’s Peace,” in Georgica: Studies in Honor of George Cawkwell, ed. 
Michael Flower and Mark Toher, 25-48 (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1991). 
155 On the Second Athenian League see Jack Cargill, The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free 
Alliance?, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981) and G. L. Cawkwell, “The Foundation of the 
Second Athenian Confederacy,” Classical Quarterly 23 (1973): 52-4.  On the League’s similarities with a 
κοινὴ εἰρήνη agreement see Shalom Perlman, “Greek Diplomatic Tradition and the Corinthian League of 
Philip of Macedon,” Historia 34 (1985): 159-60 and passim.     
156 See P. J. Rhodes and Robin Osborne, eds. Greek Inscriptions 404-323 BC (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 76 and [Dem.] 17.6, 10, 15-6; the later speech deals with Alexander’s reestablishment of the 
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some ways he functioned ‘merely’ as the replacement of the Persian King in his role as 
the “impartial” instigator of a panhellenic agreement.157  While the treaty guaranteed 
Philip’s holdings for himself and his descendants, this could, again, find a parallel in the 
assurances given to the Great King in the treaty of 386 BCE.158   So too, Philip is not 
explicitly named as the executive of the treaty; only after the formation of the League 
was he voted the status of ἡγεμών.  Nor was Macedonia itself a member of the 
synedrion: as was customary, the king and his descendants are mentioned on behalf of the 
kingdom as a whole.  Thus Philip did not take the opportunity to try to legitimize the 
Macedonians as part of the Greek world, or to have his absolute power over Greece 
explicitly recognized.  While the League of Corinth came into being and continued to 
exist because of the Macedonian power behind it, in its form and function it was adapted 
to a Greek panhellenism that had been on the rise throughout the century.          
 Nevertheless, several key innovations in the treaty make it a different and more 
intrusive agreement than those that had come before it.  For one thing, the peace 
prohibited the instigation of revolutions in the participating poleis in addition to attempts 
to subvert the rule of the Argeads in Macedonia.159  For another, the creation of a new 
League and a synedrion which was to act as a kind of judicial body to oversee proper 
adherence to the peace treaty had no direct panhellenic precedent.160  Its establishment 
                                                                                                                                                                     
peace after Philip’s death, but the peace agreement seems not to have been modified in the process.  See 
also Buckler, Philip II, the Greeks, and the King, 113-5. 
157 Buckler, Philip II, the Greeks, and the King, examines the relations between Macedonian and Persian 
policy in Greece during this period and concludes that Philip’s settlement of 338/7 was remarkable as a 
common peace which managed to exclude Persia from Greek affairs.   
158 Considering the near constant Greek involvement in Argead politics, this clause more than almost any 
other in the agreement shows just how far Philip had come over the course of his reign.     
159 See Rhodes and Osborne, eds., Greek Inscriptions, 76. This clause gave Philip and later Alexander a 
legal right to interfere in the affairs of individual poleis. 
160 Perlman, Greek Diplomatic Tradition, 85, however, notes that the Second Athenian League had a 
synedrion of the allies which could make independent, though Athens always had the final say. 
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fixed the major flaw in the King’s Peace of 386 BCE.  The synedrion of the League of 
Corinth was more than a mere cover for Macedonian power, despite the fact that its first 
action was to elect Philip ἡγεμών for an expedition against Persia.  Just a few years later 
we can find, for example, an Athenian orator appealing to the κοινὴ εἰρήνη to excoriate 
Alexander’s actions in Messene.161  Moreover, Philip’s settlement must have been 
particularly welcome to the smaller poleis, whose autonomy was most in need of 
protection.162  Many, therefore, would have approved of the agreement, even if they did 
not necessarily approve of its instigator.    
Conclusion 
 The Macedonian state and the Argead monarchy evolved from humble 
beginnings.  What Philip’s predecessors lacked in strength, they made up for in expansive 
claims backed by cunning politics.  At various points in time the Argeads wished to gain 
the aid of the Illyrians, the Greek colonists, the Persians, and later the southern Greek 
poleis in establishing their rule over a greater Macedonia; to do so, they co-opted the 
rhetoric of these non-Macedonian traditions in order to establish themselves as rightful 
claimants.  For example, both Herodotus in his account of Alexander I’s ancestry and 
Thucydides’ geography of Macedonia show the influence that Argead claims had on the 
way southern Greeks conceptualized their northern neighbor. The Macedonian adoption 
of Persian court practices, such as lion hunts and the creation of the Royal Pages, had the 
same goal of bolstering Argead power by analogy with the might of Persia.   
                                                        
161 [Dem.] 17. 
162 The reactions to Philip’s settlement among the larger and smaller states is discussed by Kondrat’uk, M. 
A., “The League of Corinth and its role in the political history of Greece in the thirties and twenties of the 
fourth century B.C.,” Vestnik Drevnej Istorii 140 (1977): 25-42 
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The story of Macedonia from the sixth to the mid-fourth century is one of 
continuous struggle for the unification of the territory claimed by the Argeads into a 
single state.   Disunity and warfare with Macedonia’s neighbors were consequently the 
biggest threat to the Argeads, as well as to Philip himself upon his ascension.  Philip 
solidified his position as king and the position of the Macedonian state in the northern 
Aegean through a mixture of military and social reforms whose antecedents we can 
already discern in the reforms of Archelaus at the end of the 5th century.   
 The fact that the role of the kings in the Macedonian state was malleable and the 
power of the state was focused around the person of the individual ruler gave the Argeads 
a certain freedom to redefine their place within society.  Indeed, the Argeads had long 
been open to outside influences, taking on at the same time iconography of Persian 
kingship and the prerogatives of a Greek aristocratic family. Philip, as well, adapted the 
character of a Greek aristocrat to suit his own needs, patronizing the arts and displaying 
his accomplishments at sports.  Throughout his reign, he also assumed roles whose nature 
closely bound them to a specifically Greek, rather than Macedonian, identity: thus he first 
became Thessalian tagos and, later, was voted a seat in his own right on the 
Amphictyonic council.  Philip’s assumption of such roles posed no threat to his 
Macedonian identity, even as Greeks could portray it as a complete reversal of hellenic 
norms.   
 Yet Philip had no desire to force the Greeks to accept a king; throughout his 
dealings with the Greek world his policies show a willingness to work within hellenic 
traditions in order to achieve his ends.  Thus when he reorganized Thessaly, he most 
likely did so under the banner of a return to tradition.  Moreover, he attempted to exercise 
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power over the poleis through traditional Greek structures of power: the Amphictyony 
first of all and, when that failed, through the League of Corinth, which itself was based 
on previous hellenic organizations.  Even the League was established through a κοινὴ 
εἰρήνη agreement whose antecedents went back to the early part of the century and to 
whose ideals most Greeks were sympathetic.  Philip’s power, while quite real, was thus 
never quite overt - and in this form was accepted by a large number of the poleis, who 
found their own interests furthered by Macedonian rule.  The following chapters turn to 
Athenian responses to Philip’s increasing influence over Greek politics and, 
concomitantly, his assumption of Greek roles within the hellenic world.  What was 
simple good policy – indeed, normative policy – for the Argeads and Philip was 
assuredly not such a simple matter for the Athenian politicians and intellectuals who were 
faced with explaining Philip’s growing power.                    
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Chapter 3: Philip in the Political Discourse before 346 BCE 
Introduction 
This chapter turns from Macedonia to the constructions of Philip’s ἦθος presented 
before the Athenian public.  The current chapter examines the speeches which were 
delivered before the Peace of Philocrates of 346 BCE, while the next chapter turns to 
those delivered after the peace agreement.  I argue that Demosthenes’ portrayal of Philip 
developed out of an older, 5th century rhetoric concerning Athens’ enemies, both the 
barbarian Persians and the Spartans.  In this way Demosthenes frames the conflict 
between Macedonia and Athens as an ideological struggle over the Athenians’ character 
and their role in the wider scheme of interstate politics.  Illuminating the ways in which 
Demosthenes positioned the current Macedonian crisis within this traditional framework 
also forms the background for the next chapter, which will turn in part to the orator’s 
innovation and development of these older typologies.   
In this chapter I will also argue that Philip’s character served as a vehicle for 
voicing internal, Athenian concerns about the democratic ethics and the role of the rhetor 
in the polis.  Philip’s identity as a barbarian outsider lent itself to arguments over Athens’ 
position as the cultural and moral center of Greece.163 Each characterization of Philip, 
                                                        
163 See Nina Johannsen, “Der Barbarenbegriff in den politischen Reden des Demosthenes,” Tyche 22 
(2007): 79-84 for a typical interpretation of Philip’s role in these terms.   Demosthenes would surely have 
agreed with the Periclean vision of Athens as the cultural and moral center of Greece:  λέγω τήν τε 
πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς ῾Ελλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι… [I say that the whole city is a school for Greece…] (Thuc. 
2.41).   Compare, for example, Dem. 9.73: τοῖς μὲν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ χρήματ᾿ ἀποστέλλειν φημὶ δεῖν καὶ 
τἄλλ᾿ ὅσα ἀξιοῦσι ποιεῖν, αὐτοὺς δὲ παρασκευάζεσθαι, τοὺς δ᾿ ἄλλους Ἕλληνας συγκαλεῖν, 
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directed at Athens’ citizen body and articulated by statesmen competing against one 
another for prominence and prestige, should therefore be analyzed as a (re)articulation of 
Athenian values.  Moreover, Philip came to represent a negative model for the orator 
himself - who, in activating his right as ὁ βουλόμενος to speak in the ekklesia, 
represented due democratic process.164  In the next chapter I will show how in his 
political maturity Demosthenes would press this antithesis between Philip and the ideal 
orator still further to articulate a radical notion of the politician’s role in enacting, as well 
as his traditional role in crafting and articulating, Athenian policy.   
Demosthenes’ deliberative corpus, presented orally before the demos during the 
course of its deliberations, is a convenient place to start an exploration of Athenian 
rhetoric concerning Philip because they constitute our most immediate source for popular 
Athenian discussion of the Macedonian problem.  The deliberative speeches were, if not 
delivered nearly verbatim orally, at least constructed in such a way as to present the 
appearance of oral delivery.165   These speeches reflect the political atmosphere and                                                                                                                                                                      
συνάγειν, διδάσκειν, νουθετεῖν· ταῦτ᾿ ἐστὶν πόλεως ἀξίωμα ἐχούσης ἡλίκον ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει.  [I say 
that we must send relief to the Chersonese and do whatever else is necessary, and to prepare ourselves, and 
to call together the other Greeks, and bring them together, and teach them, and advise them; because this is 
the prerogative of a city as greatly esteemed as ours].  Demosthenes’ admiration of Thucydides was well-
known to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and is equally acknowledged today: see for example Felipe 
Hernández-Muñoz, “Tucídides y Platón en Demóstenes,” Cuadernos de filología clásica.  Estudios griegos 
e indoeuropeos (1994): 139-160 and Usher, Demosthenes, On the Crown, 22-24. 
164 Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), argues that the role of the professional rhetor had no legal 
status apart from the citizen rights he shared with the rest of the Athenians.  For the identity of the rhetor 
see also P. J. Rhodes, “Who Ran Democratic Athens?,” in Polis & Politics. Studies in Ancient Greek 
History, ed. P. Flensted-Jensen et al. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 465-477; Harvey 
Yunis, Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1996): 7-12; Mogens H. Hansen, The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1987), 49-88; Shalom Perlman, “The Politicians in the Athenian Democracy of the Fourth 
Century B. C.,” Athenaeum 41 (1963): 327-355.   
165 The issue of the deliberative speeches’ closeness to the actual harangues delivered before the demos is a 
hotly debated issue which important implications, but hardly any absolute answer.  I am inclined to see 
these speeches as drafts crafted prior to delivery and only cursorily edited before publication: see Jeremy 
Trevett, “Did Demosthenes Publish his Deliberative Speeches?”.  However, extensive revision on the 
grounds of stylistic differences (particularly in the Fourth Philippic) has been more recently championed 
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arguments of a time very nearly, if not entirely, contemporaneous with the issue at 
hand.166  Demosthenes’ portrayal of Philip was designed to appeal to a broad spectrum of 
the Athenian citizenry rather than a particular subset of the community or a panhellenic 
audience.167  Each speech was situated in the context of a specific policy debate during 
the course of which other speeches by other orators would also have been delivered.   
Thus, while each speech is given in the voice of a particular orator, lurking in the 
background are the many other voices that would have been involved in the discussion in 
the ekklesia and in response to which a given speech was composed.168  In this way 
                                                                                                                                                                     
by Worthington, Greek Oratory, Revision of Speeches, and the Problem of Historical Reliability.  Stephen 
G. Daitz, “The Relationship of the De Chersoneso and the Philippica Quarta of Demosthenes,” Classical 
Philology 52 (1957): 145-162, following Charles D. Adams, “Speeches VIII and X of the Demosthenic 
Corpus,” Classical Philology 33 (1938):129-144 argued that changes prior to publication account for the 
near verbatim parallels between On the Chersonese and the Fourth Philippic.   
166 The fact that deliberative speeches are so closely tied to a particular time and place invites the question 
why deliberative oratory was published at all.  In this respect published deliberative speeches are different 
from epideictic and even forensic oratory, which could serve as an advertisment for the speechmaker.  
Nevertheless, published forensic oratory is useful as a comparandum: see particularly Dover, Lysias and 
the Corpus Lysiacum; Ian Worthington, “Once more, the client/logographos relationship,” Classical 
Quarterly 43 (1993): 67-72; Stephen Usher, “Lysias and his clients,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 
17 (1976): 31-40.  It is probable that the practice of publishing deliberative oratory caught on only with 
Demosthenes; in any case, it was never extensive. A history of published deliberative oratory can be found 
in Kennedy Art of Persuasion, 203-206.  See also John Buckler, “Demosthenes and Aeschines,” in 
Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator, ed. Ian Worthington (London: Routledge, 2000), 148-154.    What is 
missing from the written speech is any hint of the delivery (however, see Dover, Lysias and the Corpus 
Lysiacum, 163-167) which would of course have colored each speech in a way that is almost entirely 
impossible for us to reconstruct (the deliberative speeches present obstacles in this respect even greater than 
the forensic speeches).  For a discussion of how much delivery could have added to or even changed the 
interpretation of the text see James Fredal, “The Language of Delivery and the Presentation of Character: 
Rhetorical Action in Demosthenes’ Against Meidias,” Rhetoric Review 20 (2001): 251-267; Nancy 
Worman, “Insult and Oral Excess in the Disputes between Aeschines and Demosthenes.” American Journal 
of Philology 125 (2004): 1-25; Edith Hall, “Lawcourt dramas: the power of performance in Greek forensic 
oratory.” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 40 (1995): 39-58.  I imagine, however, that, given the 
unique nature of deliberative oratory and its greater limitations in terms of time, the orators had less scope 
for the kind of theatrics that they could employ in the  lawcourts.   
167 Ober, Mass and Elite, argues that the Athenian masses exercises a strong ideological control on 
speechmaking by the professional orators: typical, for example, is his statement that “the ideological 
control of the elite by the Athenian citizen masses was not a perfect system, but on the whole it worked 
remarkably well.” (332).   See also Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum, 54-56.  
168 Mogens H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Democracy: Structure, Principles, and 
Ideology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991):143-145 suggests that, of the approximately 6000 citizens at an 
assembly, perhaps a few hundred would have been semi- or fully-professional rhetors.  See also Mogens H. 
Hansen, “The number of ῥήτορες in the Athenian ἐκκλησία 355-322 B.C.,” Greek, Roman, and 
Byzantine Studies 25 (1984): 123-155.  Any given debate would have probably involved only a few of 
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Demosthenes’ speeches illuminate how the Athenian, adult male audience who 
frequented the assembly, along with the politicians who addressed them, employed 
familiar culturally-loaded typologies to discuss Philip.169   
How, then, did Demosthenes and his contemporaries talk about Philip?  We must 
acknowledge, to begin with, that in many cases they did so without direct knowledge of 
Macedonia or the Macedonian king.  Demosthenes, for example, had never seen Philip or 
been to Macedonia before 346 BCE, but that did not impact his ability to talk about the 
situation and about Philip from a position of authority.170  For a speaker’s authority was 
not only based on a specialist’s knowledge of the matter at hand, but also on his ability to 
articulate the norms of the majority and to apply mass mores to a given situation – that is, 
to frame an issue in terms of normative social values  - in order to find the most expedient 
solution.171  This basis for a rhetor’s competency has important implications for the                                                                                                                                                                      
them: see Hansen, The Athenian Assembly, 54-61 and Ober, Mass and Elite, ch. 3.  For the social 
background of prominent rhetors see also Ian Worthington, “Rhetoric and Politics in Classical Greece: Rise 
of the Rhetores,” in A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 255-
268. 
169 For the composition of the audience see Hansen, Athenian Democracy, ch. 5.  Adriaan Lanni, “Spectator 
Sport or Serious Justice? οἱ περιεστηκότες and the Athenian Lawcourts,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 117 
(1997): 183-189, discusses the role of bystanders in the lawcourts.  
170 The ideal speaker in the ekklesia, the idiotes, was specifically valued for having no more knowledge 
than the average Athenian; too great a familiarity with the non-Athenian world could imply that the speaker 
was not in tune with the needs and desires of his audience, and thereby diminish, rather than augment, his 
authority.  On the preeminence of mass wisdom see Ober, Mass and Elite, ch. 3.  Demosthenes does refer 
on occasion to witnesses from whom he derives his accounts (1.22, 2.17, 2.19, 8.14, 10.8, 11.8-10, 11.12), 
but he never identifies these witnesses by name, rendering their actual existence somewhat suspect; in any 
case, he certainly did not need such accounts to make his claims.  On the importance of first-hand 
information in the ekklesia see Sian Lewis, News and Society in the Greek Polis (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996), 102-9; also Gerhard Thür, “The Role of the Witness in Athenian Law,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, eds. Michael Gagarin and David Cohen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 146-169, for the ancillary role of the witness in forensic oratory. 
171 The idea that the orator was not supposed to be a specialist is best seen in the (never institutionalized) 
separation between orators and generals in the 4th century democracy: thus Aristotle, Politics 1305a, 
explains that while generals were experts in foreign affairs, their control of politics was curtailed for fear 
that their power would develop into a tyranny.  See also Mogens H. Hansen, “The Athenian ‘Politicians’, 
403-322 B.C.,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 24 (1983): 33-55; contra: Debra Hamel, “Strategoi 
on the Bema: The Separation of Political and Military Authority in Fourth-Century Athens,” Ancient 
History Bulletin 9 (1995): 25-39.  However Lisa Kallet-Marx, “Money Talks: Rhetor, Demos, and the 
Resources of the Athenian Empire.” in The Athenian Empire, ed. Polly Low (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
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deliberative speeches as sources of information.  While they cannot be used in a 
straightforward manner as historical evidence, they can tell us a lot about how the 
Athenians perceived Macedonia, and, it follows, a lot about the political situation within 
Athens itself.172   
But political attitudes were not static.  Rhetorical evidence needs to be understood 
from within an ever-evolving discourse. The discourse concerning Philip, in particular, 
lends itself to an analysis of how political rhetoric on a given issue developed since we 
have speeches concerning Macedonia from early on – the First Philippic was composed 
in 351 BCE, seven years after Philip’s ascension to power – until well after Philip’s 
assassination in 336 BCE. The politics of the Greek mainland and Macedonia underwent 
a dramatic shift during that time, and the Athenians’ rhetoric developed accordingly.  In 
the introduction, I discussed the way Athenian politicians may have adapted, added to, 
and responded to each other’s arguments with respect to Philip’s ἦθος.  Orators would 
employ or reject previous characterizations of Philip given by themselves and by other                                                                                                                                                                      
University Press, 2008), 185-210, has argued that the authority of the rhetor in fiscal matters did rest on his 
priviledged knowledge of how the Athenian system worked.  The two positions are not necessarily 
incompatible: orators may well have had different levels of competence in different areas.  It would have 
been easier to acquire knowledge about the internal concerns of the polis, for example, than about external 
affairs.   
172 Because the orator’s primary goal was to convince the demos to accept his point of view, there was a 
great incentive for them to lie about the facts.  This incentive was only augmented in discussions of foreign 
policy, since the majority of the Athenians would have little direct knowledge of the places and people 
under discussion.  Still, orators could not travel too far beyond the preconceived notions (whether right or 
wrong) which the demos itself brought to the ekklesia, and against which the orator’s statements would be 
tested: see Ober, Mass and Elite, 43-45.  Arguing for a set of facts which the people believed strongly to be 
false could backfire, and then the orator would be caught in an ostensible lie.  Thus speakers always had to 
balance their desire to win their case against the need to appear to be telling the truth, at least in so far as 
the demos understood it.  Whenever possible, it would be in the orator’s best interest not to lie outright.  
However, Philip Harding, “Rhetoric and Politics in Fourth-Century Athens,” Phoenix 41 (1987): 25-39, 
argues for a pessimistic view of the truth-value of the speeches; Ian Worthington, “Greek Oratory, Revision 
of Speeches and the Problem of Historical Reliability,” Classica et Medievalia 42 (1991): 69-70, has 
approached this problem by looking at the revision of the speeches, but he comes to the same conclusion.  
The problem of rhetoric as evidence, and the various attempts at a solution to it, has been described by 
Stephen Todd, “The use and abuse of the Attic Orators,” Greece and Rome 37 (1990): 159-178; see also 
Edward M. Harris, Aeschines and Athenian Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 1.  
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orators; their views, in turn, would be assessed against the discursive backdrop they had 
helped create.173  In the following speeches, I examine each articulation of Philip’s ἦθος 
in view of the rapidly changing historical and political realities and more slowly evolving 
collective values.      
I begin with Demosthenes’ earliest mentions of Philip, one in the forensic speech 
Against Aristocrates and a second in the deliberative On the Freedom of the Rhodians.  
These set the stage for the rest of the chapter because their ancillary treatment of Philip 
may well show how the Athenians were predisposed to think of him without any 
particular ‘guidance’ from the professional orator.  From there I turn to the speeches 
more properly concerned with the Macedonian question: Demosthenes’ Philippic I, 
delivered in 351 BCE, and the three Olynthiacs, composed over the course of 349 BCE.  
These speeches have also been particularly important for the reconstruction of 
Demosthenes’ early career before his rise to prominence during the negotiations of 346 
BCE.174  They mark the beginning of Demosthenes’ sustained involvement with 
Macedonian policy.  The early speeches show Demosthenes experimenting with various 
types of arguments, some of which he would develop further later in his career.175        
Philip before 351 BCE 
In 351 BCE, when Demosthenes delivered his Philippic I, the threat from 
Macedon was real but still distant. Less than a year beforehand Philip had embroiled                                                         
173 Kallet-Marx, Money Talks, expresses a similar sentiment with respect to Athenians’ financial knowledge 
(197): “Athenian listeners would have been predisposed to respond in a certain predictable way to financial 
information because their attitude toward Athens’ public finances had already been shaped and was 
constantly being reinforced through a complex interaction between speakers and listeners.” 
174 For Demosthenes’ early career see Raphael Sealey, Demosthenes and His Time: A Study in Defeat 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chs. 4-6 and Ernst Badian, “The Road to Prominence,” in 
Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Routledge, 2000): 9-44.   
175 Lionel Pearson, The Art of Demosthenes (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981), ch. 4 discusses Demosthenes’ 
stylistic experimentation in the early deliberative speeches.   
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himself in the Sacred War, coming to the aid of  the Amphyctiony and claiming for 
himself the prestige of being the defender of Delphi.  While there was reason at the time 
to believe that Philip was pursuing a specifically anti-Athenian policy – for one thing, the 
Amphyctiony was led by Athens’ rival Thebes, and in addition Philip had recently 
refused to cede the city of Amphipolis to Athens – Philip’s influence had not yet spread 
south of Thessaly.176  More importantly, the Sacred War was far from being concluded in 
the Delphians’ favor in 351: the Phocians, despite recent losses, still had access to all the 
sacred treasuries of Apollo.  As long as Athens guarded the key pass at Thermopylae, 
Philip would be unable to penetrate into Central Greece. 
Demosthenes was probably exaggerating, then, when he began his Philippic I by 
voicing frustration with just how often, and how fruitlessly, Athenian policy toward 
Macedonia had come under discussion (Dem. 4.1).  The Athenians were certainly not 
ready to commit resources and men to a prolonged war in the north; and besides, they had 
other problems to deal with closer to home.177  Plutarch tells us that the leading orator of 
the 350s and 340s, Eubulus, favored a quietist approach to foreign policy and a focus on 
Athens’ economy rather than her military might (Mor. 812f).178  Indeed, historical 
precedent would have justified this approach: no Macedonian king yet in the 4th century 
had died a natural death, and all the Argeads had had to contend against a seemingly 
                                                        
176 Athens had colonized Amphipolis east of the Chalcidice in the 5th century but had lost control over it 
during the Peloponnesian war.  Since then Athens had almost continuously, but for the most part 
unsuccessfully, attempted to regain control of the city.  On the early conflict between Philip and Athens 
over Amphipolis see Worthington, Philip II, ch. 5.   
177 The Athenians had just fought the grueling Social War against some reluctant members of their League 
in the early to mid 350s, leaving the city in dire financial straits.  On the Second Athenian League and the 
Social War see Jask Cargill, “Hegemony, not Empire. The Second Athenian League,” Ancient World 5 
(1982): 91-102.  On the war’s consequences see Raphael Sealey, “Athens after the Social War,” Journal of 
Hellenic Studies 75 (1955): 74-81.  
178 On Eubulus and the prevailing political policy of the time see G. L. Cawkwell, “Eubulus,” Journal of 
Hellenic Studies 83 (1963): 47-67 and Sealey, “Athens after the Social War.”     
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continuous stream of legitimate or illegitimate claimants to the throne; Philip himself had 
put down several rivals in the early years of his reign.  Against this backdrop of internal 
turmoil, Philip might well have appeared as little more than a transitory threat who would 
soon be brought low without any help from Athens.179  Two Demosthenic speeches 
composed prior to 351 support the conclusion that the Athenians had thought little about 
Philip up to this point.  Both the forensic speech Against Aristocrates and the deliberative 
speech On the Freedom of the Rhodians mention Philip in a cursory way and in 
derogatory terms that might just as well have been leveled against any other petty 
barbarian king in the region.    At this point Philip was still nothing more in the public 
discourse than a typical vehicle for the expression of community solidarity in the face of 
a foreign Other.180  
Demosthenes composed the Against Aristocrates around the year 353 for delivery 
by one Euthycles.  Euthycles had accused Aristocrates of illegality for proposing a decree 
that would have made it a criminal offense to kill the general Charidemus.  Charidemus 
was an adventurer, a minister to the Thracian king Cersobleptes, and most recently a 
newly minted Athenian.  A large portion of the speech is concerned with Athenian policy 
in Thrace and argues that Cersobleptes is faithless and not to be trusted.  In the course of 
this argument Demosthenes introduces several comparisons between Cersobleptes and 
Philip.  The Athenians, Demosthenes argues, should be wary of allying themselves too 
closely with Cersobleptes and look to the example of Olynthus, a Greek state that had 
been too trusting of the barbarian king Philip and now regrets their choice (Dem. 23.107-
                                                        
179 For the early history of Macedon, see Hammond, Miracle that was Macedonia, 1-31; Errington, History 
of Macedonia, 1-40; Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, 40-47. 
180 I will be touching upon aspects of 5th century Athenian notions of barbarism throughout this chapter 
insofar as they relate to the discourse concerning Philip.  See above, footnote 4.  
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8).  Since Demosthenes was attempting to disparage the Thracian king, such a 
comparison would have worked best if Philip was indeed especially hateful to the 
Athenians [ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐχθρὸς] (Dem. 23.121).  Demosthenes must 
have trusted Euthycles’ audience to take the charges against Philip as a matter of course 
if he wanted them to transfer their ill-will from the Macedonian to the Thracian king.   
Preeminent among Philip’s characteristics, according to Demosthenes, is a desire 
for aggrandizement rather than security, despite the great risk to himself:  μικρὰ 
λαμβάνειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπίστους φίλους καὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μετ᾿ ἀσφαλείας 
ζῆν ὀρᾶτε προῃρημένον αὐτόν.  [You see that he has chosen small gains, faithless 
friends, and danger instead of living in safety] (Dem. 23.112).  Again, Demosthenes 
explains Philip’s choice of the smallest potential gain over a life of safety by citing 
Philip’s greed [τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐπιθυμία] (Dem. 23.133).  Another element of Philip’s 
ἦθος in the Against Aristocrates is his faithlessness.  According to Demosthenes, Philip 
had promised that he would hand Amphipolis over to Athens when he gained control of 
it, but in the end annexed not only Amphipolis but Potideia for himself (Dem. 2.116).  
While the king had released Athenian prisoners and sent a letter to Athens declaring his 
desire for an alliance (Dem. 2.121), these professions of goodwill had proven to be 
entirely false.  Philip’s greed overcome all considerations of honor and trust.  
Demosthenes’ portrayal of Philip as a grasping and faithless tyrant conforms to the 
established character of the barbarian monarch, who is passionate rather than rational and 
nothing if not lawless in the intemperate gratification of his own desires.181  That the 
orator adduces Cotys (Dem. 23.118-9) and Alexander of Thessaly (Dem. 23.120) as other                                                         
181 As Herodotus’ Spartans say, “there is no trust or truth among the barbarians.” [βαρβάροισί ἐστι οὔτε 
πιστὸν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν] (Hdt. 8.142).  On the paradigm of the barbarian monarch see Hall, Inventing 
the Barbarian, 93-98; Romilly, “Les Barbares,” 283-286. 
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examples of faithless rulers alongside Philip also indicates that the Macedonian’s 
characterization is drawn in a straightforward manner from the culturally-shared 
paradigm of the bad barbarian monarch.  In sum, there is nothing particularly special or 
unique about the way Demosthenes presents Philip here.     A passing reference to Philip in On the Freedom of the Rhodians conforms to the 
view of the king presented in Against Aristocrates.  Here, too,  Philip is cast as a weak 
and transient opponent.  This deliberative speech is concerned with the situation in 
Rhodes, where the democratic party had asked the Athenians to intervene against the 
oligarchs.  The oligarchs were supported by Queen Artemisia of Caria, a vassal of Persia, 
and those opposing the motion apparently feared disrupting relations with the Great King.   
Demosthenes, however, argues that helping the Rhodian democrats would not destabilize 
Athenian relations with Persia.  At the same time, he also claims that the Athenians ought 
to increase their participation in international affairs more broadly, taking as his 
representative examples the Athenians’ discontentment with both the Great King and 
Philip of Macedonia:   
οὔτ᾿ οὖν ἐκ φανεροῦ κεκράτηκεν οὔτ᾿ἐπιβουλεῦσαι συνενήνοχεν 
αὐτῷ.  ὁρῶ δ᾿ ὑμῶν ἐνίους Φιλίππου μὲν ὡς ἄρ᾿ οὐδενὸς ἀξίου 
πολλάκις ὀλιγωροῦντας, βασιλέα δ᾿ ὡς ἰσχυρὸν ἐχθρὸν οἷς ἂν 
προέληται φοβουμένους.  Εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν ὡς φαῦλον οὐκ ἀμυνούμεθα, 
τῷ δ᾿ ὡς φοβερῷ πάνθ᾿ ὑπείξομεν, πρὸς τίνας, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 
παραταξόμεθα; 
So [the Persian King] has plainly never beaten us nor has his plotting 
gained him any advantage.  I see some of you frequently disparaging 
Philip as of no account, yet fearful of the King as a powerful enemy to 
whom it pleases him.  But if we don’t guard ourselves against the one as 
being weak, and we obey the other in everything because he is formidable, 
against whom, Athenians, will we ever stand our ground? (Dem. 15.24)        
The antithesis created between Persia and Macedonia highlights the latter’s weakness.  
Demosthenes’ point is not that Philip is stronger than he appears, but that the Athenians 
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will not send out expeditions even against their most insignificant enemies.   Again, 
because Philip is not the main concern of the argument here, it is likely that Demosthenes 
drew on a commonly held opinion in crafting his antithesis; the contrast would have 
worked quite as well had Demosthenes chosen any other ostensibly weak barbarian king.   
The disparagement of Macedonian power in On the Freedom of the Rhodians 
aligns with the overall impression in Against Aristokrates that Philip was merely a 
transitory and insignificant threat.  The king is portrayed in as a typical barbarian: greedy, 
faithless, and weak.  His amoral nature, moreover, ensures that he will never be a match 
for a real Athenian force.  It was this impression of Macedonian weakness which 
Demosthenes would do his best to shatter when he took up the anti-Macedonian cause in 
Philippic I.   Nevertheless, when Demosthenes turned his full attention to the 
Macedonian problem, he did not abandon this characterization of Philip in its entirety.  
Philip’s amoral nature, for example, as well as his greed, continue as central traits in his 
ἦθος.  Rather than abandoning Philip’s ἦθος as a typical barbarian, Demosthenes plays 
which these traits – bringing out new comparisons, and placing them within new frames 
of reference – in a way that ultimately transforms Philip’s character and breaks the 
intimate connection between his amoral nature and his weakness.   
Philippic I: 351 BCE 
Philippic I, Demosthenes’ first speech directly concerned with Macedonia, was 
probably delivered not long after On the Freedom of the Rhodians.  If the Athenians were 
as unconcerned about Philip as Demosthenes’ earlier speeches would indicate, then he 
clearly had an uphill battle to prove to them that they should muster not one but two 
citizen armies to pursue their war in the north.  He would have to shunt aside the 
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argument that Macedonia was militarily weak, an argument that he himself had employed 
earlier that same year, as we have seen, in On the Freedom of the Rhodians (Dem. 15.24).  
In Philippic I, Demosthenes emphasizes Macedonia’s growing power even as he 
continues to castigate flaws in Philip’s ἦθος, such as ὕβρις, typical of barbarian 
monarchs.    While Philip is presented as a moral failure who is successful in action 
despite his immorality, the Athenians display the very opposite characteristics:  though 
knowing and willing to do the right thing, they are supremely lethargic.182  Both Philip’s 
and the Athenians’ characters are thus based on an imbalance between their actual 
activity and the appropriateness of their motive/deliberation.  Just as Philip’s constant 
victories belie his inner depravity, so the Athenians’ sound judgment in the ekklesia is at 
odds with their failure abroad.    
Demosthenes expresses the resultant tension between intention and 
accomplishment by juxtaposing speech/deliberation (λόγος) with action (ἔργον), a 
favorite schema of Athenian thought.  Thus Demosthenes’ use of the λόγος/ἔργον 
rhetoric shows how he molded his innovative ideas within a traditional and well-
established framework.   Furthermore, a discussion of Demosthenes’ λόγος/ἔργον 
rhetoric is doubly important because it points to Demosthenes’ inheritance of a fifth-                                                        
182 This choice of argument on Demosthenes’ part also results in a relatively more lenient approach to 
Philip here than in subsequent speeches concerning Macedonia.  While this relative leniency was noted 
even in ancient times by Hermogenes, On Types of Style, recent explanations for it have tended to be 
biographical and not credit Demosthenes for his choice of argument.  Thus Sealey, Demosthenes and his 
Time, comments that Philippic I “is not imbued with the earnestness of the later Philippics” because 
Demosthenes had not yet “‘discovered his mission’ in life” (133); see also Jacqueline de Romilly,  
A Short History of Greek Literature, trans. Lillian Doherty (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985), 
116-7.  I agree rather with Galen Rowe, “Demosthenes’ First Philippic: The Satiric Mode,” Transactions 
and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 99 (1968): 361-374, who looks at the character 
of the Athenians in the speech as a deliberately constructed inversion of their ‘typical’ national character.  
Mader, expanding upon Rowe’s thesis, considered this role reversal as it applies to Philip and concluded 
that Philip is used “as contrastive foil to the supine Athenians:” see Gottfried Mader, “Quantum mutati ab 
illis…,” Philologus (2003): 58.  For Demosthenes’ use of comic tropes elsewhere see Galen Rowe, “The 
Portrait of Aeschines in the Oration on the Crown,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American 
Philological Association 97 (1966): 397-406.       
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century typology best known from Thucydides.  While Demosthenes’ debt to Thucydides 
has long been known, the particular debt which the orator owed the historian has not 
often been sufficiently discussed.183  In the following section I will therefore consider 
how what kinds of connections can be drawn between Thucydides and Demosthenes, 
employing the characterization of Philip in Philippic I as a kind of case study for the 
larger problem.  The paucity of evidence with respect to 5th century deliberative oratory 
has obscured the nature of the connection between the orator and the historian.  I argue 
that Demosthenes’ debt is not so much to Thucydides himself as to the rhetorical and 
political traditions of which Thucydides was an exponent, and for which he is our best 
source.     
After examining the place of Philippic I vis-à-vis 5th century rhetoric,  I turn to 
the space which the speech creates for Demosthenes within the contemporary political 
scene.  For Demosthenes’ focus on the misalignment of moral character with its resultant 
action was useful for his own self-presentation within the speech.  As a young rhetor with 
little experience in debate on matters of foreign policy, Demosthenes needed to assert his 
worth as an advisor.  Creating an imbalance between outcomes and inner motives 
allowed him to enhance his own value as the orator who could see beyond the realities of 
mere action into the shadowy world of Philip’s depraved morality.  Thus the 
λόγος/ἔργον paradigm both defines the conflict between Athens and Macedonia and, in 
the breakdown of the connection between deliberation and action, secures Demosthenes’ 
                                                        
183 See Hernandez-Munoz, “Tucydides y Platon,” 142-144, who argues that Demosthenes adapts the 
Thucydidean method of historiography based on politics and psychology in crafting his speeches.  See also 
Pearson, Art of Demosthenes, 114-115 and Yunis, Taming Democracy, ch. 9.  Yunis focuses his 
comparison on Demosthenes’ use of Pericles as a model for his self-characterization as the ideal rhetor in 
the Crown speech.  According to Plutarch, Demosthenes was compared to Pericles in his own day in terms 
of his difficult style (Dem. 6.5) and in his courage (Dem. 20.1).   
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usefulness as a knowledgeable σύμβουλος.184  From Demosthenes’ very first foray into 
Macedonian policy, then, we can see that his characterization of Philip benefited his self-
fashioning as an orator.  Philip’s ἦθος reflects Demosthenes’ concern with the role of the 
speaker and the nature of democratic debate in Athens.     
Demosthenes presents the older, 5th century framework within which he will be 
discussing the Athenians’ conflict with Macedonia up front.  Right after the prooemium 
(Dem. 4.1-2), Demosthenes harks back to the traditional roles of Athens and Sparta  as 
polar opposites and traditional enemies. In their war against Sparta, Demosthenes claims, 
the Athenians had conducted themselves in a manner worthy of the city and therefore 
were able to defeat the Spartans; he goes on to contrast this previous war with the current 
war between Athens and Macedonia, where the situation is just the opposite: it is Philip 
who has taken on the action-ready character of old Athens, while the Athenians assume 
the character-type of their traditional antagonists, interchangeably Spartan and 
barbarian.185   The chiastic structure between the characters of Philip and the Athenians is 
thus emphasized from the beginning.  Moreover, in contrasting the current situation with 
a previous conflict between Athens and Sparta, Demosthenes employs a typology closely 
associated with the Peloponnesian War and, at least to our modern ears, with Thucydides.   
In that former conflict, Demosthenes argues, Sparta and Athens had taken on their 
traditional roles: the former was overwhelmingly powerful and domineering, while the                                                         
184 Gottfried Mader, “Foresight, Hindsight, and the Rhetoric of Self-Fashioning in Demosthenes’ Philippic 
Cycle,” Rhetorica 25 (2007): 343-8, discusses the way Demosthenes bases his credibility as an orator on 
his foresight, and stresses the way Demosthenes is able to play up his own foresight against the backdrop of 
Athenian laxity and Philip’s tyrannical action. 
185 The character-types of the Spartan and the barbarian could be elided by virtue of being the ‘ultimate’ 
Athenian nemesis in either instance.  Elsewhere, however, Spartan society is also said to have barbaric 
undertones: so Herodotus, for instance, connects the Spartans with various barbarians by genealogy (Hdt. 
6.53-4) and practice (Hdt. 6.58-60), and Spartan commanders were notorious for “going barbarian” (for 
example Thucydides’ Pausanias, Thuc. 1.130-131).     
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latter ‘[stood] up for justice’ [ὑπεμείνειν ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων] and won out ‘because it 
turned its attention to the situation’ [ἐκ τοῦ προσέχειν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν] 
(Dem. 4.3).   Considering that Demosthenes calls this a “recent” conflict [ἐξ οὗ χρόνος 
οὐ πολύς], the options seem to be either the Corinthian War of 395-86 or Agesilaus’ 
invasion of Boeotia in 378, but specificity is hardly important – indeed, I would suggest 
that specificity would have been detrimental - for Demosthenes’ purpose.186  By alluding 
to this conflict Demosthenes prepares his audience to use the same categories of “us = 
Athens” and “them = Sparta” (and all the associations that those categories would conjure 
up) for the war against Philip.  These categories, moreover, had formed and crystallized 
during Athens’ great struggle against Sparta in the Peloponnesian War.  Now Athens, 
Demosthenes claims, should stand up to Philip’s ὕβρις just as it had formerly stood up to 
Spartan ῥώμη (Dem. 4.3).  Yet, we quickly learn, that is not what is actually happening; 
instead, the Athenians are so panicked by Philip’s apparent might that they cannot think 
straight [ταραττόμεθα ἐκ τοῦ φροντίζειν ὧν ἐχρῆν] (Dem. 4.3), a far cry from the 
mindfulness they had displayed in the past.  Spartan-Athenian relations thus provide a 
model for Athens’ war with Philip.  That Demosthenes chose to start off with an example 
of a 5th-century Athenian ideal makes the character inversion he goes on to articulate 
between the present-day Athenians and Philip all the more patent and shocking.   
Philip’s assumption of a properly Athenian character is expressed through a 
constant need for action.  Demosthenes holds up Philip’s energetic consolidation of 
power as a model for his audience:     
                                                        
186 Cecil Wooten, A Commentary on Demosthenes’ Philippic I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
48, considers Agesilaus’ invasion more likely, since Demosthenes appears to imagine that some of his 
audience would have been participants in the war.     
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Εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, δυσπολέμητον οἴεται τὸν 
Φίλιππον εἶναι, σκοπῶν τό τε πλῆθος τῆς ὑπαρχούτης αὐτῷ 
δυνάμεως καὶ τὸ τὰ χωρία πάντ᾿ἀπολωλέναι τῇ πόλει, ὀρθῶς μὲν 
οἴεται… Εἰ τοίνυν ὁ Φίλιππος τότε ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν γνώμην, ὡς 
χαλεπὸν πολεμεῖν ἐστιν Ἀθηναίοις ἔχουσι τοσαῦτ’ ἐπιτειχίσματα 
τῆς αὑτοῦ χώρας ἔρημον ὄντα συμμάχων, οὐδὲν ἂν ὧν νυνὶ 
πεποίηκεν ἔπραξεν οὐδὲ τοσαύτην ἐκτήσατ’ ἂν δύναμιν. 
 
If any of you, Athenians, seeing the magnitute of his power and that our 
lands have all been lost, thinks that Philip is difficult to fight against, he 
thinks correctly…. if however Philip then had held this opinion - that it is 
difficult to fight against Athenians who have so many defenses while his 
own land was bereft of allies - he would have accomplished nothing of 
what he has now completed nor would he have acquired so great a power. 
(Dem. 4.4-5) 
 
The reversal of roles comes to a head toward the middle of Philippic I, where Philip’s 
assumption of an Athenian ἦθος becomes still more explicit.  Some god, Demosthenes 
claims, has endowed Philip with constant energy [φιλοπραγμοσύνη]; he is incapable of 
choosing peace [ἡσυχία], and instead is always reaching for more [τοῦ πλείονος 
ὀρεγόμενος] (Dem. 4.42).   Inasmuch as Demosthenes had voiced the similar opinion in 
the Against Aristocrates that Philip’s hunger for power was insatiable (see above, pp. 78-
80), Philippic I builds upon the previous discourse concerning the king and, indeed, 
conforms to the Greek ideology that assigned hubristic tendencies to barbarian kings.   
Yet Philippic I develops the idea of the king’s insatiable drive for more in a 
radical way.  For, at least since the time of the Peloponnesian War, energetic activity, or 
πολυπραγμοσύνη – synonymous with φιλοπραγμοσύνη - was appropriated by 
Athens as part of her national ἦθος, while its opposites, ἀπραγμοσύνη and ἡσυχία, 
were connected with Sparta.187  The locus classicus for this vision of Athenian society is                                                         
187 The term φιλοπραγμοσύνη does not seem to have been used in the fifth century – its earliest extant 
use is in Cratinus (fr. 27 ) - but became common in the fourth. Aristotle, Topics 2 111a, 9, states that the 
two terms are interchangeable.  Demosthenes uses φιλοπραγμοσύνη exclusively, though not often even 
then: it occurs four times in the extant speeches (Dem. 1.14, 4.42, 21.137, 39.1): the first two of these 
instances in characterizations of Philip, the other demployed in repudiations of sycophancy.   The history of 
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Thucydides 1.70.8-9, where the Corinthians, seeking to goad the Spartans into war, 
describe the Athenians:188 
Καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι᾿ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος 
μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ 
κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι 
ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν 
ἐπίπονον.  ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε 
αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὀρθῶς ἂν 
εἴποι. 
And they struggle in all these matters with toil and danger throughout their 
lives, and they don’t enjoy what they have because they are always 
striving for more, and they consider doing what is necessary a festival, and 
they prefer painful industry to peaceful quiet.  So, in a word, it would be 
simply right to say that they are born neither to keep quiet themselves nor 
to allow other men to do so.   
 
Both Demosthenes’ Philip and Thucydides’ Athens are characterized by the self-same 
inability to live peacefully and quietly.  Even in their mode of expression, both 
descriptions employ similar turns of phrase to express the idea of their subject’s constant 
activity: so Philip toils and endangers himself [πονεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν] (Dem. 4.5) and 
cannot keep quiet [ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν] even if he has gained his end (Dem. 4.42), just as the 
Athenians struggle with toil and danger [μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων] and, 
again, are naturally ill-suited to keeping quiet [ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν].  Demosthenes’ employs a 
set of traits that were paradigmatic of a specifically Athenian nature in describing Philip. 
It is true that energetic activity was not necessarily considered an inherent good; 
so, for example, Thucydides’ Corinthians are obviously no friends of the Athenians, and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
πολυπραγμοσύνη is considered by Ehrenberg, “Polypragmosyne;” ἀπραγμοσύνη and ἡσυχία are 
discussed by Carter, Quiet Athenian, who concludes that “apragmosyne grew out of the Athenian 
democracy – as a product of it and as a reaction against it… [it] was a contradiction of what was most 
characteristic in the democracy.” (p. 187)  Mader, “Quantum mutati ab illis,” also discusses Philip’s 
energetic character in connection with Thucydides 1.70: pp. 59-62.   
188 Mader, “Quantum mutati ab illis,” 59-62, also discusses Philip’s energetic character in connection with 
Thucydides 1.70.  Pericles’ funeral oration eulogizes the Athenians’ active nature (Thuc. 2.36-2.41), and 
condemns the quietist (Thuc. 2.40).  For the inherent natures of Athenians and Spartans in Thucydides see 
Walter R Connor, Thucydides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 39-42.   
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in the later fifth century the Athenian πολυπράγμων was often satirized on the comic 
stage.189   Yet even when πολυπραγμοσύνη is disparaged in Comedy, it nevertheless 
indicates a specifically Athenian, democratic failing: the figure of the πολυπράγμων is 
quintessentially an Athenian overdoing the democratic process.  The connection between 
πολυπραγμοσύνη and the Athenian national ἦθος continued strong in the 4th century as 
well.  Isocrates, for example, melds the two when he considers τῶν ἀττικιζόντων 
πολυπραγμοσύνη as the parallel fault of τῶν λακωνιζόντων ὕβρις (On the Peace 
108).  Πολυπραγμοσύνη was an Athenian quality irrespective of whether it was being 
used positively or negatively and, as such, would shock the Athenian audience when 
applied to the barbarian Philip.  
Philip’s self-aggrandizing motives lead him into excesses similar to those which 
ultimately proved to be the Athenians’ downfall during the Peloponnesian War.190   With 
each success his ἀσέλγεια grows (Dem. 4.9), and he is nothing if not a ὑβριστής (Dem. 
4.37, 4.50).  Philip’s problem, typical of successful empires and their leaders, is that he 
does not know how or when to stop: indeed, we have already seen greed as a major part 
of Philip’s ἦθος in the Against Aristocrates.  In Demosthenes’ later speeches, as well, 
πλεονεξία will continue to play a critical role in descriptions of Philip (Dem. 2.9, 6.8, 
6.12, 9.7, 10.2).191  For Thucydides and other critics of the Athenian Empire, the same 
natural penchant for activity which had led to Athens’ acquisition of an empire would                                                         
189 Thus, for example, Aristophanes’ Sycophant claims that πολυπραγμονεῖν is more beneficial to the 
city than ἡσυχίαν ἔχων ζῆν ἀργός (Wealth 913-22).   
190 Demosthenes’ also holds out the hope that Philip’s power stems as much, if not more, from the 
Athenians’ apathy as from his own machinations: so he claims, for example, that even if Philip were to die, 
the Athenians would create themselves a new Philip quickly enough [καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὗτος τι πάθῃ, 
ταχέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φίλιππον ποιήσετε] (Dem. 4.11).    
191 On the evils of empire as portrayed in Athenian discourse see Christopher Tuplin, “Imperial Tyranny: 
Some Reflections on a Classical Greek Metaphor,” History of Political Thought 6 (1985): 348-375; also 
Fisher, Hybris, on the connection between ὕβρις, “thinking big”, and honor/dishonor. 
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lead inevitably to her downfall if it went unchecked.192  Thus for Thucydides part of 
Pericles political wisdom was his advice that Athens should hold on to, but not expand 
upon, the empire that it had already acquired (Thuc. 2.65.7).  In other words, a hunger for 
power could lead to success, if only that hunger was controlled and not allowed free 
reign: even greed is good in moderation.193  While greed was certainly not out of place in 
characterizations of Philip as the barbarian monarch, then, it is difficult to say whether 
the Philip of Philippic I is more barbarian or fifth-century Athenian in his insatiable need 
for conquest.  Whether barbarian or Athenian, Philip’s moral failings are at odds with his 
success and offer Demosthenes’ audience the hope that his comeuppance is nearing.  In 
sum, Demosthenes presents Philip with the strength in action characteristic of the 
Athenians themselves and with the typical shortcomings of a dominant, often tyrannical 
power, whether Athenian or barbarian.      
The Athenians’ ἦθος in Philippic I is similarly based upon a tension between their 
internal capacity to do good and their inability to actualize their decisions.  According to 
Demosthenes, the Athenians seem to know what they ought to do, but are unwilling to 
follow through on that understanding.  They can deliberate appropriately (λέγειν), but 
they fail in the deed (ἐργάζεσθαι).  Again, Demosthenes’ rhetoric seems to be 
hearkening back to a rhetorical framework exemplified in Thucydides, who had 
articulated the notion that the success of the Athenian democracy was based on a                                                         
192 Part of Pericles’ political wisdom was for Athens to hold on to, but not extend, the empire she had 
already acquired, thus putting a check on the city’s hunger for power (Thuc. 2.65.7). 
193 Thus Ryan K Balot, Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001), 177, sees a tension in Thucydides’ view of πλεονεξία: “on the one hand, [greed] has led Athens to 
incur sizable moral burdens.  On the other hand, Thucydides admires the Athenians for organizing greed 
out of domestic politics… this is the closest any ancient author comes to saying that greed is good; that 
greed is responsible for human progress.”  Ambiguous or even positive connotations of πλεονεξία are also 
in evidence outside of Thucydides: see Christian Bouchet, “La πλεονεξία chez Isocrate,” Revue des études 
anciennes 109 (2007): 475-490, on its use in Isocrates.  
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harmony of λόγος and ἔργον.194  The Mytilenean debate is particularly important as a 
point of comparison.  Here Thucydides focused on the worsening state of deliberation in 
the ekklesia even as overly hasty action is about to determine the islanders’ fate.  Both the 
speeches of Diodotus (Thuc. 3.42.5), who argues for clemency toward the Mytileneans, 
and Cleon (Thuc. 3.38.4), who argues for a death sentence, posit that the Athenians’  
Athenians’ words ought to match their actions.195  In its concern for the imbalance 
between Athenian λόγος and ἔργον, the Mytilenean debate provides an important 
precedent for Demosthenes’ view of Athenian deliberation in Philippic I.196    
The connection between Demosthenes’ Philippic I and the Mytilenean debate 
appears also at the surface level.  Cleon’s speech, in particular, shows distinct linguistic 
similarities with Demosthenes’ Philippic I, and begs the question of how we should 
understand the relation between Demosthenes and Thucydides’ text.  In particular, both 
Cleon and Demosthenes employ a satiric mode of discourse to highlight the Athenians’ 
failings.197  In the course of his speech, Cleon highlights the dysfunctional nature of 
                                                        
194 See Adam M. Parry, Logos and Ergon in Thucydides (New York: Arno Press, 1981). 
195 It is an interesting peculiarity of the Mytilenean debate that the arguments presented by both Cleon and 
Diodotus are so similar in form, though obviously worlds apart in purpose.  In addition to their use of the 
λόγος/ἔργον dychotomy is both orators’ assumption of the Periclean premise that the Athenian empire is 
a tyranny (Cleon: Thuc. 3.40.4; Diodotus: Thuc. 3.47.5), as well as their rejection of arguments of right and 
justice in favor of the argument from expediency (Cleon: Thuc. 3.40.2-3; Diodotus: Thuc. 3.44.1-4). For the 
Athenian empire as a tyranny see Jacqueline de Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1963), 160-163.  Some scholars have attempted to read justice back into Diodotus’ speech: see 
Clifford Orwin, The Humanity of Thucydides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 152-53, Yunis, 
Taming Democracy, 92-101, Arlene Saxonhouse, Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 160-163.  Nevertheless, Diodotus’ Hobbesian view of 
human nature (Thuc. 3.45) make such explanations difficult.   
196 Mader, “Quantum Mutati ab illis,” 64-68, has shown how Thucydides’ idealized Athens is inverted in 
Philippic I: “In Demosthenes, conversely, the refrain-like disjunction of deliberation and action, λόγος and 
ἔργον (vel sim.), signals precisely the failure of rational politics…” (66)  
197 On the satiric mode in Demosthenes’ Philippic I see Rowe, “Demosthenes’ First Philippic” and 
Gottfried Mader, “Fighting Philip with Decrees: Demosthenes and the Syndrome of Symbolic Action,” 
American Journal of Philology 127 (2006): 367-386. 
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Athenian deliberation by incongruous juxtapositions of seeing and hearing with speaking 
and doing: 
αἴτιοι δ᾿ ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες, οἵτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν 
τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα 
ἔργα ἀπὸ τῶν εὖ εἰπόντων σκοποῦντες ὡς δυνατὰ γίγνεσθαι, τὰ 
δὲ πεπραγμένα ἤδη, οὐ τὸ δρασθὲν πιστότερον ὄψει λαβόντες ἢ τὸ 
ἀκουσθέν, ἀπὸ τῶν λόγῳ καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων. 
 
 You are to blame as the bad institutors of these competitions [in the 
ekklesia], you who are accustomed to watch speeches being made, and to 
listen to action.  You scope out ways to bring about future deeds from fine 
speeches, and concerning what has already been done, you do not so much 
trust that which has been done in your sight as what you have heard in a 
critic’s pretty speech.  (Thuc. 3.38.4)  
 
Cleon’s strained language – the Athenians “watch” speeches and “listen” to deeds and 
put their trust in words rather than in the evidence of their own eyes – employs a satiric 
mode of argument that is strikingly close to that of Demosthenes in Philippic I.  
Compare, for example, Demosthenes’ remark that the Athenians’ use “letterary” forces 
[ἐπιστολιμαίους ταύτας δυνάμεις] (Dem. 4.19) instead of real citizen armies. Toward 
the end of Philippic I Demosthenes continues in the same strain:  
ἐπειδὰν δ᾿ ἐπιχειροτονῆτε τὰς γνώμας, ἂν ὑμῖν ἀρέσκῃ, 
χειροτονήσετε, ἵνα μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς 
πολεμῆτε Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις. 
 
And when you vote on your resolutions, vote, if it please you, in such a 
way that you fight Philip not only in your decrees and in your letters, but 
also in your deeds.198  (Dem. 4.30) 
 
Demosthenes’ imagery of the Athenians fighting “with letters” rather than “in deeds” is 
certainly much more daring than that of Cleon.  Yet both orators juxtapose the 
                                                        
198 See also Dem. 4.20: the Athenians, “thinking everything less than what is needed, chose the largest 
proposals on paper but accomplish not even the smallest thing in action” [πάντ᾿ἐλάττω νομίζοντες 
εἶναι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ τὰ μέγιστ᾿ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν αἱρούμενοι, ἐπὶ τῷ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὰ μικρὰ 
ποιεῖτε].  The Athenians’ penchant for “letterary” forces is a theme throughout Philippic I and appears 
again at Dem. 4.45.  For another discussion of the satiric in these passages see Rowe, “Demosthenes’ First 
Philippic,” 364-367.    
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ekklesiastic ‘actions’ of listening and voting with the ‘real action’ of seeing and doing, 
and thereby point to the Athenians’ delusional conflation of the real with the merely 
“letterary”.  Demosthenes’ satiric mode thus has a clear precedent in Thucydides’ Cleon; 
and, I suggest, it is no accident that both orators employ a similar discourse to make a 
similar point. Demosthenes was working with, and pushing the boundaries of, a familiar 
discourse that goaded the Athenians into action through satiric inversion.  
The parallels between Demosthenes and Cleon confront us with questions 
concerning the relation between Demosthenes’ and Thucydides’ text.  Relations between 
Demosthenes and Thucydides have most often been constructed around the figure of 
Pericles, whom Thucydides admired and whom Demosthenes emulated.  In consequence, 
the close ties between Demosthenes’ and Thucydides’ rhetoric have been ascribed to 
what Gottfried Mader has called Demosthenes’ “Periclean-Thucydidean orientation.”199  
Demosthenes, it is supposed, read Thucydides with an eye toward Thucydides’ 
presentation of Pericles; his admiration for Pericles, and by consequence his attitude 
toward the political atmosphere in Athens during the Peloponnesian War, was shaped by 
the historian’s narrative.  Yet here, in Philippic I, Demosthenes is apparently employing 
the rhetorical strategy of Cleon, an orator Thucydides openly reviled as a failed caricature 
of Pericles.  If Demosthenes had meant to follow in the footsteps of Thucydides’ Pericles, 
then Thucydides’ Cleon ought to be the very last politician whose rhetorical strategies he 
would want to use.   
In fact, there is no reason to see Demosthenes looking specifically to Thucydides 
as his only, or even primary, source for fifth-century Athenian politics or for information                                                         
199 Gottfried Mader, “Praise, Blame and Authority: Some Strategies of Persuasion in Demosthenes, 
Philippic 2,” Hermes 132 (2004): 56. On Demosthenes’ emulation of Pericles see Plutarch Dem. 6.   
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on Pericles.  Rather, Demosthenes’ use of themes present in Thucydides’ text suggests a 
much more complex interaction between the Demosthenes, Thucydides, and 5th century 
orators than a simple emulation of Pericles can explain.  In the next chapter, I will come 
back more specifically to Demosthenes view of himself as a 4th century Pericles and 
unpack the orator’s supposed “Periclean-Thucydidean” orientation further (see below, pp. 
175-182).  Suffice to say for now that, instead of direct emulation of Thucydides’ text, 
the parallels between Cleon and Demosthenes derive from the shared tradition of 
deliberative rhetoric inherited by 4th century orators from their 5th century 
predecessors.200  Demosthenes did not borrow directly from Thucydides’ Cleon; rather, 
they both drew from a shared body of rhetorical strategies.   
Demosthenes’ satiric tone highlights the paradox between the Athenians’ 
deliberation and the absence of any outcome in their decision-making.  This apparent 
inability on the part of the Athenians to substantiate their resolutions renders them 
susceptible to characterization as the barbarian/Other:   
οὐδὲν δ᾿ἀπολείπετε, ὥσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι πυκτεύουσιν, οὕτω 
πολεμεῖν Φιλίππῳ.  καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων ὁ πληγεὶς ἀεὶ τῆς πληγῆς 
ἔχεται, κἂν ἑτέρωσε πατάξῃ τις ἐκεῖσε εἰσὶν αἱ χεῖρες· 
προβάλλεσθαι δ᾿ ἢ βλέπειν ἐναντίον οὔτ᾿οἶδεν οὔτ᾿ ἐθέλει.   
 
You fight against Philip the very same way a barbarian boxes: for when 
hit he claps his hand on the place that has been struck, so that wherever he 
is stricken, that’s where his hands are; he doesn’t think, he doesn’t even 
wish, to hold his hands up or to hit back. (Dem. 4.40)     
                                                        
200 Such an interpretation of Demosthenes’ relationship with the Thucydidean speeches has important 
implications for our understanding of Thucydidean text: if Demosthenes were not drawing inspiration from 
the History itself, but from rhetorical discourse, then it would appear that Thucydides was in fact more or 
less accurate in his portrayal of deliberative discourse, or at least that he crafted speeches in accordance 
with the rhetorical conventions, both formulaic and linguistic, of the Athenian ekklesia.  For the view that 
Thucydides was a more rather than less accurate reporter of speeches see Maruice Pope, “Thucydides and 
Democracy,” Historia 27 (1988): 285-7.    
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The Athenians and Philip have changed roles, with the Athenians taking the place of the 
ignorant barbarian and Philip as the expert Greek boxer.  Like the Spartans in the 
Corinthian’s speech (Thuc. 1.71), the Athenians have fallen into a debilitating βραδυτής 
(Dem. 4.8, 4.37) and ῥαθυμία (Dem. 4.8) in their vain attempt to be peaceful.201  The 
Athenians’ failure to act has thus rendered them susceptible to the argument that they 
have lost a proper balance between deliberation and action.  They can be accused of 
having exchanged their traditional character for that of their worst enemy.   Yet despite these accusations of laziness, Demosthenes holds out an important ray 
of hope to the Athenians: if only they learn their lesson and begin to prosecute the war 
against Macedon in earnest, they can reverse the switch between themselves and Philip.  
The Athenians’ lethargy, and with it the whole reversal of character laid out over the 
course of the speech, is posited as a mere temporary state of affairs.   Indeed, Philip’s 
Athenianness itself is undermined by Demosthenes’ conviction that the Athenians hold 
the key to reestablishing world order.  It is the Athenians – despite their inactivity – who 
retain ultimate control over the situation: 
καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὗτὸς τι πάθῃ, ταχέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φίλιππον 
ποιήσετε, ἄνπερ οὕτω προσέχητε τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν· οὐδὲ 
γὰρ οὗτος παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ῥώμην τοσοῦτον ἐπηύξηται ὅσον 
παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν. 
 
Even if [Philip] were to die, you would quickly create a new Philip if you 
continue to think this way; for he has not grown to such strength so much 
by his own power as through your lack of care.202 (Dem. 4.11)  
What matters is the Athenian outlook on the world, which has the potential to change the 
larger political landscape.  Philip, on the other hand, is rendered inconsequential as an                                                         
201 Thucydides’ Corinthians accuse the Spartans of simply waiting in the face of Athenian aggression, 
thinking to simply keep the peace [ἡσυχίαν], while their inactivity [βραδυτής] is really bringing everyone 
only harm (Thuc. 1.71) .   
202 See also Dem. 4.7. 
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individual, since he is effectively interchangeable with any other Athenian enemy.  Philip 
is thus left with no real agency over the world, for all his frenzied activity.  His very ἦθος 
itself is either the product of the Athenians’ laxity or of the machinations of some god, 
working on behalf of the city, who wishes to galvanize the Athenians out of their lethargy 
(Dem. 4.42).  In the end, Philip’s insatiability for power only reinforces his lack of 
control over the situation and especially over his own character: not only will he not stop, 
but he truly cannot stop his advance (Dem. 4.42-43).203  Demosthenes tempers his vision 
of a topsy-turvy world where Philip is Athenian and the Athenians are barbarian by 
pointing to an underlying system that realigns the present situation with a normative 
Athenian world-view of themselves and their enemies.    Thus far I have argued that at the heart of Philippic I is a misalignment of λόγος 
and ἔργον that drives Demosthenes’ narrative of Athens’ war with Philip forward.  The 
Athenians have not followed through in deed what they have voted on in word; Philip, 
too, conceals behind his Athenian-like actions a rationale (λόγος) fit only for a 
barbarian.  In their ability to act the Athenians and Philip have taken on each others’ 
roles, a theme upon which Demosthenes expands with biting satire.  Beneath it all, 
however, lies the hope that the Athenians will righten the balance – that is, they will put 
their words into action – and return the world back to normal.  So too, I have shown that 
Demosthenes’ mode of argumentation has clear precedents in Thucydides and suggested 
that the orator was using a much older and well-established framework within which to 
portray Philip.  I turn now to another feature of Philippic I with roots in Thucydides: 
Demosthenes’ reflection on the place of the orator in deliberation.  Because                                                         
203 This tactic also negates any hope of an outcome apart from a military confrontation, if not in Macedonia 
or Central Greece, then in Attica (Dem. 4.49). 
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Demosthenes’ fashioning of the orator’s role is founded on the misalignment between 
λόγος and ἔργον he has created, it is an important element in understanding how the 
speech works as a coherent whole.  Additionally, because Demosthenes in his latter 
speeches will tie his own role as an orator and a σύμβουλος to his characterization of 
Philip, Philippic I can be seen as a testing ground of sorts for Demosthenes to present his 
own political situation vis-à-vis Philip.     While creating a misalignment between λόγος and ἔργον is central to 
Demosthenes’ characterizations of the Athenians and Philip, it also bolsters his own self-
fashioning as a competent orator.  Demosthenes claims authority for himself on the 
premise that his advice alone will allow the Athenians to reconnect their actions to their 
noble intentions.  Demosthenes also presents himself as the only one able to look beyond 
Philip’s surface successes to the terrible motives which will eventually lead to his failure.  
In short, Demosthenes based his role as σύμβουλος on the possession of specialized 
knowledge.  As we will see in the next chapter, this was not the case for all politicians: 
specifically, Aeschines takes a very different view of the speaker’s role in public 
deliberation and policy making (see below, pp. 136-161).     
As a young orator who had never spoken about Macedonia previously, 
Demosthenes naturally needed to establish his credentials before being taken seriously.  
Demosthenes’ concern to portray himself as a knowledgeable speaker is evident in the 
basic structure of Philippic I.  Thus he devotes substantial passages to a discussion of 
military strategy (Dem. 1.16-23; 1.28-29) and another to a discussion of Aegean 
geography (Dem. 1.31-32), arguments that establish his credibility for discussing 
Macedonia and foreign policy.  By contrast, most of his other deliberative speeches (both 
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earlier and later) are not nearly as detailed in terms of their proposal or the “facts on the 
ground.”204  In the same way, describing Philip’s ἦθος could bolster Demosthenes’ 
credibility: being able to infer the king’s future course of action from his character was 
obviously a useful skill when assessing a given policy towards Macedonia.205  Thus 
Philip’s ἦθος is key not only to Demosthenes’ presentation of his actual proposals, but 
also to his self-fashioning as a competent σύμβουλος.        
Demosthenes’ juxtaposes his own specialized knowledge with the demos, whom 
he characterizes as either ignorant of the facts or unable to correctly interpret them. 
Contrasting the wise advisor with the foolishness of the demos was, again, a traditional 
topos in Athenian political discourse.  Thucydides’ Diodotus, for example, defines the 
orator’s role in similar terms: 
Χρὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε ἀξιοῦν τι ἡμᾶς 
περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας λέγειν ὑμῶν τῶν δι᾿ ὀλίγου σκοπούντων, 
ἄλλως τε καὶ ὑπεύθυνον τὴν παραίνεσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀνεύθυνον 
τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀκρόασιν. 
But with respect to the most critical affairs and in such a case as this, one 
ought to consider that we speakers forecast future events more carefully 
than you who have a narrower view; and we are accountable for our 
advice, whereas you who listen are not.  (Thuc. 3.43.4) 
Diodotus emphasizes the special knowledge and abilities that the orator possesses.  Still, 
he sees the demos’ need for the orator’s foresight as contingent on Athens’ current                                                         
204 On the orator’s knowledge of policy see Peter Hunt, War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes’ Athens 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 11-12.  Mogens H. Hansen, “Two notes on Demosthenes’ 
symbouleutic speeches,” Classica et Medievalia 35 (1984): 58, calls Philippic I “exceptional” for this 
reason. However, I do not agree with his conclusion that Philippic I was the only speech Demosthenes 
delivered that had a specific proposal attached to it.  I find Sealey’s comment that he finds the speech 
“distressingly vague” puzzling (Demosthenes and his Time, 132); the fact that it glosses over important 
details such as funding surely do not make it any less vague than any of the other speeches in the 
deliberative corpus. 
205 Demosthenes defines a good politicians’ basis of knowledge in these very terms in On the Crown 173.  
See also Mader, “Foresight, Hindsight.”  The strategy of lambasting the character of one’s enemy in order 
to showcase one’s own virtues is well-known in forensic rhetoric: Craig Cooper, “Forensic Oratory,” in A 
Companion to Greek Rhetoric, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 210-214.   
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problems: once the immediate issues facing Athens are resolved, the need for the orator’s 
special insight vanishes.   At the same time, Diodotus concludes that if only the ekklesia 
as a collective would hold themselves accountable for their mistaken judgments in the 
same way they hold speakers accountable for their advice, they all would rise to the 
challenge of being insightful (Thuc. 3.43.5).  In other words, all Athenians had the 
capacity for intelligent assessment - if only they would turn their minds to that task.  This 
might all be wishful thinking on Diodotus’ part, but the underlying idea that the Athenian 
collective was intelligent and would make the right decision given the proper chance was 
critical in Athenian democratic ideology.206  It is peculiar, then, that Demosthenes holds 
out no such ray of hope: the only way the Athenians have out of the current mess is to 
follow Demosthenes’ own advice.207  Collective intelligence never supersedes the 
individual knowledge of the specialist.  Demosthenes’ critique of Athenian debate in 
Philippic I is leveled not so much at other orators who confuse and blind the populace, as 
on the confused populace itself.208  Downplaying the ability of the demos to judge issues 
                                                        
206 See Ober, Mass and Elite, 156-160.      
207 However, Demosthenes does suggests that if the Athenians were to fight for themselves in the army 
rather than hiring mercenaries, they would be able to see for themselves what was happening in their 
affairs: 
 
πῶς οὖν ταῦτα παύσεται; ὅταν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, τοὺς αὐτοὺς 
ἀποδείξητε στρατιώτας καὶ μάρτυρας τῶν στρατηγουμένων καὶ δικαστὰς 
οἴκαδ᾿ ἐλθόντας τῶν εὐθυνῶν, ὥστε μὴ ἀκούειν μόνον ὑμᾶς τὰ ὑμέτερ᾿αὐτῶν, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ παρόντας ὁρᾶν.   
How, then, can this situation be stopped? When you, Athenians, make yourselves 
soldiers, the witnesses of your generals’ actions, and, having come back home, the 
jurymen at their audits, so that you not only hear about your business from them, but you 
also see it in your own presence. (Dem. 4.47)  
The knowledge they would gain, however, is limited to the state of their army.  Demosthenes’ point is not 
so much that they would have a better knowledge of foreign affairs as that the Athenians would be better 
able to judge the competency of their generals.   
208 Demosthenes does intimate at one point that Philip has friends among the citizens who report back to 
him (4.18), but this is his only mention of possible wrongdoing on the part of his opponents.  Demosthenes’ 
may also have wanted to avoid deliberately antagonizing his opposition at this stage in his career.  
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of foreign policy brings to the fore the orator’s own unique status as the only citizen able 
to help the city against the Macedonian threat.           
Instead of thinking critically and making independent decisions, the Athenians 
engage in fruitless gossip.  Demosthenes imagines Athenian conversations concerning 
Philip, with each man asking the other for news (Dem. 4.44) and debating whether Philip 
is dead or just gravely ill (Dem. 4.11).  He returns to the issue toward the end of Philippic 
I and repeats his complaint against rumor-mongering: 
ἡμῶν δ᾿ οἱ μὲν περιόντες μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φασὶ Φίλιππον 
πράττειν τὴν Θηβαίων κατάλυσιν καὶ τὰς πολιτείας διασπᾶν, οἱ δ᾿ 
ὡς πρέσβεις πέπομφεν ὡς βασιλέα, οἱ δ᾿ ἐν Ἰλλυριοῖς πόλεις 
τειχίζειν, οἱ δὲ λόγους πλάττοντες ἕκαστος περιερχόμεθα.  
Some of us say that Philip is planning the Thebans’ destruction and the 
break up of their polity with the Lacedaemonians; some that he has sent 
ambassadors to the Great King; others that he is fortifying cities in Illyria; 
and so each one of us goes about fabricating rumors.209  (Dem. 4.48)   
The Athenians are unable to ascertain and to process information from outside the city.  
News from foreign territory, in other words, requires authentication and interpretation by 
an advisor who can pick out the truth from the falsehood.210   Demosthenes argues that 
the Athenians should stop listening to rumors and focus their energies on the problems 
inside the city, since the cause of Philip’s rise to power is their own inactivity (Dem. 
4.11-12).  Meanwhile, the world outside the polis should be left to the wise advisor, who 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Certainly he will grow less shy of accusing other rhetors of misleading the populace in latter speeches in 
the wake of the Peace of Philocrates.  
209 All these claims seem to have had some basis in reality.  See Sealey, Demosthenes and his Time (for 
Thebes: 129-30; for the Illyrians: 161-2).  Wooten, Commentary on Demosthenes’ Philippic I, 116, 
suggests that Demosthenes’ inclusion of himself in the rumor-mongering [περιερχόμεθα] shows an effort 
on his part to soften his criticism.    
210 In his capacity as a purveyor of “priviledged” information, Demosthenes’ role rather resembles that of 
the historian.  See Marincola, John, Authority and Tradition in Ancient Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 1997), ch. 2, on the historian’s authority.   
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can avoid being taken in by false rumors because he can accurately judge the truth by 
looking at Philip’s character.   
Indeed, Demosthenes disparages the demos’ current opinion of Philip.  He offers 
his own belief concerning the Macedonian’s future by contrasting it to the supposed 
thoughts of some of his audience: 
ἐγὼ δὲ οἶμαι μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐκεῖνον μεθύειν 
τῷ μεγέθει τῶν πεπραγμένων καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνειροπολεῖν ἐν 
τῇ γνώμῃ, τήν τ᾿ ἐρημίαν τῶν κωλυσόντων ὁρῶντα καὶ τοῖς 
πεπραγμένοις ἐπῃρμένον, οὐ μἐντοι γε μὰ Δί᾿ οὕτω προαιρεῖσθαι 
πράττειν ὥστε τοὺς νοητοτάτους τῶν παρ᾿ ἡμῖν εἰδέναι τί μέλλει 
ποιεῖν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνοητότατοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ λογοποιοῦντες.211 
 
But by the gods I think, Athenians, that that man [Philip] is drunk with the 
greatness of his deeds and his mind is filled with many such dreams, since 
he sees that there is nobody to stop him and he is excited by what he has 
accomplished, and indeed, by Zeus, he will not chose to do what the idiots 
among you think he will do; for the rumor-mongers are most idiotic.  
(Dem. 4.49)     
The rumor-mongers look to Philip’s actions – his political alliances in Greece and in the 
east, as well as his movements in the north – only to draw false, pessimistic conclusions 
from them.  Demosthenes himself, on the other hand, looks past the greatness of Philip’s 
accomplishments [τῷ μεγέθει τῶν πεπραγμένων] to the character flaws which leave 
him permanently unsatisfied with his current state, and on that basis predicts a happy 
outcome – if only the Athenians would follow his lead.  Again, Demosthenes 
appropriates for himself a unique position of authority in Macedonian policy-making 
based on his ability to read Philip’s ἦθος.  Demosthenes’ interpretation of Philip’s 
character is key to his self-presentation as a competent orator.  
                                                        
211 Wooten, Commentary on Philippic I, 118, argues that “νοητοτάτους must be a misprint for 
ἀνοητοτάτους.  Otherwise, the sentence does not make any sense.”    
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Philippic I was not a success.  Despite this, Demosthenes would return to the 
themes of character reversal and the λόγος/ἔργον imbalance which he introduced in 
Philippic I.  They allowed Demosthenes, and his listeners, to come to terms with Philip’s 
successes while still holding out hope that all was not yet lost.  The role of Philip’s ἦθος 
would continue to be important in Demosthenes’ self-fashioning as the wise advisor able 
to see beyond the surface of the king’s many victories into his inner nature.  While 
Philippic I harks back to traditional rhetorical paradigms also evidenced in Thucydides, 
its central themes informed much of Demosthenes’ later thinking concerning Philip and 
the Macedonian situation.     
The First Olynthiac: 349 BC 
While Philip’s characterization in Philippic I features faults, like ὕβρις, typical of 
tyrant powers, his political role as king was less important to Demosthenes at the time 
than describing the corrosive greed latent behind his military might.  In the Olynthiacs, 
Demosthenes changes tactics.  The three Olynthiac speeches were delivered sometime in 
the summer of 349 BCE in response to an Olynthian embassy sent to ask for Athenian 
help against Philip.212  Demosthenes was sympathetic to the Olynthian cause.  To 
persuade the Athenians to intervene on the Olynthians’ behalf, the orator contended that 
Athens’ democratic government gives the city an advantage over Philip’s Macedonia.  
The Olynthiacs systematically explore the relative strengths and weaknesses of Athenian 
                                                        
212 At the time, Philip was beseiging Olynthus.  For an overview of the conflict see Worthington, Philip II, 
ch. 7 and Sealey, Demosthenes and His Time, 137-143.  See also Cawkwell, Defense of Olynthus, 130-140; 
John M. Carter, “Athens, Euboea, and Olynthus,” Historia 20 (1971): 418-429; and Edmund M. Burke, 
“Eubulus, Olynthus, and Euboea,”  Transactions and Proceeding of the American Philological Association 
114 (1984): 111-120. 
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democracy and Macedonian monarchy.213  Demosthenes concludes that while Philip as 
king may have the advantage over Athens in terms of prosecuting war, he will ultimately 
fail because of his primitive governing and economic systems.  The Olynthiacs are thus 
rooted in earlier traditions of Athenian political thought which saw monarchy and 
democracy as antithetical systems of government perennially at odds with each other.  As 
well, it becomes increasingly obvious that what Demosthenes had to say about Philip as a 
king had nothing to do with the reality of Macedonian monarchy.  Like Philippic I, the 
Olynthiacs show Demosthenes’ adaptation of inherited Athenian ideas to the current 
situation and to his own point of view.  Before considering the substance of 
Demosthenes’ argument, however, I turn to a consideration of the speeches’ composition.  
I argue that the Olynthiacs were conceived of as a single unit and that the argument of 
each individual speech complements the others’.  Understanding the three speeches as a 
unit will allow me to build a coherent picture of Philip as he is portrayed over the course 
of the speeches.     
It has been the norm to view the Olynthiacs as separate entities bound together 
merely by the ultimate goal for which they were composed – namely, the aid of the city 
of Olynthus.  This view arose because, despite the evident chronological proximity of the 
speeches, on the face of it the Olynthiacs have little in common in terms of either their 
rhetorical strategy or their specific proposals.  For a long while, then – indeed, as early as 
the Demosthenic scholiasts - the major scholarly question concerning the Olynthiacs has 
been the order in which they were delivered.214  Various arguments tending toward one or 
                                                        
213 Demosthenes’ focus on Philip as king in the Olynthiacs was underscored by J. W. Leopold, 
“Demosthenes on Distrust of Tyrants,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 22 (1981): 227-246. 
214 Dionysius Halicarnassus gives the order of the speeches as 2-3-1 (ep. Ad Ammaeum. i.4.), while the 
scholia to Olynthiac II argue for the ‘traditional’ order of 1-2-3 (schol. Dem. 2.1a).  
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another order have been proposed.  19th and 20th century scholarship secured the 
identification of Olynthiac III as the last in the trilogy, but the order of the first and 
second remained in contention.215   More recently, however, Christopher Tuplin has 
questioned the premise that the three speeches were composed individually and in a 
particular, historically important, order.216  By comparing the individual organization of 
the speeches Tuplin comes to the conclusion that “the whole point” of the trio was “that 
the three speeches can – so far as definable external circumstances are concerned – be 
exactly contemporary and afford an example of the same situation being rhetorically 
addressed three times and in three different ways” (280).217  Tuplin’s arguments, getting 
away as they do from a strictly historical approach to the speeches, stresses a reading of 
the deliberative corpus that finds meaning in the orator’s manipulation of facts as well as 
in those facts themselves.     
I argue that the Olynthiacs, in addition to the structural parallels elucidated by 
Tuplin, also show coherence at the thematic level.  Each of the three speeches is focused 
on one aspect of the Olynthian problem currently facing Athens: Olynthiac I is largely 
concerned with the current military situation in the Chalcidice and outlines Demosthenes’ 
proposed plan of attack; the second deals with Philip’s political situation in Macedonia; 
                                                        
215 See Robert Whiston, Demosthenes, with an English Commentary (London: Whittaker & Co., 1868), 68-
78; Henri Wiel, Démosthenè. Les Harangues (Paris: Hachette, 1881), 170; Ellis, J. R., “The order of the 
Olynthiacs,” Historia 16 (1967): 108-11; Christoph Eucken, “Reihenfolge und Zweck der olynthischen 
Reden,” Museum Helveticum 41 (1985): 193-208. 
216 See Christopher Tuplin, “Demosthenes’ ‘Olynthiacs’ and the Character of the Demegoric Corpus,” 
Historia 47 (1998): 276-320. 
217 Tuplin argues that the three speeches show three different types of composition: I is composed of 
corresponding elements in ring composition; II is based on a bipartite structure; III features a tripartite 
structure.  He also points out that the three Olynthiacs employ a larger proportion of similes than the rest of 
the corpus.  Hartmut Erbse, “Zu den Olynthischen Reden des Demosthenes,” Reinisches Museum 99 
(1956): 364-380, also argued that the three speeches were conceived of as a unit, but his further claim that 
they must have also been delivered at the same meeting of the ekklesia (379) cannot be adequately proven 
and need not follow from their having been composed together. 
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and the third turns to the internal - mostly financial - problems in Athens itself.218  
Besides the basic message that the Athenians should intervene in the Chalcidice, then, the 
three speeches appear to have virtually nothing in common – each is concerned with one 
specific topic that bears on the overall question.  The tripronged nature of Demosthenes’ 
argument in the Olynthiacs was perceived as early as Ulpian in the early 4th century CE, 
who considered each of these (military, political, and financial) points in his 
Prolegomena to Demosthenes.  In the end, however, Ulpian concluded that the one 
concerning the military situation was the most important aspect of the three.  Interpreting 
the Olynthiacs with a view to Demosthenes’ rhetorical strategy rather than as historically 
accurate or biographically-motivated texts thus clarifies the chronological problems 
posed by the speeches.  There can be no question that the three speeches were conceived 
of and composed together, and that to speak of any chronology in terms of their 
composition would be wrong.  We can, on the other hand, identify the order in which 
they would have been delivered.  I identify Olynthiac I as the first of the trilogy based on 
its exposition of the tripronged nature of the argument to follow.  A holistic 
understanding of the Olynthiacs will also point to Demosthenes’ tripartite view of 
government.  For the orator, government is identified as an entity responsible for the 
military, for political decision-making, and for the financial obligations of a polity.   
Demosthenes establishes the tripartite focus of the Olynthiacs at the beginning of 
Olynthiac I as he outlines his advice to the audience:  
ἔστι δὴ τά ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ψηφίσασθαι μὲν ἤδη τὴν βοήθειαν, καὶ 
παρασκευάσασθαι τὴν ταχίστην ὅπως ἐνθένδε βοηθήσετε (καὶ μὴ 
πάθητε ταὐτὸν ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον), πρεσβείαν δὲ πέμπειν, ἥτις 
ταὺτ᾿ ἐρεῖ καὶ παρέσται τοῖς πράγμασιν.                                                          
218 The speech includes Demosthenes’ famous demand that the Athenians take money from the Theoric 
Fund in order to pay for the war (Dem. 3.11-13; 29-31).   
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These suggestions seem the best to me: to vote for an expedition now, and 
to prepare it as quickly as possible so that you may be of help there (and 
so that you don’t allow the same thing to happen as before), and to send an 
embassy which would inform [the Olynthians] of these things and would 
be present during the event. (Dem. 1.2)   
Demosthenes’ recommendation thus includes the actual war effort, the preparations - 
presumably financial – necessary for that war effort, and an act of diplomacy toward the 
Olynthians.219  The equally necessary nature of each action to the successful prosecution 
of the war is mirrored by their syntactic equality (ψηφίσασθαι… παρασκευάσασθαι… 
πέμπειν).     
Concomitantly, each of these tasks is assigned to a particular group within the 
larger Athenian community:     
Πάντα δὴ ταῦτα δεῖ συνιδοντας ἅπαντας βοηθεῖν καὶ ἀπωθεῖν 
ἐκεῖσε τὸν πόλεμον, τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους, ἵν᾿ ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν ὧν 
καλῶς ποιοῦντες ἔχουσι μικρὰ ἀναλίσκοντες τὰ λοιπὰ καρπῶνται 
ἀδεῶς, τοὺς δ᾿ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, ἵνα τὴν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἐμπειρίαν ἐν τῇ 
Φιλίππου χώρᾳ κτησάμενοι φοβεροὶ φύλακες τῆς οἰκείας ἀκεραίου 
γένωνται, τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας, ἵν᾿ αἱ τῶν πεπολιτευμένων αὐτοῖς 
εὔθυναι ῥᾴδιαι γένωνται, ὡς ὁποῖ᾿ ἄττ᾿ ἂν ὑμᾶς περιστῇ τὰ 
πράγματα, τοιοῦτοι κριταὶ καὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθε. 
All of us, having considered these matters, ought to provide help and to 
carry the theater of war over there [Olynthus]– on the one hand all the 
wealthy, so that, for the sake of the wealth which they possess, by 
spending a small portion they will be able enjoy the rest; and all those in 
the prime of life, so that in carrying the theater of war into Philip’s 
territory they will become the feared defendants of a  safe homeland, and 
all the speakers, so that the politicians’ audits will go easily, and you will 
judge them according to the same circumstances in which you yourselves 
stand.  (Dem. 1.28)   
                                                        
219 The exact nature of the embassy is unclear – was its purpose to administer the oaths necessary for an 
alliance, or would it be sent merely to inform the Olynthians of the Athenians’ imminent arrival? - but it 
need not be read as evidence that the alliance between Olynthus and Athens had not yet been concluded (so 
Tuplin, “Demosthenes’ Olynthiacs,” 277 contra Ellis, “Order of the Olynthiacs,” 108).  As Eucken, 
“Reihenfolge und Zweck der olynthischen Reden,” 195, rightly points out, “in allen drei Reden lautet – bei 
Hinweisen auf eine zum Gebrauch gegebene Symmachie (I 10; II 2; III6) – der die Olynthier betreffende 
Vorschlag allein, Hilfe zu schicken, nicht aber ein Bündnis zu schliessen.”      
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Again Demosthenes has outlined the three elements – financial, military, and political - 
necessary for Athenian success: the rich must provide money for the expedition; the adult 
men must serve in the military; and the politicians must serve (and be judged) honestly.  
As we will see, he returns to the same idea of a tripronged war effort in Olynthiac II and 
in Olynthiac III.220  Inasmuch as Olynthiac I introduces the three speeches as a whole by 
laying out Demosthenes’ overall plan at the beginning, it must have been delivered as 
first of the three.221       
The military, financial, and political arms described by Demosthenes with respect 
to the Athenian polity are also prominent in his account of Macedonia.  As head of the 
state - and therefore the Macedonian equivalent of the Athenian demos – Philip, 
according to Demosthenes, has three functions: he is at once the στρατηγός, the 
δεσπότης, and the ταμίας of the Macedonian state (Dem. 1.4).  These three facets of 
Philip’s position mirror the tripartite division of the Athenian citizenry which, as we have 
seen, Demosthenes had identified at Dem. 1.2 and 1.28: both Philip and the demos have 
military, financial, and political responsibilities.  Yet while different segments of the 
Athenian population have different roles to play in the success of their community, given 
the nature of monarchy, Philip alone must fulfill all three functions of government.  In 
short, Philip’s role as king brings the Athenians face to face with a paradigm of 
                                                        
220 Dem. 2.31 restates the idea that each citizen ought to do what they can, first in terms of their financial 
contribution, second in terms of serving in the army, and thirdly in terms of their accounts and in terms of 
making policy decisions.  Dem. 3.35 explains how his policies will establish order in the city’s taxes, 
military, and lawcourts, [εἰς τάξιν ἤγαγον τὴν πόλιν, τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ λαβεῖν, τοῦ στρατεύεσθαι, τοῦ 
δικάζειν] and in general having each member of the state do what he can as his age and he circumstances 
require. 
221 The tripartite role of government finds a parallel in the political theory of Plato’s Republic, which also 
divides the constitution – and the soul – into three: the apetite, the spirit, and the rational.  In choosing to 
portray the constitution as divided into three parts, Demosthenes may very well be responding to Platonic 
political theory in the Olynthiacs.  For arguments connecting Demosthenes to Plato see Hernández-Muñoz, 
“Tucídides y Platón,” pp. 154-160; Yunis, Taming Democracy, ch. 9. 
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leadership which is utterly at odds with their own.  Indeed, monarchy is not without its 
own merits: Demosthenes acknowledges that Philip’s complete control over the 
government allows him to be militarily successful.  The king’s military success in the 
Olynthiacs thus continues with the characterization of Philip as an active ruler in 
Philippic I.  In the Olynthiacs, as in the earlier speech, Demosthenes’ primary interest in 
Philip’s character lies in its capacity to illuminate the workings – and stumbling blocks – 
of the Athenian political system.  In the Olynthiacs, Demosthenes will argue that Philip’s 
eventual failure (which, of course, is not in doubt) stems from his lack of ability at two of 
his roles as monarch: namely, in his capacity as governor and steward.   
Olynthiac I sets out the tripartite schema of the entire Olynthiacs while also 
focusing on the military aspect of the war against Macedonia.   A large portion of the 
speech is devoted to outlining Demosthenes’ proposed expedition, which is supposed to 
create a double front, one army sent to help the besieged Olynthians and the other sent to 
ravage Macedonia itself (Dem. 1.16-18). These two armies are to be paid for from the 
military fund (Dem. 1.19-20).222 The main purpose of the speech is to convince the 
Athenians that if they do not immediately send an expedition to the north, they will 
eventually be faced with the necessity of fighting Philip on their own soil (Dem. 1.15, 
1.25-26).  
Demosthenes’ characterization of Philip in the Olynthiacs certainly draws on 
Philippic I.  So, for example, Olynthiac I, just like Philippic I, explains Macedonia’s rise 
to power via Philip’s insatiable desire for conquest (Dem. 1.12-13); here too Philip 
disdains relaxation [οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ῥαθυμεῖν ἀπέκλινεν] (Dem. 1.13) and his                                                         
222 While Demosthenes voices his disapproval of the Athenians’ spending on festivals, he does not 
explicitly object to the Theoric fund here (as he will do in Olynthiac III), but does reject the notion that he 
is putting up a proposal to divert money from that fund to the Military fund.  
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φιλοπραγμοσύνη makes peace impossible for him [ὑφ᾿ ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως 
ἀγαπήσας τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἡσυχίαν σχήσει] (Dem. 1.14).   Additionally, as in 
Philippic I, Demosthenes contrasts Philip’s activity with Athens’ laxity: if the Athenians 
had done as they ought from the first, Demosthenes argues, Philip would never have 
gained the power he currently has (Dem. 1.9).  Nevertheless, the orator suggests, the 
Olynthian war presents the Athenians with a “spontaneous opportunity” [καιρὸς 
αὐτόματος] (Dem. 1.9) to reverse course and take back their ancestral superiority.223    
Yet whereas Philippic I focused on the respective characters of Philip and the 
Athenians, the Olynthiacs turn to systems of governance as a source of contrast.  
Demosthenes offers a critique of monarchy and compares it to democracy and democratic 
leadership.224  Demosthenes suggests that having a single ruler responsible for all the 
tasks incumbent upon proper governance in war, politics, and finance actually benefits 
Philip, at least when it comes to making war: 
τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πάντων ἐκεῖνον ἕνα ὄντα κύριον καὶ ῥητῶν καὶ 
ἀπορρὴτων καὶ ἅμα στρατηγὸν καὶ δεσπότην καὶ ταμίαν, καὶ 
πανταχοῦ αὐτὸν παρεῖναι τῷ στρατεύματι, πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰ τοῦ 
πολέμου ταχὺ καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν πράττεσθαι πολλῷ προέχει, πρὸς                                                         
223 The idea that the Olynthian war was a perfect opportunity that had come about “spontaneously” for the 
Athenians is present also at Dem. 1.7, where a vivid metaphor introduces the speech: ὁ μὴν οὖν παρὼν 
καιρός, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφιεὶς ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν ἐκείνων 
αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστίν, εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε [The present circumstance, 
Athenians, all but says to you, even though it has no voice, that you must help the state of your affairs [in 
the North], if you think at all about their safety].    
224 It may be argued that the distinction between monarchy and tyranny, which as Aristotle expresses it 
(Pol. 1279b1-10) is the perversion of a good monarchy, ought to be applied to Philip’s case; yet the 
distinction between monarchy and tyranny is not carefully observed in the non-theoretical discourse, and 
cannot be uniformily applied to the demegoric speeches: as Hugo Montgomery, The Way to Chaeronea: 
Foreign Policy, Decision-Making, and Political Influence in Demosthenes’ Speeches (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 17 so aptly put it, “Demosthenes’ statements when assessing the 
domestic strength of Macedonia… are not those of the political theorist.  He is no neutral spectator… 
unlike Aristotle, the scientific observer of Politica, he is not concerned with specifying political events… in 
order to arrange them in an evolutional system.” See also Sara Forsdyke, “The Uses and Abuses of 
Tyranny,” in A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, (ed.) Ryan Balot (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2009), 241-245.  I use monarchy in discussing Philip’s rule rather than tyranny because, in the 
practice of the ekklesia, there is hardly any distinction between the two.   
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δὲ τὰς καταλλαγάς ἃς ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσαιτο ἄσμενος πρὸς 
᾿Ολυνθίους, ἐναντίως ἔχει.  
For it benefits that man [Philip] to be alone master of public and secret 
affairs, and to be at the same time general and ruler and steward, and to 
oversee the army as a whole himself, and to act in matters of war quickly 
and at the right time; but with respect to the reconciliations which he 
would readily make with the Olynthians, the situation is the very opposite.  
(Dem. 1.4)  
The fact that the duties of a king encompass all three facets of governance – military, 
politics, and finance – is thus beneficial to him in his military endeavors. Philip’s 
complete control of the state gives him the ability to act quickly and at the right time 
[ταχὺ καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν πράττεσθαι] in matters of war – which is precisely what the 
Athenian demos seems incapable of accomplishing.225  Philip’s claim to martial prowess 
is reinforced as Demosthenes lists the places Macedonia has already conquered (Dem. 
1.8-9; 1.12-13).  Demosthenes’ apparent endorsement of monarchy (at least when it 
comes to making war) ought not be dismissed as a momentary ploy on the orator’s part; 
rather, it makes sense as an integral component of the overall schema of the Olynthiacs.  
Demosthenes will, moreover, return to this very argument in later speeches (Dem. 
19.185-6; 18.236).  The appearance of Philip’s apparent military superiority here must 
therefore be given due weight is part of Demosthenes’ system of political thought, over 
and above its value as a strategy to shock the Athenians into immediate action.    Indeed, the claim that Philip is, by the very nature of his political role, better able 
to conduct war than Athens can is quite shocking.  Moreover, in arguing that a monarch 
had certain advantages in wartime, Demosthenes may well seem at odds with most                                                         225 The unified control of the king over his domain contrasts with the democratic system, whose principle 
was to spread the responsibility for governance across the body of citizens.  This dissimilarity in political 
structure bred mutual distrust between a monarch and a democracy [καὶ ὅλως ἄπιστον, οἶμαι, ταῖς 
πολιτείαις ἡ τυραννίς, ἄλλως τε κἂν ὅμορον χώραν ἔχωσιν], as is indeed the case between Philip  
and the Olynthians (Dem. 1.5).   
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popular Athenian discourse on monarchy, which tended to view the sole ruler through the 
dark lens of the Peisistratid tyranny or the Persian Wars.226   But popular views of 
monarchy in Athens were more complex than a model of complete vilification can 
accommodate.227  The benefits of monarchy were, in fact, articulated in a variety of 
sources - not all of them favorable to monarchic rule.  Looking into the antecedents to 
Demosthenes’ claim will help us to understand his reinterpretation of traditional Athenian 
norms within the context of the Macedonian debate.  
The earliest classical justification of monarchy, Darius’ speech in Herodotus’ 
constitutional debate, is probably also the best known.  I would stress at the outset that 
the Greek idea of monarchy within which Herodotus and Demosthenes worked was 
radically different from the reality.  We have seen that the critical problems facing the 
Macedonian kings were the integration of the peoples under their rule and the creation of 
infrastructure to ease communication between the center (the monarch) and the periphery 
(the subjects).228  Both Herodotus and Demosthenes take such issues of communication 
and identify for granted; instead, they focus on structural issues, juxtaposing monarchy 
with democracy and, in Herodotus’ case, oligarchy.  Individual and collective freedom, or 
lack thereof, becomes paramount.  Herodotus’ Darius emphasizes the fact that sole rule 
allows the good man, as king, to excel in all aspects of government: the people will be 
pleased with him, and the social strife which plagues oligarchies and democracies will                                                         
226 The Persian War narrative opposed free and democratic Greece to enslaved and monarchic Persia.  
Monarchy thus also became a halmark of a barbarian society: so in Atossa’s dream of Xerxes and his 
chariot (Pers. 270-318) Aeschylus articulates the same idea of the barbarian as one whose slavish nature is 
best suited to monarchic rule as Aristotle a hundred years later (Pol. 1285a): see Hall, Inventing the 
Barbarian, 99-98 and 154-159. On negative views of tyranny see Forsdyke, “Uses and Abuses of 
Tyranny,” and Carolyn Dewald, “Form and Content: the Question of Tyranny in Herodotus,” in Popular 
Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece, (ed.) Kathryn Morgan (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2003), 25-58. 
227 A thesis argued by Davie, “Herodotus and Aristophanes.” 
228 See above, pp. 38-55. 
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cease to exist (Hdt. 3.82.3-4), since the king’s status is unique.229 Darius’ speech also 
stresses the king’s ability to keep his plans secret from his enemies (Hdt. 3.82.2).   In this 
respect his argument is a forerunner of Demosthenes’ view that Philip is “alone master of 
public and secret affairs” [ἕνα ὄντα κύριον καὶ ῥητῶν καὶ ἀπορρὴτων] (Dem. 
1.4).230  While Darius does not explicitly discuss the king’s role in wartime, he does point 
out that it was through the (military) exploits of a monarch – Cyrus – that the Persians 
became great.  Military might was clearly integral to the king’s role, and this impression 
is borne out by Herodotus’ narrative of the Persian Wars as a whole.231    
The Athenian Empire provided another important precedent for the idea that 
monarchic rule was most apt for military success.  By the mid-5th century, when the 
Empire was at its height, the Athenians had come to associate their newfound power with 
tyranny.232  At the same time, they understood that firm control over the islanders was 
                                                        
229 What Darius’ speech lacks is any concern for the lawfullness of the monarch’s decision-making, despite 
the fact that the charge of lawless self-gratification was leveled at monarchy by Otanes (Hdt. 3.80); as such 
Darius’ argument fails to answer the most important 5th century critique of monarchy, that of the ruler’s 
ὕβρις.  What Darius does do is narrow the discussion to a monarchy where the ruler is the “best man”, thus 
presaging the 4th century elite arguments which sought to differentiate between the monarch and the tyrant.  
So, for example, Aristotle says in the Politics that if there is a man that is by far the best in a given society 
then it is only just that he rule alone (1288a15-32).  See also Ryan Balot, Greek Political Thought (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 185. 
230 Secrecy was potentially important for the monarch, just as for democracy: on secrecy in democratic 
settings see Rahul Sagar, “Presaging the Moderns: Demosthenes’ Critique of Popular Government,” 
Journal of Politics 71 (2009): 1396, who notes however that Demosthenes is the only one to ponder the 
political significance of secrecy in democratic deliberation. 
231 The wartime leadership provided by a monarch was considered critical even in many ethnically Greek 
circles.  Homeric kings gained power through military prowess: see Hans Van Wees, Status Warriors: War, 
Violence, and Society in Homer and History (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1992), chs. 3 and 4; Spartan kings  
also provided the city with critical leadership in wartime: see Ellen Millender, “Herodotus and Spartan 
despotism,” in Sparta: Beyond the Mirage, (eds.) A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (Swansea and London: 
Classical Press of Wales and Duckworth, 2002), 1-61; Hellenistic kings also defined their role in military 
terms: Arthur M. Eckstein, “Hellenistic Monarchy in Theory and Practice,” in A Companion to Greek and 
Roman Political Thought, (ed.) Ryan Balot (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 249-50.  
232 See particularly Thuc. 2.63.2, 3.37.2, and Aristoph. Knights 1111-4.  On the debate over Athenian 
imperialism see Balot, Greek Political Thought, 156-76.  
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absolutely critical to maintaining the military might of the city and for resisting Sparta.233   
The strength of the Athenian Empire could be opposed to the loose organization of the 
Peloponnesian League. Pericles, according to Thucydides’ account, articulates this 
problem as one of several that hamper the Peloponnesians in their prosecution of the war: 
μάχῃ μὲν γὰρ μιᾷ πρὸς ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας δυνατοὶ Πελοποννήσιοι 
καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀντισχεῖν, πολεμεῖν δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν 
ἀντιπαρασκευὴν ἀδύνατοι, ὅταν μήτε βουλευτηρίῳ ἑνὶ χρώμενοι 
παραχρῆμά τι ὀξέως ἐπιτελῶσι πάντες τε ἰσόψηφοι ὄντες καὶ οὐχ 
ὁμόφυλοι τὸ ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος σπεύδῃ· ἐξ ὧν φιλεῖ μηδὲν ἐπιτελὲς 
γίγνεσθαι.  καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὡς μάλιστα τιμωρήσασθαί τινα 
βούλονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἥκιστα τὰ οἰκεῖα φθεῖραι.  χρόνιοί τε ξυνιόντες 
ἐν βραχεῖ μὲν μορίῳ σκοποῦσί τι τῶν κοινῶν, τῷ δὲ πλέονι τὰ 
οἰκεῖα πράσσουσι, καὶ ἕκαστος οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν οἴεται 
βλάψειν, μέλειν δέ τινι καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ τι προϊδεῖν, ὥστε τῷ 
αὐτῷ ὑπὸ ἁπάντων ἰδίᾳ δοξάσματι λανθάνειν τὸ κοινὸν ἁθρόον 
φθειρόμενον. 
 
In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies could stand up to the 
whole of Greece, but they are incapable of fighting a war against a 
dissimilar hostile force since they do not have a single council to quickly 
produce a decisive action, they all have an equal vote, and, since they are 
not of the same nationality, each one of them looks out for his own 
interest.  It generally happens under such circumstances that nothing is 
ever accomplished.  For some wish to avenge themselves above all, while 
others are concerned to suffer no loss themselves.  They meet for a short 
time to look to the common good, but most of the time they go about their 
personal business, and while each one of them thinks that he isn’t doing 
any harm through his own carelessness, thinking that someone else will 
look to his interests, so that since this same idea is held by all of them, 
nobody ends up considering that the common good is suffering.  (Thuc. 
1.141.6-7)    
Pericles stresses the League’s inability to make quick decisions, exactly the same critique 
that we have seen Demosthenes level at his Athenian audience and for which he praises 
Philip in Olynthiac I (Dem. 1.4).  Also key to the Peloponnesians’ failure is their national 
                                                        
233 See Thuc. 2.63.2. Aristophanes’ Prometheus, in eulogizing the maiden Basileia, calls her the guardian 
“of good council, good laws, wisdom and the navy” [καλλίστη κόρη… ταμιεύει… τὴν εὐβουλίαν / τὴν 
εὐνομίαν τὴν σωφροσύνην τὰ νεώρια] (Aristoph., Birds 1537-40).  For other Aristophanic praise of 
monarchy see John N. Davie, “Herodotus and Aristophanes on Monarchy,” Greece and Rome 26 (1979): 
163-167. 
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disparity.  This lack of unity prevents the Peloponnesians from taking any interest in the 
other members’ well-being.  In criticizing the Peloponnesian League, Pericles implicitly 
justifies the tyrannical organization of the Athenian Empire, where the Athenians would 
require contributions from all the islanders for the war effort without, however, allowing 
them much say in the way the war was prosecuted.   
Pericles’ argument need not imply anti-democratic sentiment.  Extolling a 
tyranny’s ability to take decisive action could stand as the logical extension of the ideal 
of consensus [ὁμόνοια].  Consensus was a key democratic ideology, which promoted 
agreement even between groups, such as the rich and poor, who did not normally see eye 
to eye.234   At the same time, however, there was a tension between the principle of 
ὁμόνοια and the freedom of speech promoted by democratic discourse.  Indeed, 
democracy could come under fire if it was perceived to favor freedom of speech over 
concensus.  Thus Cleon only takes Pericles’ words to their logical conclusion when he 
says that democracy is incapable of ruling over others because the decision-making 
process stalls and the public is prone to changing its opinion (Thuc. 3.37.1).  Only 
consensus on the part of the polity could create quick, decisive action, whereas prolonged 
debate and different or changing opinions produced a polis incapable of action.  
Demosthenes advocates exactly this type of consensus when he calls upon all Athenian 
citizens – rich and poor, young and old, rhetors, generals, and ordinary citizens - to act 
together to protect Olynthus (Dem. 1.6; 1.28; 2.29-30; 3.35).  It is precisely this need for 
consensus-building which the monarch obviates in his singular leadership role. 
                                                        
234 See Ober, Mass and Elite, 297-298.  More recently Josiah Ober, Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation 
and Learning in Classical Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), chs. 3 and 4, provides a 
model for how the Athenians could in fact create consensus in a participatory democracy.   
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 While monarchy is beneficial in matters of war, Demosthenes argues that it harms 
Philip’s position in other respects.  Notably, monarchs have trouble in establishing 
diplomatic relations with non-monarchic systems of government.  The king is, for 
example, unable to deal politically with the Olynthians, who distrust him because of his 
tyranny (1.5).  Demosthenes even suggests that Philip had not actually wished to go to 
war against Olynthus, but had hoped to cow them with a mere show of force (1.21) – a 
rather puzzling turn that seems at odds with Philip’s otherwise warmongering nature, but 
which in any case points to Philip’s weakness on the political front.235  Moreover, the 
Paeonians and Illyrians are in rebellion, allegedly because Philip is an ἄνθρωπος 
ὑβριστής (1.23).  Financially Philip’s position is also unsound: he is having troubles 
with newest subjects, the Thessalians, who act against his wishes and refuse to pay a 
share of their port fees into Macedonian coffers; their refusal jeopardizes Philip’s ability 
to pay his men (1.22).  These statements exemplify Philip’s failings on the political and 
financial fronts and will be the bases for Demosthenes’ arguments in Olynthiacs II and 
III, respectively. 
In sum, the Athenians’ war against Philip must be waged on the military, the 
political, and the financial fronts.  The division of civic obligation into the military, the 
political, and the financial spheres allows Demosthenes to address Philip’s successes on 
the battlefield in a new way: he can admit that Philip is better at the art of war than the 
Athenians, while at the same time giving Athens the edge in the other two spheres of the 
war effort - that is, in politics and in finance.  While an acknowledgement of Philip’s 
military prowess may appear at odds with the most prominent popular views of                                                         
235 We cannot demand complete consistency from the orators; at 1.21, towards the end of his speech, 
Demosthenes may be trying to tone down his rhetoric and thereby bolster the Athenians’ confidence; he 
had ended in a similarly hopeful tone, for example, in Philippic I.  
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monarchy, it builds upon 5th century roots that urged the Athenian demos to achieve 
ὁμόνοια rather than waste time and energy in fruitless bickering.  Demosthenes adds to 
this idea of democracy’s failing by comparing it with the monarch’s ability to put his will 
into action.   
The Second Olynthiac: 349 BCE 
Demosthenes turns his focus in Olynthiac II from the military to the political 
situations at Athens and in Macedonia.   He sets forth two related goals for the speech: to 
prove, first, that the Athenians are wrong in their assessment of Philip; and, secondly, to 
provide a countering view of the king and his political situation (Dem. 2.4-5).   While 
other politicians are blinded by Philip’s apparent power, Demosthenes claims that, in 
reality, Philip’s monarchy is onerous to his people and his allies, and his position as king 
has a debilitating effect on his court.  To prove his point Demosthenes highlights a 
tension between Philip’s role as monarch and his potential usurpation of Greek (and 
Athenian) heroism.  What is particularly innovative in the present speech is the 
disjunction Demosthenes articulates between Philip’s usurpation of Athenian qualities 
and his un-Athenian role as monarch.  Yet inasmuch as Demosthenes shows Philip taking 
on characteristics generally applied by the Athenians to themselves, Olynthiac II proves 
to be a continuation of the kind of rhetoric Demosthenes employed in Philippic I: 
namely, pointing to an inherent tension or oddity within Philip’s ἦθος which requires 
rightening and which portends Philip’s ultimate destruction.  As in Philippic I, 
Demosthenes’ reinterpretation of Philip’s ἦθος also serves his own self-presentation as a 
knowledgeable orator.  Olynthiac II is more explicitly concerned with the nature of 
ekklesiastic debate, however, than was Philippic I.  I begin with Demosthenes’ evocation 
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of the wider debate against which he sets his own speech before examining his 
characterization of Philip in greater detail.   As I show, Demosthenes sets up an aura of 
‘real’ debate between himself and his opponents.  The engagement which Olynthiac II 
seeks to advance between Demosthenes and the other politicians is a far cry from the 
vitriol which we see the orator level at his opponents after the Peace of Philocrates. 
In and of itself, the existence of politicians speaking out against intervention in 
Olynthus is unsurprising.  Some wouldn’t have seen Philip as the pressing threat which 
Demosthenes made him out to be.  At the same time, Olynthus’ relationship with Athens 
had historically been less than amicable, though the Olynthians had been interested in 
peace - and possibly an alliance - with Athens some years prior to 349.236  Demosthenes 
himself mentions a time when the Athenians had allied themselves with Macedonia 
against Olynthus (Dem. 2.14).  Moreover, by the end of the year 349 the Athenians 
would be embroiled in Euboea, where they also had interests and which was much closer 
to home.237  The high cost of intervening in the Chalcidice was without a doubt an 
additional factor in the Athenians’ decision-making.238  All of these reasons help to 
account for the evident reluctance with which the city finally sent help to Olynthus: 
neither of the two expeditions that sailed out over the course of the summer of 349 
actually engaged Philip (the first did not find him there, and the second came too late).  
                                                        
236 On the pre-war relations between Olynthus, Philip, and Athens, see Hammond, Philip of Macedon, 50-
52, and Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, 93-95. 
237 Demosthenes mentions a Euboean embassy at 1.8, but it refers to events of the year 357 BCE; otherwise 
he does not mention Euboea in the Olynthiacs.  On the importance of Euboea to Athens see Burke, 
“Eubulus, Olynthus, and Euboea,” 118-9.  The relative chronology of Athens’ expeditions to Olynthus and 
to Euboea has been a matter of considerable debate.  On the basis of Demosthenes’ silence the concensus 
seems to be that at least the first two, and possibly all three, of the Olynthiacs were delivered before the 
Athenians involved themselves in Euboea: see Sealey, Demosthenes and his Time, 139-141, and Carter, 
“Athens, Euboea, and Olynthus.”  For the relations of Athens and Euboea at this time see P. A. Brunt, 
“Eoboea in the Time of Philip II,” Classical Quarterly 19 (1969): 247-251. 
238 See Burke, “Eubulus, Olynthus, and Euboea.” 
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There seem to have been many possible objections, then, that Demosthenes’ opponents 
could have leveled (and probably did) against his interpretation of events.    
Demosthenes does not refer to his opponents specifically; rather, he ascribes the 
opposing view to an unspecified segment of the Athenian collective.  According to 
Demosthenes, his opponents’ central argument rests on Philip’s might.239  They consider 
Philip to be some invincible being [ἄμαχόν τινα] (Dem. 2.5); he seems great in wars 
and battles [μεγάν... τοῖς πολέμιοις καὶ ταῖς στρατείαις] (Dem. 2.15); even his 
hangers-on appear to be wondrous [θαυμαστοί] and knowledgeable in warfare 
[συγκεκροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου] (Dem. 2.17); finally, he seems a fearful opponent [φοβερὸν προσπολεμῆσαι] (Dem. 2.22).  Demosthenes does not repudiate these views 
as inherently false or their proponents as traitors, as he would do so vociferously in the 
aftermath of the Peace of Philocrates;240 rather, he contends that his opposition is deluded 
in their assessment of the situation (Dem. 2.4), leaving open the possibility that they are 
merely ignorant rather than willfully misrepresenting the situation.  At one point he even 
claims that he himself was almost taken by the illusion that Philip was fearful [φοβερόν] 
and wondrous [θαυμαστόν] (Dem. 2.6).  Despite the disingenuousness of the claim, the 
                                                        
239 That Demosthenes does not specify his opponents should not blind us to the existence of a number of 
anti-interventionist politicians against whose arguments the Olynthiacs were aimed.  The dialogue created 
between orator and Athenian citizenry in our extant deliberative speeches is an illusion; hidden behind it is 
a more complex dialogue between the orator, the orators aligned against him (who need not have been all 
of the same view, either), and their audience.  A deliberative debate was a ‘multi-cornered dialogue’: cf. C. 
Joachim Classen, “The Speeches in the Courts of Law: A Three-Cornered Dialogue,” Rhetorica 9 (1991): 
195-207.  The lines between orator, opposition, and audience were constantly blurred in an effort to create 
the illusion of concensus (ὁμόνοια).     
240 He would later decry the men who had opposed aid to Olynthus as bribed traitors (5.5).  It may be that at 
this point in his career (349/8) Demosthenes simply did not have the political power he would have a few 
years later, after the Peace of Philocrates; the nature of the debate in the ekklesia itself may also have 
turned more vicious after the demise of the peace effort.  In any case, there is a distinct break between 
Demosthenes’ rhetoric concerning his opponents before and after the Peace.       
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speech as a whole sets up an atmosphere of serious engagement with Demosthenes’ 
opposition.    
To counter his opponents, Demosthenes argues that he alone is privy to 
specialized knowledge about Macedonia, which also allows him to better assess the 
situation.  One of his methods for proving his superior knowledge in Olynthiac II is his 
description of the character of Philip and his court.  Demosthenes even claims that he has 
access to first-hand accounts of life in Macedonia: “I heard [about Philip and his court] 
from a man who had been in that country, a man not given to lying” [ἐγὼ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ 
τῇ χώρᾳ γεγενημένων τινὸς ἤκουον, ἀνδρὸς οὐδαμῶς οἵου τε ψεύδεσθαι] (Dem. 
2.17).  Demosthenes’ citation of his source becomes a particularly pointed argument 
when viewed against a political culture where proving the reliability of one’s sources was 
relatively unimportant.241  Since Demosthenes had not yet been to Macedonia himself, his 
access to a type of information which could not be construed as ‘public knowledge’ – in 
this case, the inner workings of Philip’s court - established the credibility of his advice.242     
Demosthenes’ access to such sources of inside information complements, rather 
than replaces, his ability to see beyond Philip’s appearance to his true character.   We 
have seen the latter argument in action already in Philippic I, where I argued that 
describing Philip’s ἦθος was key to Demosthenes’ self-presentation as the wise advisor.                                                          
241 On the importance and assessment of first-hand accounts see Lewis, News and Society, ch. 4; on the 
emphasis attached to them, see 102-109.  On second-hand accounts in the orators see Victor Bers, Speech 
in Speech: Studies in Incorporated Oratio Recta in Attic Drama and Oratory (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1997), ch. 2. 
242 What Demosthenes chose to mention concerning his informant is also intriguing: we hear about his 
character but without any particulars and, perhaps most importantly, no name; this is also true of other 
second-hand reports in the other deliberative speeches (so Dem. 1.22, 8.14, 10.8, 11.8-10, 11.12).  
Similarly, Aeschines 3.77 claims that when Demosthenes first heard of Philip’s death from the spies of the 
general Charidemus, he pretended to the people that that knowledge had come to him from a god.  
Interestingly enough, this story corroborates the impression that leading orators did in fact have sources of 
information unavailable to the public; Demosthenes could only pretend that a divinity had foretold the 
future to him if he was sure nobody else in the city would know the information thus ‘prophesied’.   
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In general terms, Olynthiac II follows the same pattern.  At the same time, Demosthenes 
uses a somewhat different articulation of Philip’s ἦθος to prove his point.  Instead of 
presenting a tension between Philip’s Athenian-like actions and his barbarian λόγος, 
Demosthenes here turns to a new contrast between Philip’s “Athenian” activity and his 
(barbaric) role as monarch.  Rather than employing a λόγος/ἔργον dichotomy, 
Demosthenes focuses attention on the institutional differences between democracy and 
monarchy.  This focus on the differences in governance between Macedonia and Athens 
is, of course, in keeping with the orientation of the Olynthiacs as a whole.  Ultimately, 
Demosthenes argues in Olynthiac II that a monarch (like Philip) who pursues democratic 
virtues on the battlefield will cause strife among his people and destabilize his own rule.  
Politically, Philip’s role as a monarch harms rather than helps him.   
I begin with a key section of the speech which redeploys a topos Demosthenes 
had previously used in the Against Aristocrates (see above, 78-80).243  A comparison of 
the two highlights Demosthenes’ innovative claims about Philip’s ἦθος.  In the Against 
Aristocrates, Demosthenes had painted a scathing portrait of Philip: 
ἴστε δήπου Φίλιππον, ἄνδρες   Ἀθηναῖοι, τουτονὶ τὸν Μακεδόνα... 
μικρὰ λαμβάνειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπίστους φίλους καὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν ἀντὶ 
τοῦ μετ᾿ ἀσφαλείας ζῆν ὀρᾶτε προῃρημένον αὐτόν.  τί δή ποτ  ̓ 
αἶτιον;... οὐδ ̓ ἔχει τῶν εὖ πραττόντων οὐδεὶς ὅρον οὐδὲ τελευτὴν 
τῆς τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐπιθυμίας.  
You know that Macedonian, Philip, Athenians… you see that he has 
chosen small gains, faithless friends, and danger instead of living in safety. 
What is the reason?... the successful know no bounds in their desire for 
gain. (Dem. 23.111-2)  
Demosthenes here stresses the enormity of the risks Philip accepts in return for the 
slightest of gains. The inequality of this exchange serves to show the insatiable greed 
                                                        
243 The topos will appear for a third time in the Crown speech.  See below, pp. 178-82. 
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[πλεονεξία] which compels Philip into extraordinary and foolish risk-taking.244  Philip’s 
greed casts him in the standard mould of the barbarian king who ignores all wise advise 
in pursuit of his megalomaniacal goals.  There are two shifts of focus that occur between 
the topos as deployed in the Against Aristocrates and as reused in Olynthiac II.  First, in 
Olynthiac II Demosthenes redefines the object of Philip’s desire as a goal worthy of the 
greatest risks, which ennobles Philip’s struggle; and secondly, Demosthenes emphasizes 
Philip’s role as king, in keeping with his overall interest in governmental structure in the 
Olynthiacs.  The consequent confrontation between Philip’s pretentions to a Greek ideal 
and his role as monarch complicate his characterization as typical barbarian king.   
Demosthenes argues, in contrast to the prevailing opinion in the city, that Philip’s 
subjects are becoming restive.  He turns to the king’s ἦθος for proof:  
Μὴ γὰρ οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες  Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς αὐτοῖς Φίλιππόν τε 
χαίρειν καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ ̓ ὁ μὲν δόξης ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τοῦτο 
ἐζήλωκεν, καὶ προῄρηται πράττων καὶ κινδυνεύων, ἂν συμβῇ τι, 
παθεῖν, τὴν τοῦ διαπράξασθαι ταῦτα ἃ μηδεὶς πώποτε ἄλλος 
Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς δόξαν ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἀσφαλῶς ᾑρημένος· τοῖς 
δὲ τῆς μὲν φιλοτιμίας τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων οὐ μέτεστιν, κοπτόμενοι δὲ 
ἀεὶ ταῖς στρατείαις ταύταις ταῖς ἄνω κάτω λυμποῦνται καὶ 
συνεχῶς ταλαιπωροῦσιν.   
For you must not think, Athenians, that Philip and his subjects do well in 
these affairs; but he desires a reputation and he strives for this end, and he 
would choose to be pained, should it so happen, while toiling and 
endangering himself, since he chooses a reputation for doing what no 
other Macedonian king has ever done instead of living in safety. Βut those 
who do not get a share in the honor from these [victories] are completely 
wretched because they are constantly beaten down and harassed in the 
army marching up and back. (Dem. 2.15-16)   
Instead of the small gains and faithless friends that he had striven for in the Against 
Aristocrates, here we find Philip grasping after a reputation [δόξη] and even honor                                                         
244 The putative choice between toilsome war and quiet peace is also part of Philip’s characterization in 
Philippic I (4.4-5).  See above, pp. 85-89.  
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[φιλοτιμία].  Demosthenes has thus valorized Philip’s motives.  Indeed, the 
rearticulation of the topos transforms Philip into a kind of ἀνὴρ αγαθός, who was 
commonly portrayed choosing the renown dependant upon heroic death instead of 
obscure safety.245  The heroic ideal of the ἀνὴρ αγαθός was co-opted into the ideology 
of democratic Athens most prominently in the funeral oration, where it became the 
vehicle for extolling the community rather than the individual.246  Demosthenes has thus 
staged a confrontation between Philip’s democratic pursuit of glory and his monarchic 
politics.  His language heightens the tension: the lengthy delay of δόξη in the participial 
clause and its final placement next to his allusion to Philip as Macedonian king, stresses 
the unusualness of a king – and a Macedonian one, no less! – in pursuit of such a noble 
aspiration [τὴν τοῦ διαπράξασθαι ταῦθ’ ἃ μηδεὶς πώποτ’ ἄλλος Μακεδόνων 
βασιλεὺς δόξαν ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἀσφαλῶς ᾑρημένος].247  Demosthenes’ imagery would 
have been striking to the ears of an audience used to having the heroic ideal applied to 
themselves and their own war dead.  I begin by exploring the cultural context against 
which Demosthenes’ used the paradigm of the ἀνὴρ αγαθός, followed by the new 
understanding which this insight brings to Philip’s characterization in Olynthiac II.     In the fourth century καλοκἀγαθία came to designate a constellation of virtues 
that defined the ideal male citizen, the ἀνὴρ αγαθός.248  These virtues were enshrined 
                                                        
245 On the heroic exchange of death for reknown see for example Il. 12.310-328; see Gregory Nagy, The 
Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1980), chs. 9 and 10.   
246 See Loraux, Invention of Athens, especially ch. 2. 
247 I also note Demosthenes’ later gibe that Macedonians don’t even make useful slaves (Dem. 9.31)   
248 On the history of the καλὸς κἀγαθός see F. Bourriot, Kalos Kagathos – Kalokagathia (Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms Verlag, 1995).  While it began as a Spartan term and, in the 5th century, was used of a certain 
class of aristocrats, in the 4th century it was co-opted by democratic sources as a term for civic virtue 
unattached to a particular class.  So Demosthenes uses καλοκἀγαθία of the average πολίτης: 18.278, 
18.306, 21.218, 40.46. 
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and disseminated through the institutionalized ἐπιτάφιος λόγος, whose purpose was to 
substantiate the everlasting glory which the dead had gained for themselves and, in turn, 
for their city (Dem. 60.2).   The rhetoric that Demosthenes uses to describe Philip at 2.15-
16, which juxtaposed a peaceful life with the pursuit of glory, is common to the 
ἐπιτάφιοι λόγοι.  So Pericles, for example, says that the war dead considered suffering 
better than saving themselves and thought that in death they had not merely escaped 
reproach but rather reached the pinnacle of glory (Thuc. 2.42.4).  Again, Demosthenes in 
his funeral oration over the dead at Chaeronea asserts that the fallen were afraid of being 
shamed and therefore chose a noble death instead of a disgraceful life (Dem. 60.26).249   
The formulaic juxtaposition of the choice between a peaceful life and glory in death that 
Demosthenes uses at Olynthiac 2.15-16 thus situates Philip’s pursuit of honor within the 
familiar context of the ἐπιτάφιος λόγος.250    
Yet employing the language of the funeral oration for a subject such as Philip is – 
and was clearly supposed to be – disconcerting.  The choice between a life of shame or a 
glorified death, like the ἐπιτάφιος λόγος as a whole, was closely connected to an 
Athenian, democratic context.251  Demosthenes, for example, in his own ἐπιτάφιος 
λόγος insists that the nobility of the dead was instilled in them by the democratic 
principles of their government:                                                         
249 See also Lys. 2.24-25. 
250 See Ryan K. Balot, “Pericles’ Anatomy of Democratic Courage,” American Journal of Philology 122 
(2001): 505-525; Loraux, Invention of Athens, 101-104.  On military prowess as a democratic virtue see 
Joseph Roisman, The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators (Berkeley: University of 
California Press: 2005), ch. 5; Ryan K. Balot, “Courage in the Democratic Polism” Classical Quarterly 54 
(2004): 406-423.  Demosthenes rhetorical homage to the funeral oration is even more obvious in an 
expanded version of this same topos in On the Crown: see below, 175-182.  
251 So Loraux, Invention of Athens, 16: “an epitaphios is… closer to the speech-memory of the aristocratic 
societies than to democratic speech-dialogue, and more directed toward action, [but] this oration is 
nevertheless a political speech, marked with the seal of democracy… the speech is an act of collective 
praise and… the speaker is officially appointed by the city.”  See also Roisman, Rhetoric of Manhood, 133-
4. 
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διὰ πολλὰ δ᾿ εἰκοτως ὄντες τοιοῦτοι, διὰ τὴν πολιτείαν οὐχ ἥκιστ᾿ 
ἦσαν σπουδαῖοι.  Αἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστεῖαι δέος μὲν 
ἐνεργάζονται τοῖς πολίταις, αἰσχύνην δ᾿οὐ παριστᾶσιν· ἡνίκ᾿ ἂν 
οὖν ὁ ἀγὼν ἔλθῃ τοῦ πολέμου, πᾶς τις εὐχερῶς ἑαυτὸν σῴζει, 
συνειδὼς ὅτι, ἐὰν τοὺς κυρίους ἢ δώροις ἢ δι᾿ ἄλλης ἡστινοσοῦν 
ὁμιλίας ἐχαρέσηται, κἂν τὰ δεινότατ᾿ ἀσχημονήσῃ, μικρὸν ὄνειδος 
τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτῷ καταστήσεται. 
It stands to reason that these men came to be so excellent for many 
reasons, but not least because of their form of government.  For 
oligarchies inspire fear in their citizens, but they do not cause shame; so 
when battle approaches, each man coolly saves himself, knowing that if he 
appeases his masters with presents or with some other means, even if he 
should disgrace himself most terribly he will receive only a minor rebuke 
afterward.  (Dem. 60.25) 
The glory gained by a portion of the democratic citizenry on the battlefield redounded to 
the whole polis; the citizens of an oligarchy, on the other hand, have no such connection 
with their city.   The renown of the citizen and of the democratic polity as a whole are 
intimately related in a way which, Demosthenes asserts, is simply not true for an 
oligarchic polity.252  Only the democratic citizen could gain glory, and hence the status of 
ἀνὴρ αγαθός, by means of a glorious death.     If the pursuit of glory is incompatible with an oligarchic context, then it is doubly 
out of place in a monarchy.  Demosthenes in the passage quoted above calls the leaders 
of an oligarchy the “masters” [τοὺς κυρίους] of the populace, creating a similar 
relationship between the citizen of an oligarchy and his polity as between Philip and his 
subjects.  In so doing, he taps into a shared Athenian logic which ascribed moral and 
physical weakness to the citizen of a tyrannical government.  Thus Herodotus explains 
                                                        
252 This is also an argument that could just as well be used against tyranny: Demosthenes calls the leaders 
of an oligarchy the “masters” [τοὺς κυρίους] of the populace, in the same way that Philip is master of his 
people.  So too Herodotus explained the military failure of the Pisistratid tyranny by citing the notion that 
none of the citizens wished to go to war for the benefit of the tyrant, while under the democracy everyone 
felt that they were struggling for their own (common) benefit [δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν 
ἐγελοκάκεον ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωυτῷ προεθυμέετο 
κατεργάζεσθαι] (Hdt. 5.78). 
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the military failure of the Peisistratid tyranny by citing the notion that none of the citizens 
wished to go to war for the benefit of the tyrant; under the democracy, on the other hand, 
everyone felt that they were struggling for their own (common) benefit, and Athenian 
fortunes immediately improved (Hdt. 5.78).   The success of the democracy is dependent 
upon each citizen’s knowing that his action directly affects the community as a whole. In 
a tyranny or an oligarchy, however, the number of people who have this sense of being 
bound up with the community is smaller: in the oligarchy, only those in power would feel 
this sense; in the monarchy, only the monarch.253  The fact that the citizens of a tyrannical 
polity do not relate to the community in the same way as the tyrant leaves the latter in an 
odd position indeed.  Philip’s quest for glory may appear justified on the grounds that the 
king constitutes the state, just as the body of citizens constitute the state in a democracy; 
yet, by virtue of being the only one with such a relationship to the Macedonian state, the 
ἀγών in which Philip ‘participates’ is proved to be no real competition at all.  Instead of 
promoting the overall nobility of the polity as the democratic ἀγών over glory would do, 
Philip ends by creating strife between himself, his subjects and his allies.  His subjects 
grow weary of constant battle because the honor [φιλοτιμία] for which they are fighting 
is not their own (Dem. 2.16).   Their concerns, which are in the private business and in 
trade – that is, outside the battlefield - are being harmed by Philip’s heroic pretentions                                                         
253 Compare Euripides: “all of the barbarians are slaves except for one” [τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα 
πάντα πλὴν ἑνός] (Eur. Helen 276).  Also Aristotle: 
ὅταν οὖν ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕνα τινὰ συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι 
κατ᾿ ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὥσθ᾿ ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, 
τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάντων, καὶ βασιλέα τὸν 
ἕνα τοῦτον.      
So when a whole family or some individual from among the rest happens to be so 
outstanding in virtue as to surpass the rest, then it is just for this family to be kings and to 
rule over all, or for that one individual to be king. (Pol. 1288a17) 
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(Dem. 2.16).  The Macedonian system of government is inherently at odds with Philip’s 
attempt to win renown for himself.  
Philip’s relations with his allies are also made problematic because of his role as 
monarch.  Demosthenes rejects the notion that simple force on Philip’s part could ever 
tame populist opposition, claiming instead that a monarch can never hope for stability 
among his subjects:   
Καὶ μὴν εἴ τις ὑμῶν ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ἡγεῖται, οἴεται δὲ βίᾳ 
καθέξειν αὐτὸν τὰ πράγματα τῷ τὰ χωρία καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὰ 
τοιαῦτα προειληφέναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεται.  ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὑπ ̓ εὐνοίας 
τὰ πράγματα συστῇ καὶ πᾶσι ταὐτὰ συμφέρῃ τοῖς μετέχουσι τοῦ 
πολέμου, καὶ συμπονεῖν καὶ φέρειν τὰς συμφορὰς καὶ μένειν 
ἐθέλουσιν ἅνθρωποι. 
 And if indeed any one of you thinks that this is the case - if he thinks that 
[Philip] will be able to control matters because he has seized lands, 
harbors, and the like - he doesn’t think correctly.  For when affairs are 
based upon good will and they are to the benefit of all who partake in the 
war, people wish to toil together and to bear misfortunes and to stay 
steadfast. (Dem. 2.9) 
The reasoning behind the allies’ insubordination mirrors that of the Macedonians 
themselves: neither party sees its interests advanced in the war.  A lack of common 
purpose between Philip and one of his allies, the Thessalians, was already introduced in 
Olynthiac I.  There Demosthenes claimed that the Thessalians did not wish to give Philip 
the profits from their trade “because it ought to go to the common benefit of the 
Thessalians, not be taken by Philip” [τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ Θετταλῶν ἀπὸ τούτων δέοι 
διοικεῖν, οὐ Φίλιππον λαμβάνειν] (Dem. 1.22).254 In short, they would not accept the 
                                                        
254 One of the six traditional problems posed by the Olynthiacs, as enumerated by Tuplin, “Demosthenes’ 
Olynthiacs,” 276-8, is the Thessalian question.  Succinctly put, according to Demosthenes’ description of 
events in Olynthiac I, the Thessalians are demanding back Pagasae, have prevented Philip from fortifying 
Magnesia, and refuse to give him the tax collected from their ports and markets (Dem. 2.22); yet in 
Olynthiac II, Demosthenes says that the Thessalians are only “now” discussing what they should do about 
Pagasae and are discussing what to do with Magnesia; he also does not mention taxes.  Olynthiac III omits 
any mention of the Thessalians at all.  Because Diodorus records that Philip made an expedition into 
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enslavement that governance by a monarch generally entailed (Dem. 1.23, 2.8).255    In 
Olynthiac II, Philip is thus left toiling for his own benefit without the support of either his 
subjects or his allies (Dem. 2.13).   The very qualities which might have made him an 
ideal soldier in a democratic context have made him very much less than an ideal king.     The idea that Philip’s pursuit of a good reputation is in fact detrimental to the 
kingdom is reinforced in a description of the Macedonian court that follows directly on 
the heels of the “ἐπιτάφιος” passage.  Here Demosthenes argues against the idea that 
Philip’s courtiers are in any way remarkable or worthy of fear: 
οἱ δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντες ξένοι καὶ πεζέταιροι δόξαν μὲν ἔχουσιν 
ὡς εἰσὶ θαυμαστοὶ καὶ συγκεκροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ὡς δ ̓ ἐγὼ 
τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ γεγενημένων τινὸς ἤκουον, ἀνδρὸς οὐδαμῶς 
οἵου τε ψεύδεσθαι, οὐδένων εἰσὶν βελτους.  εἰ μὲν γάρ τις ἀνήρ 
ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷος ἔμπειρος πολέμου καὶ ἀγώνων, τούτους μὲν 
φιλοτιμίᾳ πάντας ἀπωθεῖν αὐτὸν ἔφη, βουλόμενον πάντα αὑτοῦ 
δοκεῖν εἶναι τἄργα (πρὸς γὰρ αὖ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὴν φιλοτιμίαν 
ἀνυπέρβλητον εἶναι). 
The men at his court, both foreigners and his Companions, have the 
reputation of being wondrous and knowledgeable in warfare, but as I 
heard it from a man who had been in that land – a man not at all given to 
lying – they are no better than anyone else.  For he said that, if there is a 
man among them who is experienced in war and battle, then Philip drives                                                                                                                                                                      
Thessaly while the siege of Olynthus seems to have been still on-going (Diod. Sic. 16.52.9), it has been 
supposed (Ellis, “Order of the Olynthiacs,” 110; Worthington, Philip II of Macedonia, 76-8; and more 
cautiously by Sealey, Demosthenes and his Time, 139) that Olynthiac III was delivered much later than the 
first two, after Philip’s intervention in Thessaly.  This is, however, an argument from silence and has been 
rightly condemned as such (J. L. Cawkwell, “The Defense of Olynthus,” Classical Quarterly 12 (1962): 
134).  More pressingly, the trouble in Thessaly has appeared to some less drastic in Olynthiac II than in 
Olynthiac I (Ellis, “Order of the Olynthiacs,” 110-1).  But, as Eucken, “Reihenfolge und Zweck der 
Olynthischen Reden,” 195 points out, the Thessalian situation serves different purposes in the two 
speeches, and this can explain their differences; moreover, I would add the argument that the description of 
the Thessalian situation in Olynthiac II could have been based on newer, more accurate information than 
that given in Olynthiac I.  The Thessalian situation does not, therefore, necessarily suggest a particular 
order in which the Olynthiacs were delivered; nor does it help pinpoint when they were delivered during 
the year 349/8 BCE.   
255 On Philip and the Thessalians see above, pp. 55-60.  In the same vein is the Olynthians realization of the 
full import of the war: “for it is clear to the Olynthians that they are not now fighting for repute or for a 
piece of land, but concerning the ruin and enslavement of their fatherland” [δῆλον γάρ ἐστι τοῖς 
᾿Ολυνθίοις ὅτι νῦν οὐ περὶ δόξης οὐδ᾿ ὑπὲρ μέρους χώρας πολεμοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀναστάσεως καὶ 
ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πατρίδος] (Dem. 1.5).  Subjection to monarchy as enslavement is a leitmotif of 
anti-monarchic Greek sentiment from very early on (see Hall, Inventing the Barbarian, 57-60; 93-98). 
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him away because of his ambition [φιλοτιμία], since he wishes that all his 
successes be ascribed to himself (for among other things he is not to be 
outdone in his ambition [φιλοτιμία]). (Dem. 2.17-18)       
Philip’s φιλοτιμία, a source of contention between himself and his subjects, is here 
directly responsible for the poor quality of his companions.256  At the same time, Philip’s 
status as king prevents him from pursuing glory in an appropriately agonistic context.  
For if the right setting for the struggle over good repute takes place within a community 
of equals, then it stands to reason that, in an unequal community such as a kingdom, the 
king should fear lest others attempt to position themselves as his equals by participating 
in the contest.  Creating a real ἀγών over φιλοτιμία in which more than one contestant 
participated would place the king’s supreme power in jeopardy; this is true not just of the 
common citizens, we now learn, but also of the aristocrats who are part of the king’s 
coterie.  By this reasoning Demosthenes proves that Philip’s companions are not at all 
superior in the art of war; many of them are, in fact, nothing more than robbers, flatterers, 
lewd drunkards, and Athenian rejects (Dem. 2.19).   Demosthenes’ rhetoric concerning Philip rests, therefore, on a paradox: the 
problems inherent in Philip’s system of government, which must eventually lead to his 
downfall, come about because of his assumption of laudable democratic characteristics, 
that is, his pursuit of glory and honor.  In a democratic context, Philip’s pursuit of glory 
would have been praiseworthy; in a monarchic context, it spells his ruin.  It is true that 
even in the midst of such ostensible praise Philip is not without faults that will also cause 
him trouble - in section 2.9, for example, Demosthenes adduces πλεονεξία and πονηρία                                                         
256 Again, Demosthenes’ ideas concerning Philip’s court are a far cry from the Macedonian reality; I note 
again, for example, Argead participation in the Macedonian Olympic games (see above, pp. 45-48) and the 
eclectic nature of Philip’s court (see above, pp. 49-55). Disparaging Philip’s associates, and in particular 
the Greeks who resided at Pella, seems to have been a common theme for those who disapproved of Philip: 
compare in particular Theop. F 224. 
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as the cause of the Macedonians’ discontent.   Yet it is notable that in sections 15-19, the 
central description of Philip in Olynthiac II - much of which reiterates an argument in the 
Against Aristocrates that emphasized Philip’s greed – the argument from πλεονεξία is 
absent.  Demosthenes reworked the topos in such a way as to highlight the unusual, even 
shocking, contrast between Philip’s role as monarch and his assumption of Athenian 
democratic virtues.  In doing so, he was able to provide proof that Philip was in fact not 
fearsome at all and, in so doing, counter the arguments of his opponents.  The institutions 
of the Macedonian government themselves would cause the king’s demise.        
The Third Olynthiac: 349 BC 
As Olynthiac II looked to the situation in Macedonia and abroad, Olynthiac III 
turns back inwards, toward the Athenians’ own situation and in particular the state of the 
city finances.257  In many ways, however, it builds on the arguments concerning Philip 
begun in Olynthiac II, and, inasmuch as it contains no new interpretations of Philip I, I 
will deal with it quite briefly.  In Olynthiac III Demosthenes imagines an Athens exactly 
counter to the picture of Philip and Macedonia he had painted in Olynthiac II. Philip and 
Athens are reassigned to their rightful characters – Philip as the loathsome barbarian, 
Athens as the noble hero striving for honor.  Athens herself will only succeed against her 
enemy through that self-same consensus building which Demosthenes had shown to be 
lacking in the monarchic world of Macedonia (Dem. 3.35).   Olynthiac III portrays the 
world as it had been in the (distant) past and as it ought to be in the future.     
                                                        
257 In particular, Demosthenes argues against the Theoric Fund (Dem. 3.11-13; 3.19-20; 3.33-35) as a 
welfare system which pays the Athenians for nothing; instead, he concludes, the citizens should be paid in 
equal proportion to the service they render to the city.     
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Olynthiac III presents Philip as the barbarian monarch and reassigns the role of 
the ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός back to the Athenian context in which it belongs.  The conflict 
between Philip and Athens is presented unequivocally in terms of the Persian Wars.  
Demosthenes addresses Philip as a barbarian (Dem. 3.16; 3.24) and blames the Athenians 
for being more concerned with interhellenic wars than with their war against such an 
outsider (Dem. 3.20).  Harking back to Philip’s inappropriate heroic modeling in 
Oynthiac II, Demosthenes exhorts the Athenians to look to their own Athenian 5th 
century past and specifically to their might during the Peloponnesian Wars for actions 
worthy of their emulation (Dem. 2.23-25). If in Olynthiac II Demosthenes pointed to the 
paradox inherent in Philip’s pursuit of an ethic of nobility, in Olynthiac III Demosthenes 
rightens the balance by employing encomiastic discourse for the Athenian heroes of old.  
Thus he claims that in the 5th century Athenians ruled over the other Greeks willingly, 
that they had more than 10,000 talents collected in the Acropolis, and that the 
Macedonian king obeyed them; they alone among men left a reputation [δόξαν] through 
their deeds that was superior to envy [μόνοι δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρείττω τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς 
ἔργοις δόξαν τῶν φθονούντων κατέλιπον] (Dem. 3.24).258  The 5th century 
Athenians, again, are the ones who gained honor through many and good dangers [οἱ 
πρόγονοι τῆς ἀρετῆς μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν κινδύνων κτησάμενοι], leaving 
their descendants with the duty to do the same (Dem. 3.36).  Indeed, Demosthenes claims 
that the 4th century Athenians did have the chance of regaining their supremacy among 
the Greeks after the battle of Mantinea; instead of making good on this opportunity, 
                                                        
258 For comparison see Thuc. 2.45.  See Hernandez-Munoz, “Tucídides y Platón,” 153.  
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however, they sat back and allowed Philip to gain power (Dem. 3.27-8) – a barbarian 
from the outside, who has no right to vie for supremacy in the Athenian world.   
Thus Olynthiac III once again portrays Philip as the ultimate outsider who has no 
business meddling in Greek affairs alongside the Athenians, the Spartans, or the Thebans.  
The parameters of the ἀγών for supremacy lie firmly among the foremost of the Greek 
poleis, and among the citizens of these poleis.  Having thoroughly derided Philip’s 
modeling of Greek agonistic heroism in Olynthiac II, Demosthenes now reaffirms the 
Athenians’ right, as Hellenes with a first-rate pedigree, to participate in that contest.      
Conclusion 
The close of  Olynthiac III marks a convenient pausing point in a survey of the 
public rhetoric concerning Philip.  It is the last speech to have been written before the 
Peace of Philocrates, which indelibly changed Athenian relations with Macedonia.  
Equally as important, the negotiations for the peace served as an opportunity for several 
prominent Athenian politicians, Demosthenes among them, to personally travel to 
Macedonia and meet Philip.  As I have argued, Demosthenes’ pre-peace Philip represents 
not so much the realities of Macedonia and its king as the norms of the Athenian world in 
which and to which Demosthenes was speaking.  As well, his authority in discussing 
foreign affairs was founded for the most part on his own capacity for unique insights 
rather than personal experience.  Demosthenes’ trip to Macedonia would add a 
historiographical dimension to his rhetoric after the negotiations: he could now bolster his 
claims through the use of (ostensibly) personal information and anecdotes.  Another key 
distinction between the pre- and post-peace period lies in the nature of our sources.  The 
majority of the speeches concerning Philip’s character from the post-peace period come 
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from forensic rather than deliberative rhetoric. The forensic debates between 
Demosthenes and Aeschines, in particular, feature a vast array of dramatic episodes with 
an ethopoeic focus – whether on the character of Aeschines, or Demosthenes, or Philip.   
Demosthenes’ use of Philip in the speeches thus far has not been static, and the 
portrait that emerges of the king cannot, therefore, be treated as a monolith.  Rather, the 
particular interests of the individual speech have dictated the way Philip’s ἦθος is 
portrayed: thus, broadly speaking, the interest of Philip’s character in Philippic I lies in 
the impropriety of his ‘Athenianness’, while in the Olynthiacs his role as king is 
Demosthenes’ primary concern.  In both, however, Philip becomes a model for the 
Athenian demos.  Philip is a blank canvas on which political theories can be ‘tested’: 
what is the best way to enact a political decision?  What virtues don’t belong in 
Macedonia, but rather in Athens?  What does the orator need to know in order to give 
correct advise to the demos?  In sum, Philip has served as a convenient model for 
Demosthenes to explore the things that interest him as an Athenian politician: the role of 
Athens in the outside world and the role of the orator himself on the bema.    
Philip is a model for the Athenian demos, who need to regain the will to action 
which they had lost and which Philip has assumed in their place.  In both the mundus 
perversus of Philippic I and in the Olynthiacs, and particularly Olynthiac II, Philip adopts 
the agonistic virtues which epitomize the aristocratic hero and the Athenian democracy of 
the 5th century.  Yet, as Demosthenes shows, Philip is not a collective, and so is prone to 
the faults which typify the aristocrat.  Thus he is also the ὑβριστής motivated by a 
personal rather than a communal agenda.  His relations with those around him falter, in 
short, precisely because of his aristocratic inclinations.  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As a monarch, Philip’s role in the polity stands in contrast to Demosthenes’ own 
role as an leader of the demos (albeit only an aspiring leader up to this point).  Rejecting 
the view that politics is an individual contest for glory, Demosthenes establishes a role 
for himself as the mediator and interpreter for the demos.  He is a privileged, because 
knowledgeable, observer who can see beyond the surface of events and into their inner 
causes; because of this ability he can temper Philip’s invincible exterior, evident to all, 
with an insider’s view of the king’s personal faults, visible only to Demosthenes and to 
those who can see truly [τὶς ἄν… δίκαιος λογιστὴς] (Dem. 1.11).  Demosthenes’ stress 
on his own unique position in these early speeches paves the way for his later narrative of 
a personal contest between himself and Philip as leaders of their respective states.  Where 
Philip fails to mediate between himself as an aristocratic individual and the collective 
(that is, his subjects), Demosthenes, by the very act of rising to the bema, will come to 
embody the proper symbiosis between the individual and the demos.   
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Chapter 4: Philip in the Political Discourse from 346-330 BCE 
Introduction 
This chapter turns from the early speeches concerned with the Macedonian 
question to those composed after the Peace of Philocrates.  The negotiations over the 
peace agreement mark a watershed moment in my study for a number of reasons.  First, it 
has historical significance because it marked a critical moment in the growth of Philip’s 
power in Greece: in the year 346, partly because of the Peace of Philocrates, Philip 
established a presence in central Greece and his right, as a newly minted member o the 
Amphictyony, to participate in the Greek world.  As Philip’s involvement in interstate 
Greek politics seems to have been precisely what the Athenians were hoping to avoid, the 
Peace of Philocrates also saw a break in the Athenian political rhetoric concerning the 
Macedonian question.  Where before Philip had been a distant figure, of growing but not 
central importance, in the aftermath of the year 346 Philip became a pressing problem 
whose presence was made all the more real by the fact that during the negotiations over 
the peace a number of Athenian politicians, among them Demosthenes, met the king in 
person for the first time.  Along with these historical considerations, the Peace of 
Philocrates marks an important turning point in the sources we have for this period.  
While thus far our knowledge of Philip’s ἦθος has come exclusively from the speeches of 
one orator, Demosthenes, and almost exclusively from deliberative oratory, after the 
peace we have speeches from other orators alongside those of Demosthenes that bear on 
the issue, including examples from all three types of oratory – deliberative, forensic, and 
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epideictic.259  Our field of vision into the debate over Philip’s character thus expands 
exponentially.  The plethora of differing sources requires a change in approach.  This 
chapter will be much more thematic than chronological in scheme, composed of two 
sections, the first of which will look at pro-Macedonian rhetoric as represented in the 
speeches of Aeschines, and a second which looks at the anti-Macedonian rhetoric of 
Demosthenes.   The latter section will pick up on issues of Philip’s ἦθος, such as his role 
as monarch and his assumption of properly Athenian qualities, which we have already 
seen in Demosthenes’ rhetoric in the previous chapter.   
Thus far I have argued that Demosthenes’ description of Philip presented a model 
of civic government and national ἦθος which allowed him to ask uncomfortable 
questions of his Athenian audience.  In Philippic I Demosthenes portrayed Philip 
usurping the Athenian national character in order to show the Athenians their own faults; 
in the Olynthiacs he focuses on the way Philip’s monarchy was paradigmatically at odds 
with Athenian democracy.  Philip is consistently presented in relation to the Athenian 
demos – most prominently as its enemy and its antithesis, though at times also as a 
usurper of its ancestral role and character.  The Philip of the speeches that are the focus of 
this chapter is fundamentally different.  We will see the king take on an individual as well 
as a national identity; he is Philip the man as well as Philip the embodiment of the 
Macedonian state.  This shift in focus may be due to the fact that forensic, as oppose to 
deliberative, speeches comprise the body of evidence for this chapter.  For forensic 
discourse is naturally concerned with individuals and private contests - to which national 
questions, while they may be the catalyst for a trial, are nevertheless secondary – and so it                                                         
259 Speeches concerning Macedonia have survived from both Aeschines and Hyperides.  Dinarchus also 
makes some mention of Philip, but only in a cursory way.  
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should come as no surprise that Philip, an important individual player in the narrative of 
these speeches, is treated with a descriptive care not shown in deliberative oratory. 260   
Both Aeschines and Demosthenes posit an agonistic relationship between 
themselves and Philip.  The nature of this contest, however, is in each case vastly 
different and their characterizations of Philip are therefore equally dissimilar.  Aeschines 
and the pro-peace ambassadors portrayed Philip as an orator and their contest with the 
king as a political altercation no different from normal political debate in the ekklesia.  
Philip is portrayed as conversant with Athenian norms and mores.  In other words, 
Aeschines and the ambassadors describe Philip on the model of an Athenian politician 
and their debate with him as if it were an altercation between Athenian orators.  
Portraying Philip in the guise of an Athenian speaker served to make him readily 
accessible to Aeschines’ and the ambassadors’ Athenian audience.  The demos needed no 
special knowledge to analyze Philip beyond that which they had naturally as citizens in a 
participatory democracy.   
In contrast to Aeschines and the pro-peace ambassadors, Demosthenes distances 
Philip so far from Athenian norms of discourse that he ultimately becomes not merely 
non-Athenian and non-Hellenic, but actually inhuman.  Demosthenes’ contest against 
Philip is worlds away from that of two opposing orators in the ekklesia.  Because 
                                                        
260 There are a number of factors which may influence this contrast between forensic and deliberative 
oratory.  First, there is an important element of the dramatic in the forensic speech which ties it to drama 
and may factor into the greater focus on individual character: see Hall, “Lawcourt Dramas,” 45-54.  
Forensic speeches crafted for political suits also had more allotted time, as befit the higher stakes of the 
contest.  On types of lawsuits and their relative importance in terms of time and possible penalty see 
Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 191-196.  It is also possible that the deliberative speeches as we have them 
were rougher sketches of what the orator would have said than the forensic speeches, and that details would 
have been added in speech that are simply not there in writing (on some problems of editing oratory see 
above, pp. 3-5).  Similarly, Fortenbaugh, “Aristotle on Persuasion,” 231, speculated that Aristotle omitted 
to mention character assassination in the Rhetoric because it had more to do with forensic rather than 
deliberative oratory. 
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Demosthenes’ Philip is more sinister in his role as barbarian, monarchic Other, 
Demosthenes concludes by imagining himself as an extraordinary leader who is much 
more than just an orator.  His latter speeches thus further develop and radicalize a theme 
already present in his’ earlier rhetoric: the Athenians stand in need of a wise advisor – 
Demosthenes – who can truly see and understand Philip.  For Demosthenes, placing 
Philip so far outside of Athens also necessitates - at the same time as it explicates - his 
characterization of himself as a leader who stands above the normative democratic 
system.        
The King as Orator  
It seems that even before the fall of Olynthus, during the summer of 348, Philip 
had indicated his interest in an alliance with Athens.261  After Olynthus fell that autumn, 
the actors Aristodemus and Ctesiphon, sent on separate occasions to Philip’s court, 
returned with the news that the king was interested in concluding peace with Athens.262 
The Athenians, however, were of two minds about how to receive such protestations of 
good-will.  Philocrates proposed that Philip be allowed to send a herald and ambassadors 
to Athens, but was indicted as soon as the motion passed.  With help from Demosthenes, 
                                                        
261 Philip’s interest in peace was intimated to the Athenians by an embassy from Euboea (Aeschin. 2.12), 
another area where Philip’s influence had been growing, to the detriment of traditional Athenian interests: 
see Brunt, “Euboea in the Time of Philip II” and G. L. Cawkwell, “Euboea in the Late 340’s,” Phoenix 32 
(1978): 42-67.   Philip’s sincerity in offering peace, however, has been questioned: see in particular Ryder, 
“Diplomatic Skills of Philip II;” Markle, “Strategy of Philip II;” Cawkwell, “Peace of Philocrates Again.”  
262 The details of these missions are related by Aeschines (2.12-2.17).  In the first instance, an Athenian, 
Phrynon, was captured by pirates and after his release by Philip persuaded the Athenians to send Ctesiphon 
along with himself back to Macedon to recover his ransom money.  Aristodemus was sent by the assembly 
to negotiate for the release of the Athenian prisoners captured at the fall of Olynthus.  On the relative 
chronology of these embassies, see Badian and Heskel, “Aeschin. 2.12-18.” 
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whose rationale for supporting the peace effort remain obscure, Philocrates was acquitted 
and drafted a decree for the selection of ten men to the embassy.263   
The stakes in the peace negotiations between Philip and Athens were particularly 
high due to both parties’ involvement in the Third Sacred War.264  Philip, who had 
already defeated the Phocians once on behalf of the Amphictyony at the battle of the 
Crocus Field, was now again turning his attention southward.   Although Phocis was still 
nominally Athens’ ally, it was becoming an increasingly embarrassing liability for the 
Athenians as the Phocian leadership plundered the sacred treasury at Delphi to pay for its 
mercenary armies.  A peace treaty with Philip would have indicated that Athens was 
disassociating itself from the Phocians’ cause.265  In practical terms, it would mean 
protection for Athens’ other interests if the Phocians lost the war, as appeared 
increasingly likely.  In the aftermath of Phocis’ destruction, however, Athens’ 
unhappiness with the Phocians was forgotten and the proponents of the peace would be 
accused of abandoning an Athenian ally.  
Ten envoys, including Philocrates, Demosthenes, and Aeschines, were elected to 
travel north to Pella to meet with Philip in the spring of 346.  They returned with 
favorable news and with Macedonian envoys who reiterated Philip’s desire for peace.  
Once the treaty had been drafted, a second embassy was elected to travel north to receive 
                                                        
263 The events that led up to the peace, already complex in the original, are made even more difficult to 
piece together because much of our evidence comes from the conflicting accounts of Demosthenes and 
Aeschines in their speeches on the embassy after the peace had already fallen apart, in 343/2: for 
reconstructed accounts see most recently Worthington, Philip II pp. 82-99, but also Buckler, “Demosthenes 
and Aeschines;” Carlier, Démosthène, ch. 4; Sealey, Demosthenes, pp. 143-159; Hammond, Philip II, ch. 8.   
264 On the Third Sacred War see above, pp. 44; 46-9. 
265 Adding to the Athenians’ discontent with the Phocians was the fact that the Phocians had refused to 
hand over Thermopylae to be defended by forces from Athens and Sparta after having asked the Athenians 
and Spartans to do so (Aeschin. 2.132-3). On the Phocians as a consideration for the Peace of Philocrates 
see Buckler, Philip II and the Sacred War, ch. 6 and Wolfhart Unte, “Die Phoker und der 
Philokratesfrieden,” Hermes 115 (1987): 411-429.   
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Philip’s and his allies’ oaths.  After some confusion and delay - Philip was off 
campaigning against King Cersebleptes of Thrace, another of Athens’ fair-weather allies 
- the ambassadors obtained the necessary oaths and returned to Athens with both the 
news of their success and of Cersebleptes’ fall.  The Athenians at this time approved 
another of Philocrates’ motions, which strengthened the peace agreement into an alliance.  
A third embassy, on which neither Aeschines nor Demosthenes served, was sent to 
inform Philip of the good news.              
Demosthenes, though initially a proponent of the Peace of Philocrates, quickly 
distanced himself from it as the failure of Athenian hopes became increasingly apparent.  
He even initiated a prosecution against Aeschines in 345 BCE for misconduct on the 
Second Embassy.  Aeschines countered by charging Timarchus, Demosthenes’ ally, for 
prostitution.  Aeschines won his case and Demosthenes’ indictment lay dormant for three 
years before being finally brought to trial in 343/2 BCE. Philocrates had just fled into 
exile instead of facing a similar charge of treason, and Demosthenes must have felt that 
he could win his case against Aeschines in view of the rising tide of anger against the 
supporters of the Peace; prosecuting Aeschines would also conveniently remind the 
Athenians that he, Demosthenes, had repudiated his part in the negotiations.   Thus the 
speeches on the Embassy, while critically concerned with the events of 346 BCE, were 
composed in the hindsight afforded by the year 343/2 BCE. In the event, Aeschines was 
narrowly acquitted.266  Toward the end of his speech On the False Embassy, Demosthenes summarizes 
his accusation against Aeschines.  Demosthenes states that Aeschines, after having been                                                         
266 For the trial itself see Douglas M. MacDowell, Demosthenes: On the False Embassy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 14-22. 
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bribed by Philip on the first embassy, came before the Athenian people with a series of 
claims.  Aeschines’ arguments convinced the demos to make peace under conditions that 
favored Philip.  Demosthenes recounts Aeschines’ purported speech, and concludes:  
[ἔφη] εἶναί τε τὸν Φίλιππον αὐτόν, Ἡράκλεις, Ἑλληνικώτατον 
ἀνθρώπων, δεινότατον λέγειν, φιλαθηναιότατον· οὕτω δὲ 
ἀτόπους τινὰς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ δυσχερεῖς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, ὥστε 
οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθαι λοιδορουμένους αὐτῷ καὶ βάρβαρον αὐτὸν 
ἀποκαλοῦντας.  
[He said], by Heracles, that Philip himself was the most Hellenic of men, a 
wondrous speaker, a lover of Athens; but that there were some individuals 
so tasteless and surly in the city that they were not ashamed to slander him 
and call him a barbarian. (19.308)    
Demosthenes focuses his audience’s attention on three of Aeschines’ claims about Philip: 
the king’s Hellenic behavior, his speaking ability, and his love for Athens.  Why is 
speaking ability on this list?  The other two statements are readily understandable: 
Philip’s Hellenic pretentions are clearly an argument against those orators (like 
Demosthenes) who “[slandered] him and [called] him a barbarian”; and claiming that 
Philip was friendly toward Athens is an equally self-evident argument that sought to 
build trust between Philip and the Athenians.   An argument concerning Philip’s ability to 
speak, however, seems, if not out of place, at least less important than Aeschines’ other 
two claims.  Yet as I will show, Philip’s speaking ability was of critical importance for 
both Demosthenes and Aeschines in the Embassy and Crown debates.  Demosthenes’ 
inclusion of Philip’s speaking ability alongside Hellenic identity and love for Athens as 
features of Aeschines’ pro-peace rhetoric points to the importance of this aspect of the 
debate over Philip.  It is with this in mind that I take Philip’s speaking ability as a starting 
point for my discussion of Aeschines’ On the Embassy. 
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In the abstract, Athenian civic ideology and later Greek political thought 
connected speaking ability to a Greek, and more specifically to an Athenian, identity.  
Thus for example post-classical rhetoricians located the origins of oratory, like Hellenic 
identity itself, in Homer.  So too, Corax and Tisias were said to have invented the art of 
rhetoric because of the increase in litigation that followed the establishment of democracy 
in Syracuse (Cicero Br. 46-48).267  The story of Corax and Tisias showcases the close ties 
between rhetoric and democracy.  Shortly after its creation rhetoric was brought to 
Athens, which rapidly became the uncontested center for the art.268  Praising a man for 
his speaking ability was thus closely connected to assertions of Hellenic – and, in Athens, 
Athenian - identity.269   
Conversely, rhetoric was not generally thought to subsist outside of a 
Greek/Athenian, democratic setting.  So Demosthenes could argue that when Aeschines 
spoke before the Amphyctions, he spoke to an audience “unaccustomed to speeches and 
without foresight for the future” [ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ 
προορωμένους] (18.149).  Demosthenes’ claim, while in and of itself rather 
unbelievable, is a singular expression of the Athenians’ pride in their own expertise in 
                                                        
267 Cic. Br. 40, 50; Quint. Inst. 10.1.46; see G. A. Kennedy, “The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in 
Homer,” American Journal of Philology 78 (1957): 23-35; and A. J. Karp, . “Homeric Origins of Ancient 
Rhetoric,” Arethusa 10 (1977): 237-258.   
268 The historicity of Corax and Tisias has rightly been questioned: see in particular Thomas Cole, “Who 
was Corax?,” Illinois Classical Studies 16 (1991): 65-84.  On the early history of rhetoric more generally 
see Michael Gagarin, “Background and Origins: Oratory and Rhetoric before the Sophists,” in A 
Companion to Greek Rhetoric, (ed.) Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 27-36; and 
Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, ch. 2.  
269 In addition, exceptional rhetorical ability might be seen as both a product and a mark of high social 
status.  Not all rhetors, certainly, were elite, but many of them were: see Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 
271-4; cf. Ober, Mass and Elite, ch. 6.  The Athenian elite could certainly afford the rhetorical education 
which their poorer compatriots could not: see Teresa Morgan, “Rhetoric and Education,” in A Companion 
to Greek Rhetoric, (ed.) Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 303-319.   
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rhetoric.270  If even the Athenians’ Greek neighbors could be considered ignorant of 
rhetoric, then non-Greeks were all the more readily branded as such.  A lack of rhetorical 
knowledge was also associated with undemocratic contexts on the rationale that there was 
little need for the art of persuasion outside of a democratic context.  Kings and tyrants did 
not need to persuade because they could command: we have already seen this forcefully 
argued by Demosthenes (Dem. 2.14-5).  Such a dim view of a king’s speaking ability is 
widely portrayed in popular sources.271  Thus for example Herodotus’ Xerxes does not 
need to persuade his court that going to war against Greece is a good idea; even though 
the Persians remain unpersuaded by his speech (Hdt. 7.8), their reluctance is superseded 
by the King’s will.272  Aeschines’ ascription of rhetorical ability to Philip is particularly 
striking when viewed against this general lack of rhetorical skill ascribed to barbarians 
and monarchies in popular Greek ideology.  I argue that describing Philip as a persuasive 
speaker familiar with the art of rhetoric also made him a familiar figure for the Athenian 
audience.  Both Aeschines in 343/2 BCE and the ambassadors in 346 BCE had their own 
reasons for crafting Philip as a orator, but both had a vested interest in making Philip a 
sympathetic and approachable character.      
For Aeschines, giving Philip a voice was a tactical consideration tied to the 
circumstances in which he found himself in 343/2 BCE: because of the Athenian 
disillusionment with the peace, instead of arguing that making peace was the best course                                                         
270 Thucydides’ Pericles also lauds Athenian decision-making (2.40.3).  See John Heath, The Talking 
Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), ch. 4, on the capacity for speech as central to Athenian male identity; also Deborah 
Levine Gera, Ancient Greek Ideas on Speech, Language, and Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003).   
271 Though this was not the case in 4th century elite discourse on kingship, which argued that for a 
monarchy to be successful the king had to be responsive to his subject’s desires and, by consequence, use 
means of persuasion alongside coersion: see for example Xenophon’s Hiero or Isocrates’ To Nicocles. 
272 Herodotus’ constitutional debate, an anomaly, comes closest to democratic discourse in a barbarian 
context: persuasive speeches are given, after which votes for or against are cast (Hdt. 3.80-83).    
  143 
of action, Aeschines claims that he ought not to take the blame for its lackluster results.  
By rights, he suggests, the failure of the peace was a collective Athenian failure.  So, for 
example, Aeschines dares Demosthenes: “and indeed, if you wish, you will make this 
accusation against the assembly of other Athenians” [καίτοι ταύτην, εἰ βούλει, τὴν 
κατηγορίαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ᾿Αθηναίων δημοσίᾳ κατηγορήσεις] (Aeschin. 
2.164).273   If so, and the polis as a whole was to blame, then it was manifestly unfair for 
Demosthenes to single Aeschines out for punishment.  Aeschines’ success in proving his 
argument depended on his ability to show that Philip was an artful manipulator who 
could, in fact, have completely taken in the ambassadors with his sweet-talking ways 
without the use of bribery, as Demosthenes had alleged.  Instead of employing 
underhanded schemes to get his way, Philip had simply bested the ambassadors in a fair 
fight.  It follows that if the Athenian people were to imagine that Philip was able to dupe 
some of Athens’ best politicians, then it would have been on their own footing – that is, 
in rhetoric.  Aeschines’ narrative of the actual meetings between the ambassadors and 
Philip was designed to substantiate his characterization of Philip as an artful speaker.      Yet Philip’s speaking ability is not an argument that Aeschines crafted in a 
vacuum or for the sole purpose of this trial.  The fact that, as we have seen, Demosthenes 
ascribed the use of this same ploy to Aeschines’ rhetoric of 346 BCE (Dem. 19.308) – at 
least three years before the delivery of the trial speech – proves that speaking ability was 
a major component of the original debate concerning the Peace.  While it is true, then, 
that focusing on Philip’s speaking ability was part of Aeschines’ argument in 343/2 BCE,                                                         
273 Indeed, much of Aeschines’ case rests on delineating the limits of his power; thus he questions 
Demosthenes’ claim that he was responsible for Cersobleptes being cut out of the treaty because as a rhetor 
he had no authority to do so (Aeschin. 2.86); and, again, he argues that he did not have the authority to 
‘disenfranchise’ Demosthenes by shouting him down in the ekklesia, as Demosthenes had claimed 
(Aeschin. 2.121-3; 19.23). 
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it was also a major part of the earlier debate in 346 BCE.  We can discern the way in 
which a previously important theme shifted in emphasis and implication in reaction to 
new developments.    For the ambassadors, crafting Philip’s persona as that of an orator 
was a way of making him a familiar, even domestic figure for their Athenian audience.  It 
gave Philip a persona that the Athenians, as avid frequenters of the ekklesia and the 
lawcourts, could judge in their own right on the same bases they would use in judging 
their own politicians.  Philip the orator was a comfortable figure that could gain the 
Athenians’ trust in way that Philip the barbarian king could never have done.  For 
Aeschines in the year 343/2 BCE, presenting Philip as a consummate speaker who did 
not need bribery in order to get his way absolved the ambassadors from the suspicion of 
having been suborned by the king.  
Aeschines structures his account of the embassy as a contest of words: between 
the ambassadors and Philip and also between the ambassadors themselves.274  On the one 
hand, the ambassadors participated in a competition with Philip over the terms of the 
peace; on the other hand, the ambassadors competed to see which one amongst 
themselves could deliver the best possible speech before their audience (that is, before 
Philip).   Aeschines reports that even before the meeting with the king there was some 
fear among the ambassadors that Philip would get the better of them in the argument 
(Aeschin. 2.21).275  This fear was evidently not groundless, since in the aftermath of the 
embassy Aeschines would recount to the demos that Philip was a wondrous speaker 
[δεινὸς εἰπεῖν/λέγειν]  (Aeschin. 2.43; 2.51), who spoke with a good memory                                                         
274 In much the same way, debate in the ekklesia could be envisioned in agonistic terms: see Roisman, 
Rhetoric, Manliness and Contest and James Fredal, Rhetorical Action in Ancient Athens: Persuasive 
Artistry from Solon to Demosthenes (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2006), 22-35. 
275 The embassy was also viewed as a conflict over the terms of the peace by Demosthenes: so, for 
example, he contrasts the success of the Athenian embassy with that of the Thebans (Dem. 19.139-142).  
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[μνημονικῶς] and ably [δυνατῶς] (Aeschin. 2.48).276 Aeschines’ narrative of the actual 
meeting with Philip was crafted to corroborate such claims.  After all the ambassadors 
had spoken in their turn, Aeschines describes Philip’s response:  
Ὡς δ’ εἰσήλθομεν καὶ ἐκαθεζόμεθα, ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν 
εἰρημένων ἐνεχείρει τι λέγειν ὁ Φίλιππος, πλείστην δὲ εἰκότως 
ἐποιήσατο διατριβὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους· ἴσως γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν 
ἐνόντων εἰπεῖν, ὥς γε οἶμαι, παρέλιπον· καὶ πολλάκις μου τοὔνομα 
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὠνομάζετο· πρὸς δὲ Δημοσθένην τὸν οὕτω 
καταγελάστως ἀπαλλάξαντα οὐδ’ ὑπὲρ ἑνὸς οἶμαι διελέχθη.   
After we came and sat down, Philip set out to say something in response 
to each of the speeches from the beginning, and of course he gave the 
greatest care to my speech; for I did not leave out, I think, nearly anything 
of what ought to have been said.  And he often named me in his speech.  
But I think he did not make any rebuttal at all in response to Demosthenes, 
who had spoken so laughably. (Aeschin. 2.38) 
Aeschines’ narrative shows Philip to be μνημονικός in his ability to remember each 
speech in turn and δυνατός in the proper emphasis he places on replying to Aeschines’ 
speech while entirely glossing over Demosthenes’ failure.  If the Athenian jury judging 
the case in 343/2 BCE were to judge based on the evidence given them by Aeschines, 
they too would have had to agree with his positive assessment of Philip’s skill in rhetoric.  
Aeschines presents Philip as a consummate politician who could beat seasoned Athenian 
orators at their own game.   
Aeschines’ account further enhances both his own and Philip’s rhetorical ability 
by placing it in contrast with that of Demosthenes.277  After a retelling of the speech he                                                         
276 δεινὸς εἰπεῖν/λέγειν is the standard expression for a clever speaker – an orator par excellence - both in 
a good or in the bad sense.  See Jon Hesk, “The Rhetoric of Anti-Rhetoric in Athenian Oratory,” in 
Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy, eds. Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 201-230. On Philip’s memory and his able speech cf. Dem. 2.277. 
277 Demosthenes’ failure is also the antithesis of Aeschines’ own speech before Philip, which he recounts in 
glowing detail (Aeschin. 2.25-33); cf. Plutarch, Demosthenes 16.1.  Needless to say, I find it hard to agree 
with T. T. B. Ryder, “Demosthenes and Philip II,” in Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator, ed. Ian 
Worthington (Oxford: Routledge, 2000), 60-2, who concludes, based on the fact that Demosthenes’ On the 
False Embassy does not contain a rebuttal of Aeschines’ allegation, that Aeschines’ was a fair assessment 
of what actually happened; I hope to have shown by the end of my analysis that this episode should be 
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had delivered himself, and to which Philip would spend so much effort responding, 
Aeschines turns to the speech delivered by Demosthenes – the last of the ambassadors to 
speak.278  Having risen, Demosthenes is completely overwhelmed and manages only a 
few words before he is lost in silence.  Philip has thus quite literally gotten the better of 
Demosthenes in an argument – so much so that Philip even takes pity on his opponent:    
Φθέγγεται τὸ θηρίον τοῦτου προοίμιον σκοτεινόν τι καὶ τεθνηκός 
[δειλίᾳ], καὶ μικρὸν προαγαγὼν ἄνω τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξαίφνης 
ἐσίγησε καὶ διηπορήθη, τελευτῶν δὲ ἐκπίπτει τοὺ λόγου. ἰδὼν δὲ 
αὐτον ὁ Φίλιππος ὡς διέκειτο, θαρρεῖν τε παρεκελεύτο καὶ μὴ 
νομίζειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, διὰ τοῦτο [οἴεσθαί] τι 
πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ᾿ ἡσυχῇ καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι καὶ 
λέγειν ὡς πρείλετο.  ὁ δ῾ ὡς ἅπας ἐταράχθη, καὶ τῶν 
γεγραμμένων διεσφάλη, οὐδ᾿ ἀναλαβεῖν αὑτὸν ἐδυνήθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
πάλιν ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν ταὐτὸν ἔπαθεν. 
This brute, dying from cowardice, mouthed out some obscure proem, and 
having proceeded a ways into matters suddenly stopped and lost himself, 
finally completely deprived of words.  Philip, seeing what had happened 
to him, told him to take courage and not to think that he had suffered a 
reverse because of it, as in the theater, but to calmly and little by little 
remember and speak what he had predetermined to say.  But he, when 
once thrown off course and forgetting what he had written, was not able to 
righten himself, but in trying to continue speaking suffered the same 
reverse. (Aeschin. 2.34-35)   
Demosthenes’ inability to handle the pressure of the situation shows him to be the very 
opposite of a competent and professional orator; even those words he does manage to say 
are distinctly lackluster.  Particularly when contrasted with Aeschines’ speech 
Demosthenes effort appears to be an abject failure.   
Philip, however, is also no mere silent auditor to Demosthenes’ failing.  Instead, 
he takes on the role of an indulgent teacher, patiently encouraging his frightened student 
                                                                                                                                                                     
neither “a sad disappointment to historians” nor “fertile ground for psychologists” who seek material on 
Demosthenes’ ability to extemporize (62), but rather another example of an orator hard at work building a 
particular kind of (rhetorical) reality.  
278 Aeschines claims that the ambassadors spoke in order of age, from the oldest, Ctesiphon, to the 
youngest, Demosthenes (Aeschin. 2.22). 
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to continue with his lesson.279  His advice is worth unpacking in detail, as it has much to 
say not just about Philip’s role in the narrative but also about rhetorical training and 
preparation in Athenian ideology.  I argue that Philip’s advice – to calm down and take 
the speech piece by piece, according to what Demosthenes had predetermined to say – is 
entirely appropriate and, moreover, showcases his knowledge of rhetorical craft.  Philip’s 
suggestion resembles, for example, Aspasia’s rhetorical method in Plato’s Menexenus:  
ΣΩ. Ἀσπασίας δὲ καὶ χθὲς ἠκροώμην περαινούσης ἐπιτάφιον 
λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων. ἤκουσε γὰρ ἅπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὅτι 
μέλλοιεν Ἀθηναῖοι αἱρεῖσθαι τὸν ἐροῦντα· ἔπειτα τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ 
παραχρῆμά μοι διῄει, οἷα δέοι λέγειν, τὰ δὲ πρότερον ἐσκεμμένη, 
ὅτε μοι δοκεῖ συνετίθει τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λόγον ὃν Περικλῆς εἶπεν, 
περιλείμματ’ ἄττα ἐξ ἐκείνου συγκολλῶσα.    
Socrates: But just yesterday I listened to Aspasia delivering a funeral 
oration on these very things.  She had heard the story that you told, that 
the Athenians were going to choose their speaker; and then she discussed 
with me the sort of things he ought to say, some things off the cuff, and 
some that she had arranged beforehand - when, it seems to me, she 
composed the funeral oration which Pericles gave - encompassing what 
she had pieced together from it.  (Plato, Menexenus 236 a-c)    
Aspasia breaks up her speech up into smaller units in just the same manner as Philip 
councils Demosthenes to do for ease of memory.  Both Aspasia and Philip take for 
granted the fact that at least a part of a speech would have been considered, and perhaps 
memorized, before delivery: Aspasia divides her speech into ‘some things [spoken] off 
the cuff’ [τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμά] and ‘some that had been arranged beforehand’ 
[τὰ δὲ πρότερον ἐσκεμμένη]; Philip in a similar vein councils Demosthenes to speak as 
he had chosen beforehand [λέγειν ὡς πρείλετο].  Both acknowledge that there were 
parts of the speech that had been given previous consideration and were not created on 
the spur of the moment.    
                                                        
279 On oratorical schooling see Morgan, “Rhetoric and Education,” 303-309.   
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The suggestion made by both Philip and Plato that at least some part of a speech 
was spoken according to a prearranged plan is noteworthy.  Most importantly, it implies 
that preparation before the delivery of a speech may not necessarily have been negatively 
perceived by Aeschines’ Athenian audience.  Athenians, certainly, valued the ability of 
the orator to speak with a passionate immediacy that was by definition antithetical to the 
long hours of care required for a written speech;  but considering appropriate arguments 
and how best to frame did not necessarily involve any laborious memorization of exact 
wording.280  Neither Aspasia nor Philip reference writing as the medium for prior 
preparation.  It is also probable that the amount of preparation that would have been 
acceptable may very well have differed according to the occasion of delivery: the 
strictures of a funeral oration, as in Aspasia’s case, and of an ambassador’s speech, as in 
Philip’s, would have been known to the speaker before the event - unlike a situation in 
the ekklesia, where the ὁ βουλόμενος was, at least putatively, responding to information 
that was entirely new to him.  There is therefore nothing inherently suspicious about 
Philip’s suggestion that Demosthenes follow ‘the prearranged plan’ of his speech, and 
much that shows his knowledge of the preparations required of the orator.   
Noteworthy too is the fact that while Philip makes no mention of writing, 
Aeschines, continuing the narrative in his own voice in the next section, does implicate 
Demosthenes in having written out his speech: he claims that despite Philip’s advice 
Demosthenes is unable to continue “having once been thrown off track and having lost 
the thread of what he had written.” [ὁ δ῾ ὡς ἅπας ἐταράχθη, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων 
διεσφάλη] (emphasis mine) (Aeschin. 2.35).   Philip himself, however, does not make                                                         
280 For the Athenians’ attitude to rhetorical education and preparation, see Ober, Mass and Elite, 156-191; 
Yunis, Taming Democracy, 237-247.    
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any such accusation.281  Rather, Aeschines’ Philip is imagined to be familiar with 
rhetorical methods and with rhetorical mentorship; if Demosthenes failed even on his 
second attempt at speaking, it is because of his own lack of skill and not for any lack of 
useful advice from the king.     
Philip is also quick to point out the benefit of making a speech in a private setting 
rather than in a public arena, where a single misstep could spell the politician’s doom.  
He casts himself and his court as the antithesis of a crowd in the theater always ready 
either to be led by or to shout down an actor based on the pleasure it derived from his 
performance (Aeschin. 2.35).  The comparison is particularly well suited to Philip’s 
character because of his well-known interest in drama.   However, the analogy does not 
need to be understood so narrowly.  The close – sometimes too close – ties between the 
goings-on in the ekklesia and the theater appear often in Athenian discourse.282  The 
theater and the ekklesia were also conflated in more immediate ways: political meetings 
were occasionally held in the theater and actors often crossed the boundary into politics 
in the late 4th century.283  The distinction Aeschines’ Philip draws between himself and an                                                         
281 An anecdote by Plutarch may be a later conflation of this ‘proper’ method of preparation and the 
improper use of writing: according to Plutarch, Demosthenes admitted that his speeches were neither 
completely written nor completely unwritten [οὔτε γράψας οὔτε ἄγραφα κομιδῇ λέγειν ὡμολόγει] 
(Dem. 8.5).  On Demosthenes’ ambiguous reputation in antiquity as an orator who finely crafted his 
speeches see Craig Cooper, “Philosophers, Politics, Academics: Demosthenes’ Rhetorical Reputation in 
Antiquity,” in Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Routledge, 2000), 224-
245 and Yunis, Taming Democracy, 244-7.  Lionel Pearson, “The Development of Demosthenes as a 
Political Orator,” Phoenix 18 (1964): 95-109 and “The Virtuoso Passages in Demosthenes’ Speeches,” 
Phoenix 29 (1975): 214-230, are modern arguments for Demosthenes’ development as an orator over the 
course of his career. 
282 Hall, “Lawcourt Dramas,” discusses the influence of drama on forensic speeches.  More generally on the 
connection between drama and political rhetoric see Anne Duncan, Performance and Identity in the 
Classical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch. 2; Josiah Ober and Barry Strauss, 
“Drama, Political Rhetoric, and the Discourse of Athenian Democracy,” in Nothing to do with Dionysios? 
Athenian Drama in its Social Context, eds. John Winkler and Froma Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 237-270. ; Victor Bers, “Tragedy and Rhetoric,” in Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in 
Action, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Routledge, 1994), 176-195. 
283 On the theater used as a place of assembly see Frank Kolb, Agora und Theater, Volks- und 
Festversammlung (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1981), 88-99.   Aeschines came under fire from 
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audience in a theater could thus be understood not only in terms of his own predilections, 
but as part of a widely shared understanding of the parallels between the skill of the 
orator and the actor.  In sum, Philip’s advice to Demosthenes serves to establish his 
knowledge of an orator’s craft and in so doing solidifies his role as a competent adversary 
for Aeschines and the other Athenian ambassadors.  Aeschines has presented Philip as a 
character fully conversant with Athenian political debate and society.    
The theater analogy also makes clear one of the peculiarities in Aeschines’ 
narrative which arises from Philip’s assimilation to the role of an orator: the king has a 
dual role in the rhetorical contest as both participant and audience.  Inasmuch as the 
debate rests between the ambassadors and Philip over the terms of the peace treaty, Philip 
is an active participant; as audience and judge for each individual speech presented 
before him by the ambassadors, he also ‘stands in’ for the Athenian demos.  That I divide 
Philip’s role in this way ought not imply any inherent disjunction between the orator and 
his audience; the distinction between the two was always fluid, lasting for no longer than 
the duration of a speaker’s speech, at which point in time he would be reabsorbed back 
into the collective.  For Aeschines, certainly, Philip’s dual role does not appear as a 
source of tension.   
A passage from Hyperides’ Against Diondas, however, shows that Philip’s dual 
role as participant and auditor could sometimes be interpreted as a problem.  In the 
Against Diondas Hyperides asks the jury to imagine what would happen if Philip were to                                                                                                                                                                      
Demosthenes for having been an actor before he turned his talents to the ekklesia; Aristodemus (Aeschin. 
2.15-19, 3.83, Dem. 18.21 19.12), Neoptolemus (Dem. 5.6, 19.12), and Ischander (Dem. 19.9, 303) were 
actors by profession but also involved in the peace negotiations with Philip; and Aristodemus and his 
troupe went to Thessaly and Magnesia to stir up hostility against Philip when the Peace of Philocrates had 
gone sour (Aeschin. 3.83).  Actors also made good negotiators and ambassadors because their itinerant 
lifestyle would have made them known and welcome everywhere; while they made particularly good 
negotiators with Philip because of his love of theater, this was not the only cause in which they were 
employed.   
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bring a suit against the Athenians.  As in Aeschines’ On the False Embassy, Philip takes 
on two roles: he acts as both litigant and jury.  The demarcation between a litigant and the 
jury - as opposed to the position of the orator in the ekklesia – was clearly defined, and 
Hyperides’ does his best to highlight the impossibility of Philip taking on both roles: 
Καὶ μὴν κἀκεῖν(ο) σκέψασθε, ὧ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, εἰ παρὰ Φιλίππωι 
συλληφθέντες ἡμεῖς ἐκρινόμεθα, τί ἂν ἡμῶ(ν) κατηγόρει; οὐχ ὅτι 
[Β]υζάντιον μὲν αὐτὸν ἐκωλύσαμεν λαβεῖ̣̣ν, τὴν δ᾿ Εὔ̣̣β̣ο̣ιαν 
ἀπεστήσαμεν, τὴν δὲ πρὸς Θηβαίους ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῶι 
συμμαχίαν καθείλομεν, ὑμῖν δὲ συμμάχους ἐποιήσαμεν; τί 
δ᾿ἀν⟨τ⟩επάθομεν ἂν ὑπ᾿ ἐκείνου; ἆρ᾿οὐκ ἂν ἀπεθὰνομεν; ἐγὼ μὲν 
οἶμαι. 
And look to this too, Athenians: if you were arrested and brought to court 
by Philip, what would he accuse you of?  Would it not be that we 
prevented him from capturing Byzantium, that we made Euboea revolt, 
and that we destroyed his existing alliance with the Thebans and made 
them our allies?  How would he punish us?  Wouldn’t we be killed? I 
certainly think so.  (Hyp. Against Diondas 136r)  
The effect Hyperides creates is quasi-comical – this is clearly no proper court of law 
because of the untenable conflation of Philip’s role as both prosecution and jury.284  
Philip’s dual role is rather the dream job of the sycophant and base politician, who is 
regularly portrayed suborning the jury in order to secure a conviction.285  Hyperides’ 
Athenian jury is invited to equate themselves with Hyperides, the defendant, and equate 
Philip with Diondas, the unjust prosecutor who seeks to circumvent the law in order to 
assure his own victory.  At the same time, Hyperides’ imagined scene works because it 
presents Philip in a context and in a role that would have been familiar to his Athenian 
audience.  Thus, like Aeschines, Hyperides presents a Philip who speaks out loud in the 
character of an - albeit morally wrong - orator.  As we will see, this tactic of likening 
                                                        
284 See also Dem. 19.214, which imagines Aeschines defending himself against Demosthenes where Philip 
is the jury. 
285 See for example Dem. 19.1; 21.4.     
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Philip to a (good or bad) orator is diametrically opposed to Demosthenes’ 
characterization of Philip in the forensic speeches.    
Philip’s Appearance and Deportment 
I have shown how Aeschines fashioned Philip as a knowledgeable speaker.  Yet it 
may be argued that being an orator involved much more than the mere capacity to speak, 
or even the ability to speak persuasively.  An orator also had to embody Athenian ideals 
of masculinity, power, and self-discipline to persuade his audience that his argument was 
worth listening to.286  His body and his life were on display and subject to debate by the 
audience; his social graces went hand in hand with his skill at addressing the crowd.  He 
had to embody the model citizen whose example should be followed and any flaws in his 
lifestyle could provide ammunition for his opponents.  So, for example, Aeschines 
virtually begins his attack on Timarchus by relating the story of his most recent act of 
gross misconduct:  
Οὑτοσὶ δὲ οὐ πάλαι, ἀλλὰ πρώην ποτὲ ῥίψας θοίμάτιον γυμνὸς 
ἐπαγκρατίαζεν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οὕτω κακῶς καὶ αἰσχρῶς 
διακείμενος τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ μέθης καὶ βδελυρίας, ὥστε τούς γε εὖ 
φρονοῦντας ἐγκαλύψασθαι, αἰσχυνθέντας ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, εἰ 
τοιούτοις συμβούλοις χρώμεθα. 
This man at one time – not long ago, but just recently – ripped off his 
cloak and leaped about naked in the assembly, so badly and grossly was 
his body overcome by wine and lewdness, that the right-minded covered 
their eyes, ashamed that we have such a man as advisor for the city. 
(Aeschin. 1.26) 
Timarchus’ lack of propriety in drink and deportment are given as proof of his inability to 
act as an appropriate σύμβουλος to the people.  His body bears witness to his 
debauchery:  Timarchus’ unseemly lifestyle can literally be read from the repulsiveness                                                         
286 See Roisman, Rhetoric of Manhood, ch. 6; Fredal, Rhetorical Action, 32-35; Duncan, Performance and 
Identity, ch. 2.  All these qualities beyond speaking ability that a good rhetor had to possess fall under the 
category of ἦθος in Aristotle’s Rhetoric I.2.3-4.  
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of his body and in his mannerisms (Aeschin. 1.61, 189).  One’s appearance is proof 
positive of one’s morality.287    
To return to the On the Embassy speech, Aeschines’ Philip excels not just in the 
art of speaking; the ambassadors, Aeschines insists, based their positive assessment of 
Philip on more than his words.  During their report to the assembly they also spoke of  
Philip’s pleasing “appearance” [τῆς ἰδέας αὐτοῦ] and his “drinking ability” [τῆς ἐν 
τοῖς πότοις ἐπιδεξιότητος] (Aeschin. 2.47).   Personal appearance and drinking ability 
– that is, a man’s deportment in a sympotic setting - were crucial features of a man’s self-
presentation.288  Consequently the ambassadors in their report, and Aeschines in his 
speech On the Embassy, presented Philip as a man fully conversant with Athenian norms 
of behavior in order to prove that he was a man the Athenians could trust politically.  It is 
these qualities that I will consider below.   
According to Aeschines it was Ctesiphon, the oldest of the ambassadors, who 
praised Philip’s appearance.  I have used Ctesiphon’s remarks and their refashioning by 
Demosthenes previously as one example of a rhetor’s possible method in replying to his 
enemies (pp. 13-16).  Here, however, I would like to emphasize the substance of 
Ctesiphon’s remarks.  Aeschines relates that Ctesiphon aired his views on Philip’s 
appearance twice, first at a private dinner party before the other ambassadors where he                                                         
287 It was, however, sometimes acknowledged that visual clues of a man’s character could be  difficult to 
read.  So Aeschines says that Demosthenes and a certain general, both of whom argued on Timarchus’ 
behalf, would claim that personal beauty in a youth should not be automatically suspect (Aeschin. 1.126; 
133-4).  See Fredal, Rhetorical Action, 157-172, for a lengthier explication of this passage as well as of 
Aeschines’ characterization of Demosthenes in the Against Timarchus as rhetorical self-fashioning.  See 
also Hesk’s discussion of physiognomonic deception: Jon Hesk, Deception and Democracy in Classical 
Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 219-27. 
288 On male identity see the articles in Lin Foxhall and John Salmon, eds., Thinking Men: Masculinity and 
its self-representation in the Classical Tradition (London: Routledge, 1998); Roisman, Rhetoric of 
Manhood; Kenneth Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1974), ch. 3; on various aspects of the symposium see the articles in Oswyn Murray, 
ed., Sympotica: A symposium on the Symposion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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claimed that “in all his long life he has never seen such a pleasant and lovely fellow” [ἐν 
τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ καὶ βίῳ οὐ πώποθ᾿ οὕτως ἡδὺν οὐδ ἐπαφρόδιτον ἄνθρωπον 
ἑωρακὼς εἴη] (Aeschin. 2.42) and then in public before the ekklesia where he praised 
Philip’s “appearance” [τῆς ἰδέας αὐτοῦ] (Aeschin. 2.47).   In terms of Philip’s actual 
body, calling Philip pleasing in his appearance would have been wildly out of keeping 
with his actual physical state.  He had lost his right eye during the siege of Methone in 
354; at some point – it is unclear whether this happened before or after the Peace of 
Philocrates - he would also sustain serious injuries to his collar-bone, arm, and leg.289  
The resultant sight would hardly have come close to the Greek ideal - or anyone’s ideal - 
of physical beauty.  If the Athenians knew anything at all about Philip’s appearance prior 
to the ambassador’s report, Ctesiphon’s description ought to have read as 
impossibility.290  That it did not – and that, in fact, it apparently seemed acceptable to 
Ctesiphon and the other ambassadors – warrants additional remark.  Evidently 
Ctesiphon’s comments were not quite as incompatible with Philip’s physical state as they 
appear at first.   
                                                        
289 On Philip’s eye see Dem. 18.67, Theopompus FGrH 115 F 52, Marsyas FGrH 135 -6 F 16, col. 12 49-
50.  For a comprehensive list of Philip’s possible injuries see Dem. 18.67. It appears likely that the injury to 
Philip’s collar-bone is corroborated in Isocrates Epistle II 1-12, if both events are indeed to be dated to 345 
or 344 BCE.  See also Riginos, The Wounding of Philip II of Macedon, pp.103-119.  Latter sources 
(Didymus in Dem. Ix 22, col. Xiii 3-7, Plutarch Mor. 331b and 739b no.4) suggest that Philip’s leg injury 
had made him lame. 
290 Demosthenes, for example, mentions an apparently life-threatening illness suffered by Philip on his 
Thracian campaign of 351 BC (Dem. 1.11, 3.5), though this has never been conclusively identified with any 
one of the bodily injuries he received.  We may also suppose that the Athenians who had previously gone 
on embassies to Macedon and, quite possibly, any Athenian prisoners kept for ransom in Macedon would 
have known and possibly talked about Philip’s appearance.  While this constitutes very littl in the way of 
proof, it seems to me hard to suppose that the ambassador’s report was the first time Philip’s appearance 
was brought up in the assembly.     
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In fact, to reduce Ctesiphon’s remark to an estimation of mere outward beauty 
would be misrepresentative.291  On the contrary, Ctesiphon’s original claim was only 
vaguely physical and was chiefly meant to reassure the Athenians that Philip looked 
trustworthy.  Ctesiphon conflated the physical with social/moral qualities, just as 
Aeschines had done when pointing to Timarchus’ body as an indicator of his 
debauchery.292  Ctesiphon’s original remarks were founded on an entirely traditional 
linking of social mores with physical terminology.  A substantiation of this reading is 
provided by a similar comment on the tyrant’s appearance in Xenophon’s Hiero.  Hiero, 
tyrant of Syracuse, has complained to Simonides that being tyrant is a wretched state 
rather than the prized life of leisure and plenty that it appears to be.  He has, in particular, 
claimed that he is unable to enjoy good company and that the tyrant’s court breeds 
dissention, greed, and slavishness.  Simonides disagrees, and adds the following:    ἀλλ ̓ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἐκ θεῶν τιμή τις καὶ χάρις συμπαρέπεσθαι 
ἀνδρὶ ἄρχοντι.  Μὴ γὰρ ὅτι καλλίονα ποιεῖ ἄνδρα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν 
αὐτὸν τοῦτον ἥδιον θεώμεθά τε ὅταν ἄρχῃ ἢ ὅταν ἰδιωτεύῃ, 
διαλεγόμενοί τε ἀγαλλόμεθα τοῖς προτετιμημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς 
ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἡμῖν οὖσι.  Καὶ μὴν παιδικά γε, ἐν οἷς δὴ καὶ σὺ μάλιστα 
κατεμέμψω τὴ τυραννίδα, ἥκιστα μὲν γῆρας ἄρχοντος 
δυσχεραίνει, ἥκιστα δ ̓ αἶσχρος, πρὸς ὃν ἂν τυγχάνῃ ὁμιλῶν, 
τούτου ὑπολογίζεται.  Αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ τετιμῆσθαι μάλιστα 
συνεπικοσμεῖ, ὥστε τὰ μὲν δυσχερῆ ἀφανίζειν, τὰ  δὲ καλὰ 
λαμπρότερα ἀναφαίνειν.   
But it seems to me that respect and some kind of charm falls to the ruler 
from the gods.  Not only does [tyranny] make a man more handsome, but 
we perceive him as being more pleasing when he rules than when he is a 
common citizen, and in conversation we take delight in those that are                                                         
291 Aeschines’ narrative about Demosthenes’ parody of Ctesiphon is based on just such a 
mischaracterization of Ctesiphon’s meaning: according to Aeschines, Demosthenes claimed that 
Ctesiphon’s eulogy was better suited to a woman than Philip (Aeschin. 2.112). As I have argued earlier (pp. 
14-16), part of Demosthenes’ joke involved mistranslating Ctesiphon’s original argument into purely 
physical terms and thereby degrading it; Ctesiphon’s original words concerned a more general and 
ethically-motivated in nature rather than concerned with the king’s actual physical appearance.   
292 As Simon Goldhill put it, “ ‘stature’ is a visible, social quality.”  Simon Goldhill, “The Seductions of the 
Gaze: Socrates and his Girlfriends,” in Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict, and Community in Classical 
Athens, eds. Paul Cartledge et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 105. 
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more esteemed rather than those that are of the same rank as us. And 
indeed in matters of love, with respect to which you especially blamed the 
tyrant’s situation, old age hampers the ruler least of all, and least of all is 
any ugliness set to the tyrant’s account by whoever he happens to be 
conversing with.  For the respect he gets itself adorns him, so that 
whatever is ugly is hidden, and whatever is beautiful appears more visible. 
(Hiero 8.4-6) 
In arguing that the tyrant’s social position makes even his body appear differently in the 
eye of the beholder,  Xenophon’s Simonides essentially agrees with the implicit 
underpinning of Ctesiphon’s remarks on Philip: inner worth and status materially affect 
the way the body is viewed.  Ctesiphon’s claim that Philip’s appearance was lovely adds 
to the overall impression the ambassadors presented the king as a figure who quite 
literally ‘looked the part’ of a trustworthy Athenophile.    
In addition to praising Philip’s rhetorical abilities and personal appearance, the 
ambassadors also voiced their approval of Philip’s lifestyle and social manners.  
Specifically, Aeschines encapsulates this aspect of Philip’s character by citing his 
“dexterity at drinking” [ἡ ἐν τοῖς πότοις ἐπιδεξιότης] (Aeschin. 2.47).  To be wondrous 
at drinking could imply more than simply the ability to drink a lot, just as being beautiful 
encapsulated much more than simple physical appearance: Plutarch perhaps makes this 
clearer in his rendition of this same episode (Dem. 16) when he says the ambassadors 
praised Philip for being “a most suitable companion to drink with” [συμπιεῖν 
ἱκανώτατον] and thereby emphasizing the social aspect of the drinking party.  When 
latter in Aeschines’ narration Demosthenes dissmisses the ambassadors’ praise on the 
grounds that Philocrates could drink as much as Philip (Aeschin. 2.52), and then asserts to 
Philip’s face that “I do not say… that you are a great drinking companion because I 
consider this to be praise for a sponge” [οὐκ εἶπον… ὡς δεινὸς συμπιεῖν, σπογγιᾶς 
  157 
τὸν ἔπαινον ὑπολαμβάνων τοῦτον εἶναι] (Aeschin. 2.112), Demosthenes is 
comically degrading the ambassadors’ original meaning to its lowest denominator.293  
Being “a good drinker” implied much more than the simple ability to drink in great 
quantity and could therefore be politically significant.294    
Philip was not the only one whose sympotic behavior was being narrowly 
watched.  Macedonian symposia appear to have been particularly fruitful for 
Demosthenes and Aeschines as settings for morally deviant acts.295  We have already 
seen Demosthenes attack the lewdness and license of Philip’s court (Dem. 2.18-9) in 
order to persuade the Athenians to help Olynthus.  Indeed, such tales appear to have been 
more true to the reality of the Macedonian court than many other such stories.296  Yet the 
orators employed Macedonian excess to a characteristically Athenian end.  Thus in the 
speech On the False Embassy, Demosthenes regales his audience with the tale of a 
banquet at the house of one Xenophron in Macedonia at which Aeschines in a drunken 
rage mocked and almost beat an Olynthian woman (Dem. 19.196-8).297  The combination 
of a foreign setting and an anti-democratic host serve as the corrupting influence that can 
                                                        
293 Philocrates was known for his drinking ability, hence Demosthenes’ comparison (Dem. 19.46).  
294 See James Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes: the Consuming Passions of Classical Athens (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 147-59.  On sympotic behavior in Comedy see also Nick Fisher, 
“Symposiasts, Fish-Eaters and Flatterers: Social Mobility and Moral Concerns in Old Comedy,” in The 
Rivals of Aristophanes: Studies in Athenian Old Comedy, eds. David Harvey and John Wilkins (London: 
Duckworth, 2000), 355-396. 
295 Probably, of course, it was simply easier to set such outrageous acts in a foreign land, far away from the 
eyes and ears of the Athenian demos.  On sympotic wrong-doing more generally see William John 
Henderson, “Men Behaving Badly: conduct and identity at Greek symposia,” Akroterion 44 (1999): 3-13.  
See also M. Noël, “ ‘Symposion’, ‘philanthrôpia’, et empire dans la ‘Cyropédie’ de Xénophon,” in 
Φιλολογία: Mélanges offerts à Michel Casevitz, eds. Pascale Brillet-Dubois and Édith Parmentier (Lyon: 
Maison de l’Orient et de la Méditeranée, 2006), on Cyrus’ sympotic behavior in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia.  
296 Philip’s drunkenness, like that of the Macedonian royalty in general and his son Alexander in particular, 
was of legendary proportions: see Carney, “Symposia and the Macedonian Elite,” and above, pp. 53-54. 
297 Demosthenes claims that he was the son of one of the Thirty Tyrants; Aeschines, however, claims that 
the man’s name was Xenodocus, and that he was a Macedonian (Aeschin. 2.4, 153-158). 
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bring out into the open an inner depravity kept hidden within the bounds of Athens.298  
Demosthenes’ emphasizes Aeschines’ immoral behavior by juxtaposing it with another 
sympotic story set in Macedonia.  In the latter tale, a Greek by the name of Satyrus 
successfully begs Philip to release two Olynthian women into Satyrus’ custody instead of 
selling them into slavery (Dem. 19.192-5).  The sympotic setting is thus used by the 
orators to illuminate a man’s social competency, which in turn provides a direct 
commentary on his inner worth.     
While stories about Macedonian symposia highlight drunkenness, drinking too 
little could also fall under suspicion.  Not drinking enough could give rise to accusations 
of hardness of character: thus Demosthenes complains that Philocrates accused him of 
being stubborn and stringent [δύστροπος καὶ δύσκολος] because he was a teetotaler 
(Dem. 6.30; cf. 19.46).  Both extremes show that what might have concerned the 
Athenians about over- or under-drinking was not so much the quantity of drink in and of 
itself as the inappropriate social responses which each extreme was presumed to elicit: 
drunks were prone to acts of ὑβρίς; the dry, such as Demosthenes, to severity.  In light of 
this discourse, the ambassadors’ praise of Philip’s drinking becomes further clarified.  
Philip’s good drinking behavior indicated his ability to maintain appropriate social 
interactions with others.       
Deriving political relevance from social activity, however, was no sure-fire 
argument.  It too was open to re-enterpretation by one’s opposition.  Thus Demosthenes,                                                         
298 Heavy drinking, such as Aeschines supposedly engaged in at Xenophron’s house, was also sometimes 
thought to reveal a man’s true nature: see W. Rösler, “Wine and Truth in the Greek Symposion,” in In Vino 
Veritas, eds. Oswyn Murray and Manuela Tecusan (Oxford: Alden Press, 1995), 106-112.  Symposia, as 
private, elite settings, were also particularly open to suspicion by the demos: see Fisher, “Syposiasts, Fish-
eaters, and Flatterers.” See also Ann Steiner, “Private and Public: Links between Symposion and Syssition 
in Fifth-Century Athens,” Classical Antiquity 21 (2002): 347-379, on the occurrence of elite symposiastic 
behaviors in public spaces.   
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for example, could brand the ambassadors gossip-mongers for discussing Philip’s 
drinking habits (Aeschin. 2.49-50).  An episode from Aeschines’ earlier speech Against 
Timarchus is particularly illuminating in this respect.  Aeschines complains of a recent 
altercation between himself and Demosthenes on the subject of a Macedonian banquet.  
The episode deserves note not only for its treatment of a Macedonian feast, but also for 
its complex layering of speech within speech:  
ὡς γὰρ τὰς ἐμὰς εὐθύνας βλάπτων, ἃς ὑπὲρ τῆς πρεσβείας μέλλω 
διδόναι, φησί με, ὅτ᾿αὐτὸς πρώην πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ 
παιδὸς ᾿Αλεξάνδρου διεξῄει, ὡς ἔν τῳ πότῳ [ἡμῶν] κιθαρίζοι καὶ 
λέγοι ῥήσεις τινὰς καὶ ἀντικρούσεις πρὸς ἕτερον παῖδα, καὶ περὶ 
τούτων ἃ δή ποτε αὐτὸς ἐτύγχανε γιγνώσκων πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν 
ἀπεφήνατο, οὐχ ὡς συμπρεσβευτήν, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς συγγενῆ τοῖς εἰς τὸν 
παῖδα σκώμμασιν ἀγανακτῆσαι.  ἐγὼ δ᾿ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ μὲν εἰκότως 
διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν οὐ διείλεγμαι, Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν εἰκότως διὰ τὴν 
τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπαινῶ·  ἐὰν δ᾿ ὁ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν τοῖς 
ἔργοις γένηται, οἷος νῦν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπαγγέλμασιν, ἀσφαλῆ καὶ 
ῥᾴριον τὸν καθ᾿ αὑτοῦ ποιήσει ἔπαινον. ἐπετίμησα δ᾿ἐν τῷ 
βουλευτηρίῳ Δημοσθένει οὐ παῖδα ἐκθεραπεύων, ἀλλ᾿ἐὰν τὰ 
τοιαῦτα ἀποδέχησθε, ὁμοίαν νομίζων τὴν πόλιν φανήσεσθαι τῇ 
τοῦ λέγοντος ἀκοσμίᾳ. 
For in order to harm my audit, which I am about to give concerning the 
embassy, he [Demosthenes] says that when, just lately, he was going on 
about the boy Alexander before the boule – talking about his playing on 
the cithara while we were drinking and reciting some speeches and 
debates with another boy – and when he was declaring whatever he 
happened to know about it to the boule, I  grew angry at the jokes 
concerning the boy not as befitted a member of the embassy but as befitted 
a relative.  It was not proper for me to discuss Alexander because of his 
youth, but I now properly praise Philip because of his auspicious words; 
and if he acts in deed towards us in accordance with his letters, he will 
make his own praise safe and easy. I found fault with Demosthenes in the 
bouleuterion not to flatter the boy, but because I thought that  if you 
approved of such things, the whole city would appear to equal the speaker 
in impropriety.299 (Aeschin. 1.168-9)                                                             
299 Alexander’s behavior in and of itself seems to be in keeping with Greek sympotic norms.  Youths at 
symposia might entertain the group with lyre-playing and moralizing songs, and recitation would 
presumably serve the similar purpose of showing a boy’s mastery of the rhetorical training he would need 
to take up his position as a (Greek) male.  See J. M. Bremmer,  “Adolescents, Symposion, and Pederasty,” 
in Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposion, ed. Oswyn Murray (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 135-
148 and Fredal, Rhetorical Action, 59-60.   
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Aeschines’ argument is predicated on the Athenians’ interest in Macedonian sympotic 
behavior as an important component of the debate concerning the peace treaty: 
Demosthenes’ original account of the Macedonian banquet took place before the boule, 
though in what specific context we do not know.300  It appears, at all events, that 
Demosthenes was making some sort of sexual joke aimed at Alexander, doubtless as a 
means of disparaging Philip and Macedonia as a whole.  In so doing he opened himself to 
the criticism of being a gossip, just as he himself had criticized the ambassadors for their 
character sketch of Philip (Aeschin. 2.49-50).  Aeschines’ critique of Demosthenes’ joke 
is made precisely on these grounds: he questions the relevance of the story and attempts 
to redirect the focus back to Philip and the peace process.  Like the ambassadors’ 
description of Philip, however, Demosthenes’ story had claim to immediate relevance as 
a tale that impugned the elite status of a member of the Macedonian royal family and, 
therefore, Macedonian social norms in general.301   
Aeschines’ rebuttal of Demosthenes’ story in the boule, as well as his narrative of 
the episode in the speech Against Timarchus, portrays Demosthenes as a typical boor 
who lacks refinement and learning [ἄμουσός τις οὗτος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος ἄνθρωπός 
ἐστι] (Aeschin. 1.167).  According to Aeschines, Demosthenes derives an inappropriate 
pleasure from Alexander’s performance and is wrong to put the boy on display before a 
group of grown men.  The boy’s age, Aeschines claims, ought to prevent his name and 
his actions from being bandied about in public.  By stressing Alexander’s young age – 
Aeschines calls him a παῖς five times over the course of the anecdote – he reinforces the 
                                                        
300 Demosthenes was a member of the boule in the year 347/6 (Aeschin. 3.62).   
301 On the role of unofficial reports in the workings of the Athenian democracy see Lewis, News and 
Society, ch. 4. 
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inappropriate nature of Demosthenes’ innuendo and seeks to re-establish Alexander’s 
status as an elite boy worthy of the same consideration as any proper Athenian youth.302         
Demosthenes, according to Aeschines’ account, in turn found fault with 
Aeschines’ disapproval on the grounds that it displayed a too-sensitive regard for 
Alexander’s character.  Given that Demosthenes seems to have been casting these 
aspersions with a view to his recent indictment of Aeschines for misconduct (Aeschin. 
1.168), it may be that his goal was to cast Aeschines’ over-sensitivity and bluster as the 
result of being bribed by Philip.  Demosthenes would employ a somewhat similar 
argument years later, insinuating that Aeschines was a born flatterer by accusing him of 
making too much of his relationship with the Macedonian royal family (Dem. 18.51).  In 
view of the rhetorical similarities between the two episodes, it is possible that Aeschines’ 
narrative in the Against Timarchus preserves an instance where Demosthenes attempted 
to point to Aeschines’ ‘fawning’ over the Macedonian royal family as proof of his 
corruption.  In any event, the episode as a whole shows how an account of a Macedonian 
banquet initially told with a view to Macedonian policy could quickly devolve into a 
personal argument.    
It thus becomes clear than in focusing their remarks on the main aspects of 
Philip’s character - his speaking ability, his appearance, and his social skills – the 
Athenian ambassadors were pursuing a path of inquiry that could have been viewed as 
highly relevant to Athenian public policy.  In painting Philip as a consummate speaker 
both pleasing to look at and adept in the social graces, the ambassadors sought to portray 
him as a trustworthy figure to their Athenian audience.  Indeed, Aeschines’ and the                                                         
302 Alexander’s propriety and the respect that was its due would have been particularly clear to an audience 
who had just been regailed with a laundry list of Timarchus’ youthful and not-so-youthful failings.    
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ambassadors’ treatment of Philip is comparable to the way they might have praised any 
Athenian orator.  They placed Philip within the self-same Athenian framework that their 
Athenian audience would have been used to using in judging their own speakers.   
To the portrait of a trustworthy Philip Aeschines’ narrative of 343/2 BCE adds a 
new layer of complexity.  By not only telling his audience what the ambassadors’ opinion 
of Philip was but also narrating the embassy in such a way as to show Philip speaking 
and acting in his own right,  Aeschines allows his audience to implement their own 
judgment in testing the ambassadors’ conclusions about Philip’s ἦθος against the Philip 
of his narrative.  Aeschines’ speech sets Philip on display before the jurors: Philip 
engages in a conversation with the Athenian ambassadors comparable to, if somewhat 
more sedate than, a debate in the ekklesia.  Setting Philip on display as well as giving the 
ambassadors’ opinion of him served Aeschines’ immediate ends in the trial: showing that 
the ambassadors’ had come to the same conclusion about Philip as the Athenian demos 
itself would have come to had it been able to interact with Philip face-to-face, Aeschines 
absolves himself and the other ambassadors from wrongdoing or even simple stupidity.  
Any Athenian, Aeschines’ narrative suggests, would have thought Philip trustworthy 
upon meeting him; the fault for the Peace therefore lies with the collective and not with 
the individual ambassadors. Thus Aeschines’ Philip is above all a familiar Athenian 
entity, one that the Athenians are capable of seeing and judging for themselves.  This 
Philip differs radically from Demosthenes’ barbarian king who requires the mediation of 
a wise advisor to be properly understood by the Athenians.    
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Demosthenes’ Philip 
In the last chapter I explored how Demosthenes’ early anti-Philip speeches drew 
from older paradigms of the Athenian enemy – both Spartan and Persian – to present the 
conflict between Athens and Macedonia in dramatic, oppositional terms.  I further argued 
that Demosthenes located himself within this schema as the wise advisor able to mediate 
between Macedonian foreignness and Athenian understanding.  The experience and 
stature Demosthenes gained during the peace process and over the course of the next 
fifteen years strengthened his position in the polis and, as we will see, enabled him to 
manipulate cultural norms with greater freedom.  More than the wise warner who 
mediates between the outside world and Athens, in his later speeches, culminating in On 
the Crown, Demosthenes re-imagines himself as a leader taking part in a cosmic contest 
against Philip.  For, if Aeschines and the ambassadors attempted to bring Philip ‘to 
Athens’ – that is, to make him familiar and thereby non-threatening to the Athenians – 
Demosthenes attempted to do exactly the opposite: to silence and alienate Philip, thereby 
magnifying the threat that Macedonia supposedly posed.  Instead of being created in the 
eminently Athenian role of an orator, Demosthenes’ Philip becomes the ultimate 
foreigner.  Concomitantly, the more alien the threat from Philip became, the more the 
Athenians stood in need of a Demosthenes to lead them onto the path of victory.  In 
magnifying Philip’s power Demosthenes validated his own privileged role as the wise 
leader and representative of Athens in the political battle against Macedonia.  
Demosthenes’ uniquely strong leadership was acceptable within a democratic context if 
and only if the idea of Philip as an extraordinary, alien threat was first accepted.  
Demosthenes’ ἦθος and his characterization of Philip are thus dependent on each other.  
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The following section traces the evolution of Demosthenes’ presentation of Philip from 
barbarian king to other-worldly threat.  I will then argue that this escalation in Philip’s 
alienness also marks Demosthenes’ gradual assumption of more and more power over the 
deliberative process as the only Athenian able to counteract the Macedonian threat.    
In the earlier deliberative speeches Demosthenes had discussed the conflict with 
Philip as a public, collective struggle between the king, who acted as the representative of 
the Macedonian state, and the Athenian demos.  In the later forensic speeches, 
Demosthenes focuses on the personal struggle between himself as leader of the Athenians 
and Philip as leader of the Macedonians.  In some ways, Demosthenes’ ἀγών with 
Philip even replaces the public struggle as it becomes evident that the Athenian demos 
stands no chance of victory unless Demosthenes himself is victorious.303  Demosthenes 
and Philip are thus engaged in a private political duel.  The serious nature of their 
struggle is emphasized through Demosthenes’ use of traditionally agonistic 
terminology.304  Thus in On the Crown Demosthenes presents an account of his conflict 
with Philip in the following manner:  
καὶ μὴν τὸ διαφθαρῆναι χρήμασιν ἢ μὴ κεκράτηκα  Φίλιππον· 
ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ὠνούμενος νενίκηκε τὸν λαβόντα, ἐὰν πρίηται, 
οὕτως ὁ μὴ λαβὼν {καὶ διαφθαρεὶς} νενίκηκε τὸν ὠνούμενον.  
ὥστε ἀήττητος ἡ πόλις τὸ κατ ̓ ἐμέ.   
And in the matter of being bribed with money or not I defeated Philip; for 
just as the one looking to buy defeats the one taking the offer if the sale 
comes through, just so the one refusing the offer [and not getting bribed] 
has defeated the one looking to buy [him].  So the city remained 
undefeated because of me.  (Dem. 18.247)                                                         
303 This is clearer in On the Crown than in the On the False Embassy. 
304 Slipage between politicial and military language is common in narratives of both kinds of conflicts: see 
Roisman, Rhetoric of Manhood, 142-5; also Ryan Balot, “Courage in the Democratic Polis,” Classical 
Quarterly 54 (2004): 406-423, on the way Athenian ideology transferred courage from the military to the 
civic sphere of action.  Hyperides’ Against Diondas 136r, as well, translates the military contest between 
Philip and Athens into the political world of the courtroom and thus testifies to the close ideological 
parallels between military and political conflict.   
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The king and the politician are locked in a fierce personal combat.  The metaphor 
Demosthenes employs of the prospective buyer further clarifies the personal immediacy 
of the ἀγών.  The use of market imagery might have also engendered a sense of 
familiarity in the Athenian audience, who would have had to navigate the ἀγορά 
themselves and take part in business transactions on a regular basis.305  Notably, 
Demosthenes does not use the political terminology of the courtroom or the ekklesia, as 
do Aeschines and Hyperides, in discussing his ἀγών with Philip.  The fact that he does 
not do so fits Demosthenes’ general rejection of Philip’s ability to speak and portrayal as 
an orator.  Demosthenes, in short, presents his confrontation with Philip as an extra-
rhetorical conflict of two individuals, each one of whom is looking out for their own 
private interests.   
Demosthenes sought to repudiate the construction of Philip as an orator by the 
pro-peace politicians.   Where Aeschines crafted a Philip who spoke and thus took part in 
a rhetorical contest against the ambassadors, Demosthenes posits a king who rejects open 
communication with Athens.  Remarkably, he portrays the suppression of Philip’s voice 
as the king’s own choice: Philip, according to Demosthenes, realized when the 
negotiations over the Peace began that he could not win a competition of words against 
his Athenian opponents.  Demosthenes reenacts Philip’s decision to use covert trickery 
before the Athenian jury as an imaginary inner monologue by the king: 
ᾔδει δὴ σαφῶς, οἶμαι, τοῦθ ̓ ὅτι νῦν, ἡνίκ ̓ ἐστασίαζε μὲν αὐτῷ τὰ 
Θετταλῶν, καὶ Φεραῖοι πρῶτον οὐ συνηκολούθουν, ἐκρατοῦντο δὲ 
Θηβαῖοι καὶ μάχην ἥττηντο καὶ τρόπαιον ἀπ ̓ αὐτῶν εἱστήκει, οὐκ 
ἔνεστι παρελθεῖν, εἰ βοηθήσεθ ̓ ὑμεῖς, οὐδ ̓, ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ, χαιρήσει, εἰ                                                         
305 Demosthenes’ representation of his immediate struggle against Aeschines is similarly fiercely agonistic: 
see D. Ochs, “Demosthenes: Superior Artiste and Victorious Monomachist,” in Theory, Text, Context: 
Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory, ed. Christopher Lyle Johnstone (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996), 140-3. 
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μή τις τέχνη προσγενήσεται.  πῶς οὖν μήτε ψεύσωμαι φανερῶς, 
μήτ᾿ ἐπιορκεῖν δόξας πάνθ᾿ ἃ βούλομαι διαπράξωμαι; πῶς; οὕτως, 
ἂν ᾿Αθηναίων τινὰς εὕρω τοὺς ᾿Αθηναίους ἐξαπατήσοντας· ταὺτης 
γὰρ οὐκέτ᾿ ἐγὼ τῆς αἰσχύνης κληρονομῶ.     
[Philip] clearly knew, I think, that now, when the Thessalians were 
embroiled in civil disputes, the Pheraians in particular were not falling in 
line, and the Thebans were beaten - they had lost a battle and a trophy was 
set up over them – that he could not invade if you sent help, nor, should he 
attempt it, would he have any success, unless some trick were to be used.  
“How, then, can I accomplish everything I want without openly lying or 
appearing to perjure myself? How?  In this way – if I find some Athenians 
to deceive the Athenians; this way I will not be touched by the stigma.” 
(Dem. 19.320)  
Philip’s silence is explained by his fear perjuring himself: he remains silent so that 
Athenian traitors can speak, and then take the blame, on his behalf (Dem. 19.68).  Philip’s 
silence is consistent with Demosthenes’ presentation of him as a barbarian and a 
monarch, divorced from all things Athenian and therefore also lacking the capacity for 
persuasive speech which was the sine qua non of Athenian democratic participation.306 
Indeed, Demosthenes’ use of oratio recta in this passage ironically highlights Philip’s 
desire for silence: what better time to have Philip ‘speak’ before the Athenians than at the 
very moment he decides to hide his voice from the Athenian public for fear of betraying 
himself?307   By revealing Philip’s voice at this particular moment, Demosthenes points to 
his own ingenuity in ‘forcing’ Philip to ‘betray’ himself to the demos.  Only 
Demosthenes has the power to make Philip ‘speak’ - even if the king doesn’t want to.  By                                                         
306 See Heath, Talking Greeks, 192-201, on silence as the marker for barbarian otherness.  In the same 
manner, particular speech patterns were thought to characterize particular character types: see Nancy 
Worman, The Cast of Character: Style in Greek Literature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), who 
traces a particularly “Odyssean” and “Helenic” type of speech through various portrayals of Odysseus and 
Helen.  
307 Philip’s thoughts in oratio recta continue at 19.323 and 19.324, as he outlines the rest of his plan for 
world domination; nowhere else in the speech does he speak in oratio recta.  On Demosthenes’ use of 
oratio recta more generally see Bers, Speech in Speech, 149-217; Jeremy Trevett, “The Use of Direct 
Speech by the Attic Orators,” in Lo Spettacolo delle voci, eds. Francesco de Martino and Alan H. 
Sommerstein (Bari: Levante, 1995), highlights oratio recta as the stylistic choice of the individual rhetor. 
René Nünlist, “Speech within Speech in Menander,” in The Language of Greek Comedy, ed. Andreas Willi 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), studies the same phenomenon in Menander. 
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recreating the king’s initial decision to bribe his way into power instead of losing in a 
rhetorical contest, Demosthenes argues both for Philip’s essential otherness and for the 
necessity of his own acumen in combating the king’s nefarious schemes (19.315-319).     
The rest of Demosthenes’ speech On the False Embassy is built on the premise 
that Philip desires to keep silent.  Philip hardly ever speaks in his own voice, and never 
again in oratio recta, as he did above; rather, his method of persuasion is the bribe, a 
necessarily clandestine affair opposed to the openness of speech.308  The political duel 
Demosthenes thus opens up between himself and Philip is paradigmatically opposed to 
that Aeschines envisioned between Philip and the ambassadors in his speech On the 
Embassy.  Demosthenes replaces Aeschines’ battle of wit and word with underhanded 
bribes and trickery.  For Demosthenes, the contest between king and politician hinges not 
on the better argument but on the bribe, offered by the (silent) king, and either accepted 
or (verbally) rejected by the politician.  This monetary contest between king and 
politician is, for example, articulated in the speech On the False Embassy when the 
Thebans prevail over Philip by refusing to accept his bribe; instead, they ask the king to 
redirect his ‘kindness’ to the welfare of their city (19.139-41).  Demosthenes similarly 
wins a victory by asking Philip, who had attempted to bribe him, to use that same money 
toward the ransom of some Athenian prisoners then in Macedon (19.168).309  In the same 
                                                        
308 On accusations of bribery see Joseph Roisman, Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006), ch. 6; F. Harvey, “Dona Ferentes: Some Aspects of Bribery in Greek 
Politics,” in Crux: Essays in Greek History Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix on His 75th Birthday, eds. 
Paul Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (London: Duckworth, 1985); and Douglas McDowell, “Athenian Laws 
about Bribery,” RIDA 30 (1983): 57-78.  On allegations of bribery directly more specifically against Philip 
see Ryder, “Diplomatic Skills of Philip II” and Lynette Mitchell, Greeks Bearing Gifts: The Public Use of 
Private Relationships in the Greek World, 453-323 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
181-6.  
309 Philip had attempted to give the gift openly as a mark of hospitality to the ambassadors, but 
Demosthenes had refused it; he claims, however, that Philip had then privately sent that money about to the 
other ambassadors.  When Demosthenes then asked the king to employ his ‘gift’ to ransom the prisoners, 
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vein Demosthenes recounts an episode in which the actor Satyrus was able to free the two 
daughters of Apollophanes from slavery by confronting Philip publicly through speech 
(19.193-5).  Demosthenes’ narrative offers proof that those who combat Philip with 
speech come out victorious against him.  The king can only achieve his ends by bribery, 
not by persuasion.      
Philip’s desire to avoid open debate stems from a fear of harming his public 
image.  So, for example, the reasons for Philip’s concession to Satyrus lie in the public 
opinion of those around him:  
ὡς δ᾿ ἀκοῦσαι τοὺς παρόντας ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ, τοσοῦτον κρότον 
καὶ θόρυβον καὶ ἔπαινον παρὰ πάντων γενέσθαι ὥστε τὸν 
Φίλιππον παθεῖν τι καὶ δοῦναι. 
When the guests at the symposium heard [Satyrus’ request], there arose 
such applause, cheering, and praise among everyone that Philip was 
moved and granted the request. (Dem. 19.195) 
It is the guests’ reaction to Satyrus that finally persuades Philip to give in to the request, 
superseding even the eminently powerful motive of revenge – as Demosthenes states, the 
Apollophanes whose daughters Satyrus saved was the same man who had killed Philip’s 
brother Alexander (Dem. 19.195).310  Looking back to Philip’s initial decision to stay 
silent, here too he is reluctant to lie ‘openly’ [πῶς οὖν μήτε ψεύσωμαι φανερῶς] 
(Dem. 19.320) because he fears being caught in a lie: better have others do the dirty 
work, and run the risk, for him (Dem. 19.323).  Even Philip’s letter to the Athenians,                                                                                                                                                                      
Philip could not admit that the money had been given in secret to the bribed ambassadors, and was forced 
to act as if it was still in his possession.   
310 Revenge, particularly in such a case of sibling homicide, was a natural motive. We might imagine that 
Demosthenes’ Athenian audience would probably have felt some sympathy for Philip’s loss and would 
have perceived his desire for revenge as eminently reasonable - although one wonders whether taking 
revenge on a man’s now orphan daughters would have been perceived as socially acceptable.  On revenge 
in Athenian  ideology see Fiona McHardy, Revenge in Athenian Culture (London: Duckworth, 2008); 
Werner Riess, “Private Violence and State Control,” in Sécurité Collective et Ordre Public dans les 
Sociétés Anciennes (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 2008), 49-94; Gabriel Herman, “Athenian Beliefs about 
Revenge: Problems and Methods,” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 46 (2000): 7-27.      
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according to Demosthenes, had to be written secretly by Aeschines lest Philip perjure 
himself (19.36-38).311  Thus Demosthenes portrays a Philip who is hyperconscious of 
others’ judgments about him.  The king is constrained to silence lest he disclose 
something of his sinister motives.   
Demosthenes’ portrayal of Philip as a silent, secretive figure is not confined to his 
forensic debates against Aeschines.  He also rejects Philip’s speaking ability in Philippic 
II, composed in 344 BC in the hopes of inciting the Athenians to abandon the Peace of 
Philocrates.312  The evidence of this speech reflects the same interest in Philip’s speaking 
ability during this time period which we have already seen in Aeschines’ and 
Demosthenes’ forensic debates.   Philippic II thus supports my conclusion that Philip’s 
speaking ability was a primary concern in the debate over the Peace of Philocrates.313  
Demosthenes’ argument is additionally important because it showcases an amalgam of 
themes from his earlier deliberative discourse and the later forensic debates:  
ὑμεῖς οἱ καθήμενοι, ὡς μὲν ἂν εἴποιτε δικαίους λόγους καὶ λέγοντος 
ἄλλου συνείητε, ἄμεινον Φιλίππου παρεσκεύασθε, ὡς δὲ κωλύσαιτ᾿ 
ἂν ἐκεῖνον πράττειν ταῦτα ἐφ᾿ ὧν ἐστι νῦν, παντελῶς ἀργῶς 
ἔχετε.  You seated here, you are better prepared than Philip to make just 
arguments and to comprehend a speaker, but you are completely idle when 
it comes to preventing him from doing what he is about. (Dem. 6.3) 
Demosthenes returns to the λόγος/ἔργον typology from his earlier deliberative 
discourse, which was, as I have argued, a familiar topos for politicians bent on chastising                                                         
311 Aeschines would reject this claim by asking the audience whether it was possible that neither Philip nor 
his advisors were capable of writing a letter for themselves (Aeschin. 2.124-5).   
312 On the historical context of the speech see M. M. Markle, “Demosthenes’ Second Philippic. A Valid 
Policy for the Athenians Against Philip,” Antichthon 15 (1981): 62-85.  For a literary analysis see Wooten, 
Comentary on Demosthenes’ Philippic I, 123-36. 
313 Sealey, Demosthenes and his Time, 171-2, also notes the occurrence of ἐπανόρθωσις [a setting right] 
in Philippic II in Demosthenes’ characterization of the policy of his opponents with respect to the peace 
agreement.  Sealey argues that this may be a reflection of the pro-peace politicians’ slogan during this 
period.   
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the Athenian populace (see above, pp. 85-96). What is new here is that Demosthenes 
combines this censure with the claim that the Athenians are better at debate than Philip.  
Again, the argument that Philip is a poor speaker is consistent with his characterization in 
the Demosthenic corpus as a foreigner and a monarch.   Demosthenes rejects the notion 
that Philip could be conversant with the norms of rhetoric as understood by the 
Athenians.  The king’s ignorance of the Athenian deliberative system provides 
Demosthenes with the grounds to reject even the possibility of peace between Philip and 
the Athenian community.  While Demosthenes’ argument concerning Philip’s lack of 
skill in debate is readily comprehensible in and of itself, it takes on added value when 
viewed as part of a larger Athenian debate over Philip’s speech during this period.  
Philip’s ability to speak was a central element in the debate over the Peace of Philocrates. 
Demosthenes points to Philip’s silence in order to characterize the king as a foreign entity 
with whom productive debate was impossible.        In the aftermath of the Peace of Philocrates, the Athenians were left much worse 
off than they had hoped.  With Phocis destroyed and the Spartans voluntarily excluding 
themselves from panhellenic affairs, Athens appeared to be at the mercy of the Thebans, 
newly bolstered by Philip’s forces of Macedonia.  Moreover, the legitimacy of Philip’s 
meddling in Greek affairs was secured by the Amphictyons decision to give the votes of 
the Phocians to Philip.314  The change in the king’s role in Greek affairs is marked by an 
escalation in Demosthenes’ vitriol against Macedonia.  The latter Philippics not only 
emphasize Philip’s role as an outsider and a barbarian (Dem. 6.25; 9.30-1) on the Persian 
model (Dem. 6.11), but also magnify his power to almost inhuman proportions.  He is 
pervasive as a disease (Dem. 9.29) and as unlooked for as a hailstorm (Dem. 9.33).  Philip                                                         
314 See the Third Sacred War and its aftermath see above, pp. 60-64. 
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becomes a threat to the whole world, Greek and barbarian alike (Dem. 9.27); he is worse 
than just any barbarian (Dem. 9.31).  Demosthenes’ magnification of Philip’s otherness 
coincides with his own growing importance on the Athenian political scene.315  As I will 
show in the rest of the chapter, Demosthenes’ rhetoric concerning Philip served as a foil 
for his own self-image as the foremost orator of his day.   
Demosthenes 18.66-67 
Demosthenes’ articulation of the struggle between himself and Philip comes to a 
head in his speech On the Crown which was delivered in 330 BCE, eight years after the 
fateful battle of Chaeronea and six years after Philip’s death and Aeschines’ indictment 
of Ctesiphon on the charge of paranomia.316 Demosthenes’ speech on Ctesiphon’s behalf 
is much more concerned with what it means to be an Athenian involved in politics than 
with the actual legal issue over the crown.317  I begin with a key passage that elaborates 
on a topos we have seen Demosthenes use twice before, once at Against Aristocrates 112 
and again at Olynthiac II 15-6 (see above, pp. 78-80; 119-126).  This passage is 
particularly useful because it packs within it all the various strands of Demosthenes’ 
thought on Philip that I have been tracing thus far.  Teasing out these strands will show 
how Demosthenes came to understand Philip’s character after the king’s death as well as 
illuminate Demosthenes’ stance on his own career as an anti-Macedonian politician.   
                                                        
315 See Sealey, Demosthenes and his Time, 174-93, on Demosthenes’ activity during this period (344-339 
BCE). 
316 For historical accounts of the period see Worthington, Philip II, ch. 11; Harris, Aeschines and Athenian 
Politics, ch. 7; Sealey, Demosthenes and his Time, ch. 8.  On Demosthenes’ actions between 338 and 330 
see particularly G. L. Cawkwell, “The Crowning of Demosthenes,” Classical Quarterly 19 (1969): 163-
180.  On the legal background of the speech see also Yunis, Demosthenes. On the Crown, 7-17. 
317 Yunis, “Politics as Literature,” has brilliantly argued that ‘the facts’ of the case are of little concern to 
Demosthenes, and they apparently were of as little concern to his audience, who overwhelming voted for 
Ctesiphon’s acquital.  If the trial had only been about the legality of Ctesiphon’s proposal, then Aeschines 
ought to have won.    
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To briefly recount, the topos at its most basic, as at Against Aristocrates 112, 
argued that Philip is faced with a choice between a life of constant struggle and a life of 
peace.  In Olynthiac II, where the topos was somewhat expanded, Demosthenes presented 
Philip as a king [Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς] choosing to strive for good repute [δόξη] and 
honor [φιλοτιμͅία] instead of a life of safety [τοῦ ζῆν ἀσφαλῶς].  As I had argued (see 
above, pp. 120-125), Demosthenes used language reminiscent of the funeral oration to 
create tension between Philip’s role as monarch and the democratic ideals to which he 
aspires: as king, Philip cannot participate in an ἀγών over glory, as this struggle is 
bound to a democratic context.  Philip’s quest therefore causes debilitating strife between 
himself and his subjects rather than the communal ennoblement which heroic death 
engenders in the democratic polis.   In On the Crown, Demosthenes elaborates the topos 
still further.  He changes focus from the effects that Philip’s quest for honor has in his 
kingdom to the consequences this desire has for his own person, as an individual.   That 
is, Demosthenes points to the physical toll which  Philip’s desire for martial glory has on 
his own body, marrying this new focus with the contrast between Philip and the Athenian 
heroic dead already present in Olynthiac II.  Demosthenes introduces the passage as the 
view of the political situation he had taken as a young man just beginning his career.  
Thus Demosthenes frames the topos with the impact it had on the trajectory of his own 
career.  As such, the passage also invites a comparison of Demosthenes’ and Philip’s 
policies and their  roles within their respective communities.  I begin by unpacking 
Demosthenes’ presentation of Philip before turning to the larger question of the way 
Demosthenes’ view of Philip affects his own self-presentation as an Athenian politician. 
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 Demosthenes has just concluded a brief account of the political situation of 
Greece before Chaeronea (Dem. 18.60-68).  The present section begins as Demosthenes 
turns dramatically to address Aeschines: 
Τί τὴν πόλιν, Αἰσχίνη, προσῆκε ποιεῖν ἀρχὴν καὶ τυραννίδα τῶν  
̔Ελλήνων ὁρῶσαν ἑαυτῷ κατασκευαζόμενον Φίλιππον; ἢ τί τὸν 
σύμβουλον ἔδει λέγειν ἢ γράφειν τὸν  Ἀθήνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο 
πλεῖστον διαφέρει), ὃς συνῄδειν μὲν ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου μέχρι 
τῆς ἡμέρας ἀφ ̓ ἧς αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα ἀνέβην, ἀεὶ περὶ πρωτείων 
καὶ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης ἀγωνιζομένην τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ πλείω καὶ 
χρήματα καὶ σώματα ἀνηλωκυῖαν ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας καὶ τῶν πᾶσι 
συμφερόντων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων  Ἑλλήνων ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν ἀνηλώκασιν 
ἕκαστοι, ἑώρων δ ̓ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον, πρὸς ὃν ἦν ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών, 
ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένον, τὴν κλεῖν 
κατεαγότα, τὴν χεῖρα, τὸ σκέλος πεπηρωμένον, πᾶν ὅ τι 
βουληθείη μέρος ἡ τύχη τοῦ σώματος παρελέσθαι, τοῦτο 
προϊέμενον, ὥστε τῷ λοιπῷ μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης ζῆν; 
What, Aeschines, ought the city to have done when it saw Philip scheming 
to obtain kingship and tyranny over the Greeks?  And what ought a 
councilor of the Athenians to say or to propose (for these are very 
different) who saw his fatherland always fighting for primacy and honor 
[τιμῆς] and good repute [δόξης] from the beginning until the day he 
himself rose upon the speakers’ platform, and having spent more money 
and lives [σώματα] for the sake of love of honor [φιλοτιμίας] and the 
common good than any of the other Hellenes have spent on their own 
behalf; and who saw Philip himself, against whom was our contest, having 
his eye stricken out, his collar bone broken, his arm and his leg maimed – 
everything which fortune might wish to take from his body [σώματος] - 
for kingship and sovereignty; giving this up, so as to live for the rest of his 
life with honor [τιμῆς] and good repute [δόξης]? (Dem. 18.66-67)   
Unlike Demosthenes’ use of the topos in Olynthiac II, here Philip’s life choices are 
overtly juxtaposed with those of the Athenian forefathers.  Philip’s subjects, on the other 
hand, are no longer of any importance: Philip is competing for honor with the Athenians 
themselves, rather than against other Macedonians.318 The closeness of the Athenians’ 
and Philip’s goals is emphasized by the repetition of τιμή and δόξα in Demosthenes’                                                         
318 Hearking back the past glory of Athens functions at the same time to goad the Athenian audience and to 
assuage their pride.  Demosthenes will later argue, of course, that the Athenians “took back” the honor that 
was rightfully theirs at Chaeronea (Dem. 18.199-205); Philip did not win this ἀγών after all.  On 
Demosthenes’ use of the past in On the Crown see Yunis, “Politics as Literature.”  
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account of their aspirations.319  Indeed, it may almost appear that Philip’s choice of a life 
of struggle is validated by the analogy – after all, he is similar to the Athenian forefathers 
in having chosen painful toil in return for a good reputation, a pursuit which is 
incontestably noble and, as such, is tirelessly lauded in the rhetoric of the funeral 
oration.320  Nevertheless, the consequences of the quest for military glory are vastly 
different for Philip and the Athenians.  The outcome of Philip’s attempt at realizing an 
‘Athenian’ ideal shows that his participation in the ἀγών is illegitimate.  As in Olynthiac 
II, it is Philip’s role as monarch that prevents him from properly pursuing this democratic 
ideal.       Demosthenes focuses attention on the physical results of the contest to show how 
Philip’s ostensibly laudable desire for martial renown exacerbates his otherness.  
Demosthenes’ emphasis on the body [σώματα / σώματος] invites the audience to 
assess the physical toll exacted on the Athenians and Philip: where Athens sacrifices 
citizens in the quest for good repute, Philip sacrifices his own body parts.  Thus the 
physical state of the Athenians’ bodies merit no remark; like images of the dead, we must 
think of them as unblemished and youthful.321   Philip’s body, on the other hand, is 
mangled, disabled, and ugly.  Indeed, by rights Philip ought to be dead: according to the 
heroic ideal only the ultimate sacrifice of death on the battlefield can grant the hero his 
                                                        
319 See also Demosthenes’ reflections on the Thebans’ lack of τιμή and δόξα at Dem. 5.21. 
320 On Athenian predecessors as models for the choice of glory over death see for example Thuc. 2.43.4-6 
and Dem. 60.12.  Here, as in Philippic I, Philip has somehow usurped – or at least attempted to usurp - the 
Athenians’ place as inheritor of the forefathers’ example: he is the one looking at the Athenians of old for 
moral guidance, even though it is the Athenians of Demosthenes’ day who are constantly confronted with 
visual reminders of their forefathers’ virtue (Dem. 18.68).  There is an uncomfortable level of 
“Athenianness” in Philip’s self-fashioining which, Demosthenes argues, the Athenians must mitigate by 
taking back their ancestral virtues for themselves.  
321 Mutilating the bodies of the dead was taboo: see Lawrence Tritle, “Hector’s Body: Mutilation of the 
Dead in Ancient Greece and Vietnam,” Ancient History Bulletin 11 (1997): 129-133; Charles Segal, The 
theme of the Mutilation of the Corpse in the Iliad (Leiden: Brill, 1971), ch. 2.   
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ultimate wish for undying renown.  Athens was able to properly discharge this exchange 
by giving up σώματα for glory.  The exchange of death for honor is an impossibility, 
however, for Philip: he cannot die if he is to achieve his goals, since in a monarchy 
neither his glory nor the power with which it is synonymous will redound to the credit of 
the Macedonian state at large after his death.322  There is an imbalance, therefore, in 
Philip’s attempted exchange of his body for glory.  The sense that  Philip is delusional in 
his pursuit is only heightened when Demosthenes reminds his audience that “such 
ambition” [τοσαύτην μεγαλοψυχίαν] as Philip’s comes from Pella, “a small and 
insignificant place” [χωρίῳ ἀδόξῳ τότε γε ὄντι καὶ μικρῷ] – his ambition is better 
suited, the orator implies, to Athens and her glorious history (18.68).  The juxtaposition 
of Philip’s grand ideas with his rightful place in life are indissolubly at odds.  Just so, he 
has no place in the ἀγών over honor.  In attempting to achieve a heroic ideal that is not 
his to achieve, Philip has become a kind of living dead and the ultimate perversion of the 
hero.323   
How is the polis, and particularly the councilor of the polis, to react to Philip’s 
unnatural pursuit of the heroic ideal?  These are the two immediate questions which 
frame Demosthenes’ description of Philip in the passage above (Dem. 18.66).   The 
contest against Philip is thus posed as a double one, featuring both a public struggle 
between Philip and Athens and a personal struggle between Philip and the politician.  The 
two contests are closely associated.  The critical nature of the conflict between Philip and 
                                                        
322 This is clear as well in Olynthiac II, as Demosthenes explicitly states that Philip’s subjects are weary of 
constant warfare since they do not get any share of honor [φιλοτιμία] in return (2.16).   We might imagine 
that Philip’s progeny would succeed to Philip’s power upon his death, but hereditary succession is 
curiously absent in Demosthenes’ portrayal of the Macedonian monarchy.   
323 Self-mutilation was most prominently viewed as an act of madness: so Oedipus’s blinding is treated as 
an act of madness (Soph. OT 1251-1312), as is the self-mutilation of Attis (Cat. 63).    
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Demosthenes in determining the outcome of Athens’ war against Macedonia will become 
the justification for the politician’s outsized role within the polity. Demosthenes presents 
an understanding of his own subsequent policy proposals, as well as the Athenians’ 
actions, as a response to this new and unnatural threat posed by Philip.  Demosthenes 
justifies his own gargantuan role within the polis by pointing to Philip’s power as sole 
ruler.  In the final analysis, Demosthenes’ ἦθος in the Crown speech is dependent on his 
characterization of Philip.   
Leader of the Polis  
I have noted previously that Demosthenes’ self-fashioning has long been 
understood as the orator’s engagement with a Periclean, or elite, model of leadership (see 
above, pp. 92-93).324  This idea essentially turns on two related points of congruity: first, 
Demosthenes’ and Pericles’ ability to instruct, and even criticize, the demos; and second 
the overwhelming strength of their leadership roles - to the point that, as Thucycides put 
it, “the democracy existed in name only, and was in reality the rule of one man” 
[ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή] 
(Thuc. 2.65.9).325  The locus classicus for the claim that Demosthenes’ ἦθος presents a 
style of leadership modeled on that which Thucydides ascribes to Pericles is 
Demosthenes’ account of the meeting after Philip’s capture of Elatea at Dem. 18.169-79.  
The passage describes Demosthenes as the only man able to help the city through that 
crisis.  He has just proposed that the Athenians send an embassy to the Thebans in order                                                         
324 Plut. Dem. 6.5, 9.2, 14.3; see also schol. ad Dem. 5.12.  For modern scholarship see for example 
Gottfried Mader, “Dramatizing Didaxis: aspects of Demosthenes’ ‘Periclean’ project,” Classical Philology 
102 (2007): 155-179 and Montgomery, Way to Chaeronea, 27.   
325 These two points are not the same, though they are naturally closely linked: the first point exclusively 
concerns the relationship between the rhetor and the demos; the second concerns the “three-cornered” 
dialogue between orator, opposing orators, and demos.  See Yunis, Taming Democracy, 247-268 and 
Mader, “Dramatizing Didaxis.”    
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to convince them to join Athens in the upcoming war against Philip; having recounted the 
substance of his own speech, Demosthenes continues:  
Σύνεπαινεσάντων δὲ πάντων καὶ οὐδενὸς επόντος ἐναντίον οὐδέν, 
οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ, οὐδ ̓ ἔγραψα μέν, οὐκ 
ἐπρέσβευσα δέ, οὐδ ̓ ἐπρέσβευσα μέν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δὲ Θηβαίους, ἀλλ ̓ 
ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς διὰ πάντων ἄχρι τῆς τελευτῆς διεξῆλθον, καὶ ἔδωκ ̓ 
ἐμαυτὸν ὑμῖν ἁπλῶς εἰς τοὺς περιεστηκότας τῇ πόλει κινδύνους. 
Everybody praised [my speech] and nobody spoke anything against it. I 
didn’t speak without making a motion; I didn’t make a motion without 
going on the embassy; I didn’t go on the embassy without persuading the 
Thebans – from the beginning to the end I saw everything through, and I 
ranged myself against the dangers surrounding the city on your behalf.  
(Dem. 18.179)  Demosthenes presents his audience with a moment of perfect consensus in the ekklesia 
in which he has articulated a suggestion none can contest. Moreover, the orator has not 
only taken control of debate in the ekklesia; critically, he has taken control of the whole 
political process, both speech and the action that follows.  He not only proposes to send 
an embassy to Thebes; he himself goes to Thebes and sees that the embassy meets with 
success.  The normal processes of democratic government are streamlined into a seamless 
movement carried out “from beginning to end” by one man - Demosthenes.326  
Everything revolves around Demosthenes’ actions – indeed, his actions stand in for those 
of the Athenian people.   
Harvey Yunis has recently argued that Demosthenes’ self-presentation goes even 
further than the Thucydidean version of Pericles in its rejection of any nonconformance 
whatsoever with the leader’s policy.  He suggests that Plato’s Pericles may in fact be a 
                                                        
326 As discussed by Ober, Mass and Elite, concensus [ὁμόνοια] was a democratic ideal constantly at odds 
with that other democratic ideal, freedom of debate [ἰσηγορία]: see particularly 72-3; 295-9.  Thus it is 
important for Demosthenes to stress that Aeschines did have the opportunity to contradict Demosthenes’ 
plan at this ekklesia if he had wanted to.  
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closer model for Demosthenes.327  Seeing such an elite thinker as Plato as a source for 
Demosthenic political ideology raises an intriguing issue: if we are to imagine 
Demosthenes articulating an elite model of democratic leadership – and I think we clearly 
must328 – then the question arises how such statements were to be successfully articulated 
before a non-elite audience with vastly different ideas about the relative roles of the 
demos and the orator.  In particular, normative democratic ideology imagined the 
speaker, the ὁ βουλόμενος, as an average individual, whose value stems from his ability 
to articulate the will of the demos; additionally, it is up to the demos to follow through on 
the proposals it has adopted.   Demosthenes’ vision of himself taking over the democratic 
process in toto – even if this were on behalf and with the concent of the people – presents 
a vision of leadership, and of the speaker’s role, almost antithetical to that of the 
normative democratic ideology.   
There is a tension inherent in ascribing to Demosthenes a Thucydidean-Periclean 
orientation, and even more so a Platonic bent, which has not been fully acknowledged.  
Yunis seems to see a solution to this tension in Demosthenes’ argument that he was the 
most knowledgeable and most-experienced politician on that fateful day, and thus the 
only one who was capable of creating a successful policy (Dem. 18.170-2).329  Once the 
audience had bought into Demosthenes’ vision of himself as the best and most 
knowledgeable policy-maker, then it would be only reasonable for them to also buy into 
the argument that his policy was summarily agreed upon by the demos.  Yet while 
                                                        
327 See Yunis, Taming Democracy, 276-7.    
328 Although Jeff Miller, “Warning the Demos: Political Communication with a Democratic Audience in 
Demosthenes,” History of Political Thought 23 (2002): 401-417, has argued that in articulating such 
models Demosthenes was actually trying to counter traditional elite critiques (see particularly p. 403); his 
proof, however, seems too weak to be ultimately convincing and he appears unaware of Yunis’ argument. 
329 Yunis, Taming Democracy, 269-275. See also Sagar, “Presaging the Moderns,” 1397-1399. 
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Demosthenes’ ἦθος as the wisest politician is reason enough for the acclamation of his 
policy in the ekklesia, it can say nothing about the rapid-fire actions with follow: 
Demosthenes makes a motion, goes on an embassy, and persuades the Thebans – from 
beginning to end, Demosthenes takes charge of the whole political process that led 
Athens to the peace agreement with Thebes.   Demosthenes on his own account is here 
more than a councilor; he does not merely say, he also does.  Indeed, he points to the 
unusualness of his complete control over Athenian political affairs at this point in time 
still more explicitly: the Athenians, he claims, had had many great politicians before him, 
but never one who had so completely given himself to the state throughout the whole 
process – both proposing and seeing the proposal through to completion (Dem. 18.219).  
By what rhetorical sleight-of-hand was it possible for Demosthenes to argue that he took 
charge of Athenian action during this time period so completely?  We must look beyond 
Demosthenes’ ἦθος as the wise councilor to explain how he was able to make such an 
inherently elite model of leadership palatable to the Athenians.   
The key to Demosthenes’ self-presentation as a strong “Periclean” leader lies, I 
argue, with Demosthenes’ presentation of Philip. I showed above that in the forensic 
debates Demosthenes develops the conflict between himself and Philip as a kind of 
doublet for the conflict between Philip and Athens.  So, to reiterate, Philip’s career leads 
Demosthenes to ask two questions, one concerning how the polis should deal with the 
Macedonian threat and one concerning how the politician ought to react to Philip (Dem. 
18.66).  Both the polis and the politician have their own, though related, conflict with the 
king.  The parallelism between Demosthenes and Philip created in the forensic speeches, 
and particularly in the Crown speech, suggests that Demosthenes structured his role as 
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leader with a view to Philip’s leadership, at least as he understood and articulated it.  
Demosthenes’ “Periclean” leadership becomes the natural antithesis – equal in power, 
opposite in style - of Philip’s kingship.      
Demosthenes explicitly contrasts his leadership with that of Philip.  Philip, 
Demosthenes claims, has numerous advantages over the politician.  In describing the pre-
Chaeronean situation, Demosthenes conflates the public Athenian contest with his 
individual struggle against Philip and proceeds with an analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the parties involved.  Once again, the topos is one Demosthenes had used 
previously (Dem. 1.4).  In relation to the earlier passage, I discussed the way in which 
Demosthenes employed his articulation of Philip’s power as king to critique the 
Macedonian system of government. (see above, pp. pp. 106-107).  Demosthenes 
emphasized the contrast between Philip’s quickness to act and the Athenians’ lazy 
attitude.  In On the Crown, Demosthenes adds a new layer of contrast to the topos:    
τὰ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὕτως ὑπῆρχεν ἔχοντα, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔχοι 
παρὰ ταῦτ᾿ εἰπεῖν ἄλλ᾿ οὐδέν· τὰ δὲ τοῦ Φιλίππου, πρὸς ὃν ἦν ἡμῖν 
ὁ ἀγών, σκέψασθε πῶς.  πρῶτον μὲν ἦρχε τῶν ἀκολουθούντων 
αὐτὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, ὃ τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον μέγιστόν ἐστιν 
ἁπάντων· εἶθ᾿ οὗτοι τὰ ὅπλα εἶχον ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἀεί· ἔπειτα 
χρημάτων ηὐπόρει καὶ ἔπραττεν ἃ δόξειεν αὐτῷ, οὐ προλέγων ἐν 
τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν, οὐδ᾿ ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντούντων κρινόμενος, οὐδὲ 
γραφὰς φεύγων παρανόμων, οὐδ᾿ ὑπεύθυνος ὢν οὐδενί, ἀλλ᾿ 
ἁπλῶς αὐτὸς δεσπότης, ἡγεμών, κύριος πάντων.  ἐγὼ δ᾿ ὁ πρὸς 
τοῦτον ἀντιτεταγμένος (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτ᾿ ἐξετάσαι δίκαιον) τίνος 
κύριος ἦν; οὐδενός· αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ δημηγορεῖν πρῶτον, οὗ μόνου 
μετεῖχον ἐγώ, ἐξ ἴσου προὐτίθεθ᾿ ὑμεῖς τοῖς παρ᾿ ἐκείνου 
μισθαρνοῦσι καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ ὅσα οὗτοι περιγένοιντο ἐμοῦ (πολλὰ δ᾿ 
ἐγίγνετο ταῦτα, δι᾿ ἣν ἕκαστον τύχοι πρόφασιν), ταῦθ᾿ ὑπὲρ τῶν 
ἐχθρῶν ἀπῇτε βεβουλευμένοι. 
The affairs of the city stood thusly, and nobody would have any more to 
add beyond that; but look how affairs stood with Philip, against whom we 
were fighting.  First, he himself ruled his subjects as sole ruler, which is 
the greatest advantage of all in wartime; then, his men were always under 
arms; and again, he was monetarily doing well and he could do whatever 
seemed best to him without putting his intention up to a vote, nor being 
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indicted by sykophants, nor defending changes of paranomia, nor being 
put under audit, but he was simply his own master, and leader, and 
commander of all.  But I, who ranged myself against him, (and this too 
should, by rights, be closely observed) – what did I have under my 
command?  Nothing.  For, in the first place, I only had a share in the 
deliberations, and you gave equal shares of that to those who had sold 
themselves to him and to me, and whenever these men would beat me (and 
this happened often for various reasons), you would have made a decision 
benefiting the enemy.  (Dem. 18.235-6)   
While Demosthenes begins by discussing the public conflict with Philip [τὰ μὲν τῆς 
πόλεως… τὰ δὲ τοῦ Φιλίππου, πρὸς ὃν ἦν ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών], this contest is quickly 
superseded by the individual struggle between Philip and himself [ἐγὼ δ᾿ ὁ πρὸς 
τοῦτον ἀντιτεταγμένος].  The apparent naturalness of the transition heightens the 
sense that the public and the individual conflict are, in fact, one and the same.  Where in 
Olynthiac I Philip’s role as king was compared only to the abilities of the Athenians, here 
the prerogatives of his role are to be compared to those of the Athenians as well as those 
of Demosthenes himself.   
For Demosthenes arrogates to himself the role of Athenian representative in the 
political battle against Philip. This personal battle, as Demosthenes envisions it, is fought 
over potential allies, foremost among them the Thebans (Dem. 18.237).  The double 
conflict Demosthenes thus creates (one between Philip and Athens, and one between 
Philip and himself) becomes a key foundation for the heart of his defense in the speech 
On the Crown: whereas the Athenians incontestably lost the public confrontation at 
Chaeronea, Demosthenes claims that on the political front he, Demosthenes, trounced the 
enemy.  In this – his – front of the battle, so Demosthenes claims, Philip was soundly 
beaten.   He proves his point by showing that Philip was everywhere forced to impose his 
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authority militarily rather than politically (Dem. 18.237; 244-5).330  This political struggle 
between Philip and Demosthenes culminates in Demosthenes’ account of his embassy to 
Thebes, where the orator confronts the Macedonian envoys who had come to convince 
the Thebans to adhere to their alliance with Philip.331  Despite the Macedonians’ 
persuasive arguments (Dem. 18.195, 213-5), Demosthenes prevails in what is the 
centerpiece of his anti-Macedonian effort.  Demosthenes’ political victory validates 
Ctesiphon’s motion to crown him.   
 At the same time, Demosthenes narrative of a personal political struggle between 
Philip and himself also validates his own acquisition of extraordinary power over, and on 
behalf of, the demos.  If Demosthenes is to be imagined confronting Philip with any 
semblance of success, then he must do so as the representative of the city; so too, if 
Philip’s advantage comes from being the sole master of his affairs, then the politician 
who seeks to overcome him must have, or obtain, a similar control over the deliberative 
process.  Qualitatively, of course, Demosthenes’ leadership may be not at all like that of a 
king – we understand that he is no slave-master; but his ability to put his policy into play 
quickly and effectively is the same.  Working within and on behalf of a democracy  
actually hampered Demosthenes’ ability to match Philip blow for blow (Dem. 18.235-6).  
Indeed, Demosthenes’ wish that his “share” of the discussion in the ekklesia had been 
larger than strict equality would have dictated comes close to critiquing the very 
foundation of the Athenian deliberative process (Dem. 18.236): giving politicians equal 
shares in the debate, Demosthenes contends, simply makes it too easy for the Athenians                                                         
330 Philip’s apparent desire to win over allies politically rather than by military force finds an anticedent in 
Dem. I.4 and 21.  The blame for the defeat at Chaeronea is transfered variously either to the generals or to 
fortune (on fortune see for example Dem. 18.193; on generals see Dem. 18.245-7). 
331 On Theban relations with Macedonia during this period see Buckler and Beck, Central Greece and the 
Politics of Power, ch. 16. 
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to fall under the spell of orators advocating bad policy.  If Demosthenes was to beat 
Philip under such adverse conditions, then the normal deliberative processes in the 
ekklesia had to be circumvented by the orator who had the good of Athens at heart.332   
Only by arrogating to himself the ability not only to propose policy but also to put it into 
effect would the Athenian politician be able to successfully match Philip, political blow 
for political blow.   
Demosthenes’ mastery of the demos comes to a head at the pivotal point of his 
narrative, the panicked meeting of the people after Philip’s march on Elateia.  As I have 
noted,  as Demosthenes magnifies his own role in the proceedings the deliberative 
process becomes streamlined and minimized: οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ, 
οὐδ ̓ ἔγραψα μέν, οὐκ ἐπρέσβευσα δέ, οὐδ ̓ ἐπρέσβευσα μέν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δὲ 
Θηβαίους [I didn’t speak without making a motion; I didn’t make a motion without 
going on the embassy; I didn’t go on the embassy without persuading the Thebans] 
(18.179).  Demosthenes does what no politician has done before him (18.219) – he 
speaks and acts, taking complete control over Athenian policy making.  His description 
of his own actions before Chaeronea thus suggest that he has gained the ability to act 
decisively on his ideas - precisely that ability which he had identified as the key to 
Philip’s power as a leader.333  Demosthenes’ control of Athens before Chaeronea 
                                                        
332 Montgomery, War to Chaeronea, 76-78, brings together a number of instances where politicians went to 
political bodies other than the ekklesia to win their point.  In terms of Demosthenes’ rhetoric, one might 
also recall Diodotus’ claim that the state of the democracy has so deteriorated that to do good for the city 
one must be deceptive (Thucydides 3.43.2-4).  Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of blatant manipulation of 
the system (Aeschin. 3.125-6), though naturally this allegation can hardly be believed.  Obviously, I do not 
believe that Demosthenes was advocating for the actual subversion of the democratic process, even under 
extraordinary circumstances; but I do think there are undemocratic underpinings to his rhetoric that beg 
explanation.    
333 Indeed, it is suggestive that in the end it is Demosthenes who gives up his whole being entirely for the 
city’s benefit [ἔδωκ ̓ ἐμαυτὸν ὑμῖν ἁπλῶς εἰς τοὺς περιεστηκότας τῇ πόλει κινδύνους] (Dem. 18.166-
7).  Could this be an “appropriate” sacrifice that counters Philip’s “unnatural” sacrifice of body-parts?   
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matched Philip’s control over his subjects.  More than ‘Periclean’, Demosthenes’ 
leadership as presented in On the Crown might be better characterized as ‘Philippic’. 
Only Philip’s extraordinary, potentially inhuman power and kingly leadership legitimizes 
Demosthenes’ own singular role as uncontested leader of the polity.   
Conclusion 
Philip’s character was a potent battleground for the orators of the late fourth 
century.  Nowhere is this clearer than in Demosthenes’ and Aeschines’ prosecutions of 
each other: on the one hand we have Aeschines’ well-spoken, handsome, and charmingly 
philhellenic Philip; on the other Demosthenes’ mangled, greedy, and hubristic barbarian 
king.   Yet even though these characterizations of Philip are worlds apart, they are 
nevertheless governed by the same imperative to define the role of the orator himself 
against the character of his antagonist.  At the heart of the debate over Philip’s character 
lies a debate over what it means to be an Athenian orator.  Unsurprisingly, Aeschines and 
Demosthenes present differing visions of the orator’s role in debate over international 
policy. While the demos could be expected, or at least imagined, to know something 
about affairs inside the polis, the transfer of information from abroad was outside the 
realm of common knowledge and thus much more easily co-opted into the specialized 
realm of the professional politician.  In other words, the orator potentially had a lot more 
authority over information that came from outside the polis than from inside the 
community; and with this potential power also came the potential for its abuse. While 
Aeschines presented his and the other ambassadors’ roles as that of simple transmitters 
who articulate easily understood information from Athens to Philip and back again, 
Demosthenes presents the politician as something much more: a highly knowledgeable 
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leader whose specialized knowledge of Macedonia allows him to judge policy more 
accurately than any of his compatriots.  The reverse was of course also true: according to 
Demosthenes, the unscrupulous politician had the ability to completely bamboozle the 
demos without the people ever being the wiser.  Thus Aeschines and Demosthenes 
articulate two competing visions of the politician’s role in international affairs.      
Aeschines attempted to minimize the power which he and the other ambassadors 
had over the negotiations.  Not only did he deride Demosthenes’ claim that he, Aeschines 
– a single man - could have derailed the peace, but the ambassadors of his narrative 
transfer information lucidly and openly from Macedonia to Athens.  Aeschines’ Philip is 
a visible and audible quantity: the Athenian jury to whom he was speaking in 343/2 can 
‘hear’ the king speak, just as the Athenians in the ekklesia once ‘saw’ him through the 
verbal description of the ambassadors.  The narrative portion of Aeschines’ speech 
substantiates the claims of the ambassadors with respect to Philip’s character.  Aeschines’ 
audience can ‘verify’ for themselves that the Philip Aeschines met had the same character 
that the ambassadors described to them on their return.  The ambassadors’ purpose in 346 
was to convince the Athenian demos that Philip was trustworthy; Aeschines’ task in 
343/2 was to convince the jury that Philip had at least appeared trustworthy.  Thus 
Aeschines’ Philip is presented in terms drawn from the common Athenian democratic 
politics that the Athenians would readily understand and could easily relate to.  
Aeschines’ Philip speaks like an orator and participates in dialogue with the ambassadors 
as an equal; in appearance and habits he also conforms to that ideal against which any 
Athenian politician would have been judged.  This Philip, in sum, is presented in a type 
that Athenians were used to judging by themselves, in their own right.  Aeschines’ task, 
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and consequently that of the politician in general, thus becomes the ‘simple’ transfer of 
information from the outside into the polis; no further explication is necessary, because 
the Athenians need no specialized help to understand it.          Demosthenes, on the other hand, does his best to defamiliarize Philip. Presenting 
Philip as a persona foreign to Athens served a dual purpose: it both magnified the threat 
that Philip posed to the polis and enhanced the role (and need for) a knowledgeable orator 
who could contend against such an extraordinary enemy and explicate him to an 
Athenian audience.  Thus Demosthenes’ Philip is explicitly secretive about his identity.  
Unlike Aeschines’, this Philip is obstinately silent and can only be brought to ‘speak’ to 
the Athenians under duress from the orator.  No ordinary Athenian or even ordinary 
politician, with mere ordinary abilities and powers, could take on the extraordinary, 
virtually inhuman nefariousness that was Demosthenes’ Philip.  By casting Philip as an 
inhuman force opaque to popular comprehension, Demosthenes sets himself up as the 
only possible – and hence privileged - medium between Macedonia and Athens.  To 
combat the over-powerful Philip that he himself had crafted, Demosthenes needed more 
than the power to make informed decisions; he needed control over the whole of the 
policy-making process.  Thus in the Crown speech Demosthenes goes still further in 
arrogating to himself ‘monarchic’ powers – albeit for a limited time, and under critical 
stress - to match Philip’s powerful leadership.  Only by exercising a quasi-monarchic 
control over the political process in his own right could Demosthenes represent himself 
as the rightful antagonist, and victor, in the political contest against the king of 
Macedonia.  
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 Philip’s character was a battleground in the popular rhetoric of the late 4th century 
for more than just reasons of historical accuracy or personal opinion; instead, the debate 
over Philip was framed by a contested set of Athenian mores and democratic values.  
Both Aeschines’ and Demosthenes’ characterizations of Philip were shaped by their own 
perspectives as individual orators before an Athenian audience.  Yet their articulations of 
Philip’s ἦθος were also framed by the larger discourse concerning Macedonia which had 
evolved over the last twenty years and which would have included many more voices 
than those that have come down to us.  Indeed, defining Philip’s character was not critical 
only within the popular debate over policy occurring in the ekklesia and the lawcourts.  In 
the next chapter I turn to Isocrates, an elite critic of Athenian democracy, who also came 
into contact with Philip.  For Isocrates, too, defining Philip’s role as a leader was a way 
for him to reconceptualize his own identity as an elite political philosopher.   
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Chapter 5: Isocrates and Philip 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have discussed Philip as he was perceived and interpreted 
by Athenian politicians before a general audience of Athenian citizens, whether in the 
ekklesia or in the courtroom.  This chapter turns to Philip as presented in Isocrates’ 
rhetoric, that is, in a speech and two letters (Epistles 2 and 3) the philosopher composed 
for the Macedonian king himself.334   Isocrates’ elite perspective and his flattery of Philip 
have led to the marginalization of his works in Philippic studies, where they have 
generally been judged as a display of patent self-servience that could have had little or no 
impact on practical policy, either in Athens or in Macedonia.335  In the field of Isocratean 
rhetoric the Philip has fared rather better, as it contains important points concerning 
Isocrates’ self-fashioning and his παιδεία, but the uniqueness of its political agenda is 
                                                        
334 Isocrates wrote the Philip in the year 346, shortly after the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates.  He 
also wrote a letter to Alexander (Epistle 5) and one to Antipater (Epistle 4).   
335 One of the more ingenious analyses of the Philip has been that of M. M. Markle, “Support of Athenian 
Intellectuals for Philip: A Study of Isocrates’ Philippus and Speusippus’ Letter to Philip,” Journal of 
Hellenic Studies 96 (1976): 80-99, who argues that if Isocrates addressed his speech to Philip “as practical 
advice and not as propaganda, then it ought to be dismissed as nothing more than the vain illusion of a 
senile pedant” (83).  Markle proposes instead that the speech was meant primarily for Athenian 
consumption.  For an overview of the question as it stood in the mid-20th century see Shalom Perlman, . 
“Isocrates’ “Philippus”: A Reinterpretation,” Historia 6 (1957): 307-8.  For disparaging analyses of 
Isocrates’ advice among historians of this time period see for example Sealey, Demosthenes and his Time, 
166-7 and Griffith, History of Macedonia II, 456-63.  With respect to the Philip as an exercise in 
pandering, I note that On the Peace 22-23, which is addressed to the Athenians and was probably written in 
355 BCE, councils the demos to give up their dreams of empire because this will improve their relations 
with Cersebleptes and Philip, who will in turn be persuaded to give back the territory they have conquered 
from Athens in order to maintain friendly relations.  However delusional, the Philip was not simply an 
exercise in buttering up a potential patron. 
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often lost in this context.336   Because there is so little scholarship on the speech, and 
because Isocrates’ articulation of Philip’s ἦθος must be contextualized within his 
political philosophy as a whole to be fairly interpreted, my discussion will at times deal 
with issues more peculiarly Isocratean than Philippic.   
Isocrates’ Philip exhorts the king to unite the Greeks in a panhellenic war against 
the Persian Empire and thereby bring about an age of peace and prosperity.  Panhellenic 
war against Persia was a policy that Isocrates had endorsed repeatedly in an address to 
the Athenians in the Panegyricus and in letters to various Hellenic kings.337  There is, it is 
true, a general similarity between Isocrates’ proposal and the eventual course of action 
which Philip and Alexander would follow.  Nevertheless, it would be simplistic to 
suggest that Isocrates’ advice was literally taken at face value by the Macedonian 
monarchs.  What mattered to them, as much as to Isocrates himself, was not so much the 
actual assumption of the political advice of the speech but the assumption of its 
underlying philosophy.  In the present chapter I turn away from the question of whether 
Isocrates’ policy was ‘practical’ or even ‘practically possible’ to examine the way 
Isocrates’ articulates his political vision to his audience: Philip and his court on the one 
                                                        
336 The last exploration of Philip in the context of Isocrates’ rhetoric has been that of Gunther Heilbrunn, 
“Isocrates on Rhetoric and Power,” Hermes 103 (1975): 154-178. While still extremely valuable, it is 
obviously dated.  V. I. Isajeva, “The Political Programme of Isocrates in the Philippus,” Vestnik Drevnej 
Istorii 128 (1974): 162-176, views Isocrates’ Athenian loyalty as preeminent, and his exhortation to Philip 
as an ingenious method of safeguarding Athens from destruction.  Perlman also examined the speech in the 
1950s and 60s: see Perlman, “Isocrates’ ‘Philippus’ – A Reinterpretation” and “Isocrates’ “Philippus” and 
Panhellenism,” Historia 18 (1969): 370-374.  For the Philip in larger works on Isocratean rhetoric see Un 
Lee Too, The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, Power, Pedagogy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), passim; Ekaterina Haskins, Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2004), passim; Takis Poulakos, Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates’ 
Rhetorical Education (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), passim.  Georges Mathieu, 
Les Idées Politiques d’Isocrate (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1966), ch. 13 examines Isocrates’ speeches within 
contemporary politics and against Philip’s policy, for which see also Mario Marzi, “Isocrate e Filippo II di 
Macedonia: L’autenticità della II epistola a Filippo,”  Atene e Roma 39 (1994): 1-10. 
337 See Epistle I, to Dionysius of of Syracuse, and Epistle IX, to Archidamus.  Isocrates had also called 
upon the Athenians to institute a similar policy in his speech On the Peace. 
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hand and Isocrates’ students on the other.  Creating dialogue between them on the basis 
of a shared body of political ideals lay at the heart of Isocrates’ project.    
Isocrates’ two audiences were not as dissimilar as their geography would suggest.  
In Chapter 2 I discussed the many ways in which the Macedonian court, in Philip’s time 
even more than previously, had become closely connected to a panhellenic Greek 
aristocracy and the Athenian elite (see above, pp. 83-84).  The Macedonian royals had 
also formed close bonds with Plato’s Academy at Athens, and there are several strange 
stories told about the influence of Plato himself on the court of Perdiccas III, Philip’s 
older brother.338  There was also Aristotle, of course, whose father had been court 
physician to Amyntas III and who tutored Alexander from 342 to 340 BCE.339     It is 
therefore a false dichotomy to posit that Isocrates had to address either his Athenian or 
his Macedonian audience to the exclusion of the other.  Philip’s court presented Isocrates 
with an amenable audience, one which was saturated with the modes of thinking of 
aristocratic Greece.340    
Isocrates offers his audience a rationalization of Philip and his policy from within 
an elite rhetoric of panhellenism. As a positive rearticulation of Philip’s policy, Isocrates’ 
                                                        
338 Speusippus in his Letter to Philip claims that Plato took an interest in the strained relationship between 
the brothers.  Platomay have been instrumental in getting Perdiccas to assign some territory to Philip’s 
jurisdiction (Athen. 11.506f.).  A letter from Plato to Perdiccas III, Epistle V, and another letter to Philip 
himself (thirty-first of the Socratic Epistles) are often considered spurious, though see Anthony Francis 
Natoli, The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II: Introduction, Text, Translation, and Commentary (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner, 2004), Appendix I. A pupil of Plato, Euphraeus of Oreus, also became something of a 
cultural arbiter in Perdiccas court (Athen. 11.115-9; Caryst. Frag. 1-2.    
339 Plut. Alex. 7.2-5.  Isocrates’ Epistle V, which is addressed to Alexander, also suggests that Alexander 
consider ‘supplementing’ his studies with Aristotle with practical rhetoric.  
340 It is difficult to say how much the contest between Isocrates’ school and the Academy would have 
affected the patronage of intellectuals in Macedonia.  It has been argued that Isocrates’ Philip may have 
been meant to sway Philip away from his patronage of the Academy and toward a congenial attitude to his 
own school; this certainly seems to be the way Speusippus understood Isocrates’ motives in his own letter 
to Philip, the viciousness of which in denouncing Isocrates evidently knew no bounds.  On the other hand, 
Philip seems to have had no problem patronizing both Aristotle, a pupil of Plato, and Theopompus, a pupil 
of Isocrates.   
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argument did indeed have political importance within the elite Hellenic world.  One 
wonders, indeed, how much Philip enjoyed, and how much he was amused by, Isocrates’ 
sleight of hand.  Yet Isocrates’ Philip does not only rearticulate Philip’s policy in a way 
that would have been pleasing to a Macedonian audience.  It also tackles the conflict of 
loyalty which arose for the orator himself between his Athenian identity and his espousal 
of Macedonian interests in Greece.   This conflict of loyalty was one which many Greek 
aristocrats would have felt as, in the mid and late 4th century, they found themselves 
increasingly drawn to the power and potential of Philip’s court.  Isocrates actively seeks 
to bridge the potential gap between Hellenic elites and the Hellenized aristocracy of 
Macedonia by dealing with Isocrates’ own ostensible conflict of loyalties as an Athenian 
endorsing Philip’s involvement in Greek affairs.  Inasmuch as Isocrates’ stated conflict of 
loyalty was not unique to himself, the Philip speaks for a certain subset of elite Hellenes - 
not necessarily Athenians - who also found it expedient to forward Philip’s agenda.  I 
argue that Isocrates offers two lines of reasoning to explicate his turning to Philip as a 
panhellenic leader: on the one hand, he highlights the affinity between his own political 
discourse and Philip’s political activity, thus suggesting Philip’s acuity and right 
thinking; and, on the other hand, he valorizes Philip’s position as a political outsider who 
can solve the in-fighting which characterizes and degrades the politics of the Hellenic 
world.     
I begin by examining the Amphipolis prologue (Philip 1-30), which sets out the 
background and the goals for the Philip and, I argue, connects Athens with Macedonia 
and Isocrates with Philip.  These two relationships – between Athens and Philip on the 
one hand, and Isocrates and Philip on the other – serve as focal points for the rest of the 
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chapter.  I highlight the parallels Isocrates builds between himself and Philip, first as 
political philosophers and then as outsiders to the Greek polis.  Considering Philip’s 
status as a Hellene and at the same time as monarch of a non-Greek community allowed 
Isocrates to explore his own role as the philosopher who has his city’s interests at heart 
but who cannot participate in governance.  Inasmuch as Isocrates’ self-exploration turns 
on his construction of Philip’s ἦθος, his method is quite similar to that of Demosthenes 
and Aeschines, who also employed Philip’s ἦθος as a vehicle for expressing their own 
identities and political roles.   Indeed, there are a number of noteworthy parallels 
specifically between Isocrates’ and Demosthenes’ rhetoric which I will tease out over the 
course of this chapter.341  These parallels point to the percolation of political rhetoric 
from elite to public forums of communication (and visa versa).   The results of Isocrates’ 
exploration, however, could not be further from those of Demosthenes and the political 
dialogue of the ekklesia: his rhetoric addressed a panhellenic elite community of which 
Philip was not only a part but, if Isocrates had his way, its leader.    
Amphipolis 
The present Philip, Isocrates tells us, had been some time in the making.  
Isocrates relates that he had been in the act of composing a speech to Philip about the 
merits of peace with Athens and the senselessness of the dispute over Amphipolis when 
                                                        
341 Parallels between Demosthenes and Isocrates have been studied before: most recently, and perhaps most 
importantly, by Galen Rowe, “Anti-Isocratean Rhetoric in Demosthenes’ Against Androtion,”Historia 49 
(2000): 278-302 and “Two Responses by Isocrates to Demosthenes,” Historia 51 (2002): 149-162, posits 
Demosthenes’ specific engagement with Isocratean ideas, particularly through the many pupils of Isocrates 
active in Athenian politics in the mid 4th century.  Comparisons between them have been of long standing, 
though they have been explained variously: see Gabriele Bockisch, “Der Panhellenismus bei Isokrates und 
Demosthenes,” in Eirene: Actes de la XIIème conférence internationale d’études classiques (Amsterdam: 
1975), 239-246.  See also Jacqueline de Romilly, “Eunoia in Isocrates or the Political Importance of Good 
Will,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 78 (1958): passim; Isajeva, “Political Programme of Isocrates,” 166 on 
the theme of Philip’s power and 167 on the theme of ὁ καιρός. 
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Philip and the Athenians anticipated him by concluding the Peace of Philocrates.342  
Isocrates therefore had to scrap his initial attempt, and begin a new speech – the current 
Philip – in the hopes of making the peace between Philip and Athens a permanent one.  
Isocrates then continues to elaborate on his own considerations in writing and on the way 
his students received a preliminary draft of the current speech.  This preface (Philip 1-
30), in its seemingly exhaustive detail concerning the circumstances that prompted 
Isocrates to write to Philip, the contents of his old speech, and its reception, begs the 
question of why Isocrates included it in the current text.  Indeed, the Amphipolis 
prologue is more than a perfunctory apology or an elaborate setting of the scene; rather, it 
is an integral part of the speech that has both Philip and an Athenian readership in mind.    
Moreover, this section is programmatic for the rest of the speech because it sets up the 
comparison between Philip and Athens as potential readers of Isocrates and panhellenic 
leaders.      
As past commentators have noted, Isocrates’ arguments concerning Amphipolis 
seem to be more Athenocentric than an address to Philip should warrant. 343  Most 
obviously, Isocrates takes Athens’ side in the Amphipolis conflict while offering Philip in 
return for the city nothing more tangible than Athenian goodwill (Philip 3-6).  Moreover, 
Isocrates explicitly says that he has set out to write the current speech with a view to 
Athens’ benefit (Philip 9).  It is clear that Isocrates did have an Athenian readership, both 
students (Philip 7; 17-21; 23) and detractors (Philip 57; 93-4; 128-31), in mind. Yet 
                                                        
342 Amphipolis was a key point in the Peace of Philocrates, at least from the Athenians perspective, though 
Philip had captured the city in 358 BCE and the Athenians didn’t have the shadow of a hope of realizing 
their claims in 346.   
343 For example, Markle, “Support of Athenian Intellectuals,” 81-2, argued  that the speech was aimed 
mainly at an Athenian audience and that Isocrates was not actively advocating Philip to go to war against 
Persia, largely on the basis of the Athenocentrism of  Isocrates’ digression on Amphipolis.    
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despite the blatant overtures to Isocrates’ Athenian audience and Isocrates’ own overt 
Athenocentrism, its audience need not have been exclusively Athenian.344  For one thing, 
even as Isocrates suggests that Philip ought to hand over Amphipolis to Athens (in the 
present Philip), everyone would have known that, in reality, the Peace of Philocrates had 
already ceded Amphipolis to Philip’s control.  As a common platitude among Athenian 
politicians eager to stave off accusations of disloyalty, such a demonstration of 
Athenocentrism was exactly the sort of argument that Isocrates’ elite students of rhetoric 
and Philip might not be expected to take seriously (for a parallel, see Aeschines 2.27-
33).345  Moreover, Isocrates actively endorsed diverse – even antithetical - readings of his 
speeches.346  What mattered was the ability to convincingly interpret the speech after 
one’s own fashion, in a display of παιδεία that showed one’s belonging to a 
geographically diverse but culturally connected elite.  Such an exercise of reading a 
particular argument into a speech served to build rather than negate consensus.  The 
Philip, like the rest of the Isocratean corpus, was meant to be read in diverse ways and 
thereby marry Macedonian and Athenian arguments together.  I will come back to this                                                         
344 Indeed, I note as well that Isocrates’ mention of his detractors at Philip 57 is addressed to his detractors 
in Macedonia, who might council Philip that Isocrates’ proposal is too outlandish or too difficult to 
accomplish.    
345 On this point I agree with Markle: see “Support of Athenian Intellectuals,” 82. 
346 In writing the Panathenaicus, Isocrates included a rereading of his speech by a Spartan, a former student 
of his, who reinterprets an encomium of Athens as praise of Sparta (Panathenaicus 234-263);  after he is 
finished, Isocrates says that he praised the man’s speech but did not come down on either side of the issue:  
 
Οὐ μὴν οὐδ ̓ ἐγὼ παρεστὼς ἐσιώπων, ἀλλ ̓ ἐπῄνεσα τήν τε φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν 
ἐπιμέλειαν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἐφθεγξάμην ὧν εἶπεν, οὔθ ̓ ὡς ἔτυχε ταῖς 
ὑπονοίαις τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας οὔθ ̓ ὡς διήμαρτεν, ἀλλ ̓ εἴων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχειν 
ὥσπερ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν διέθηκεν.  
Nor did I stand silently to the side, but I praised his aptitude and his cleverness.  But I 
didn’t say anything about any of the arguments that he had spoken – neither that he had 
hit upon the intention of my speech or that he had missed the mark - allowing him to 
maintain his opinion just as he had formed for himself (Panathenaicus 265). 
On Isocratean ambivalence and dissoi logoi see also Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 61-73.     
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larger point concerning the whole of the Philip and its addressees later; for now, I will 
show that the Amphipolis prologue can be interpreted in a non-Athenocentric fashion in 
order to demonstrate the affinity between Isocratean and Macedonian policy-making.     
The preface seeks to connect the policies advocated by Isocrates and Philip.  
Isocrates relates that he was first prompted to write to Philip upon seeing that both 
Philip’s advisors and the orators in Athens held hawkish views, and that therefore neither 
the king nor the demos was being correctly counseled (Philip 2-3).  In setting his advice 
apart, Isocrates elevates his own authority as an advisor: whereas the other councilors, 
whether Athenian and Macedonian, counseled wrongly, Isocrates had got it right in 
advocating for peace (Philip 3).  Yet, it turns out shortly thereafter, Isocrates was not 
alone.  In fact, Philip was also in the right in concluding peace with Athens – and he did 
so before he had the benefit of Isocrates’ council in the matter (Philip 7-8).  It is 
noteworthy in this regard that Isocrates never actually states how the matter of 
Amphipolis was resolved, though in point of fact, Amphipolis remained a Macedonian 
possession.  In omitting to mention the denouement of the Amphipolis conflict – the only 
point on which, it would appear, Isocrates’ and Philip’s policies differed – the conformity 
of their political approaches is highlighted.  One might thus apply the consideration 
which Isocrates ascribes to Philip also to the Athenians: that “to conclude this [peace], no 
matter how, was better than to suffer the evils that come about from war” [ὅπως γὰρ 
οὖν πεπρᾶχθαι κρεῖττον ἦν αὐτὴν [τὴν εἰρὴνην] ἢ συνέχεσθαι τοῖς κακοῖς τοῖς 
διὰ τὸν πόλεμον γιγνομένοις (Philip 7)].  The Athenians, too, would benefit from 
peace – even if it came at the expense of Amphipolis. Philip is shown to have arrived at 
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the same conclusion as Isocrates not only without the philosopher’s advice, but even in 
contravention to the desires of his own advisors.   
In connecting Isocrates and Philip as two bastions of appropriate thinking in a 
world (of orators and advisors) full of folly, the preface sets Philip up as a potentially 
sympathetic reader for the speech.347  For, in detailing his former speech and the 
circumstances surrounding the Peace of Philocrates, Isocrates shows that his advice is 
already not far from Philip’s own policy.  Now, under the guidance of the updated Philip, 
the Macedonian king has the opportunity to realize the full potential of the Peace of 
Philocrates by making it permanent and extending its benefits to the whole of Greece.  At 
the same time, he will be able to turn his war effort towards the Persian Empire with the 
support of the Greeks.  Inasmuch as pointing to the peace as Philip’s own political 
success would have been pleasing for the Macedonian, the prologue is an effective 
captatio benevolentiae for Philip as well as Isocrates’ Athenian audience.348      
It may be argued that the Amphipolis prologue assigns credit for the Peace of 
Philocrates to both Philip and Athens equally, thereby mitigating the emphasis I have 
placed on the connection drawn between Isocrates’ policy and Philip’s political stance.   
Indeed, Isocrates does praise Athens as a willing participant and equally prudent in voting 
for peace (Philip 7).  At the same time, however, the wisdom of Athens’ conduct is 
undercut by the very fact that Isocrates turns to Philip – rather than Athens – to make the 
peace a permanent one.  Isocrates claims that he is now afraid for the Athenians, who 
                                                        
347 While Isocrates is relatively gentle towards Philip’s hawkish advisors, he has no such patience with 
Athenian proponents of war: see Philip 73; 81.   
348 Isocrates will make the same point later on as well, extoling how much Philip had already achieved in 
his reign: see Philip 41; 98; 105.  Heilbrunn, “Isocrates on Rhetoric and Power,” 177-8, remarks on the 
similarity in Isocratean rhetoric between Isocrates’ own quest for glory [δόξα] through his λόγος and the 
dynast’s quest for glory through political and military success. 
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may quickly grow tired and once again turn to war-mongering (Philip 8); he voices no 
such qualms on Philip’s behalf.  Moreover, Isocrates alludes to his Panegyricus, which 
was addressed to the Athenians, as a forerunner of the present speech (Philip 9) even 
though he had addressed similar speeches to other Hellenic kings as well.349   That 
Isocrates refers to the Panegyricus specifically, I argue, points out his disillusionment 
with the Athenians as potential leaders of the Hellenic world and sets Philip up as the 
inheritor of the Athenians’ former primacy among the Greeks.   
Isocrates wrote the Panegyricus after the Peace of Antalcidas was concluded in 
387 BCE.350  His speech called on Athens and Sparta to conclude a panhellenic peace and 
lead an expedition to Persia.  The Athenians came in for particular praise, as they were to 
be the leaders of the Persian expedition.  Isocrates’ choice of the Parengyricus as the 
point of contrast for the Philip, instead of the many other speeches on the same theme he 
had written for various dynasts, calls attention to Athenian inaction as a negative 
paradigm for Philip. Athens, in short, had already had the benefit of Isocrates’ advice and 
had failed the test.  Linguistic parallels between the openings of the Philip and the 
Panegyricus secure the close interplay specific to these two speeches in the Isocratean 
corpus.351  Thus Isocrates invites the reader to compare the way Isocrates has dealt with 
the same theme – panhellenic peace complemented by war against the barbarian – when                                                         
349 Isocrates does mention these previous attempts later on (Philip 93).  He also particularly mentions his 
letter to Dionysius of Syracuse (Philip 81).  His speech On the Peace, as well, advocated panhellenic peace 
and a resumption of Athens’ position of leadership among the poleis.  Nevertheless, the Panegyricus is 
particularly drawn out for comparison, here and in later sections of the Philip (see Philip 84, 129; see also 
Epistle 3.6).  Speusippus remarked on the existence of Isocrates’ other speeches that counseled panhellenic 
peace and war against the barbarian in his criticism of the Philip, citing Isocrates’ exhortations to 
Agesilaus, Dionysius, and Alexander of Thessaly (Letter to Philip, 13).  We have another letter to 
Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, which may have preceded a similar speech.     
350 The Peace of Antalcidas brought the Corinthian War, fought between Sparta and a coalition of Thebes 
and Athens, to a close.  Ironically, it was backed by the Persian king Artaxerxes II and was supposed to be 
a ‘Common Peace’ for the whole of Greece.  See Badian, “The King’s Peace;” Jehne, Koine Eirene; Ryder, 
Koine Eirene.    
351 As detailed by Perlman, “Isocrates’ ‘Philippus’ and Panhellenism,” 371. 
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directed at two such different political players as the Athenians and Philip.   By inviting 
his audience to read Philip against Athens, Isocrates highlights Philip’s unique suitability 
to the task at hand.  Philip comes to embody an attractive alternative to Athenian 
leadership, even though – and, indeed, because - he stands outside of the Athenian and 
the Hellenic world.  Again, then, Isocrates’ focus on the Panegyricus shows that the 
Philip was interested in capturing the goodwill of a Macedonian as well as an Athenian 
audience.   
 I have focused on two threads in the Amphipolis prologue: Isocrates’ construction 
of his own relationship with Philip and Philip’s parallelism with Athens as recipients of 
Isocratean advice.  Thus far I have shown that Isocrates recommends himself to Philip on 
the basis of the evident sympathy between their political goals.  Isocrates and Philip are 
differentiated from the common run of men who surround them, whether the demagogues 
in Athens or Philip’s ἑταῖροι in Macedonia.  Philip will take Athens’ place in ushering in 
an era of panhellenic peace by building on the Peace of Philocrates and establishing 
goodwill [εὔνοια] as the basis and goal for his future relations with Greece.352  Isocrates 
and Philip, and Philip and Athens, are comparisons which Isocrates will develop and 
complicate throughout the speech.  Neither relationship is as simple as it might appear 
from the prologue and, as may already be evident, the two issues are closely 
interconnected.       
Isocrates, Philip, and Philosophia 
The connection Isocrates imagines between himself and Philip cannot be 
understood outside of Isocrates’ self-presentation as a teacher and a political                                                         
352 εὔνοια was the return that, Isocrates claimed, Philip would get by handing Amphipolis over to Athens 
(Philip 5-6). 
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(non)activist.  On the surface, their relationship is structured along the well-trodden lines 
of the wise advisor and the politically active pupil.  Such a relationship had an ancient 
tradition that had taken a new lease on life in 4th century elite thought.353 Isocrates 
himself had assumed the role of advisor to the monarch elsewhere in his corpus.354 In the 
Philip, Isocrates’ repudiation of Philip’s ἑταῖροι is a fairly obvious bid to replace them 
himself (Philip 2; 18-19).  Again, the Amphipolis preface is paradigmatic in its concern 
with Isocrates’ influence on Philip’s actions.  Both philosopher and king choose peace 
instead of war, Isocrates in his speech and Philip in his actions.  Furthermore, both of 
their initial efforts need to be further solidified: Isocrates’ first speech, on the one hand, 
was only a beginning that must now be superseded by a new and better exhortation; so 
too, the Peace of Philocrates is impermanent and in its current state and needs to be 
restructured to include all of Greece (Philip 8).  Isocrates’ speech [λόγος] and Philip’s 
action [ἔργον] are both necessary components to the creation of a real panhellenic peace.  
Yet the division of labor suggested by this distinction between Isocrates’ speech and 
Philip’s action is complicated over the course of the Philip.  As Isocrates’ role will 
become something more than that of the wise advisor, so too Philip will appear to have 
some of the qualities of a philosopher.355   
                                                        
353 On the topos of the wise advisor see R. Lattimore, “The Wise Adviser in Herodotus,” Classical 
Philology (1939): 24-35.   
354 The Το Nicocles contains perhaps Isocrates’ most pointed exhortation for the monarch to court the good 
advisor, “knowing that a good advisor is the most useful and the most monarchic of all possessions” 
[γιγνώσκων ὅτι σύμβουλος ἀγαθὸς χρησιμώτατον καὶ τυραννικώτατον ἁπάντων τῶν 
κτημάτων ἐστίν] (To Nicocles 53). 
355 Isocrates was interested in the interplay of λόγος and ἔργον elsewhere as well.  Their relationship was 
naturally critical for a writer crafting λόγοι ostensibly meant for oral delivery while at the same time, in as 
much as they were material, written documents, being ἔργα.  See Michael Gagarin, “Λόγος as ἔργον in 
Isocrates,” in Papers on Rhetoric 4, ed. Lucia Calboli Montefusco (Rome: Herder Editrice, 2002), 111-119, 
on the conflation of λόγοι and ἔργα in the Antidosis and for a fascinating look at Isocrates’ 
reinterpretation of Thucydides.  
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Isocrates’ inability to be politically active is a consistent feature of his ἦθος, in 
the Philip and throughout his corpus.356  In part, Isocrates’ ἀπραγμοσύνη stems from 
his age; so, for example, he claims that the Philip should really have been written by a 
man of outstanding stature at the prime of his life (Philip 10-12).  While Isocrates’ age 
acts as a convenient excuse for any potential faults in his writing, it also taps into 
Isocrates broader self-representation as a man without the nature [φύσις] requisite for 
public speaking, and hence normative public action.  Nevertheless, the mental acuity 
which Isocrates has honed through education [παιδεία] makes his political advice 
invaluable.357  Thus, while he cannot actively participate in politics, Isocrates dispenses 
practical advice through writing.   
In the Philip Isocrates confronts his inability to participate in the democratic 
debate and his consequent attempt to influence events by other means: 
ἐγὼ γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι πάντων ἀφυέστατος ἐγενόμην 
τῶν πολιτῶν (οὔτε γὰρ φωνὴν ἔσχον ἱκανὴν οὔτε τόλμαν 
δυναμένην ὄχλῳ χρῆσθαι καὶ μολύνεσθαι καὶ λοιδορεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐπὶ 
τοῦ βήματος κυλινδουμένοις), τοῦ δὲ φρονεῖν εὖ καὶ πεπαιδεῦσθαι 
καλῶς, εἰ καί τις ἀγροικότερον εἶναι φήσει τὸ  ῥηθέν, ἀμφισβητῶ, 
καὶ θείην ἂν ἐμαυτὸν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἀπολελειμμένοις ἀλλ ̓ ἐν τοῖς 
προέχουσι τῶν ἄλλων.  Διό περ ἐπιχειρῶ συμβουλεύειν τὸν 
τρόπον τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγὼ πέφυκα καὶ δύναμαι, καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς 
Ἕλλησι καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ἐνδοξοτάτοις.   
For I am by nature the least suited of the citizenry for practicing politics.  
For I do not have a ready voice nor the courage to deal with the crowd, 
and to become corrupt and throw around insults with the men hanging 
about the bema.  But - even if someone should say that I speak boorishly 
[in saying so] - I argue that I have intelligence and am well educated, and I 
would place myself not among the worst but among the best men.                                                          
356 On Isocrates’ characteristic ἀπραγμοσύνη see Too, Rhetoric of Identity, ch. 3. 
357 Isocrates specifically cites his age, along with his lack of experience in the courts, as excuses for his 
imaginary public speech at Antidosis 26-7.  For other remarks on Isocrates’ age see Epistle 2.23, Antidosis 
9-10, and Panathenaicus 3-4.  On Isocrates’ rhetoric in the broader context of Athenian thought on old age 
see Roisman, Rhetoric of Manhood, 210-12. On Isocrates’ age as a chronological indicator that acts to 
organize his corpus see Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 43-48.  See also Poulakos, Speaking for the Polis, 94-97, 
who argues that Isocrates put great stock in φύσις.  
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Because of this I have at least attempted to give council in whatever way I 
am naturally suited and able to, both to the city, to Greece, and to the most 
distinguished among men.  (Philip 81-2)      
Isocrates cites his “natural” inability [ἀφυέστατος ἐγενόμην] to engage in politics, 
claiming in its stead intelligence [τὸ φρονεῖν] and education [παιδεία].  Isocrates’ also 
focuses on his vocal weakness, which prohibits him from producing the ready and 
powerful speeches required of a politician in active life.358  The Isocratean rhetoric of the 
‘small voice’ was a convenient fiction that allowed the philosopher to assume the mantle 
of elite critic while touting his παιδεία as practical knowledge useful to those who 
wished to speak in the ἐκκλεσία.359  At the same time, Isocrates’ disability required that 
his ideas be championed by someone who did have the physical and practical know-how 
to put them into action (Philip 13).  Indeed, Isocrates explicitly states that as Philip excels 
in action, so he himself excels in rhetoric (Philip 151).  Theirs, it would appear, is a 
practical partnership for achieving what neither could accomplish alone.   
Yet to divide Isocrates’ and Philip’s roles into speaking advisor and active advisee 
would be to oversimplify their roles.  On the one hand, Isocrates’ rhetoric is itself an 
active agent, whose new written rather than spoken format makes up for, even as it points 
                                                        
358 Too, Rhetoric of Identity, aptly states that “for Isocrates, the representation of speaking in public as a 
political activity is the normative one” (87).  On Isocrates’ weak voice see also Epistle 8.7 and 
Panathenaicus 9-10.   
359 That Isocrates’ ‘deficiency’ was part of a carefully constructed persona has been convincingly argued by 
Too, Rhetoric of Identity, ch. 3.  Some of his students were, however, active politicians in the democracy; 
perhaps the most notable was Timotheus the general.  Thus at the same time as Isocrates reneges on an 
active public life he also argues for the practical usefulness of his brand of philosophy.  On Isocrates as 
critic of Athenian democracy see Josiah Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics 
of Popular Rule (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), ch. 5.  Isocrates’ definition of philosophy 
stands in opposition to that of Plato and his Academy, whose school of thought rejected Athenian 
democracy entirely and favored a φιλοσοφία based on fixed abstract principle rather than a malleable 
perception of reality.   See Too, Rhetoric of Identity, ch. 1 and Niall Livingstone, “Writing Politics: 
Isocrates’ Rhetoric of Philosophy,” Rhetorica 25 (2007): 15-34, on Isocrates’ philosophy as the politicos 
logos.   
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out, its author’s deficiency.360   Thus for example Isocrates can imagine his rhetoric as an 
act of war in itself: “employing whatever power I happen to have, I have persisted 
constantly in warring against the barbarians” [τῇ δυνάμει ταύτῃ χρώμενος ἣν ἔχων 
τυγχάνω, διατετέλεκα πάντα τὸν χρόνον πολεμῶν μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις] (Philip 
130).  Isocrates casts himself as an active participant in the one issue which had become 
the driving purpose of his political agenda: namely, the unification of the Hellenic world 
against the Persian Empire.  Paradoxically, then, Isocrates’ ἀπραγμοσύνη turns out to 
be the best method for enacting real change.  Indeed, Isocrates posits that finding an 
individual to champion his cause is more useful than speaking to the demos would have 
been; it is also more practical than composing imaginary constitutional states like the 
sophists:  
ἀλλ᾿ ὅμως ἐγὼ ταύτας τὰς δυσχερείας ὑπεριδὼν οὕτως ἐπὶ γήρως 
γέγονα φιλότιμος, ὥστ᾿ ἠβουλήθην ἅμα τοῖς πρὸς σὲ λεγομένοις 
καὶ τοῖς μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ διατρίψασιν ὑποδεῖξαι καὶ ποιῆσαι φανερόν, ὅτι 
τὸ μὲν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν ἐνοχλεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας λέγειν τοὺς 
συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς οὐδένα λέγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾿ ὁμοίως οἱ 
τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἄκυροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ 
ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις, δεῖ δὲ τοὺς 
βουλομένους μὴ μάτην φλυαρεῖν ἀλλ`προὔργου τι ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς 
οἰομένους ἀγαθόν τι κοινὸν εὑρηκέναι τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐᾶν 
πανηγυρίζειν, αὐτοὺς δ᾿ ὧν εἰσηγοῦνται ποιήσασθαί τινα 
προστάτην τῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν δυναμένων καὶ δόξαν 
μεγάλην ἐχόντων, εἴπερ μέλλουσί τινες προσέξειν αὐτοῖς τὸν νοῦν. 
But, disregarding these failings, I have become so ambitious in old age 
that I decided, in the words addressed to you, to show and make clear to 
my students that to tire the masses with panegyrics and to speak at the 
same time to everybody is in fact to speak to nobody, and that such                                                         
360 At times, Isocrates also imagines his own speeches as ‘acting’ in his stead.  In the Philip, for example, 
Isocrates claims that his initial discourse to Philip would bring about the end of the war (Philip 7).  The 
conceit of the Antidosis works on a similar principle: having been unable to win his case before a ‘real’ jury 
in his antidosis trial, Isocrates is now publishing his speech to plead his case for him, in the hopes that it 
will be more successful than he was himself: Antidosis 1-12.  That a written speech can taken on a life of its 
own, divorced from that of its author, is most poignantly claimed by Isocrates in the Panathenaicus, which 
he wrote at the end of his life: see Gagarin, “Λόγος as ἔργον;” Too, Rhetoric of Identity, 124-7.  On the 
other hand, Isocrates sometimes suggests that a written speech may be less persuasive than speech: see for 
example Epistle 3.4. 
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speeches are as ineffectual as the laws and constitutions written by the 
sophists.  But those who do not wish to chatter in vain but do something 
practical, and who think that they have hit upon something that will be of 
universal benefit, should allow others to issue panegyrics while they 
themselves should find someone to champion their cause who is capable 
of both speech and action, and who has a widespread reputation, if they 
are to command attention (Philip 12-13).  
Isocrates stakes out for himself the middle ground between the politicians of the Athenian 
democracy and the sophists.   He argues for the preeminence of his approach on the basis 
of its ability to create both quick and far-reaching results.361  Isocrates’ brand of political 
disengagement turns out to be the best approach to real-world change, after all.          
Just as Isocrates imagines his rhetoric as an active entity on the political stage, so 
too does he address Philip as a budding philosopher, exhorting him to deliberate and 
make judgments about policy in his own right.  Already in the Amphipolis prologue we 
have seen Philip deliberating wisely and opting for peace without the benefit of Isocrates’ 
advice (Philip 7).  Later in the speech, Isocrates advises Philip on the way he is to 
approach the speech before him:  
Οὕτω δ ̓ ἂν ἀκριβέστατα καὶ κάλλιστα θεωρήσειας εἴ τι 
τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες, ἢν τὰς μὲν δυσχερείας τὰς περὶ τοὺς 
σοφιστὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀναγιγνωσκομένους τῶν λόγων ἀφέλῃς, 
ἀναλαμβάνων δ ̓ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξετάζῃς, μὴ 
πάρεργον ποιούμενος μηδὲ μετὰ ῤᾳθυμίας, ἀλλὰ μετὰ λογισμοῦ 
καὶ φιλοσοφίας, ἧς καὶ σὲ μετεσχηκέναι φασίν.  Μετὰ γὰρ τούτων 
σκοπούμενος μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης ἄμεινον ἂν 
βουλεύσαιο περὶ αὐτῶν. 
You will be able to best and most carefully consider whether I happen to 
have spoken something [to the purpose], if you set aside any prejudices                                                         
361 Isocrates is perhaps alluding to Plato’s Academy in his comment on the sophists.  See Ober, Political 
Dissent, 248-256, on Isocrates’ relationship to other critics of the democracy; I find particularly 
illuminating his conclusion, in discussing the Antidosis, that “Isocrates takes for himself the role of a 
concerned member of both the democratic and the critical communities, who seeks an appropriate means to 
reintegrate the interests of the upright individual and his polis” (272).  See also William Benoit, “Isocrates 
and Plato on Rhetoric and Rhetorical Education,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 21 (1991): 60-71, for a more 
specific comparison of Isocrates and Plato; also Shalom Perlman, “Rhetoric and Philosophy: a Chapter in 
Fourth-Century Literary Criticism,” Scripta Classica Israelica 12 (1993): 86-93, who argues that Plato took 
a positive view of Isocrates in the Phaedrus. 
  204 
against sophists and written speeches, and instead examine each point as 
you take hold of it in your mind, neither doing so lightly nor as an 
amusement, but with consideration and with that love of knowledge which 
they say you too have.  For if you consider these things in such a manner 
rather than by following the common opinion of the masses, you will be 
better able to judge them.  (Philip 28-9)        
Isocrates imagines Philip as a philosopher and rhetorician – as he puts it, Philip already 
has an interest in philosophy.362  So, at least, Isocrates says he has heard: he cannot claim 
direct knowledge of Philip’s character.  In claiming that he had heard about Philip’s 
philosophical inclinations from others, Isocrates sets Philip within a larger social group 
composed of a well-educated Greek aristocracy.  It is in the eyes of these others – and, 
from their report, in Isocrates’ view as well – that Philip gains his credentials as a social 
equal via his φιλοσοφία (which is to say, his παιδεία).  It is the mode of thought shared 
by this elite that Philip should continue to follow rather than the “common opinion of the 
masses” [ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δόξη].   By studying Isocrates’ speech, Philip takes on the role 
of a student of political rhetoric and thereby also gains social acceptance from his 
Hellenic peers.   
In the passage above Isocrates particularly suggests that Philip take hold of each 
point in the speech in his own mind and ponder it carefully.  In recommending this 
method of reading to the king, Isocrates alludes to the kind of philosophical inquiry 
which he himself taught.363  For Isocrates, appropriate deliberation with the self [εὖ 
φρονεῖν] was as much the mark of the wise man as appropriate speechmaking [εὖ 
                                                        
362 Isocrates says the same of Alexander, whom he calls φιλάνθρωπος... καὶ φιλαθήναιος καὶ 
φιλόσοφος (Letter to Alexander, 2). 
363 Isocrates positioned his philosophy in contravention to philosophy as understood in the Academy.  On 
φιλοσοφία as a contested term between the two schools, and Isocrates’ understanding of it, see 
Livingtstone, “Writing Politics;” Ober, Political Dissent, 248-56.  
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λέγειν].364  Moreover, private deliberation, as contrasted with the oratory put on for the 
masses, marked the philosopher as a man of a higher order than the mere public rhetor, 
who did not necessarily need to have a well-considered policy in order to put on a crowd-
pleasing rhetorical display.  In the Antidosis, for example, Isocrates valorizes those who 
can debate skillfully with themselves, in their own minds, above those who can only 
argue publicly (Antidosis 256).  In the Philip, then, Isocrates argues that Philip should 
employ his own powers of discernment in ascertaining the best course of action; he is no 
mere automaton who is to act upon Isocrates’ advise as upon law.  Of course, implicit in 
Isocrates’ advice is the supposition that if Philip considers the matter carefully he will 
come to agree with Isocrates’ views.  Unlike Isocrates’ own students, who have already 
made the mistake of inconsiderate judgment (Philip 24), Philip ought to carefully study 
the whole of Isocrates’ corpus in an unprejudiced manner and only then to deliberate on 
the specific policy proposal at hand (Philip 138).365  Philip too is something of a 
philosopher and able to employ Isocratean παιδεία for himself.   
Philip is neither the mere recipient of Isocratean wisdom, nor simply the means by 
which Isocrates can attain his end.366  The champion for the cause of panhellenic peace 
must not only be able to speak and act, and be of good repute (Philip 13), but must also 
be a philosophically-minded individual in his own right.  His own social position within 
the cultural Greek elite draws him into sympathy with Isocrates’ views, just as acting on                                                         
364 Isocrates’ school of thought taught students both to εὖ φρονεῖν and λέγειν: see Poulakos, Speaking for 
the Polis, ch. 4.  
365 That Philip is encouraged to study the present speech alongside the rest of the Isocratean corpus also 
points to his role as a specifically Isocratean student-philosopher.  Too, Rhetoric of Identity, has stressed 
Isocrates’ view of his own corpus as a coherent whole; see particularly ch. 2.   
366 Isocrates often portrays his students thinking for themselves, and sometimes contrary to his own ideas: 
so the general Timotheus, Isocrates’ student who was later convicted of treason in the courts and went into 
exile, is portrayed in the Antidosis as a worthy leader who was nevertheless unable to conform his nature to 
Isocrates’ advice (Antidosis 101-39, especially 32-8); in the Panathenaicus, Isocrates praises a Spartan 
former student of his for reading his discourse in a pro-Spartan fashion (Panathenaicus 234-63).   
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those views will serve to reaffirm his position within that social sphere.  Philip thus 
becomes the ideal monarch as Isocrates understood him to be.367 
Monarchy and Democracy 
 In mentioning the Panegyricus, Isocrates makes it clear that he had entertained 
similar hopes before of Athens becoming the panhellenic leader of a peaceful Greece 
(Philip 9).  Moreover, as partners in the Peace of Philocrates, both Philip and Athens had 
the potential to be recipients of Isocrates’ advice.  The comparison between Athens and 
Philip implicit in the Amphipolis prologue is elaborated over the course of the speech.  
Ultimately, Isocrates attempts to show that Philip is indeed better suited to enacting his 
project than Athens.  In arguing that Philip would be a better panhellenic leader, Isocrates 
vindicates his own choice of Philip over Athens, a choice whose moral implications for 
Isocrates himself I will discuss in the next section.  First, however, I will explore the way 
the contrast between the Macedonian king and the Athenians helps to define Philip 
himself.  Isocrates focuses his comparison of the two potential panhellenic leaders on 
constitutional issues.  Isocrates portrays Philip as politically outside the Greek world, and 
claims that this gives Philip an advantage that Athens can never have.  He also lauds 
Philip’s capabilities as a monarch not bound by laws and community mores.368  While 
Isocrates only praises monarchy in so far as it is exercised over non-Greeks, he does 
                                                        
367 Compare Isocrates’ advice to Nicocles:  
ὅ τι ἂν ἀκριβῶσαι βουληθῇς ὧν ἐπίστασθαι προσήκει τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ἐμπειρίᾳ 
μέτιθι καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν τὰς ὁδούς σοι δείξει, τὸ δ ̓ ἐπ ̓ αὐτῶν 
τῶν ἔργων γυμνάζεσθαι δύνασθαί σε χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι ποιήσει. 
Whenever you desire to thoroughly understand what kings ought to know, pursue it in 
practice as well as in study; for studying will show you the way, and training yourself in 
actuality will make you able to deal with matters. (To Nicocles 35).    
368 Noted by Isajeva, “Political Programme of Isocrates,” 166, who also contrasts Isocrates’ view of Philip’s 
power with that of Demosthenes’ (166 n. 14).  
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claim for the monarchy the potential to be more successful than any other type of 
government.     
In the Panegyricus, Isocrates had argued that Sparta and Athens ought to resolve 
their differences and lead a panhellenic expedition against Persia (Panegyricus 15-17).  
Despite this initial call for a partnership between the two cities, Isocrates spent the rest of 
the speech arguing that Athens had the better right to lead the Hellenic world. He rested 
his case on the innate superiority of the Athenians as well as on the city’s past 
munificence to the rest of Greece.  Athens, Isocrates argued, was unique among the other 
Greek poleis in the purity of its Hellenic descent: Athenian autochthony was the reason 
why “we alone among the Greeks can call [the city] our nurse, father, and mother” 
[μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν τῶν  Ἑλλήνων τὴν αὐτὴν τροφὸν καὶ πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα 
καλέσαι προσήκει] (Panegyricus 25).  Isocrates also credited Athens as the birthplace of 
human civilization, as emblematized by the twin gifts of farming and religion 
(Panegyricus 28-33), as well as the establishment of the Hellenic world through 
colonization (Panegyricus 34-37).   Athens’ preeminence is thus founded on ancestral 
right coupled with a continued record of benefaction to the rest of Greece.   
Isocrates crafted Philip’s merits – some current, some still potential - as an 
analogue to his praise of Athens in the Panegyricus.  Thus Philip, too, has a claim to 
ancestral preeminence in Greece based on his descent from Heracles, the “benefactor of 
all of Greece” [ἁπάσης... τῆς Ἑλλάδος εὐεργέτης] (Philip 76).369  Like Athens, Philip 
is of prestigious lineage that assures him the goodwill of the entire Greek world.  More 
                                                        
369 Isocrates also included in the Philip an encomium of Heracles (Philip 105-6; 109-112), which presents 
the hero as a model for Philip.  Isocrates perhaps also wished to emphasize the myth of Philip’s Heraclid 
ancestry because it was such a contested issue (see above, pp. 27-32); however, he (wisely?) makes no 
mention of the existence of such doubts.     
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particularly, Isocrates ties Philip to the four major cities of mainland Greece – Argos, 
Thebes, Sparta, and Athens - via his Heraclid ancestry (Philip 32-33).370  At the same 
time, Philip’s Argead ancestors also materially benefited the Greeks.  So the first Argead 
king – who remains unnamed in the Philip - had the benefit of the Hellenes in mind when 
he chose to travel beyond the bounds of Greece and exercise his rule in Macedonia, rather 
than imposing a tyranny upon his native Argos (Philip 106).  Such, then, are Philip’s 
ancestral rights to privilege; his own benefactions, Isocrates asserts, will be made 
manifest once he is able to bring the panhellenic world to a state of peace (Philip 68).  At 
that point the Greeks themselves will willingly acknowledge his leadership (Philip 69; 
95).371  This is a task which, Isocrates asserts, would be impossible for anyone but Philip, 
whose ability to succeed at impossible tasks has already been proven (Philip 41).  Finally, 
in leading the panhellenic expedition against the Persians, Philip will open up new land to 
be settled by the poor and migrant populations that now infest Greece (Philip 121-3).  
Thus Philip, like Athens, is of impeccable ancestry and will bring peace and prosperity to 
the Hellenic world.  Philip’s uniqueness as a benefactor of the Greeks is closely modeled 
on Athenian exceptionalism as presented in the Panegyricus. 
Despite the parallelism between Athens and Philip, Isocrates does not stop at 
simply ‘replacing’ the former with the latter.  Rather, he argues that in terms of his 
political situation Philip is even better suited than Athens for panhellenic leadership.                                                          
370 Isocrates list of the ‘greatest cities of Greece’ varied over his lifetime; in his Panegyricus for example, 
which features a similar proposal for all of Greece to turn their martial effort against Persia, the leaders of 
the expedition were to be Athens and Sparta (though cf. Panegyricus 64, which lists all four as the 
greatest).  Isocrates’ choice of these four cities, and particularly his elevation of Argos into the ranks of the 
greatest Hellenic powers of the day, was less practical than it was attuned to those places best connected to 
Philip’s Heraclid ancestry – under which criteria, Argos is surely preeminent as the place of Argead origin 
(Philip 32).       
371 Isocrates never appears to consider the possibility of ingratitude; rather, a good act inevitably binds the 
recipient to gratitude, thus creating a bond of goodwill [εὔνοια] between the two parties.  See de Romilly, 
Eunoia in Isocrates, esp. pp. 98-101.  
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Isocrates bases this claim on Philip’s unusual position as a Greek king whose seat of 
power is outside the Greek world.  Indeed, inasmuch as he is a Hellene ruling over a non-
Greek people, Philip is unique among all the previous recipients of Isocreatean 
exhortations.  A direct comparison between Athens and Philip again proves particularly 
telling in this respect. In the Panegyricus, Isocrates had argued that one of Athens’ key 
benefactions to the Hellenes was the establishment of polities and laws, the twin 
foundations of appropriate human relationships: 
Παραλαβοῦσα γὰρ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀνόμως ζῶντας καὶ σποράδην 
οἰκοῦντας, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ δυναστειῶν ὑβριζομένους τοὺς δὲ δι ̓ 
ἀναρχίαν ἀπολλυμένους, καὶ τούτων τῶν κακῶν αὐτοὺς 
ἀπήλλαξε, τῶν μὲν κυρία γενομένη, τοῖς δ ̓ αὑτὴν παράδειγμα 
ποιήσασα· πρώτη γὰρ καὶ νόμους ἔθετο καὶ πολιτείαν 
κατεστήσατο.   
For, finding the Greeks living lawlessly and scattered about – either being 
violently oppressed by overlords or devastated because of anarchy, 
[Athens] released them from both evils, becoming mistress of the former 
and the model for the latter; for she was the first to set down laws and 
establish polities. (Panegyricus 39).  
Thus Athens is credited with creating the polis structure and lawful government.  
Isocrates also praises the city’s love of justice and the equality between the rich and the 
poor which it engendered (Panegyricus 104-5).  Monarchy and tyrannical leadership, on 
the other hand, come in for harsh criticism: in the passage above, for example, dynasts as 
well as anarchy oppress the Greeks.372   Nevertheless, in the Philip Isocrates argues that a 
monarch is better positioned to accomplish great things than any individual constrained 
under the rule of a polity.   
                                                        
372 See also Jean-Pierre Liou, “Isocrate et le vocabulaire du pouvoir personnel: roi, monarque et tyran,” 
Ktèma 16 (1991): 211-217. 
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Isocrates lauds the freedom of movement afforded to Philip because of his 
kingship.  Comparing his capability to that of other Greeks, Isocrates finds Philip’s 
potential to be greater: 
Ἅ περ ἐγὼ γνοὺς διαλεχθῆναι σοὶ προειλόμην, οὐ πρὸς χάριν 
ἐκλεξάμενος... ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἑώρων τοὺς ἐνδόξους τῶν 
ἀνδρῶν ὑπὸ πόλεσι καὶ νόμοις οἰκοῦντας, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς 
ἄλλο πράττειν πλὴν τὸ προσταττόμενον, ἔτι δὲ πολὺ 
καταδεεστέρους ὄντας τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ῥηθησομένων, σοὶ δὲ 
μόνῳ πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης δεδομένην κα πρέσβεις 
πέμπειν πρὸς οὕς τινας ἂν βουληθῇς, καὶ δέχεσθαι παρ ̓ ὧν ἄν σοι 
δοκῇ, καὶ λέγειν ὅ τι ἂν ἡγῇ συμφέρειν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ 
πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν κεκτημένον ὅσην οὐδεὶς τῶν  Ἑλλήνων, ἃ 
μόνα τῶν ὄντων καὶ πείθειν καὶ βιάζεσθαι πέφυκεν· ὧν οἶμαι καὶ τὰ 
ῥηθησόμενα προσδεήσεσθαι.   
Considering these things I chose to address you.  I made this choice not 
because I wished to curry favor, but because I saw other distinguished 
men living in cities and bound by laws, unable to do anything save what 
was proscribed, and, moreover, unequal to the matter I am about to 
propose; but [I saw] that to you alone fortune had given the ability to send 
ambassadors to whomever you wished, to receive them from wherever 
seemed best to you, and to say whatever seemed to you to be most fitting; 
and, in addition to this, [I saw] that you had acquired wealth and power to 
a greater degree than any other Hellene, which are the most suitable things 
of all for persuasion and the use of force.  These last, I think, are also 
needed for my proposal. (To Philip 14-5).      
Isocrates establishes Philip’s political freedom by specifically opposing it to the Greek 
political system of polis laws which constrained the individual.373  The king, by contrast, 
is free from the polity’s laws; his actions are not under anybody’s supervision.374  The                                                         
373 The constraint exerciesd by the polis on the individual was a halmark of the Athenian democracy, at the 
same time lauded by the oratorsin public forums and lamented by the elites, who saw it as an encroachment 
into their private affairs: see Balot, Greek Political Thought, 57-63.  Public officials, in particular, were 
constrained by the εὔθυναι that ensured their accountability; and there were a host of other potential ways 
of indicting a magistrate: see Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 212-24 on εἰςαγγελία and εὔθυναι. 
374 The king is rather, as we will see, constrained by appropriate ethics.  This is consistent with Isocrates’ 
discourse on kingship and tyranny, particularly as articulated in the To Nicocles, where Isocrates argues 
that the tyrannt’s position is a disadvantage to him because he is not induced by the laws and by other 
social contraints to learn how to live ethically (To Nicocles 3-4).  See also Balot, Greek Political Thought, 
146-53, on ethics as a counterbalance to monarchic imperialism and Kathryn Morgan, “The Tyranny of the 
Audience in Plato and Isocrates,” in Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents, ed. Kathryn 
Morgan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 188-91 on ‘constitutional slipage’ and the consequent 
emphasis on ethics.   
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passage is particularly striking in its apparent repudiation of any and all Greek types of 
government dependent on the polis, whether tyrannical, oligarchic, or democratic.  By 
taking aim at poleis and nomoi rather than Athenian democracy specifically, Isocrates 
seems to be criticizing the polis system as a whole - precisely that system which he had 
praised Athens for instituting in the Panegyricus.375 
Isocrates’ words are quite similar to those which Demosthenes employed to 
lament Philip’s power in the Olynthiacs and On the Crown 235-6 (see above, pp. 106-
107, 179-181).376   Like Demosthenes, Isocrates argues that Philip’s freedom plays out in 
three areas of action.  In the first place, Philip is able to send and receive embassies as he 
pleases.  Philip’s kingship thus leaves him free on the political front.  His kingship also 
gives him unprecedented wealth and military power with which to persuade or force 
others to his will.377  In describing Philip’s position, Isocrates uses the same tripartite 
schema employed by Demosthenes in his consideration of kingship in Olynthiac I.378  
Isocrates and Demosthenes appear to be drawing upon a similar rhetoric concerning the 
efficiency of kingship, though in the event they use it to suit their own ends.       
 In his position as an outsider to the Greek poleis, Philip is of course following in 
the venerable footsteps of his ancestors.  As I have already mentioned, Isocrates lauds the                                                         
375 Isocrates’ critique of the polis rather than radical democracy is all the more pointed because he did not 
hesitate to criticise the latter elsewhere, even elsewhere in the Philip: see Philip 81-2.  The Areopagiticus is 
Isocrates’ most sustained critique of the 4th century democracy, counceling a return to the democracy ‘of 
Solon and Cleisthenes’ (Areopagiticus 20).  On Isocrates’ balance of oligarchic and democratic points of 
view see Isajeva, “Problem of πάτριος πολιτεία in Isocrates.” 
376 Also noted by Stephen Usher, “Isocrates: Paideia, Kingship and the Barbarians,” in The birth of the 
European Identity: the Europe-Asia contrast in Greek thought, 490-322 B.C., ed. H. Akbar Khan 
(Nottingham: University of Nottingham, 1994), 138. 
377 It is interesting to note that Isocrates apparently sees bribery as a viable weapon in Philip’s arsenal.  That 
he was not averse to the monarch’s use of wealth, presumably when used toward a good end, see also 
Nicocles 22. 
378 In the Nicocles, Isocrates had also already argued that the monarch’s freedom leads to a greater 
efficiency in government (Nicocles 22), precisely the point made by Demosthenes in lamenting the 
constraints imposed on him by the democratic process in On the Crown.   
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first Argead, who knew better than to try to establish his power over a Greek polis but 
chose rather to reign over the barbarians, whose temperament was eminently more suited 
to monarchy (Philip 106-8).  Philip’s ancestor did so, Isocrates states, because he knew 
that if he took power in Argos civic strife and factionalism would follow: thus the first 
Argead was avoiding the same kind of internecine wars that currently plagued the whole 
Greek world, albeit on a smaller scale (Philip 107).379  Like Philip, the first Argead is 
unique in his repudiation of a political position (whether simple citizenship or monarchy) 
within the framework of the Greek polis.  Even more pointed is Isocrates’ discourse on 
Heracles, whom he presents as a model for Philip.  Heracles, like the Argeads, holds a 
unique position vis-à-vis the Hellenic world: though not part of its political structure, he 
is able to achieve the twin goals of panhellenic peace and victory over the barbarians 
(Philip 111-2).  Heracles seems not to have been able to muster a truly panhellenic 
expedition against Troy precisely because of his lack of official status, though naturally 
what he lacked in manpower he made up for in skill.  Instead of social hierarchy, the 
bond between Heracles and the Greeks is built on the basis of εὔνοια (Philip 114).  
Again, εὔνοια, a powerful political force in Isocratean philosophy, has displaced social 
or political position as the basis for true political power.  The fact that Heracles and the 
first Argead, and now Philip, stood outside the Greek political world of the polis gave 
them the ability to change Hellenic politics for the better.        
 More particularly, the ability of Philip and his ancestors to create ὁμόνοια – that 
agreement which results from the growth of εὔνοια between two parties – is due to their 
position as nonpartisan arbitrators.  Isocrates advances the notion that Philip’s lack of                                                         
379 By gaining his kingdom outside of Greece, where he was in fact superior to those he ruled, the Argead 
founder also made his dynasty more stable and of longer duration (Philip 108).   
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loyalty to any one Greek city gives him an impartial perspective on Greek affairs.  This 
lack of loyalty to a particular polis distinguishes Philip from among the other Greeks as a 
most suitable partner for Isocrates himself.  Specifically, Isocrates contrasts Philip’s 
position to that of other Heraclids, who might at first blanche appear to be Philip’s rivals 
for the role of panhellenic leader:    
Προσήκει δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις τοῖς ἀφ ̓ Ἡρακλέους πεφυκόσι καὶ τοῖς 
ἐν πολιτείᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐνδεδεμένοις ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν στέργειν, ἐν ᾗ 
τυγχάνουσι κατοικοῦντες, σὲ δ ̓ ὥσπερ ἄφετον γεγενημένον 
ἅπασαν τὴν  Ἑλλάδα πατρίδα νομίζειν, ὥσπερ ὁ γεννήσας ὑμᾶς, 
καὶ κινδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ὑπὲρ ὧν μάλιστα 
σπουδάζεις. 
It is fitting for the other Heraclids, who live under the constraints of a 
polity and her laws, to be partial to that city in which they happen to live.  
But it behooves you, as a man free from such mundane constraints, to 
consider the whole of Greece as your fatherland - just as your progenitor 
did - and to endanger yourself on her account just as you would about 
anything that especially concerns you. (Philip 127).  
While Isocrates approves of the loyalty engendered by the polis in citizens such as the 
other Heraclids, this partisanship hampers the credibility of the citizen who might with to 
become a panhellenistic leader.  That such national loyalty can harm the panhellenic 
agenda is evidenced by Isocrates’ story of Agesilaus, whose ambition of conquering 
Persia stalled precisely because of his many personal ties within Greece.  In helping his 
friends achieve power in their respective polities, Agesilaus embroiled himself and all of 
Greece in a war that sapped their collective strength (Philip 87).380  Philip’s lack of ties to 
any one polis, therefore, allows him to transcend regional differences.381   Moreover, 
Philip can explicitly model his relations with Greece on those of his father, Amyntas, 
who was on friendly terms with all four major powers (Sparta, Argos, Thebes, and                                                         
380 Isocrates’ critique of Agesilaos is a repetition of a passage in his letter To Archidamus 13, which argues 
that while war against the barbarian and helping one’s friends are equally laudable pursuits, they are 
incompatible.   
381 Also noted by Heilbrunn, “Isocrates on Rhetoric and Power,” 161-2. 
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Athens) (Philip 106).  In minimizing Philip’s ties to any one Greek city, Isocrates could 
claim for him the right to the goodwill [εὔνοια] of all.382   
Philip’s independence from internal Hellenic politics is precisely what 
differentiates him from Athens as a potential panhellenic leader.  While Philip – like 
Athens – has grounds to consider all of Greece his fatherland, he has the advantage over 
the city because he stands to the side of the petty internal wars which consume the 
Greeks.  As I have shown, Philip’s lack of loyalty to any single polis lends credibility to 
his role as arbitrator between the Greeks and concomitantly facilitates his assumption of a 
truly panhellenic position of leadership.    Philip need only emulate the example of the 
founder of the Argead dynasty, who did not aspire to kingship over his native Argos 
precisely because such an action would foster strife and factionalism (To Philip 107), and 
of Heracles, who was the benefactor of all Greece equally.  By comparison, Isocrates 
fears that Athens, deeply embedded as it was in the political tensions of the past hundred 
and fifty years, would be unable to refrain from factional strife – unless, of course, it was 
constrained to do so by Philip (Philip 8-9).383  While Isocrates does not reject native polis 
loyalty as a force for good among the common rank and file, he does argue that such 
                                                        
382 See de Romilly, “Eunoia in Isocrates,” who argues that Isocrates’ rhetoric of εὔνοια should be read as a 
rejection of Thucydidean φόβος.  Speusippus misses the point when he argues that, if Isocrates had really 
wanted to flatter Philip, he ought to have pointed to the nominal Athenian citizenship Philip gains as a 
Heraclid.  Speusippus’ claim, that Philip has a right to Athenian citizenship because Heracles became the 
adoptive son of Pyleus, is an obvious sleight-of-hand that takes no account of Athenian citizenship laws.  
Nevertheless, his entire point – that Isocrates could have insisted on a closer relationship between Philip 
and Athens – misses the mark, since this claim would in fact have been detrimental to Isocrates’ larger 
argument that Philip had to transcent regional differences.  I would suggest that the same holds with respect 
to Speusippus’ argument that Isocrates ought to have mentioned Philip’s involvement with the 
Amphictyony.   It is true that at the time Isocrates was writing his Philip the 3rd Sacred War had played 
itself out, and therefore Isocrates had no way of knowing that Philip would receive the votes in the League 
that had formerly belonged to the Phocians; nevertheless, given Isocrates’ rhetoric, it seems unlikely that he 
would have brought up Philip’s new membership even if he could have done so, just as he had ignored 
Philip’s ‘citizen status’.  Isocrates consistently councils Philip to stand aloof from active participation in 
precisely such political strife as the Amphictyony was known to breed.   
383 So also Isocrates Epistle III 2. 
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loyalties are detrimental for panhellenic leaders.  Philip, whose ties to all major poleis are 
equal, has no competing loyalties to hold him back from making panhellenic peace a 
reality.      
Panhellenism and Utopia   
The political center of the Hellenic world has shifted.  Athens is no longer to be 
the political model from which the rest of Greece learns laws and the ways of public life 
(Panegyricus 39-40), though in παιδεία it may still remain preeminent.384  Rather, it will 
be to Philip and the Macedonian court that the rest of Greece will turn for advice:  
Τίς γὰρ ἂν ὑπερβολὴ γένοιτο τῆς τοιαύτης εὐδαιμονίας, ὅταν 
πρέσβεις μὲν ἥκωσιν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων πόλεων οἱ μάλιστ ̓ 
εὐδοκιμοῦντες εἰς τὴν σὴν δυναστείαν, μετὰ δὲ τούτων βουλεύῃ 
περὶ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας, περὶ ἧς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος φανήσεται 
τοιαύτην πρόνοιαν πεποιημένος, αἰσθάνῃ δὲ τὴν  Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν 
ὀρθὴν οὖσαν ἐφ ̓ οἷς σὺ τυγχάνεις εἰσηγούμενος, μηδεὶς δ ̓ 
ὀλιγώρως ἔχῃ τῶν παρὰ σοὶ βραβευομένων, ἀλλ ̓ οἱ μὲν 
πυνθάνωνται περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, οἱ δ ̓ εὔχωνταί σε μὴ 
διαμαρτεῖν ὧν ἐπεθύμησας, οἱ δὲ δεδίωσι μὴ πρότερόν τι πάθῃς 
πρὶν τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς πραττομένοις; 
For what addition might there be to such good fortune, when the most 
distinguished ambassadors from the greatest cities come to your court and 
you deliberate with them about the common welfare – concerning which 
nobody will appear to have given as much forethought as you?  And when 
you will see that all of Greece eagerly waits upon whatever you happen to 
propose, and everybody pays attention to your judgments - some asking 
how matters stand, some praying for you lest you fail in achieving your 
desires, and some fearing lest you suffer some accident before you 
accomplish what you have set out to do? (Philip 69-70)     
In the new world order which Isocrates envisions after panhellenic peace has been 
achieved, Philip’s court will dispense political wisdom, both through advice and through 
example, throughout the Greek world.  The Greek world, in turn, will be attuned to news 
from the Macedonian court and will equate their own good with that of Philip.                                                             
384 The Philip makes no mention of Athenian cultural preeminence, but of course Isocrates himself, as a 
teacher remains firmly rooted in Athens.   
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Isocrates envisions εὔνοια, rather than any more formalized power relationship, 
as the basis for future relations between Philip and the Greeks.385  For the philosopher, 
the Peace of Philocrates foreshadows the new state which will be achieved once all the 
Greek poleis are at peace with each other.  In the case of the conflict over Amphipolis, 
Isocrates argued that both Philip and Athens were wasting their energy in a contest where 
winning offered no practical advantage to either party, while peace would be useful to 
both (Philip 2-3).  Furthermore, he argued that Philip ought to seek Athenian friendship 
[φιλία] (Philip 5) and goodwill [εὔνοια] (Philip 6).  Isocrates’ advice in the present 
speech seeks not only to make this peace between Athens and Philip permanent, but also 
to extend it to the rest of the Greek world (Philip 8).  For the Peace of Philocrates is a 
model for Philip’s future relations - not only with Athens but also with the other three 
major powers in Isocrates list: Sparta, Argos, and Thebes (Philip 7-9; 56).    By fostering 
relations based on εὔνοια among the Greeks, ὁμόνοια, the concord that arises from 
mutual good will, would take the place of covetousness [πλεονεξία] as everyone came 
to realize that their mutual interest lay in the conquest of the Persian Empire.386  Ideally, 
Philip was to achieve his ends in Greece by persuasion [πείθειν], while the use of force [βιάζεσθαι] was to be redirected against the barbarians (To Philip 16).387  Philip’s 
                                                        
385 See de Romilly, “Eunoia in Isocrates,” on εὔνοια in Isocrates and the broader Athenian political 
discourse of the 5th and 4th centuries.    
386 See Perlman, “Isocrates’ ‘Philippus’ and Panhellenism,” 372-3, who points out that in the Philip εὔνοια 
is the precondition – and not the result – of the panhellenic expedition against Persia.  See de Romilly, 
“Eunoia in Isocrates,” 98, and Perlman, “Isocrates’ Philippus – a Reinterpretation,” 310, on εὔνοια and 
ὁμόνοια.  See Bouchet, “La πλεονεξία chez Isocrate,” on Isocrates’ use of πλεονεξία. 
387 See also Philip 73-75.  Nevertheless, Isocrates was not above acquiescing to Philip’s use of force against 
the Greeks when the matter was a fait accompli: in his letter to Philip after the battle of Chaeronea, 
Isocrates acknowledges that the situation is now different from that of 346, when, he says, he had suggested 
the Philip persuade the Greeks to be well-disposed toward him:  
 
Τότε μὲν οὖν ἄλλος ἦν καιρός, νῦν δὲ συμβέβηκε μηκέτι δεῖν πείθειν· διὰ γὰρ τὸν 
ἀγῶνα τὸν γεγενημένον ἠναγκασμένοι πάντες εἰσὶν εὖ φρονεῖν καὶ τούτων 
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authority would then derive from the willingness of the Greek states to trust in his 
foresight and his unquestionable superiority.388     
Isocrates did not envision the world order resulting from Hellenic ὁμόνοια as a 
formalized organization.389  The practical ramifications of Philip’s leadership, indeed, are 
left open to interpretation; on only one point is Isocrates positive: that Philip was not to 
achieve preeminence in Greece through conquest, as the demagogues were suggesting 
(Philip 73-5).390  Once the poleis could be brought to ‘think clearly’ [εὖ φρονείν], 
Isocrates contended, all would come to freely acknowledge that their collective advantage 
lay in an expedition against Persia.  Philip would be the natural choice for leadership of 
the expedition because of his ancestry, his skill, and his standing as a political outsider in 
the Greek world.     
                                                                                                                                                                     
ἐπιθυμεῖν ὧν ὑπονοοῦσί σε βούλεσθαι πράττειν καὶ λέγειν, ὑς δεῖ παυσαμένους 
τῆς μανίας καὶ τῆς πλεονεξίας, ἣν ἐποιοῦντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους, εἰς τὴν   ̓Ασίαν τὸν 
πόλεμον  ἐξενεγκεῖν. 
That was a different situation, and now there is no more need for persuasion; for because 
of the battle [of Chaeronea], all are compelled to be prudent and to desire that which they 
suspect you wish to do and say – namely, to cease from the madness and the 
aggrandizement which guided their treatment of each other and to carry the war into Asia 
(Epistle 3. 2). 
See Marzi, “Isocrate e Filippo II di Macedonia,” who argues for the authenticity of the letter. 
388 In this way Philip’s relations with the Greeks mirror the ideal relationship of a king to his people, as 
envisioned by Isocrates elsewhere: see for example 2.24; 3.51-56.  
389 The point that major states are to keep their independence is more openly argued in the Panegyricus, 
one of the models of the speech to Philip: see 17; 78-81.  Nevertheless, this independence for the largest 
powers goes hand in hand with the rule of the smaller poleis.  See, for example, Isocrates’ defense of the 
Athenian Empire at Panegyricus 100-105.  Perlman, “Isocrates’ ‘Philippus’ and Panhellenism,” also argues 
that Isocrates wished to redirect Philip’s imperialism from Greece to Persia.  On Isocrates’ possible 
influence on the League of Corinth see Jacqueline de Romilly, “Isocrates and Europe,” Greece and Rome 
39 (1992): 11. 
390 Here Isocrates’ notably deviates from his argument in the Panegyricus, which stressed the propriety of 
Athens’ empire (100-19).  Isocrates justifies Athens’ primacy in lawgiving  justice (26-7; 39-40).  See 
Isajeva, “Political Programme of Isocrates,” 171, on εὔνοια as an antithesis for κράτος in the speech. 
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Political Disengagement 
I have argued above that Philip’s lack of attachment to a particular polis was 
precisely what made him best able to champion Isocrates’ panhellenic point of view.  In 
the present section I consider Philip’s identity as a political outsider in the Hellenic world 
in relation to Isocrates’ own espousal of a panhellenistic mindset.  While the Philip was 
not the first speech in which Isocrates advocated panhellenism, the problems associated 
with this viewpoint are particularly felt in this speech.  For previously, Isocrates had 
conveniently coupled panhellenism with Athenian preeminence: as the progenitor and 
capital of normative Greek life, as embodied by nomoi and philosophia, Athens became 
almost synonymous with the larger Hellenic world: thus, for example, Isocrates 
highlighted the openness of Athenian society to the rest of the Greek world (Panegyricus 
38-45) and even called Athens the capital of Greece (Antidosis 299-300).  In the Philip, 
however, it is Pella – not Athens – which is to become the heart of the future unified 
Greece.  In this speech, where panhellenism is no longer synonymous with 
Athenocentrism - and, indeed, nationalistic fervor actually detracts from panhellenic 
sentiment - Isocrates’ personal loyalty to Athens becomes newly problematic.  For if 
panhellenism is best championed by a political outsider, where does that leave Isocrates 
the Athenian?  Thus Isocrates poses no mere rhetorical question when he worries that, in 
addressing his speech to Philip, he will cast his loyalty to Athens into doubt (Philip 129-
31). Envisioning a future where the mantle of panhellenism is taken up by a king whose 
seat of power is outside the Greek world seems at odds with Isocrates’ persona as a proud 
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and loyal Athenian citizen.391  That Isocrates argues for the Philip as a ‘new’ Panegyricus 
emphasizes this problem, since the earlier speech advocated so powerfully for a 
panhellenism coupled with Athenian preeminence.  While Isocrates mobilizes a number 
of different strategies to resolve this crisis of loyalties, I will argue that the most sustained 
strategy he deploys is to be found in the parallelism between Isocrates’ and Philip’s 
political personae.  Isocrates, like Philip, can be read as a political outsider whose impact 
on Athenian/Greek politics, while real, is as informal – in so far as it does not follow 
normative political channels – as he envisions Philip’s will be.  Isocrates can espouse 
panhellenism because, like Philip, he is an outsider in Athenian political life.  
There are a number of possible solutions to the tension between Isocrates’ 
nationalism and his panhellenism that are floated over the course of the Philip.  Early in 
the speech, for example, Isocrates attempts to minimize the problem by framing 
panhellenism as a policy which would benefit Athens along with the other Greek cities.   
It ‘just so happens’ that Athenian needs will be best served by adopting a panhellenic 
policy (Philip 9).392  Moreover, Isocrates stresses that the origin of his policy lies in 
Athenian concerns.393  Thus the question which the speech is designed to answer is 
specifically Athenian in outlook: how should Athens – not Philip or even all of Greece - 
remain at peace (Philip 8-9)?  Nevertheless, this Athenocentric conceit falters rather 
quickly, to be replaced by concern for the welfare of all Greece (see for example Philip 
                                                        
391 Too notes this tension but claims that for Isocrates, “just as being a quietist is in the end more important 
than being able to speak in public, being Athenian ultimately takes precedence over and eclipses being 
Greek” (Rhetoric of Identity, p. 129).   
392 A convenient elision, but one Isocrates was immensely fond of: see for example Antidosis 79. 
393 Though in the latter portions of the speech Isocrates expresses concern for the whole of Greece: see 
Philip 149.  
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149-50).394  Moreover, even if the goal of Isocrates’ policy is the benefit of Athens along 
with the other Greeks, this still does not deal with the fact that the position of leadership 
among the Greeks is to be taken by Philip, not Athens (Philip 128-31).  Another strategy 
Isocrates briefly employs is to claim the approval of the gods for his plan: toward the end 
of the Philip he wonders whether it was not the gods that inspired him to write his speech 
and whether the gods will inspire Philip to action (Philip 150-1).  He openly affirms that 
the gods must have been behind Philip’s successes thus far (Philip 151-2), arguing that 
they had designed Philip’s early career as a kind of testing ground to hone his skill on 
campaign.  Again, it is τύχη that leads Philip to glory (Philip 152).395  Thus Isocrates 
attempts to deflect the agency for his proposals onto a deity, as well as to rationalize 
Philip’s present success, by pointing to the influence of a higher power.   
I suggest, however, that Isocrates saw a more fundamental resolution to the 
dilemma between panhellenism and loyalty to Athens in the symmetry he built between 
his own and Philip’s relations toward Athens/Greece.  I have already pointed in a 
previous section to the parallels between Isocrates’ self-imaging and that of Philip; 
specifically, the philosopher presents both himself and the king as political thinkers.  I 
also pointed to the characterizations of Isocrates and Philip in the Amphipolis prologue as 
lone visionaries in the woods, aiming at peace while the rest of the world, identified with 
the Athenian politicians and Philip’s advisors, aims for war.  Both understand the 
distinction between petty politics and a grander vision for Greece; both are at odds with 
the political world around them.  I have already shown the Amphipolis prologue to be                                                         
394 Isajeva, “Political Programme of Isocrates,” 170, has argued that Isocrates takes the position of impartial 
arbitrator between Athens and Philip.   
395 Here again Isocrates’ language is reminiscent of Demosthenes (or rather, Demosthenes is reminiscent of 
Isocrates): Demosthenes cites τύχη or divine influence as the reason for Philip’s success on a number of 
occassions, though most prominently in the Crown speech. 
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programmatic for the Philip as a whole in other ways.  The parallel between Isocrates and 
Philip in the Amphipolis prologue thus suggests that we should continue to read their 
political positions as symmetrical throughout the speech.  For Isocrates’ vision of Philip’s 
future relations with the Greeks takes on new meaning when viewed as a parallel to 
Isocrates’ own position in relation to the Athenian political world.  Both Isocrates’ and 
Philip’s identities are founded on the tension between their insider and outsider status: 
thus Philip’s status as a political outsider, as discussed above, acts as a validation for his 
panhellenic leadership.   In the same way, Isocrates’ renouncement of an active role in 
the Athenian democracy, a feature of his self-construction throughout his corpus, allows 
him to espouse Philip’s panhellenic leadership in the Philip.396    
A central section of the speech (Philip 72-82), in particular, focuses on the 
parallel political situations of Isocrates and Philip.   Set off by a programmatic apology 
for the turn to a new and touchy topic (Philip 72), the section begins by examining the 
anti-Philippic views of the Athenian politicians (Philip 73-5) and ends with Isocrates’ 
own self-identification as both an ἀπράγμων and a politician (Philip 81-2; see also 
above, pp. 200-202).  Between these arguments is an exhortation to Philip not to ignore 
the slanders directed against him among the Greeks (Philip 78-80).  By framing his 
advice to Philip with his views on Athenian politics and his own role therein, Isocrates 
literally embeds Philip in the political situation at Athens.  Structuring the section in this 
way allows Isocrates to bring out the parallels between himself and the Macedonian king 
with respect to the contentious politics of the ekklesia.                                                            
396 In saying that Isocrates renounces an active political life I do not mean to suggest that he is apolitical.  
Isocrates’ rhetoric is of course deeply political and even practical, in so far as it sought to create a better 
political discourse in Athens.  See Haskins, “Rhetoric between Orality and Literacy,” 163-4.  Isocrates also 
participates in the polis in so far as his duties as a citizen are concerned; the conceit of the Antidosis, for 
example, finds Isocrates serving as a trierarch (Antidosis 5).   
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Isocrates consistently disapproved of the narrow, self-interested vision plaguing 
contemporary politicians and the Athenian demos.  In the Antidosis, for example, he 
criticized the Athenians for creating a false dichotomy between Athenocentrism and the 
panhellenic policies espoused by the better rhetors (Antidosis 301-3).  Elsewhere, he 
called the panhellenic agenda the more noble as well as the more difficult line of 
argument, opposing it to nationalism (To Archidamus 7).  Isocrates’ synoptic view of the 
Hellenic world is thus antithetical to the active politicians’ narrower understanding of 
Athenian interests (Antidosis 3).  In the Philip, as well, Isocrates’ sets himself against 
Philip’s detractors in Athens, whom he portrays discussing particular Macedonian 
policies toward particular cities instead of looking at the larger picture (Philip 73-77). 
The list of their arguments – Philip’s rescue of the Messenians, Philip’s involvement in 
the Third Sacred War, his relations with the Thessalians, Thebans, the Amphictyony; and 
the Argives, Messenians, and Lacedaemonians (Philip 74) - particularizes the Greek 
world in a way which is contrary to Isocrates’ panhellenic view.   Narrow 
Athenocentrism and the desire to look at the individual interests of various poleis are 
contrasted with Isocrates’ broader, panhellenic vision.   
Furthermore, a panhellenic viewpoint is fostered by Isocratean ἀπραγμοσύνη 
rather than the busy lifestyle of the active politician.397  Isocrates insists that his own 
abnegation of political activity is exactly what allows him to be the best advocate of his 
ideas (Philip 81).  At the same time, Isocrates’ own ἀπραγμοσύνη is different from the 
disengagement he ascribes to the sophists, who may be disinterested in active politics but 
                                                        
397 On ἀπραγμοσύνη as an Athenian cultural phenomenon see L. B. Carter, The Quiet Athenian (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986). 
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who, at the same time, busy themselves in completely impractical pursuits (Philip 12).398  
Isocrates charts for himself a middle course: though unable to harangue the demos, 
Isocrates has the judgment and παιδεία necessary to give proper council 
[συμβουλεύειν] through his written speeches (Philip 81-2).399  Thus Isocratean παιδεία 
displaces participation in polis politics as Isocrates’ means of displaying his engagement 
with Athens/Greece.400  Indeed, for Isocrates παιδεία becomes as much an indicator of 
Hellenic identity as political activity was in normative Athenian ideology.401  For 
example, in the Evagoras Isocrates can claim the Cypriots involvement in music and 
παιδεία as evidence of their Hellenization (Evagoras 47-50).  In the Philip, Isocrates’ 
valorization of παιδεία as an indicator of Hellenic identity is of course clear in the figure 
of Philip himself, who is an educated Hellene without, however, being part of a polis.402  
Hellenic identity as construed by Isocrates, in sum,  is not dependent upon embededness 
in the political life of a specific polis.  This rupture between engagement in polis life and                                                         
398 Isocrates famously wrote his Against the Sophists at the onset of his career as a rhetorical teacher to 
outline his own brand of practical παιδεία to potential pupils; the Antidosis speech is also a classic locus 
for Isocrates’ rejection of sophistic rhetoric.  See Ekaterina Haskins, “Logos and Power in Sophistical and 
Isocratean Rhetoric,” in Isocrates and Civic Education, ed. David Depew and Takis Poulakos (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2004), 84-103; also Poulakos, Speaking for the Polis, passim, on the novelty of 
Isocrates’ παιδεία with respect to older and current sophistic models.  
399 It is intriguing, in this light, that Isocrates claimed at the beginning of the section to speak on this touchy 
subject “with freedom” [μετὰ παρρησίας] (Philip 72).   
400 See also Antidosis 80; 304-5.  See Niall Livingstone, “The Voice of Isocrates and the Dissemination of 
Cultural Power,” in Pedagogy and Power: Rhetorics of Classical Learning, ed. Yun Lee Too and Niall 
Livinsgstone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 263-281.  Being part of a polis was an 
expression of Hellenicity in the sense that poleis were civic structures unique to the Greek world.  
Engaging in the polis need not have meant overt political participation, but could take the form of 
engagement in religious, military, and other civic institutions.  In Athens, however, membership in the 
community took on overtly political connotations with the advent of democracy.   See P. J. Rhodes, “Civic 
Ideology and Citizenship,” in A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Ryan Balot 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 57-69 and Balot, Greek Political Thought, ch. 1. 
401 It has long been noted that Isocrates’ ideology of Hellenism foreshadowed the attitude of the Hellenistic 
world: see for example Perlman, “Isocrates’ ‘Philippus’ and Panhellenism.”  Isocrates’ valorization of 
Hellenic culture is reflected most prominently in his reinterpretation of Pericles’ statement that Athens was 
the ‘school of Greece’ to reflect Athens’ cultural accomplishments: see Panegyricus 47-50; Antidosis 295-
6.  See also de Romilly, “Isocrates and Europe,” 4-7.   
402 See Mathieu, Les Idées Politiques D’Isocrate, ch. 5. 
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Hellenism is not only key to Philip’s identity, but also to that of Isocrates, who is an 
Athenian who does not contribute to the polis through normative political channels.  By 
decoupling polis politics from Hellenism, Isocrates can self-identify as both an Athenian 
and an ἀπράγμων with a panhellenic sensibility.  Indeed, because the Athenocentric 
viewpoint is so prevalent among the common people, it becomes precisely Isocrates’ 
disengagement from active politics that allows him to see ‘panhellenically’.   Philip’s 
Heraclid ancestry and lack of ties to any one polis on the one hand, and Isocrates’ 
political ἀπραγμοσύνη on the other, has paradoxically made them the best champions 
of panhellenism. 
Political disengagement, of course, did not entail complete apathy to the current 
political world, either for Philip or for Isocrates.403  I noted above that the central portion 
of this section literally embeds the king within a framework of Hellenic politics.  The 
construction of the section, in placing Philip within Athenian politics, thus mirrors its 
central argument: namely, Isocrates’ advice that Philip heed public opinion and make 
sure that he is well thought of by the masses (Philip 78-80).404  Indeed, the dangers of 
apathy could potentially affect Isocrates himself.  That cultivating public opinion was a 
matter of critical importance for the philosopher is one of the main points of Isocrates’ 
Antidosis speech.  Thus the Antidosis finds Isocrates engaged in combating a similar set 
of misconceptions about himself and his school as are leveled at Philip by the Athenian 
politicians.  According to the lengthy prologue of the speech, Isocrates was challenged to                                                         
403 The peculiar combination of ἀπραγμοσύνη with political engagement is also not unique to Isocrates: 
see for example Brown, “False Idles: The Politics of the ‘Quiet Life,’” in A Companion to Greek and 
Roman Political Thought, ed. Ryan Balot, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 495-8, on this tension as it 
plays out in Plato and Aristotle.   
404 His good repute will, in turn, serve as the basis for a definitive relationship between Philip and the 
Hellenic world, such as that of the Spartan kings with respect to the Spartans or Philip himself with respect 
to his companions (Philip 79).  
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an exchange of property in the lawcourts, where he faced something of an identity crisis.  
While he had previously thought it unnecessary to defend himself and his φιλοσοφία 
because he thought that he already had the good opinion of the people, he soon realized 
that he was not well thought of and that, moreover, he could no longer ignore the general 
opinion: 
Μέχρι μὲν οὖν πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ᾠόμην καὶ διά τὴν προαίρεσιν 
ταύτην καὶ διά τὴν ἄλλην ἀπραγμοσύνην ἐπιεικῶς ἔχειν πρὸς 
ἅπαντας τοὺς ἰδιώτας· ἤδη δ ̓ ὑπογυίου μοι τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς 
οὔσης, ἀντιδόσεως γενομένης περὶ τριηραρχίας καὶ περὶ ταύτης 
ἀγῶνος  ἔγνων καὶ τούτων τινὰς οὐχ οὕτω πρός με διακειμένους 
ὥσπερ ἤλπιζον... τοῦ γὰρ ἀντιδίκου περὶ μὲν ὧν ἡ κρίσις ἦν οὐδὲν 
λέγοντος δίκαιον... ἔγνωσαν ἐμὴν εἶναι τὴν λειτουργίαν. 
For I thought, until well past my prime, that because of this choice [to 
speak and write about topics of larger scope rather than private disputes 
(Antidosis 3)] I was tolerably well thought of by all individuals; but 
suddenly at the end of my life, when challenged to an exchange of 
property over a trierarchy and brought to court over this issue, I realized 
that some people were not so well disposed towards me as I had hoped… 
for even though my opponent said nothing just about the subject of the 
lawsuit… they imposed the liturgy on me.  (Antidosis 4-5) 
By means of the Antidosis speech Isocrates will now correct his error and take up the task 
of vindicating himself in the public eye (Antidosis 5-7).405  He thus imagines himself 
coming face to face with the problems created by his withdrawal from normative polis 
politics.  The Antidosis speech is his response to the demos’ fear that the philosopher 
espouses apathy.406  In the speech, Isocrates acts on the same advice that he would latter 
give to Philip: not to ignore public opinion but to counter it (Philip 78-80).407  Isocrates’                                                         
405 See Ober, Political Dissent, 256-260, on the Antidosis as a discourse critical of the polis yet addressed to 
an imaginary mass audience.   
406 It is therefore particularly jarring that the Antidosis was a written speech whose audience would have 
been drawn from the elite rather than the common individuals judging real court trials.  See Haskins, 
“Rhetoric between Orality and Literacy,” on Isocrates’ use of the written medium to engage with, rather 
than reject, popular political discourse.   
407 Isocrates claims that the same pitfall – namely, rejecting the importance of public opinion – brought 
about Timotheus’ exile (Antidosis 129-39).  As Isocrates’ protégé, the parallels between Timotheus and 
Philip are obvious.   
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exhortation to Philip in Philip 78-80, as an echo of his portrait of himself in the Antidosis, 
brings their political identities together.  Both Isocrates and Philip strive to create similar 
relationships between themselves and the Hellenes: relationships built on mutual trust 
and εὔνοια and fostered in turn by the political wisdom of the king/philosopher.   
Conclusion 
 Isocrates lived long enough to see Philip defeat Theban and Athenian resistance at 
Chaeronea.  He took the opportunity to write the king a letter of congratulations, 
exhorting him once again, now that he had the backing of Greece, to set out as quickly as 
possible on a Persian campaign.408  He relates the questions which he was asked about his 
own role in Philip’s policy:  
Καὶ πολλοὶ μυνθάνονται παρ ̓ ἐμοῦ πότερον ἐγώ σοι παρῄνεσα 
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν στρατείαν τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἢ σοῦ 
διανοηθέντος συνεῖπον· ἐγὼ δ ̓ οὐκ εἰδέναι μέν φημι τὸ σαφές, οὐ 
γὰρ συγγεγενῆσθαί σοι πρότερον, πρότερον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ ̓ οιἴεσθαι 
σὲ μὲν ἐγνωκέναι περὶ τούτων, ἐμὲ δὲ συνειρηκέναι ταῖς σαῖς 
ἐπιθυμίαις. Μany ask of me whether I advised you to go on this expedition against the 
barbarians or whether I confirmed an idea you had already formed; I said 
that I did not rightly know, for previously I had not known you, but that I 
thought you had formed an opinion about these matters and that I had 
spoken in line with your desires. (Epistle 3.3)       
Isocrates remains vague on assigning responsibility for the idea of a panhellenic 
expedition against Persia; he does not definitively say whether it was his own or Philip’s 
plan.  In doing so he once again highlights the affinity between his philosophy and 
Philip’s policy, an argument central to the Philip, without being too specific about the 
nature of their relationship.  No matter whether Isocrates or Philip had had the idea first,                                                         
408 Isocrates seems to take it for granted that that is Philip’s intention (Epistle 3.3).  Arguments against the 
authenticity of the letter have been generally unconvincing: see Marzi, “Isocrate e Filippo II di 
Macedonia;” also Ian Worthington, “Two Letters of Isocrates and Ring Composition,” Electronic 
Antiquities 1 (1993). 
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Isocratean advice would help Philip realize desires that he had already formed.  While 
Isocrates and Philip would have their own roles to play in bringing about panhellenic 
peace and the destruction of Persia, both were joined in their outlook on the world and 
their pursuit of a common political philosophy.  If nothing else, Epistle 3 makes clear that 
Philip’s recent activity in Greece had not shaken Isocrates’ perception of the king’s 
motives and abilities.     
 Isocrates portrayed himself and Philip as unique exponents of panhellenic peace 
and the war against the barbarian.  Moreover, both were connected by their peculiar 
position between belonging to the Athenian/Hellenic community and being, at the same 
time, apart from it - Philip because of his role as king of Macedonia, and Isocrates 
because of his ἀπραγμοσύνη.  Just as Isocrates had rejected an active role in Athenian 
politics, so Philip was to refuse any position of formal power over the Greek poleis; his 
rule was to be based on the ὁμόνοια that would arise once everyone acknowledged his 
primacy and his right to lead.   Isocrates’ presentation of Philip reflects his own ἦθος.  
 The parallels I have traced between Philip and Isocrates recast Philip as an elite 
Hellene who is interested in philosophy.  The king is also politically disengaged from the 
Greek world, though at the same time striving for the betterment of Greece.  In presenting 
Philip as a philosopher king striving after Isocratean ideals, Isocrates reconstructs Philip 
in terms that would be sympathetic to elite Hellenes and Macedonians steeped in Hellenic 
culture alike.  More than a discourse between a single philosopher and a king, the speech 
creates the basis for an exchange between the greater elite Hellenic world and elite 
Macedonia.  At the same time, the speech would have presumably appealed to Philip 
himself as a favorable rearticulation of his identity and his policy.  Thus the Philip, in 
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crafting the eponymous king as an elite Hellene, itself fosters that understanding and 
εὔνοια between Philip and Greece which it advocates.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Philip’s ἦθος stood at the center of a contest of values that tested the Hellenic and 
democratic paradigms on which Athenian identity was based.  For Philip was not an 
individual who could be readily classified: a king from the non-Greek world, he beat 
Greeks at their own military and political game and single-handedly changed the face of 
the known world.  Philip’s success demanded ethopoieic explanation even as it defied the 
ready-made typologies of the hubristic barbarian and incompetent monarch.  A 
consciousness of this crisis did not, of course, develop all at once; indeed, understandings 
such as that of Aeschines, who sought to recast Philip in familiar, and thus less 
threatening, terms, actively worked against it even well into Philip’s reign.  It is in 
Demosthenes’ rhetoric, a body of speeches spanning roughly twenty years, where the 
development of the discourse concerning Philip’s ἦθος becomes most clear.  It was not 
hard for Demosthenes, at the beginning of Philip’s reign, to portray him as a typical 
barbarian king with a greedy streak whose very nature would assuredly lead him to 
failure.  Indeed, much of Demosthenes’ early rhetoric is readily understandable in terms 
of older 5th century paradigms being put to use for a new, late 4th century problem.  After 
346 BCE, however, and the failure of the Peace of Philocrates, Demosthenes’ rhetoric 
changes.  In the aftermath of Chaeronea, Philip emerges as a being that defies all 
boundaries and, in doing so, compels the orator himself to do the same.  Philip’s success 
changed the way Athenians viewed themselves and their relations with the outside world.   
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For inasmuch as redefining the Other means redefining the Self (and visa versa), 
redefinitions of Philip affected, and were affected by, the speaker’s self-identification.  
Thus Aeschines’ Philip was a speaker and a politician, much like any other politician, 
participating in an equal contest of words with the Athenian ambassadors; Demosthenes, 
again, came to define Philip as a quasi-supernatural force whose undemocratic methods 
of success rationalized, and even demanded, Demosthenes’ assumption of an equally 
strong position of leadership in Athens.  So too, Isocrates saw in Philip a “new Athens”, 
whose political success mirrored in the realm of policy what Isocrates had achieved in the 
realm of philosophy.  At the same time, each of these articulations of Philip’s ἦθος 
renegotiated the character of the Athenians themselves as they clung to an older, more 
imposing image of Athens even as their present power was being eroded away. 
While the rearticulation of Philip’s identity by the orators was Athenocentric in 
nature – that is, it was produced by and for Athenians, and dealt with Athenian paradigms 
- it was also a piece of a much larger dialogue between the Hellenic and Macedonian 
worlds centered, again, around Philip’s changing role as monarch, tagos, Amphictyonic 
member, and finally guarantor of the panhellenic League of Corinth.  Viewed from a 
Macedonian perspective, the unprecedented expansion of Argead power was only the 
latest in a centuries-long dialogue between Macedonian, Greek, and Near Eastern forces.  
The Argeads had always sought legitimation for their rule from outside sources, be they 
Illyrian, Persian, or Greek; in this respect Philip’s acquisition of roles for himself that 
were not properly Macedonian conformed to the strategy of his predecessors.   
In approaching the way a multiplicity of sources handled a particular theme – that 
is, Philip’s ἦθος – I have sought to recapture the larger political framework within which 
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our extant speeches stood.  As different as the constructions of Philip’s ἦθος by 
Aeschines, Demosthenes, and Isocrates are, they operate on the basis of shared Hellenic, 
Athenian, and democratic frameworks and from within the same immediate political 
discourse.  The responsion between Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Hyperides in particular 
gives a sense of how frames of communication were continuously developed in the 
public arena; at the same time, the parallels between Demosthenes’ and Isocrates rhetoric 
– and, for that matter, between Demosthenes and Platonic philosophy as well - point to 
the interaction between elite and democratic discourse.  Each definition of Philip’s ἦθος 
stands at the center of a complex of socially conventional typologies, individual 
predilections, and ways in which past discourse itself framed current articulations of a 
given issue.     
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